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Abstract
The thesis examines the construction of official statistics using the qualitative case study
of the UK Office for National Statistics' 'Measuring National Well-being' programme.
Its  major  original  contribution  is  to  critically  engage  with  the  making  of  official
statistics, theorising their construction as a social process. This provides novel ways of
explaining the form and content of official statistics. It also furthers debates on 'well-
being' through an examination of the concept's theoretical and institutional history.
The research argues that official statistic-making is an activity conducted by actors with
agency. This agency is  not taken into account by existing accounts of the nature of
official statistics, which are  more abstract and which do not engage with the statistic-
making process.  It is argued that attention to the social processes of official statistic-
making make a fuller understanding of the form and content of statistics possible.
This argument is supported by an examination of the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme.  The institutional  and theoretical  context  for  this  programme presents  a
number of challenges to existing accounts, highlighting the need for agential  action.
This context is explored through semi-structured interviews with those involved in the
creation of  the programme,  triangulated against  secondary material  such as  meeting
minutes produced by the Office for National Statistics and published statistical outputs.
In the specific case of the 'Measuring National Well-being'  programme, the research
finds a high degree of autonomy for those constructing the programme. This freedom
was used to position the programme within wider European and international statistical
contexts, rather than domestic political ones. Despite being a programme in a new area
of social research, the final content of the programme fitted within established ways of
thinking  partly  as  a  result  of  path  dependency  created  by  the  statisticians'  pre-
established ways of working.
More generally, it is argued that approaching the construction of official statistics as a
social  process  helps  explain  the  form  and  content  of  the  statistic.  The  research
demonstrates  that  it  is  possible  to  trace  linkages  between  the  features  of  the  final
statistic  and  social  interactions  which  gave  rise  to  them.  It  is  argued  that  this  is
applicable beyond the case study used and beyond statistic-making in the UK.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Problematic, Context and Motivation for the Study
1.1. Introduction
Official statistics, economic and social, are ubiquitous in everyday life, playing a central
role  in  policy-making,  media  discourses  and in  shaping popular  conceptions  of  the
world  (Dorling  and Simpson 1999a;  Holt  2008;  Matheson 2010;  National  Statistics
2002;  Office for National  Statistics 2010a, 2013e).  They act as 'evidence',  objective
statements  to  inform policy  decisions  and  to  assess  the  quality  of  those  decisions
(Bumstead and Alldritt  2011; Economic Secretary to the Treasury 1999; Keat 1979;
Performance and Innovation Unit 2000b; Porter 1995; Prime Minister and Minister for
the Cabinet Office 1999). As such, they are much contested, with the appropriateness or
robustness  of  a  particular  statistic  within  a  particular  debate  routinely  challenged
(Dorling and Simpson 1999a;  Levitas and Guy 1996).  However,  while  questions  of
technical or definitional accuracy, or of applicability, are continually raised with respect
to  given  statistics,  the  practice  of  statistic-making  and  the  status  of  statistics  as
'evidence' are less controversial. For example, while unemployment figures have been
the subject of much historical controversy, those challenging them seldom suggest that
unemployment statistics should be abolished completely, instead offering suggestions of
adjustments  (Dean  1995;  International  Labour  Organization  2013;  Levitas  1996a;
Walters 1994). This is true more generally; where there is a challenge to an official
statistic, it often comes in the form of another statistic, and the solution is a revised or
alternative statistic, one piece of evidence being replaced by another (Cameron 2010;
Working Party on the Measurement of Unemployment in the UK 1995). The practice of
official statistic-making itself is rarely challenged; official statistics as a technology of
the  state  are  naturalised,  their  ontological,  epistemological  and  ethical  aspects
unquestioned (Carmargo 2009).
Official statistic-making is not merely ubiquitous, but also has the potential to impact
the  world  it  records.  Official  statistics  have  discursive  power;  they  both  set  the
definition of a phenomenon and define it as a phenomenon worth paying attention to
(Levitas  and  Guy  1996;  Porter  1995;  Starr  1987).  Supporting  this  second  point,
Townsend (1996)  has  argued  that  successive  governments  rejected  calls  to  produce
poverty statistics, as these would offer official sanction to what was formerly an issue
framed by pressure groups and academics;  by not  producing statistics,  governments
could deny there was a problem to be studied. This dual power of definition and framing
is  important  because,  unlike  the  physical  world  where,  quantum  states  aside,
observation does not change the phenomenon observed, the existence of representations
of the social world can lead directly to changes in that world. The relation of official
statistics to the external world is two-way: the statistic observes the external world, but
also makes it amenable to action and establishes incentives and disincentives for it to
match the definition of the statistic (Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 1991; Rosenthal and
Weiss 1966). This is particularly the case where statistics are used as the basis of public
policy; definitions imposed by the statistic become tied to sanctions or entitlements for
the people or things they are imposed on.
Their  role  in  defining  and  potentially  shaping  the  social  world,  together  with  their
ubiquity,  gives  official  statistics  a  power and importance  within everyday life.  That
power and importance establishes official  statistics  as  phenomena which need to  be
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understood as part of wider debates around the relations between state and civil society.
Such an understanding cannot  be reached without a corresponding understanding of
official  statistic-making,  the  process  by which  the  form and  content  of  the  official
statistic is arrived at. It will be argued that while there exist several theories of the role
that official statistics play within society, there is a gap around the understanding of the
statistic-making process. Very little research has addressed the question of how official
statistics are made, of how their influential definitions are arrived at. This is a gap which
the present research seeks to address.
1.2. Defining official statistic-making as a social practice
For the purposes of this research, official statistics are defined as: counts or measures,
and derivative calculations of these, compiled by, or on the behalf of, a state actor for
the instrumental purpose of monitoring economic or social activity. This definition is
descriptive rather than theoretical; it attempts to encompass outputs of the state which
would conventionally be considered 'official statistics', not to establish and police some
theoretical boundary against which such outputs might be assessed. Such a definition
encompasses outputs ranging from administrative data collected by local government, to
national projects which establish sociological categories, such as the Indices of Multiple
Deprivation.
Several descriptive additions can be made to this working definition. One is that an
official  statistic  is  a  made  object,  created  by  professional  actors  working  within
institutions  or  branches  of  institutions  specialised  for  the  creation  of  statistics  (see
National Statistics 2000). Officially, these actors are departments of the state: in the UK
legislation,  the  official  statistic  is  defined only in  terms  of  the  corporate  body that
creates it, rendering the official statistic an interaction between impersonal entities: the
bodies desiring, creating, and using it (Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007). As
an instrumental monitoring device, the official statistic is designed for a purpose, under
given  circumstances  and  conditions  of  possibility,  and  enacted  under  such
circumstances and conditions (such as budgetary constraints, e.g., Matheson 2010, p.2).
As an implication of this  definition,  the official  statistic  is  historically and spatially
contingent;  that  is,  the  statistic  and  its  existence  are  not  fully  determined  by  the
statistic's content. In other places and times the statistic may not exist, or may take a
different form.
The present  research will  explore  a  further  claim:  that  official  statistics  are  not  the
product of impersonal corporate state actors, but of individual actors within them. This
shifts  the  focus  of  the  definition;  rather  than  being  a  product  of  systems  of  state
interaction,  the  official  statistic  is  a  social  product,  arising  from the  interactions  of
individuals working within the state. This claim builds on the work of Jones (e.g., 2007)
and, to a lesser extent, Peck (e.g.,  2001) and Rhodes (e.g.,  1992) that the state is a
fundamentally 'peopled' entity. While individuals within state bodies are subject to the
structures of those bodies, this work argues that they cannot be reduced to them; they
are not neutral intermediaries between the institutions they are embedded in and the
outputs  they  produce.  Rather,  they  operate  with  agency,  embodying  a  variety  of
identities, subjectivities, aims and beliefs. These, and the actions which flow from them,
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are shaped by a  range of interests,  motivations  and institutional  positions.  They are
capable of acquiescing to, resisting and shaping the institutions and rules they operate
under. This does not do away with structures – state actors are still subject to the rules
and institutions they are embedded within – but does allow that such structures are
flexible, and so need to be understood in relation to the actors who inhabit them (Mann
2003).
This reading of agency and structures draws on some of the insights of Giddens' work
(especially Giddens 1984), without being a full endorsement of structuration theory. In
particular,  it  utilises his characterisation of individuals as knowledgeable,  sometimes
acting reflexively but often acting on the basis of practical consciousness. While non-
reflexive activity will normally serve to reproduce existing social systems, agents have
the ability to  alter  them through deliberate  acts.  However,  the reading departs  from
structuration theory in allowing a greater role for structures as things which confront
agents.  As  Archer  (1982;  see  also  King  2010  and  O’Boyle  2013) shows,  Giddens'
account renders structure inert as it exists only through the instantiation of individuals.
This  underplays  the  role  of  structural  constraint  (and  enablement),  and  offers  no
guidance on how or under what conditions agents can act to change structures. Instead,
structures are conceived of here as social relations, permitting differential degrees of
freedom to agents in their actions (Burkitt 2015). In allowing for both knowledgeable
actors and structures which pre-date them which they must negotiate, this reading of
agency is in line with the structural-relational reading of Jessop (2001, 2008; Jessop,
Brenner and Jones 2008; see also Biebricher 2013; Gill 2009, 2010; Jones 2007; Kelly
1999) 
These agents operate within a peopled state (see particularly Jones 2007; also Rhodes
2005). Following Mitchell (1991), 'the state' here is not conceptualised as a monolithic
entity  which  stands  outside  of  and  separate  from  'civil  society'  (for  an  analogous
argument  from the  perspective  of  'civil  society',  see  Latour  2005).  Rather,  what  is
conventionally read as 'the state' is a “structural effect” (Mitchell 1991, p.94), produced
and reproduced through the actions of agents, not the least of which is the production of
official statistics. This is the counterpoint to the theory of agency sketched above; the
state exists in the social relations of institutions, regulations and technologies in which
agents  operate.  Such  structures  are  flexible,  but  not  completely  so.  They  are  also
permeable,  with  agents  from outside  formal  structures  conventionally thought  of  as
being part of 'the state' being able to gain access and act to produce state effects; and
with  agents  within  such  'state  institutions'  also  carrying  with  them  identities  from
outside  (such  as  professional  or  personal  identities)  (Jones  2012).  Consonant  with
Painter's  (Painter  2006) account  of  the  state  as  an  imaginary,  'the  state'  acts  as  a
motivation  for  beliefs  and  actions  of  agents  both  within  and  without  its  formal
structures,  and these  beliefs  and actions  in  part  construct  it  (Mitchell  1988;  Wilson
2001). 'The state',  on this reading, goes beyond the formal structures of government
institutions  and  outputs,  it  embraces  Statistical  Actors  who  may  act  within  those
structures temporarily, as well as those (and members of the Statistical Audience) who
never join such structures but who invest them with authority. 'The state' here is peopled
in the dual sense that its formal structures are filled with agents who can shape those
structures; and that those structures themselves are social relations, ongoing interactions
between people which are concrete  but  impermanent  (Burkitt  2015;  see also Jessop
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2001, 2008; Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008).
This definition of official statistics as the work of interacting agents within a peopled
state has a major implication for the understanding of them: if actors are capable of
influencing outputs through their negotiation of structures, then those outputs are partly
dependent  on the actions of those actors.  This contingency is  obscured both by the
naturalisation of official statistics discussed above, and by understandings of statistics as
the product of undefined corporate bodies. Rather than being abstractions produced by
abstractions, official statistics understood in this way become concrete manifestations of
social processes.
Such a high-level description raises a large number of questions about the nature of the
actors involved, of their agency, of their context, and of the decisions that they make.
These are empirical questions. A priori, as an initial conjectural framework to structure
investigation,  an  act  of  official  statistic-making  would  seem to  require  at  least  the
following  stages:  the  identification  of  a  phenomenon  to  be  counted,  the  normative
decision that this phenomenon should be counted, the definition of what constitutes an
occurrence  of  that  phenomenon,  repeated  application  of  that  definition  in  an act  of
counting or measuring, the collation of these counts according to some accepted method
into  a  statistical  instance,  the  publication  of  this  instance  for  an  audience,  the
interpretation by this audience according to the intentions of the statistic's designers or
their own. Each one of these stages is subject to the agential analysis above; actors are
required to make decisions, but will do so within the limits set by their existing context.
There are multiple actors involved in such a process, and three classes may usefully be
distinguished. The Commissioning Actor is that which proposes the statistic, identifying
the phenomenon to be counted and determining that it should be counted. They may
also  define  what  constitutes  an  instance  of  the  phenomenon.  The  Statistical  Actor
designs and enacts the statistic. This can involve defining the phenomenon, but will
include repeated application of a definition, collating these counts and publishing them
as a statistical output. The Statistical Audience receives, interprets and uses that output.
As these names imply, the Statistical Audience is usually, but not necessarily, passive in
the process, receiving statistics but having little input into their creation. In contrast, the
Commissioning  and  Statistical  Actors  act,  using  agency  to  negotiate  institutional
structures and create a statistic where there was no statistic originally. This conjectural
framework is presented as figure 1.1..
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Figure 1.1. Classes of statistical actor and their activities
The boundaries between these classes of actor and their roles are blurry and complex.
Commissioning Actors,  for instance,  will  often be part  of the Statistical  Audience –
commissioning the official statistic for their own use – and may also act as Statistical
Actors – advising on the composition of the statistic. Similarly, the Statistical Actor,
often a  professional  and specialised body,  stands  in  particular  socio-spatial  relations
with other statistical and non-statistical agents such as Commissioning Actors in other
parts of the state and members of the Statistical Audience as users of statistics. They
may  draw  in  these  groups  as  temporary  Statistical  Actors  to  shape  their  work,  or
incorporate feedback from non-statistical agents in later iterations of a statistic. This
creates  a  complex  picture  of  individuals  with  multiple  roles  and  positionalities,
interacting with each other to produce the statistic. The relative power of actors, and
with it their ability to shape the statistic according to their own aims, will impact on the
final form and content of the statistic.
With  multiple  classes  of  actor  comes  the  possibility  of  disagreement  over  the
appropriate  form  and  content  of  the  official  statistic.  The  classes  of  actor  are
heterogeneous within themselves, containing multiple individual actors in multiple roles
(Acker 1989). This extends the possibility of disagreement, allowing it to occur within
as well as between classes as actors and classes relate to and interact with each other in
complex ways.  The Statistical  Actor,  for example,  may involve international  policy-
making  bodies  setting  standards  for  statistical  composition;  teams  of  statistical
designers, taking advice from academic institutions or colleagues in other institutions;
actors  responsible  for  conducting  data  collection  formally attached  to  the  statistical
body,  collecting  as  part  of  other  duties  (for  instance  within  local  government),  or
employed by a third party in the private sector; various actors involved in validation or
quality-checking, both in terms of data collected and of methodology; actors involved in
presentation, publication and dissemination. There is again no guarantee of agreement
between these various individual actors; the desires of designers may not mesh with the
standards set by international best-practice, for example.
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This  initial  conjectural  framework,  then,  while  based  on  a  very  simple  categorical
division of actors and their activities, reflects an interactive process which is not at all
simple. It highlights the importance of the relationships between actors, and of their
agency  within  their  categorical  structures.  The  output  of  such  a  model  is  highly
indeterminate.  Commissioning  Actors,  for  example,  cannot  request  a  statistic  and
guarantee that the final product fully will capture their intention. Indeed, the framework
suggests that 'the intention' of Commissioning Actors is, itself, a complex social product
which is open to multiple interpretations even amongst members of the Commissioning
Actor.  Similarly,  from the other end of the process, the outcome as received by the
Statistical  Audience  is  a  contingent  product,  reflecting  any number  of  debates  and
compromises between and within Statistical Actors.
A particular  aspect  of  this  contingency  is  geographical,  as  social  and  institutional
contexts  are  necessarily  spatial  (Elden  2004;  Lefebvre  1991,  2003,  2009).  Official
Statistical Actors are embedded within particular institutional contexts:  their powers,
remit, budgets and responsibilities are determined by their specific institutional settings.
They are called on to count along pre-determined national and sub-national boundaries
by Commissioning Actors at levels from local to supranational, which they must do
within local limitations of power and resources (Mann 2003). Even when following pre-
established non-local methodology, the end product of the statistic-making process will
be  the  result  of  local  adaptations  or  the  adaptation  of  local  conditions  to  fulfil  the
requirements of the statistic (see, for similar arguments relating to other branches of the
state, Gill 2009, 2010; Jones 2007). Statistical Actors stand in particular socio-spatial
relations to the Commissioning Actors and Statistical Audience. The statistic cannot be
separated  from its  institutional  context,  and  this  context  must  be  understood  if  the
statistic is to be.
The focus on social processes, then, has wide-reaching implications. These are generally
under-examined in existing accounts of statistic-making. While accounts of particular
statistics  exist,  produced  both  by Statistical  Actors  and  actors  within  the  Statistical
Audience, these do not usually reflect the full complexity of the statistic-making process
as posited above. Normally written after the process of statistic-making, and so after
any  debate,  resistance  and  compromise  has  occurred,  these  present  post  hoc
justifications  of  decisions  already  made,  often  referring  to  external  standards  or
requirements  which,  themselves,  go  unjustified  (see,  for  example,  Beaumont  2011,
2012;  Jones  and Fender  2011).  After  the  fact,  the  teleology of  the  statistic  appears
inevitable,  a  progression  from  conception  through  technical  debates  to  the  final
statistical output without reference to the aims, desires or beliefs of actors or classes of
actor.
If  the  conjectural  framework above is  taken as  a  starting  point,  then such accounts
appear  unconvincingly  incomplete  explanations  the  official  statistic.  Denying  this
appearance  of  inevitability,  and  suggesting  instead  that  statistic-making  is  a  social
process, raises the question of how the interactions of the specific agents involved in its
creation and the specific institutional context of a statistic have impacted on its final
form and content. This research aims to outline the official statistic-making process and
through this to deepen understanding of official statistics as its outputs. What, exactly, is
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being done and by whom when official statistics are made? Why are they doing it? How
do these aims and actions intersect in the production of the statistic? The answers will
be different for each official statistic produced, but by investigating specific institutional
contexts, which will be subject to general conditions of possibility and constraint, broad
conclusions may be drawn.
1.3. The 'Measuring National Well-being' programme as a case-study of statistic 
creation
The  conjectural  model  of  statistical  creation  above  involves  numerous  a  priori
assumptions which can only be checked with reference to actually existing statistics.
Similarly, the questions which arise from a consideration of the statistic-making process
cannot be resolved through reference to theory alone.
One approach would be to consult existing accounts of particular statistics or systems of
statistics  such as  National  Accounts  (see,  for  example,  Goldsmith  1950 or  Kuznets
1938). However, as argued above, such accounts tend to pay very little, if any, attention
the activity of statistic-making. It may be possible to see evidence in these of a small
number of technical disagreements or compromises between actors, but the day-to-day
human solutions, institutional or methodological limitations or practical simplifications
which determine the form and content of the final statistic are omitted.  While  such
accounts  might  be  supplemented  with  personal  testimony  about  the  process  by
individuals involved, in the case of long-established statistics this may not be possible.
The 'Measuring National  Well-being'  programme offers an opportunity to make this
supplementation.  On  25  November  2010,  David  Cameron  became  only  the  second
sitting Prime Minister to launch a programme of statistical research by the Office for
National Statistics.1 Building on a famous speech by Robert Kennedy, he noted that the
traditional measure of national progress, GDP, counted 'something of an immigration
free-for-all', 'something of a cheap booze free-for-all', and 'something of an irresponsible
media  and  marketing  free-for-all',  which  contributed  to  growth  but  which  did  not
'improve lives' (Cameron 2010, np.).2 The solution was a new statistical programme, not
tied to economic measures, to address the question of 'quality of life'; the 'Measuring
National Well-being'  (MNW) programme. Developed over several years, this saw its
first release in 2013 (Office for National Statistics 2013e, f). The programme eventually
encompassed  41  headline  measures  reported  twice  annually,  with  a  range  of  sub-
measures reported as part of less frequent 'domain' reports (see Appendix C for a list of
measures, and Chapter Three, Allin and Hand 2014 and Scott 2012 for a fuller account
of the programme).
At the point  at  which the present  research commenced,  the programme was still  in
development (see, for example, Government Statistical Service 2013); while there had
been numerous statistical releases since the project was launched in 2010, it was still
1 The first was Wilson, launching the publication Social Trends in 1970 (Nissel 1970; Moser 2000).
2 Kennedy had mentioned air pollution, the 'chaotic sprawl' which destroyed the natural environment, 
napalm and the materiel for combatting race riots (Kennedy 1968). In comparing the two lists, it is 
hard not to be reminded of the opening lines of Marx 1852. 
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open to adjustment in light of feedback from Commissioning Actors or the Statistical
Audience.  The currency of the project meant that Statistical  Actors,  both within the
ONS  and  their  advisory  bodies,  were  still  accessible,  which  allowed  them  to  be
questioned on the nature of their work. It also meant that there were on-going decision-
making  processes  which  could  be  opened  to  scrutiny.  Unlike  established  statistical
series,  where  the  process  of  statistic-making  has  been  routinised  and  the  original
determinants  of  the  statistic  lost,  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme
permits  an  examination  of  official  statistic-making  as  a  living  social  practice.  Also
unlike  established  series,  the  programme  is  being  developed  in  an  era  of  'open
government',  meaning  that  minutes  of  advisory  committees,  responses  to  public
consultations, and other evidence of internal discussions should be freely available for
scrutiny.
The  MNW  programme  has  some  interesting  features  as  an  official  statistical
programme. It owes its origin to criticisms of an existing set of official statistics, GDP
(see  Cameron  2010  as  indicated  above;  also  Stiglitz,  Sen  and  Fitoussi  2009),  so
exemplifies the pattern of statistical solution to an existing statistical problem discussed
in the opening section. At the same time, it seeks to record a phenomenon, 'well-being',
the definition of which is disputed within the theoretical and empirical literature (see,
for a discussion, Scott 2012 and, for an example, Tomlinson and Kelly 2013).3 As an
official programme, the statistic intervenes in this debate, setting the terms on which
'well-being'  will  be  used  within  wider  state  discourse.  The  grounds  on  which  this
intervention  is  made  thus  has  wider  ramifications,  outside  of  official  statistics  and
within broader discussions around social policy.
Doubts cast on the programme by the Statistical Audience (see, for example, Office for
National Statistics 2012a), offer further reasons for interest. Statistical Actors have had
extensive  engagement  with  members  of  the  Statistical  Audience  within  the  general
public,  academia  and  government,  incorporating  them into  the  design  process.  The
extent to which these Audience members were included as Statistical Actors is unusual
in  official  statistic-making practice,  and will  present  additional  complexities  for  the
social production process. That it has occurred at all is interesting, suggesting either a
shift in practice demanded by shifting social norms and expectations of public bodies, or
a  sense on the part  of Statistical  Actors within the ONS of a  peculiar sensitivity in
relation to the MNW programme. It is worth noting that this incorporates the Statistical
Audience earlier than suggested in figure 1.1., an example of the blurred lines between
Statistical Actors and Statistical Audience. How typical this is, and what influence it had
on the outcome of the programme, are open empirical questions. 
As a final point of interest, the programme arises at an interesting social juncture for the
UK. At the time of the project's commencement, devolved governance on the part of the
constituent  nations  of  the  UK  was  well  established,  bringing  with  it  increased
fragmentation and specialisation within government and public policy. The Office for
National Statistics was complemented by the statistical wings of the devolved Scottish
Government and Northern Irish Administration, while still acting on behalf of the Welsh
Devolved Administration and the remaining parts of the UK through its role as overall
3 It is also disputed in non-academic literatures; see, for example, de Saint-Exupery  (1971) or Dickens 
(2003).
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UK executive statistical body. The Scottish Administration, rather than replicating the
ONS  programme,  devised  one  of  their  own  which  was  very  different  ('Scotland
Performs';  see  Scottish  Government  2011).  How  these  local  political  geographies
impacted on the programme will have implications for the practice of official statistic-
making in general.
The  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme,  then,  offers  the  potential  to
investigate  statistic-making  as  a  social  practice,  and  has  a  number  of  particular
theoretical and institutional features which will offer insight into that practice. Using the
conjectural framework above as a starting point, this project will examine the MNW
programme to explore  the  social  practice of  official  statistic-making within  the  UK
institutional context.
1.4. Outline of the thesis
On the argument of this chapter, the actual activity of official statistic-making cannot be
ignored  if  a  full  understanding of  official  statistics  is  to  be  reached.  Chapter Two
explores existing literature on official  statistics. It  will  argue that this falls into two
broad categories: critical readings, largely Foucauldian and Marxian in outlook, which
suggest that official statistics are tools of the state used for purposes of social control;
and native accounts, predominantly from Statistical Actors, suggesting that statistics are
neutral objective representations of the external world. It will be argued that both these
approaches underplay the act of official statistic-making; in as far as it is represented at
all, it is treated as occurring within a black box and uncontested. By the arguments of
the present chapter, such readings are at best incomplete and at worst contribute to the
naturalisation process by reducing the published statistic to the inevitable outcome of a
smooth  process.  Chapter  Two  will  highlight  the  gaps  created  by  such  approaches,
particularly  around  the  actions  and  intentions  of  the  multiple  Statistical  Actors  and
suggest that the literature around social constructionism offers ways of understanding
these gaps. Building from this examination, it will propose a key research question to be
answered:
Does an examination of the social process of official statistic-making add to
the understanding of official statistics' form and content?
This  over-arching  question  will  then  be  broken  down  into  four  sub-questions  for
examination as the research proceeds:
(1) How can the official statistic-making process be understood as a social 
process?
(2) What are the components (institutions, theories, individuals, 
technologies, &c.) of that process?
(3) How do these components interact to produce the official statistic?
(4) What are the implications of this for an understanding of the official 
statistic?
Chapter Three will define an epistemology which derives from the claims made in the
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present chapter about the essentially social nature of official statistic-making. From this
it  will  be argued that  the most  appropriate  research methodology for  answering the
questions set out in Chapter Two is one based around direct engagement with Statistical
Actors  through  interviews  and  the  study  of  their  formal  and  semi-formal  written
outputs. From this, a research methodology will be outlined, built around and justifying
the choice of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme as a case study. A key
feature of this methodology is its focus on the institutional and theoretical contexts of
the statistical programme and, separately, its focus on the negotiation of these contexts
by Statistical Actors. This division allows the research to avoid collapsing into a fully
agential or fully structural viewpoint, recognising the interplay between Actors and their
contexts  (see,  for  similar  arguments,  Jones  2007,  Ch.1).  By  defining  a  research
methodology and case  study,  this  chapter  represents  a  contribution  to  the  literature
around  official  statistics  by  allowing  the  explication  of  the  official  statistic-making
process. It is unusual for new statistics to be created, so the process of their creation has
previously not been observed and its details are currently unknown.
Chapters  Four  to  Seven  will  follow this  methodology through.  Chapter  Four will
examine the institutional structure of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme,
looking at the history of the Office for National Statistics and of the policy-making
structures  of  the  UK  state  within  which  it  sits,  up  to  2010  when  the  statistical
programme  was  launched.  This  examination  will  draw  out  themes  of  institutional
constraint and opportunity which the Statistical Actors responsible for the programme
will need to navigate in the process of constructing the statistic.
This  chapter  makes  contributions  to  the  literatures  around  the  Office  for  National
Statistics and policy-making structures in the UK. In the case of the former, it extends
previous accounts of the organisation, taking account of organisational and legislative
changes over the last twenty years. In the case of the latter, it brings together accounts
from multiple disciplines, offering a fuller picture of policy-making than any of them
offer alone.
Chapter  Five will  follow the  same  model  as  Chapter  Four,  but  will  focus  on  the
theoretical  structure  of  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme.  This
encompasses both the multi-disciplinary literature around 'well-being' and historical and
recent attempts to quantify well-being within statistical programmes. It will note the
complexity of 'well-being'  as a  topic  for quantification and the historical difficulties
around it, underlining the challenges Statistical Actors face in operationalising it.
This chapter makes contributions to the literature around well-being, extending the work
of others such as Scott (2012). It surveys accounts from several disciplines to produce a
fuller account than is usually found. It contributes to the literature around well-being
measurement,  extending  and  modifying  the  work  of  authors  such  as  Bache  (2013;
Bache and Reardon 2013).
Chapter Six will examine interviews with and writings by Statistical Actors to explore
how the institutional context of the programme was navigated. It will argue that the
programme was more strongly influenced by international actors than domestic policy-
making concerns. Aspects of the programme are explained in terms of the difficulty
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Statistical  Actors  had  in  co-ordinating  these  two  competing  sets  of  concerns;
particularly, this is shown to explain the failure of the programme to serve the needs of
domestic  policy  actors.  It  will  argue  that  other  features  of  the  programme  were
influenced by budget limitations and the restriction on possibilities that this created. It
will also argue for the importance of public understanding as an aim which altered the
design of the programme.
Chapter  Seven will  follow  the  model  of  Chapter  Six,  but  explore  how Statistical
Actors,  both  part  of  the  Office  of  National  Statistics  and  drawn from a  variety  of
academic  disciplines,  negotiated  the  theoretical  complexities  of  'well-being'.  It  will
argue for a certain degree of path-determinacy, with conceptions of well-being favoured
by economists being privileged in discussions. This led to the programme favouring
mechanical conceptions of well-being over more holistic ones. Such debates became
embodied  in  individuals,  highlighting  the  personal  and  agential  nature  of  official
statistic-making.  Such  embodied  responses  led  to  a  variety  of  features  of  the
programme. A further key finding is that measures were included for practical reasons,
with theoretical discussions about their appropriateness avoided.
Chapter Eight will draw this research together, addressing the questions outlined in
Chapter Two (see above). It will argue that the official statistic-making process can be
understood as a social process and that this does aid the understanding of the form and
content  of official  statistics.  This  will  be illustrated with features  of the 'Measuring
National Well-being'  programme, such as its  inclusion of 'Human Capital'  as  a sub-
measure. In doing so, the chapter will suggest that the conjectural model outlined in
Section 1.2. stands as a good working model for the official statistic-making process,
and point to the ways in which the particularities of the 'Measuring National Well-being'
case study apply to official statistic-making more generally. The findings of the research
will  be compared with the literatures examined in Chapter Two, suggesting ways in
which the understanding of social processes can extend both critical and native accounts
of official statistics. This chapter will also note the limitations of the present research,
and  suggest  ways  in  which  future  research  may  overcome  these  and  build  on  its
findings.
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Chapter Two
How have official statistics previously been understood?
2.1. Introduction
The previous chapter argued that official statistics were created by agents and suggested
that the precise activities of those agents – their interactions with each other and the
world around them – was likely to be important in shaping the form and content of
those statistics. One implication which was drawn from this was that the intentions of
both those commissioning the statistic (the Commissioning Actors) and producing it (the
Statistical Actors) might not be fully realisable. That is, the circumstances of production
–  the  constraints  and  opportunities  offered  by  technology,  resources,  institutional
setting, the beliefs and capabilities of the Statistical Actors themselves, and so on –
made the output of the process contingent. Any given official statistic may well have
taken a different  form, or had a  different  content,  if  the actors  producing it,  or  the
circumstances in which it they produced it were different.
The present chapter examines existing literatures around official statistics in particular,
and  around  statistics  more  generally.  It  will  argue  that  existing  literatures  take  an
abstract  approach  to  official  statistics,  seeing  them as  natural  objects  within  larger
processes. In the case of critical readings of official statistics, such as those proffered by
Foucauldian  and Marxian  writers,  the  official  statistic  is  treated  as  a  technology of
control,  a  relatively  unproblematic  translation  of  an  intention  to  control  by  some
political actor or actors. In the case of more native accounts of official statistics, those
made  by  statistical  producers  themselves,  the  statistic  is  treated  as  a  more-or-less
accurate representation of the external world, a relatively unproblematic translation of
observations  into  manipulable  inscriptions.  This  chapter  will  argue  that  both  these
approaches are too abstract: while they offer potential explanations as to the existence
of particular statistics, they cannot explain why those statistics take the particular form
that they do. The examination of the process of official statistic-making represents a gap
in the literature and a gap in  the understanding of  the form and content  of  official
statistics.
The chapter will then draw on a social construction literature, both directly engaged
with statistics and more broadly, to develop the ontology sketched out in the conjectural
model  of  Chapter  One.  This  will  help  highlight  the  implications  of  understanding
official statistic-making as a social process, particularly the complexity and contingency
of the statistics themselves.  It  will  be argued that  attention to  the social  process by
which objects are made offers new ways of understanding their form and content, and
that applied to official statistics this allows a way to move beyond high-level theories.
The argument presented is not one of the incompatibility of approaches; both critical
and native approaches are capable of accommodating accounts of the official statistic-
making process. Rather, the argument is that an understanding of the process changes
the terrain on which existing theories need to operate.  For the critical  accounts,  the
contingency of the official statistic raises questions of the relation between the intention
behind the official statistic and its use; if there is a gap between an intention to control
and the official statistic used for control, how does control come about? For the native
accounts,  contingency  raises  questions  about  the  nature  of  the  representations  that
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statistics  provide;  if  the  form and  content  of  the  official  statistic  is  contingent  on
circumstance, to what extent is the statistic a representation of its object rather than the
object a product of the statistic?
The chapter will proceed as follows: Sections 2.2. and 2.3. will examine the critical and
native literatures around statistics and official statistics in turn. Section 2.4. will then
examine  social  construction  literature  as  a  complement  to  these.  The  chapter  will
conclude  in  Section  2.5.  by drawing out  four  empirical  questions  which  arise  from
approaching official statistics as the products of social processes.
2.2. Critical readings of official statistics: Foucauldian and Marxian accounts of 
official statistics as technologies of control 
The present section will examine the role that official statistics play in Foucauldian and,
to a lesser extent, Marxian writings. In the case of the former, the role is central: as
Foucault argues in his writings on governmentality (e.g., Foucault 1991a), the modern
state exerts its power on the level of the population rather than the individual and this
level  is  both  acted  on  and  largely  known  through  statistics.  The  inscription  and
aggregation of individuals numerically by official statistics acts as a concretisation of
the concept of 'population', providing something above the individual on which the state
can act. At the same time, statistics, and official statistics in particular, act as regimes of
truth to constrain the actions of individuals, influencing the ways in which they self-
govern.
While  there  is  an  obvious  affinity  between  Marxian  and  Foucauldian  theories  of
governance, official statistics play a much smaller role in the writings of Marx and his
followers. While both made use of official statistics as counter-information to illustrate
social conditions under capital (see, for example, Braverman 1998; Engels 2009; Marx
1990),  a  use  that  later  critical  scholars  have  continued  (e.g.,  Dorling  and  Simpson
1999b),  there  have  been  relatively  few  direct  theorisations  of  official  statistics  by
Marxians. However, what work there is (Irvine, Miles and Evans 1979) and broader
Marxian critiques of rationality (see Adorno and Horkheimer 1997) can usefully be read
in dialogue with Foucauldian theorisations to develop a reading of official statistics as a
form of social control.
Such  a  instrumentalist  reading  is  not  structurally  out  of  step  with  native
pronouncements on official statistics. The Office for National Statistics, for instance,
explicitly  links  their  work  to  policy  and through  this  to  individuals'  lives  (see,  for
example, Matheson 2010; Office for National Statistics 2013b) while the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development publishes its social statistical programme
under  the  motto  'better  policies  for  better  lives'  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
Operation and Development 2013a). Official statistics are intended by their creators to
have a role in intervening on the external world, particularly through making it easier to
administer. The distinction between the critical and native approaches is in the object of
the official statistic's instrumentality: while native accounts claim that official statistics
are designed for use in improving lives, a critical reading would suggest instead that
they are designed to establish a dichotomy of 'improved' and 'unimproved' lives and to
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manage the 'problems' of the latter.
It will be argued that such critical readings, while useful, are incomplete. They tend
either to start with the reality of the official statistic and deduce its intention to control
from its  features  or  use;  or  to  move  from a  theorised  intention  on  the  part  of  its
Commissioning Actors to the statistic's features or use. In both cases, the work of the
Statistical Actors are treated as a black box and assumed away. This is not to claim that
statistics cannot be forms of biopolitical or class control; instead, the following review
aims to highlight  that  they are not necessarily so,  meaning a gap exists  around the
question of how such control comes about.
2.2.1. Official statistics as a Foucauldian technology of government
For Foucault, the modern state is not a concrete entity, but a system of power based
around a rationality of governance predicated on the non-physical control of populations
(Foucault 1991a, 2008). This can be contrasted with earlier feudal states, where systems
of government were based on the direct coercion of individuals; where such systems
ensured compliance with their aims through the power over life, the modern exercise of
governmentality ('government rationality') secures its aims through a manipulation of
public discourse. This manipulation of discourse creates entities, such as 'the nation' or
'the economy' that are not real in the sense of 'concrete entities existing in an external
world', but which are true in the sense of 'abstract entities which can be meaningfully
discussed  and  shown  to  have  impacts  on  individuals'.  As  Foucault  explains  in  an
example  of  this  distinction:  “Politics  and the  economy are  not  things  that  exist,  or
errors, or illusions, or ideologies. They are things that do not exist and yet which are
inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false.”
(Foucault  2008,  p.20;  see  also  Dworkin  1982,  Ch.7,  which  makes  the  same  point
somewhat less opaquely).
Such 'regimes of truth' and the entities they define have 'transactional reality' (Foucault
2008,  p.297);  their  definitions  limit  what  is  possible  for  individuals  in  the  external
world.  Governmentality acts  with and within such regimes,  both bringing them into
being and acting within their limitations. Key amongst these entities, for Foucault, is
'the population', an abstract entity which is 'made true' largely by statistics and official
statistics as regimes of truth (Foucault 1991a, p.99). In isolation, any given individual
can have no conception of 'the population'; their lived experience is of interactions with
family, friends and community (c.f., Porter 1995). Statistics allow aggregate effects to
appear that are not apparent at the individual level, and simultaneously open up these
effects to management. 'The population' here is analogous to Latour's (2005; or, for that
matter, Thatcher's 1987) 'society'; it is an emergent effect of the activities of individuals
when framed within a particular regime of truth.
Foucault argues that the collapse of feudalism led to a shift in the accepted object of
government rationality from the individual to the population, and a resultant shift in the
techniques suitable for the exercise of that rationality. There was, for Foucault, a shift
from 'sovereignty' as exercised on an individual to 'security' exercised through them via
biopolitical control. Such control comes through a manipulation of regimes of truth that
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create a self-governance on the part of individuals (Foucault 1991a). As an example of
such biopolitical control, Foucault offers the example of 'madness', a discourse which
has the transactionally real effect of defining 'normality' and acceptable behaviour, with
the consequence that a set of reactions and institutions becomes necessary to police the
boundary  between  the  two  (Bordieu  and  Wacquant  2001;  Foucault  2001).  Less
dramatically,  contemporary  'nudge'  theory  seeks  to  use  behavioural  psychology,  a
regime of truth structured around population-level generalisations, to shape the actions
of individuals (Fisher 2009; Jones, Pykett and Whitehead 2013; Thaler and Sunstein
2008; Whitehead, Jones, Pykett and Welsh 2012).
An important aspect of these regimes of truth is their apparent naturalness. Foucault
(2008) offers the example of 'the economy', which is claimed to operate according to
natural,  empirically  discoverable  laws.  Such  laws,  as  natural,  are  neutral;  once  the
causal universe that the regime of truth invokes is accepted, it is no longer possible to
talk about the consequences of actions normatively. The market is no longer a place
where justice is adjudicated, but one where truth is; the outcomes of exchanges are right
or wrong, not fair or unfair. This invocation of natural, causal laws has clear roots in
Enlightenment  rationality  (see  Adorno  and  Horkheimer,  1997,  and  the  discussion
below);  it  attempts  to  understand  individual  entities  and  events  as  the  outcome  of
aetiologies divined through the observation of a mass of cases.
Situating official statistics within a tradition of Enlightenment thinking allows them to
be seen as a special case of statistics more generally. Knowing an object requires the
invention or use of technologies of knowing, modes of representation which allow the
entity in question to be depicted and so made amenable to deliberation and argument
(Latour 1987; Porter 1995). Underlying this is an assumption that individual entities or
events are commensurate in some way, that they are tokens of a larger type. Without this
assumption, there can be no object at all in the sense that there is no type of which the
given case is token. There can also be no statistic, only a collection of anecdotes about
individual objects (what Foucault calls the 'singularity', Foucault 1991b). The existence
of an official statistic is predicated on a regime of truth in which the commensurable
aspect is essential to the object and its individual aspects are unimportant. The official
statistic becomes part of the regime of truth, defining the essential nature of the object
which it counts.
By reducing the complexities arising from individuality, previously vague domains are
translated into information which is stable, mobile and comparable. In the case of the
official statistic, this creates new information that provides 'calculating power'  (Rose
1991); it allows governmental actors to influence the development of the domain across
widely dispersed populations (Hopwood and Miller 1994; Miller and Rose 1990). The
categories defined by the statistic become transactionally real, having concrete effects
within the domain that the statistic has helped define (Foucault 1991b, 2008; see also
Kalpagam  2000  on  the  role  of  statistics  in  structuring  reality  in  areas  of  colonial
occupation). This is because, again, the individual has been reduced to a component of
the 'population', subject to the laws which have become apparent at that level and so to
the interventions which those laws suggest. Most particularly, the governmental concern
shifts from being the control of individual acts themselves and instead the management
of the rates of those acts across the 'population'.
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Important within the official statistic is the conception of the 'normal', set at the level of
either an 'average' individual or some politically defined optimum or minimum. This
arises  from  the  re-presentation  of  individuals  as  an  aggregate  which  allows  the
definition  of  extremes  ('abnormality'),  and  so  targets  for  governance  (Miller  and
O’Leary 1994). Such targets arise naturally from the definition of a domain as one to be
governed, with statistics becoming both a marker for such a domain and an instrument
for co-ordinating the process the government seeks to direct (Foucault 1991a). Castel
(1991) has argued that this culminates in governments seeing individuals as collections
of  risks  defined  by  probabilistic  laws,  with  the  role  of  government  becoming  risk
management. This is the logical conclusion of a population-based approach, seeing the
individual merely as a component of the aggregate, rather than constitutive of it. These
risks  need  to  be  managed  preventively,  a  decision  which  separates  diagnosis  from
treatment.  'At-risk'  sub-populations  are  defined and resources  targeted,  regardless  of
actual  experiences  by  individuals  of  'abnormality'  as  defined  (Office  for  National
Statistics 2013c).
In  this  way,  official  statistics  become  'technologies  of  calculation',  a  literal  re-
presentation of processes and events away from where they occur and in the places
where decisions are to be made about them (Miller 1991). These sites may be dispersed,
with the site of statistical creation being distinct from the sites of both data collection
and the site of decisions and actions taken on the basis of the statistic. This is possible
because the common language of statistics (Miller and Rose 2008; Porter 1995) enables
multiple 'centres of calculation'  (Latour 1987, 2005). This is a transformation of the
domain of government, enabling an aggregation of events to be made across space and
time.  By  revealing  statistical  norms  they  also  construct  policy  norms,  allowing
evaluations  to  be  made  and  interventions  to  be  targeted.  The  statistics  create  the
domains they record, a 'population' or 'an economy' arising form diverse and dispersed
individuals and phenomena (Rose and Miller 1992). 
In performing this role, official statistics are a technology of governance, supporting the
programmatic aims of state actors (Hopwood and Miller 1994; Power 1997; Rose and
Miller 1992). Governmental rationalities have a moral form and are epistemological in
nature, articulated in relation to some conception of the nature of the object governed.
The official statistic defines that nature by saying what it is that is being counted. This
acts as a gate-keeping mechanism, influencing the decisions of individuals indirectly by
setting the conditions under which their behaviour will be counted. Power (1994, 1996,
1997) gives a comparable account of the audit process, which alters business behaviour
by requiring it to be auditable. By defining 'employment' or 'happiness' or 'well-being' in
a particular way, only those aspects which meet the definition are open to targeting. The
remaining complexity of  an  individual's  circumstances  is  invisible  to  the  governing
actor and irrelevant to their  concerns. Increasingly,  this  complexity can become less
relevant to the individual too, as all the incentivisations offered by governing actors
relate to the phenomenon as defined, not as experienced. In this light we can read claims
such as those made by UK Statistics Authority that official statistics are “essential to the
proper functioning of a democratic state” (Bumstead and Alldritt 2011, p.1; see also
European Statistical  System System 2015);  the  statistic  plays  a  role  in  defining  the
nature and functioning of the state, and is in turn defined by understandings of what the
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'democratic state' consists in (Prewitt 1987).
However,  this  dual  aspect  of  governmental  action,  technological  and programmatic,
leads to the failure of government action. The technological solution can never fulfil the
programmatic aims because its necessary abstraction from the nature of the object being
governed leads to its inadequate representation (Miller and Rose 1990). Individuals are
different and are in different circumstances, so applying a causal relation which works
in the majority case will fail in individual ones. More than this, the causal relation is
only  relating  to  a  particular,  isolated  part  of  the  individual's  circumstances,  while
ignoring the rest. This skewed attention leads to other problems arising through lack of
care. The solution to one 'problem' which the statistic defines leads only to another. In
this sense, regulation (and the statistics which inform it) is always failing (Miller and
Rose 2008).
2.2.2. Marxian approaches to statistics
Despite the use made by Marx of statistics, both official and unofficial,  as evidence
underpinning  his  arguments  (see,  for  example,  Marx  1990)  and  a  tradition  which
follows this use (see, for examples, Baran and Sweezy 1966; Braverman 1998; Engels
2009), there is little explicit engagement with the nature of statistics within Marxian
writing  outside  of  the  chapters  in  Irvine,  Miles  and  Evans  (1979).  However,  an
argument can be made for a comprehensive implicit engagement with official statistics
within  Marxian  theory.  A simple  form  of  this  argument  would  note  the  role  of
government as the caretakers of the interests of the bourgeois class (Marx and Engels
1992), and read all their activities, including the official statistic, as a means to this end.
A development of this argument would note the relations between the economic base of
capitalist production and its expression through governmental forms (Marx and Engels
1977).  Such  an  argument  allows  the  consideration  of  the  official  statistic  as  a
technology of control in a manner akin to Foucauldian readings, but technologies which
form part  of a wider superstructure obscuring the true nature of the social world.  A
further extension would encompass the critique of epistemology and prevailing social
forms  typified  by  Adorno  and  Horkheimer's  (1997) critique  of  the  Enlightenment
rationality which underpins statistical methods.
On such a reading, official statistics are expressions of the capitalist system. They are
only possible because labour power is traded as a commodity, allowing human beings
and  their  activities  to  be  denominated  in  a  common  fashion  as  economic  entities,
rationalising their various qualities and properties and allowing them to be compared
(Shaw and Miles 1979). It is this which underpins the commensurability which official
statistics  require  (Porter  1995),  rendering  the  individual  (Doel  2001),  or  individual
object interchangeable with other items denominated in the same fashion (Marx 1990).
This is a reification; the social relations which give rise to people, skills and objects are
obscured in statistics and official statistics which instead treat them as context-free data.
Reification is both a tendency within the capitalist system (Lukás 1971) and a necessary
act for statistics to be possible; the qualities of subjects must be reduced to quantities,
humans  rendered  as  objects  to  be  counted  (Parker  1999;  Vaneigem  2003).  By
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abstracting from their properties and homogenising them under capital, individuals and
acts  can  be  aggregated  into  theoretical  abstract  entities  such  as  the  'nation'  or  the
'economy'. These and, by implication, the individuals and acts which make them up,
become the subject of impersonal forces, statistical regularities such as 'recession' or
'competition'.  Instead  of  seeing  individual  circumstances  as  arising  from  localised
choice and political decision, they are subsumed in supposedly universal forces. In this
way, the deeper meanings of actions and events are obscured (Lukás 1971).
This is the ontological inversion, the treatment of people as things (Hacking 1991; Marx
1990). The statistic acts as a fetish, a way of masking the true nature of circumstances,
hiding the individual and the power relations which have produced their situation. This
acts in the same way as the commodity fetish: there one is confronted with a commodity
which appears as a natural object, here one is confronted with data about an abstract
entity which appears as a natural object. In both cases, the actual object is hidden by the
veil of production, a process of obscuring the social meanings and values inherent in the
object (Olsson 2000). This mirrors the Foucauldian move to the population rather than
the individual; what is seen is the movement in the abstract output, not that output's
expression in the lives of individuals. All that is visible in the official statistic is the
movement in the reified object, not the social circumstances which it is formed from. As
such, the statistic alienates its subject from their subjectivity (Sartre 1968).
Later authors read this homogenisation of the individual as a unit under capital as a
natural extension of the mythic fatalism of Enlightenment thinking which abandons the
idea of the social and of individual control in favour of grand impersonal regularities.
What  cannot  be  abstracted  from  in  this  way  is  abandoned  as  subjective  or
phenomenological, ostensibly in an effort to obtain neutrality by replacing a normative
discourse  with  a  positivist-empiricist  one  (Adorno  and  Horkheimer  1997).  The
abstraction inherent in statistics is of a piece with the division of labour under capital,
which values  people only for  abstracted aspects of  their  being,  the alienated labour
which makes the system possible. The product of that labour, its purpose and use value,
is lost in the exchange value which is all that is counted in economic statistics (Young
1979).
Statistics  and official  statistics are  required because the capitalist  division of labour
creates complexity within production processes which requires co-ordination, while at
the same time the alienation it rests on creates contradictions which need to be managed
if they are not to impede the accumulation of capital (Harvey 1985, Young 1979). This
is particularly the case at the national level, where the committee of the bourgeoisie who
run the economy need to make sure that actions taken by members of their class in their
own best interests do not impede the reproduction of the class as a whole (for instance,
that wages are not suppressed below the point at which labour can no longer reproduce
itself). Shaw and Miles (1979) see the growth of official social statistics as an explicit
response to such contradictions; an interest in unemployment, for example, arising from
the need to regulate the size and revolutionary potential of the reserve army of labour.
On this  reading,  official  social  statistics  stand as  a  complement  to  economic  ones,4
4 It is worth noting the reification of 'economic' in this division of official statistics in opposition to, 
rather than as a part of, 'social', exemplified by the separation of statistics in UK official publications 
such as Social Trends and Economic and Labour Market Review.
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showing where accumulation is  threatened by the living conditions  of the labouring
classes. Only the state has the resources to conduct data collection on the scale required
and its position serves to co-ordinate the interests of the otherwise competing capitalist
class.  Such statistics are necessarily geographical in their  nature,  as social  problems
have  spatial  expression  and  the  state  extends  over  territory  (Brenner  1997,  2004;
Brenner and Elden 2009; Elden 2004; Lefebvre 1991, 2009; Soja 1985)
According to this interpretation, the state, which strives to present itself as apolitical,
and the statistics it produces, which are presented as neutral technological solutions to
apolitical  problems,  are  both  nakedly political.  They are  attempts  by the owners  of
capital to secure their ability to accumulate and to aid them in that accumulation (Miles
and Irvine 1979). The extent of this presentation is marked; in the UK context, official
statistics  are  produced  by  an  arms-length  government  body  under  an  independent
National Statistician, one of whose responsibilities is correcting party-political misuses
of officially produced statistics (National Statistics 2000). This explicit depoliticisation
masks  the  role  the  state  is  playing  in  the  maintenance  of  the  conditions  for  the
reproduction  of  capital;  the  independence  of  the  individual  producing  the  official
statistics  is  unimportant  when  the  statistics  themselves  reproduce  the  dominant
ideology. In this way, official statistics allow both the control of productive processes
and social  control,  as  well  as the legitimation of  policies  designed to achieve these
(Atkins and Jarrett 1979).
In agreement with the Foucauldian account, such Marxian readings assert that statistics
are not uncovering 'reality'. Instead, they are acts of prestidigitation, showing isolated
elements of phenomena out of context as if it were the phenomena and not the context
which were important. These statistics act as spectacles, meaningless in themselves (it
matters  not  to  the unemployed person that  unemployment has  fallen generally),  but
acting  as  grand  gestures  pretending  to  meaning  (people  will  vote  to  re-elect  a
government  who  brings  unemployment  down,  as  they  are  'good  on  the  economy',
pretending to offer a security which the economic system denies) (Debord 1995, 1998;
Wark 2013).
2.2.3. Questions left by Foucauldian and Marxian accounts of statistics and 
official statistics
These two critical accounts offer broadly consistent readings of statistics and official
statistics.  In  both  accounts,  the  specificity  of  the  object  of  an  official  statistic  is
sacrificed for an imposed generality. This creates an abstract statistical object which is
taken to be a concrete object in the real world. By representing the statistical object in
the abstract, political actors are able to talk about it, consider it and act on it. In this, the
abstract concept comes to have real effects on individuals, limiting the scope they have
for action. Such a mode of control was the intention of official statistic in the first place
either as a result of governmental rationality or of a class rationality expressing itself
through governance.
Before  considering  the  gaps  left  by these  accounts,  it  is  worth noting  a  number  of
differences between them. One is the role official statistics are playing in their analysis.
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The  Marxian  account  is  quite  straightforward:  the  official  statistic  shares  features,
principally  reification  and  fetishisation,  with  other  forms  of  capitalist  abstraction,
allowing these features to be explained in the same way. Official statistics are incidental,
a case study within a wider model of capitalist activity.  In the Foucauldian account,
official statistics should be more crucial, but tend to only be mentioned in passing: they
are taken to be a technology of control because that is what governmentality requires.
The precise form and content of the statistic tends not to be examined; merely by virtue
of being an official statistic, whatever their object is they are a form of control.
To varying degrees, both accounts have trouble dealing with the question of intention.
In both cases, the official statistic is generated somewhere within government with the
intention of permitting the control of the population. That there is an intention to control
is assumed. However, there is a question of how this intention is conveyed through the
statistic-making process.  The danger here is  that  of affirming the consequent.  If  the
starting  point  of  an  analysis  is  that  the  state  is  known  by  its  actions,  as  it  is  in
Foucauldian theory, or that all cultural activity under capitalism reflects capitalist modes
of production, as it is in Marxian theory, then the official statistic, as an activity of the
state,  can  be  nothing  but  an  expression  of  political  control.  The  actions  of  those
designing the statistic are under-determined as there was no way they could have acted
which would not have brought about such control. The precise form and content of the
statistic  cannot  be  explained;  they  appear,  post  hoc,  as  the  inevitable  result  of  a
teleology whose existence precedes them. (It is worth noting that this is generally true
of the actions of state actors in both theories, partly because neither Foucault nor Marx
was especially concerned with the specific internal workings of the state.)
Such a post hoc analysis also tends to treat the production of the official statistic as a
black  box.  Both  approaches  have  explanations  as  to  why  Statistical  Actors  might
produce an object which allows for governance of individuals in the external world. In
the case of the Foucauldians, it is because they are thinking in terms of the 'population'
to start with; the official statistician, by virtue of being a statistician, is operating within
a regime of truth in which biopolitical control is inevitable. For Marxians, the Statistical
Actor is a part of the committee of the bourgeoisie that is the state, and shares their class
concerns. Again, though, this doesn't help explain the form or content of a statistic: why
has control  been sought  in this  particular  way? Ironically both explanations  tend to
homogenise  official  statistics  just  as  these  statistics  homogenise  individuals,  seeing
them all as tokens of a type rather than as entities in their own right.
This  is  particularly problematic for later Foucauldian theories which accept that the
actors within the state are diverse (Miller and Rose 2008) and that those in the centre are
often confounded by those who are more peripheral (Rose 1991). In this way the theory
allows both that the official statistic is designed as a technology of control, but also that
there is no guarantee that it will turn out to be usable as one. Miller and Rose (2008) go
further,  suggesting  that  the  technologies  of  control  always  fail  to  meet  their
programmatic aims; that no official statistic can operate quite as it was intended to. The
precise nature of the statistic arises from contestation and does not (quite) meet the aims
set for it. This makes their aims unknowable, as, by assumption, the actions the statistic
allows are not necessarily what it was intended to allow; resistance and contestation
intercede between intention and outcome. To come at this from the opposite side, if
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government and regulation always fail as some Foucauldians have claimed (Miller and
Rose 1990; Power 1994, 1996, 1997), it seems important to consider how things fail and
for what reasons. 
The problem for Marxian accounts is similar but somewhat cruder. If the argument is
accepted that statistics are developed in the interests of capital, as a way of monitoring
the effects of contradictions and the resources available to capital, then it matters who is
doing  the  monitoring.  Even  when  both  Commissioning  and  Statistical  Actors  are
drawing on the  same body of  economic  theory,  there  can  be  no guarantee  that  the
outcome of the design process will be the statistic the Commissioning Actors require.
Technical  restrictions  around  what  it  is  possible  to  measure,  how much  funding  is
available, existing statistical best practice, and so on may limit what is achievable. This
will need to be negotiated amongst the Statistical Actors, whose class composition is
potentially heterogeneous in terms of origins and will be broadly petty bourgeois rather
than capitalist in terms of present interest. How a statistic arises which serves the needs
of capital from agents who are not themselves capitalist and who may not consciously
act in the interests of capital, becomes a live question.
2.3. Native accounts of official statistics: how the statistical profession considers 
its output
The critical theories surveyed above can be broadly understood as being rationalist in
their  outlook.  They  start  from  the  premise  that  categories  are  being  originated  by
Commissioning or Statistical  Actors,  and then imposed on an external world. While
these categories gain a transactional reality, shaping that external world, they lack truth,
in  that  they  are  not  discovered  from  that  world.  Accounts  by  official  statisticians
themselves,  and by academic  statistical  theoreticians,  can  be  broadly categorised  as
empiricist.  They start from the premise that there is a phenomenon or quality in the
external world which can be observed, and then proceed to define that phenomenon or
quality  in  terms  of  its  observable  characteristics.  They are  thus  strongly tied  to  an
empiricist world view and the scientific method (Lindley 2000). This definition allows
counting to occur by ensuring commensurabilty: for the purposes of the statistic, there is
an  identity between two phenomena or  entities  meeting the  definition,  they  are the
object  the  statistic  describes  and,  for  the  purposes  of  the  statistic,  nothing  more
(Bandyopadhyay and Forster 2011; Hand 2004). (For fuller accounts of rationalism and
empiricism, see Benton and Craib 2011; Hammersley 2000; Hindess 1977).
In  both  critical  and native  assessments  of  statistics  and  official  statistics  there  is  a
correspondence between the object of the statistic and objects in the external world. The
difference between the assessments, on this argument, is whether the object precedes the
statistic or vice versa. For example, the Office for National Statistics and the National
Statistician describes the organisations' vision as: “To be widely respected for informing
debate and improving decision making through high quality, easy to use statistics and
analyses on the UK's economy and society.” (Office for National Statistics 2013b, p.9;
see also 2010a; Matheson 2010). The 'UK', its 'economy' and 'society' are taken here to
be  real  entities  which  the  statistic  observes  and analyses.  The official  statistic  may
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capture  these  more  or  less  well,  with  their  'quality'  being  both  a  function  of  their
accuracy when compared with the external world and the rigour of their attempts at
capturing it, but there is something in the world external to the official statistic there to
be captured. We can contrast this directly with Foucault's denial of 'society'  as an  a
priori entity  and  his  claims  instead  that  it  is  an  a  posteriori rationalisation  within
broader  regimes  of  truth  around  ideas  such  as  'economy'  and  'liberalism'  (Foucault
2008).
The reference to 'decision making' in the vision statement above points to the official
statistic  as  being  instrumental,  again  an  assessment  which  is  shared  with  critical
readings.  They assume a regularity in phenomena that can be observed through data
collection and thus allow influence through policy intervention. This is clearest in the
reception of statistics by certain parts of the statistical audience; when employment rates
fall, or inflation increases, causal and systemic explanations are given (see, for example,
Cameron 2013). Statistics are treated as records of phenomena within a causal universe,
impacting on and being impacted by other entities and phenomena. Statistics suggest
action  or  reaction,  to  affect  inputs  to  change  the  statistical  outcome  or  perhaps  to
respond  to  a  statistical  outcome  which  cannot  itself  be  influenced.  Again,  there  is
agreement here between critical  readings and native ones in as far as the desire for
influence of the external  world directs  the statistic;  however,  while  the instrumental
purpose seen by the critical reading is essentially malign, here it need not be. The vision
statement above assumes a decision-maker for whom the statistic is a neutral tool; the
'improvement' of their decisions which it enables is relative to their purpose, which lies
outside the remit of the Statistical Actor.
It  should be noted that this  claim to instrumentality arises largely from the specific
contexts of UK, European and global official statistics (encompassed in the example of
United  Nations,  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and  Development,
International Monetary Fund and European Union 1993). It is possible to conceive of
official statistics which are not collected with any instrumental purpose. This is easiest
to imagine in situations where a purpose formerly existed, or where there is a normative
value attached to the object but no intention to influence it or the actions of others.
However, it is possible that an official statistic could exist recording an object merely
for the sake of recording an object.5 The fact that such ornamental statistics are rare
again  places  official  statistics  firmly  in  the  Enlightenment  tradition  in  which  the
understanding  of  the  world  is  intrinsically  linked  to  action  on  it  (Adorno  and
Horkheimer 1997).
The neutrality of the official statistic derives from its empiricist underpinnings: as the
objects  of  statistics  are  independent  of  beliefs  about  them,  the  task  of  the  official
statistic is to represent that object as accurately as is possible. Accuracy, expressed in
terms  of  'quality'  (Office  for  National  Statistics  2013b)  here  has  the  two  standard
5 It can be argued that such statistics may already exist – I am unaware of any official use of the 
statistics on the most common names given to new-born children, which are published every year by 
the Office for National Statistics. The 2014 version lists a number of potential users and uses, 
including "Journalists who report and produce articles on the popularity of names", but agents of the 
state and their uses are not included (see Office for National Statistics 2014a, p.6). I myself use this 
set of statistics in the present research as a way of anonymising interview participants (see Chapter 
Three).
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components of accuracy in the natural sciences, validity and reliability. Official statistics
must rest on a definition which captures the phenomena under question (they must be
'valid') and must do so free of bias (they must be 'reliable'). Accuracy in this sense is
achieved through making statistics replicable: publishing methodologies, making them
both  subject  to  external  inspection  and repetition  by peers.  Within  official  statistic-
making bodies, such as the ONS, hierarchies of quality control exist to enforce methods
of accepted best-practice and settled bodies of epistemology. Clearly, there are decisions
to be made by the Statistical Actor about how best to measure the object in question, but
these are always limited by the object itself. Two different Statistical Actors, operating
within different contexts, may differ in their ability to measure an object and so produce
different official statistics but the existence of the object in the external world acts as
standard of quality. One official statistic will be 'better', more reliable and valid, than the
other and both statistics could 'better capture' the object if a more reliable and valid
methodology was used.
If this summary is accurate, and it will be argued below that it is, then the process of
official statistic-making is essentially one of representation. There exists an object in the
external world and the task of the Statistical Actor is to characterise it as best they can.
That characterisation will be primarily guided by technical arguments aimed at securing
the most theoretically valid and the most procedurally reliable representation. It will be
observed  that  examples  of  accounts  of  official  statistics  by  their  producers  tend  to
emphasise  such  technical  arguments.  However,  if,  as  Chapter  One  suggested,  the
Statistical Actor has agency and acts within a context-specific set of opportunities and
limitations,  there remains  the question of  why a given technical  argument  has been
found convincing. Where there are multiple ways of characterising an object of varying
validity and accuracy, how has one been settled on?
2.3.1. An example of a native account of official statistics: Human Capital
To illustrate the arguments made above, and some of the problems inherent in them, this
section  will  explore  the  consultation  and  release  documents  around  the  Office  for
National Statistics' 'Human Capital' statistic (Jones and Fender 2011; Office for National
Statistics 2012c, d). This statistic is interesting because it acts to define an object in the
external  world  which  is  both  abstract  in  nature  and of  relatively recent  'discovery'.
While it can be argued that there was an understanding of human capital as far back as
the writing of 'the father of statistics' William Petty (1899), and similar concepts appear
in the writing of the statistical pioneer Galton (1909), its theoretical development dates
only as far as the 1960s (Becker 1962, 1980; Mincer 1962, 1974; Schultz 1961, 1962,
1970).  It  can  be  noted  that  there  is  still  a  50  year  gap  between  the  theoretical
development of this object and the creation of an official statistic to capture it, a point
which will be returned to below. Part of the task of the official statistician in developing
the 'human capital' statistic is in establishing 'human capital' as an object in the external
world, rather than something of a merely theoretical nature.
As the consultation paper on human capital estimates defines it, “At the individual level
we can think about [human capital] as measuring a person's competencies, knowledge,
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social,  personality  and  health  attributes,  including  creativity.”  (Office  for  National
Statistics 2012c, p.6). This draws on a definition from the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation  and  Development,  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and
Development 2001, p.17), where human capital is “The knowledge, skills, competencies
and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and
economic well-being.” There are, in these definitions, clear claims to an external world;
there is an abstract entity, 'human capital', comprised of other entities, both concrete and
abstract,  which  can  be  observed.  (This  runs  counter  to  arguments  such as  those  of
Blaug, who denies that any such entity exists; see Blaug 1972, 1976, 1985)
In the very name of the object being described by the statistic, there is a conception of it
as an economic entity. It is a form of capital. Immediately this presents problems for a
purely  rationalist  reading  of  the  statistic,  as  it  is  not  apparent  that  a  'person's
competencies, knowledge, social, personality and health attributes, including creativity'
are economic properties. However, once they are treated as such it is possible to make
empirical  observations  of  them:  by  comparing  starting  levels  of  knowledge,  for
example, and finishing levels of financial income it will be possible to place a monetary
value on an individual's knowledge. Such a valuation is justified on the basis of links
between the factors of human capital and economic performance at both the individual
and national levels (Office for National Statistics 2012c, pp.8-9).
In this way the statistic follows from empirically observable features of the external
world. It is, though, clearly selective in the features it observes: the factors listed as part
of human capital equally contribute to non-economic outcomes, such as happiness or
community cohesion. That the economic causal relation is being highlighted is a result
of the purpose of the statistic:
“Human capital is a driver of economic growth and therefore, in order to
better understand the dynamics of an economy, it is important to measure
accurately the stock of human capital  assets. Stocks of capital are also a
useful measure to monitor sustainability. Therefore, as part of the Measuring
National Well-being Programme, ONS has published estimates of human
capital to compliment existing measures of fixed capital.”
(Office for National Statistics 2012c, p.2)
The statistic is devised as a means of better understanding the economy which, in turn,
impacts on sustainability and 'National Well-being'. “[M]easurement is very important
due  to  its  implications  for  policy”  (Office  for  National  Statistics  2012c,  p.8).  The
definition of the statistic here sits within a much larger causal universe in which there
are observable objects such as 'the economy' and 'sustainability' which are the subjects
of  policy.  That  these  are  legitimate  subjects  of  policy  is  not  questioned  by  the
consultation paper, and nor is the nature of the causal universe into which the statistic
falls. The observation of human capital is not independent of pre-existing beliefs about
the existence of the economy or the viability of intervention through policy, rather it
follows from them. The statistic is here presented as independent of politics: 'human
capital' is counted because it is important, and is important and can be counted because
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it uncontroversially exists (Keat 1979). Such a position is not uncontested; the existence
of 'human capital' is disputed by authors outside of the neoclassical paradigm (Bowles
1970; Bowles and Gintis 1975, 1976; Fine 1997)
Having broadly defined human capital, the consultation paper (and, more fully, Jones
and Fender  2011) goes on to  operationalise  it  (Office for  National  Statistics  2012c,
pp.12-18). Here it notes a number of contested aspects of human capital, centring both
on what counts towards it and what outputs count in its valuation. Once these issues are
resolved, further decisions must be made, for instance relating to the present valuation
of future returns. As the paper observes, alternative assumptions can result in radically
different statistical values.
The  consultation  paper  elicits  responses  from potential  users  on  these  decisions  of
methodology,  again underlining the instrumental  nature of  the statistic.  Although an
empirical observation of the external world, it is directed in a particular fashion and to a
particular end. For example, Office for National Statistics 2012c, p.12 observes “This
narrow focus reflects the view that these “experimental” monetary measures potentially
can  be  integrated  into  a  conventional  economic  accounting  framework.”  However,
while  these  'monetary measures'  are  accepted  as  imperfect,  the  approach is  seen  as
amenable to improvement; Jones and Fender (2011, pp.22-23) lists a number of areas
for future research which would develop the statistic while Office for National Statistics
(2012c) is an explicit call for suggestions for improvements. These are not attempts to
construct a better unreal or purely discursive object, but attempts to better capture the
aspects of a real object that are relevant to users. The statistic, imperfect as it is, exists
because human capital exists in the external world and having any statistic which meets
the basic requirements of validity and accuracy is more useful than having no statistic.
2.3.2. Questions arising from a native account of statistics and official statistics
One thing to note about such a native account of official statistics, in comparison with
the  critical  accounts  considered  earlier,  is  its  acknowledgement  of  the  process  of
statistic-making.  The documents  reviewed have been clear  that  decisions  have been
made. These decisions have been specific, dealing with exact technical choices rather
than the stylised 'desire to achieve control' which appears in Foucauldian and Marxian
accounts.  The  basis  for  those  decisions  draws  attention  to  the  contingency  of  the
statistic-making process: it is not the case that there is a single, obvious 'best method'
and the 'quality' of a method is in part determined by non-theoretical factors such as
resources or data-collection abilities.
However, what these documents show is a dispersal of the decision-making process. As
a starting point, it is not clear who has originated the official statistic. While it argues
that  its  measurement  is  “important  due  to  its  implications  for  policy”  (Office  for
National Statistics 2012c, p.8), the ONS does not suggest any specific commissioning
demand  beyond  human  capital's  position  within  a  wider  'well-being'  measurement
programme. Indeed, the consultation document is partly aimed at soliciting information
on how the statistic might be used and so adapted to better suit that use. The motivating
force behind the statistic is that an object important to policy in the external world is not
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currently  being  observed  statistically,  which  leaves  economic  accounts  of  wealth
incomplete;  that  physical  capital  is  measured  within  the  national  accounts,  but  not
intangible capital. The ONS cite various international bodies, political, statistical and
non-governmental, who have suggested that this incompleteness is a problem, and do so
in a manner that suggests that they, as Statistical Actors, agree. There is no suggestion,
however, of a direct demand by potential users.
This complicates critical readings, as conceptions of official statistics as technologies of
control now have to account for statistics which do not originate with domestic policy-
making actors.  Another  example of this  would be the System of  National  Accounts
which  were  developed over  a  matter  of  decades  by diverse  academics,  government
actors  and  official  statistic-makers  internationally  (United  Nations,  Organisation  for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, International Monetary Fund and European
Union 1993) and to which policy-makers are subscribed by long-standing international
treaties.  This  is  not  incompatible  with  a  critical  reading  of  official  statistics,  but
necessitates a reading of 'government' which is amorphous and multi-scalar, not simply
operating at the level of a single state and its agencies.
At the same time, the dispersal of decisions through consultation complicates a simple
reading of the statistic as empiricist. While the statistic is still claiming to observe an
object in the external world, the questions of what it observes and how are still open.
For all the technical discussion about the merits of different ways of measuring human
capital,  options were constrained both by what  was possible  and what  was desired.
Another  example  would  be  official  statistics  relating  to  unemployment,  where
historically two different statistics have existed and their validity been debated within
public  discourse:  the  'claimant  count',  based  on  government-controlled  access  to
unemployment benefits,  and International Labour Organisation definitions applied to
national  surveys.  The former is  open to easy political  manipulation (Levitas  1996a;
Working Party on the Measurement of Unemployment in the UK 1995). The latter is
open  to  debate  (International  Labour  Organization  2013),  but  its  acceptance  and
incorporation into domestic official statistics lies out of the hands of Statistical Actors.
The selection of the statistical method is not simply a neutral, technocratic act, but has
political aspects.
It is possible to go further, and observe that the act of quantification itself, over and
above what is quantified, is a choice that has been made. This is not apparent at the
level  of  the  native  account  as  the  natives  themselves  are  a  part  of  that  choice;  the
existence of the ONS is predicated on quantification as a form of knowledge about the
world.  As discussed above,  quantification requires  commensurability,  that  the things
counted are, in some sense, the same (Cartwright 1994; Porter 1995). Discussing social
statistics, Doel (2001) argues that this is not the case; that human individuals cannot be
meaningfully  treated  as  tokens  of  the  same  type.  This  can  be  taken  as  akin  to  an
extension of a critical realist position that an understanding of the context of the object
is necessary for understanding the object itself (Sayer 2000). This position is implicitly
rejected by the existence of official statistic-making as an activity.
While it is possible to incorporate context within the framework of an official statistic
(for instance, stratifying objects by social group or geographical location), removing
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some of the politics from the act of counting, it is not possible to remove politics from
the decision to count. The official statistic starts from the position that official statistics
are possible, that there are regularities to be observed. The observation of regularities is
not a neutral act, but an interpretive one. This is nicely illustrated by Percy and Dolman
(1953), who examined the death certificates issued by doctors in neighbouring counties
in the United States. Despite having the same standards by which to categorise causes of
death and the same training in how to apply these,  doctors in different places were
interpreting the same symptoms as evidence of different  proximate causes.  At some
point in the engagement with the external world, there will always be a judgement. The
grounds of this  judgement  are not  set  by the definition of the statistic as there will
always remain the question of how to apply the definition.
There are, then, a number of questions that a technocratic account such as those offered
by native readings of official statistics leave unresolved. If, as has been argued, official
statistic-making is not a simple matter of translating empirical reality into numerical
representations, it is necessary to ask how and why the statistics are being made. How
do Statistical Actors relate to Commissioning Actors; how are questions of technical
accuracy balanced against questions of instrumental need; how, in general, are political
concerns  resolved  within  the  statistic-making  process?  These  are  social  questions,
which native accounts avoid.
2.4. Complements to critical and native accounts from the social construction 
literature
It has been argued that the three approaches surveyed above are incomplete. All three
provide straightforward accounts of the official statistic which move from a conception,
either in the form of a desire to control or of an external world to be represented, to the
statistic itself. However, it was argued in Chapter One that there is human mediation
between the conception and the official  statistic.  The technology of control must be
realised  by  the  makers  of  official  statistics,  the  world  to  be  represented  must  be
translated by them. This mediation is only considered by these approaches in an abstract
fashion: Foucauldian and Marxian approaches focus on the generalised form of official
statistics as 'technologies of calculation', native approaches in empiricist exercises of
representation. In both cases, the mediation is technocratic and neutral, a pursuit of 'the
best way' of achieving the official statistic's instrumental aims.
This amounts to placing official statistic-making in a black-box, with official statistics
acting to illustrate pre-existing explanatory frameworks rather than standing as objects
of investigation in their own right. Chapter One argued against this black-box treatment.
As the native approaches above acknowledged, decisions are made within the statistic-
making process on how best to represent the statistical object. While there are clearly
technical grounds for opting for one mode of measurement over another, Chapter One
pointed to a number of other potential grounds such as the limitations of resources or
technology.  Critical  accounts  suggest  others  by highlighting  the  political  aspects  of
statistic-making  to  which  the  Statistical  Actor  will  need  to  respond  alongside  any
technical concerns. In dialogue with each other, then, the three approaches surveyed
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here underline the need for an examination of the statistic-making process itself.
Such an examination, considering the actions and reactions of individuals with agency
within  the  statistic-making  process,  could  be  usefully  informed by the  literature  on
social  construction.  This  literature emphasises  human activity and interaction  in  the
creation  of  knowledges  such as  bodies  of  statistical  theory and the  concepts  which
official statistics hope to capture. It suggests that the created object is a reaction to or a
negotiation of its context, with that context similarly a reaction or negotiation to what
came before in a fluid and dynamic system. This offers another way to consider official
statistics, one which complements those examined above. 
2.4.1. What would it mean to say that 'official statistics are socially 
constructed'?
After Hacking (1999), two types of claim to social construction might be distinguished.
One is the mundane observation that objects are made by people. This clearly applies to
the official statistic as an output; it is not a naturally occurring object, it is made by
Statistical  Actors.  However,  it  is  also  true  of  the  official  statistic  as  a  form  of
knowledge. Statistic-making is a form of metrology, and like all other measurements it
requires social acceptance (see Proverbs 11:1). Just as a metric of distance is defined by
common agreement and there is  no necessity to  the metre or mile,  the scale  of the
statistic is a defined yardstick for something more basic (Duncan 1984). At the same
time,  'accuracy'  or  'efficiency'  are  defined  in  terms  of  publicly  accepted  standards
(Power 1994, 1996, 1997; MacKenzie 1981; Miller 1991; Miller and O’Leary 1987),
meaning that the acceptance or rejection of the agreed measure rests on a network of
other theories and definitions. As Alonso and Starr (1987) and MacKenzie (2009) argue,
this is a political process in two different ways. The first is that the decision to count an
object is a function of power relations, particularly in the case of official statistics which
originate in the actions of government agencies. The second is that the official statistic
has impacts on the world, both in directly shaping actions and in highlighting the object
of the statistic as normatively important in some way.  There are echoes here of the
critical  approaches discussed above; it  is  possible to read metrologies as regimes of
truth  which  make  it  legitimate  to  say  some things  ('this  distance  is  a  mile')  while
delegitimising others ('this distance is just').
Building on this weak claim, a stronger claim would develop the idea of socially agreed
definitions to consider the social world in which they, or any knowledge, are agreed
(Searle 1995). The need for a metrological definition of a phenomenon and, indeed, the
conceptual apparatus which allows the understanding of that phenomenon as something
requiring such a definition,  arises in relation to the knowledge, belief  structures and
aims  of  social  actors  (Latour  1987).  It  is  not  only that  the  measure  requires  social
agreement,  but  that  there  needs  to  be  social  agreement  that  a  measure  is  desirable
(Hacking 1999). On this reading, not only is the official statistic socially constructed,
but it is constructed on the basis of social knowledges, out of social knowledges and on
the basis of social interactions between such knowledges (Searle 1995).
Theory  precedes  action  at  this  point  and  the  measure  is  constructed  to  allow  the
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representation of what is already believed to be there (Burchell, Clubb and Hopwood
1985; Hopwood and Miller 1994; Porter 1995; Power 1997). Miller and O'Leary (1987)
describe this process in relation to standard costing, an accounting method used to cost
activities carried out under normal conditions. This method was desired by government
actors in response to what they saw as a crisis of national productivity.  The method
changed the way in which firms viewed their businesses, highlighting different aspects
of  their  activity  and  linking  them  together  in  new  ways.  This  had  the  effect  of
confirming the 'crisis' which the government was seeking to solve; the new calculative
norms brought individuals within the reach of efficiency calculations, subjecting them
to  new  behavioural  norms  to  which  they  did  not  immediately  match  up.  The
measurement both flowed from pre-existing theory and served to confirm it. 
The  tight  relation  between  theory  and  observation,  then,  is  not  accidental.  The
observation  of  the  object,  event  or  phenomenon  arises  alongside  the  theory  which
defines  it  (Marginson  1997).  This  definition  may  have  far-reaching  effects;  Power
(1994, 1996, 1997), for example, observes the way in which the requirement for audit
alters the way businesses organise themselves, as they re-arrange their operations to
ensure  they  are  visible  and  auditable.  This  is  more  than  the  definition  merely
conforming to the theory under which it was designed, the technology for observation is
altering what is observed. Similarly MacKenzie (2009) and Callon (2007) argue that the
efficient markets hypothesis creates the type of markets it believes exist by shaping the
behaviour of participants in existing (non-efficient) markets. In both cases, it is not that
the definition of the phenomenon is proved by that phenomenon being found, but that
the phenomenon is only occurring in that specific form as a result of the definition.
This can be read as a complement to the critical approaches of earlier sections. The two-
way relation between the theory and reality corresponds to the idea of the 'regime of
truth', the structured discourse which allows some things to be said but not others. Here
a series of regimes – about populations, economies, the neutrality of quantification, and
so on – interact and combine, creating a new regime expressed by the official statistic
which then acts to limit the possibilities of the external world. It is the blindness to the
social nature of this process which is being critiqued in the Marxian account of fetish
objects. However, unlike the critical positions above, the social construction approach
emphasises the contested nature of theory; as the theory arises through social activity, it
is shaped by it. The Statistical Actor works using their own conceptions of theory, in
interaction with others with potentially different conceptions, within the limits of their
resources  and  abilities.  The  official  statistic  created  then  feeds  back  into  theory,
impacting on the external world which it records.
This argument extends native accounts of official statistics discussed above. In the case
examined, that of human capital (Office for National Statistics 2012c; Jones and Fender
2011), there was a claim that human capital was observable in the external world and
that  the  official  statistic  worked  towards  measuring  this  accurately  and  reliably.
Theories of social construction would suggest that this was a partial account, in places
an incorrect one. 'Human capital'  can be seen as existing in the external world only
because of the frameworks of understanding applied to it: theories about 'capital', the
treatment of education as an investment, re-imagining human life in terms of income
streams,  and so on (see  for  a  general  argument  about  the situatedness  of  economic
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theory Dunford and Perrons, 1983). It can be measured only because of prior agreement
on  measurement  techniques,  mathematical  tools,  statistical  processes  and  so  on.
Following its 'discovery', as Foucault suggests (2008), its existence allows individuals
to target their 'human capital' in a calculating way by making it visible and linking it to
structures of incentives (Sointu 2005 makes a similar argument about 'well-being'). The
official statistic is a true reading of the world but only because there has first been social
agreement on what 'true' is. For critical theorists, 'true' is a function of power, but for
native accounts this need not be insidious. Hand (2004), for instance, talks about the
'pragmatic' aspect of statistics, the question of whether they serve the purpose set for
them, reading this as a technical rather than a political question. However, as Martin
(1981)  notes,  looking  at  the  activities  of  the  US  Statistical  Bureau,  the  pragmatic
element always comes first; the definition of the statistic follows the political need for
the statistic, not the other way around.
This  emphasis  on the  social  creates  a  sense  of  contingency within  official  statistics
which  is  much  more  obvious  than  in  the  accounts  discussed  above.  While  it  is
understandable that Statistical Actors may not see the contingent nature of the theories
they engage  with  ('human  capital',  for  instance,  is  shaped  by existing  accountancy
frameworks,  but  these  frameworks  are  never  questioned),  there  are  moments  of
interaction  where  new  theories  or  modes  of  action  become  possible.  For  instance,
Duncan (1987) notes the way that technological improvement in the conduct of the US
Census,  specifically  the  move  to  using  punch-cards,  increased  efficiency  in  data
analysis  and  so  allowed  more  questions  to  be  asked.  This  opens  up  new areas  for
exploration which were not there previously, prompting a dialogue between theories of
objects in the external world which do not yet have quantified aspects and theories of
quantification which are then applied to them. This extension of the statistical contrasts
with  that  identified  by  Government  Statisticians’ Collective  (1979) who  saw  later
technological  developments  as  ways  of  de-skilling and down-sizing  workforces;  the
statistical boundary is not expanded, but how the statistic is carried out is adjusted. This
adjustment is possible because of theories which accept the identity between machine
and human activities and the removal of aspects of the statistic-making process from
being questions  of  judgement  to  questions  of  technical  routine.  In  these  contrasting
approaches to new technology can be seen a set  of social  processes: mediating pre-
existing theories, attitudes, aims, priorities, and so on.
Such an approach can be critiqued. Schwandt (2000) and Craib (1997) both note the
danger that constructionism collapses into relativism; if all knowledge is situated within
locally negotiated contexts, there is no standard by which any knowledge can be said to
be 'true' or 'false'. This is an incomplete criticism, however. While it has force if one
comes from a naive realist standpoint, from a social constructivist standpoint it merely
seems to be describing the theory: knowledge is contingent and local and one cannot,
merely on the basis that it is locally true, suggest it applies more globally (Denzin and
Lincoln 2000). Schmidt (2001) goes further, arguing that constructionism, by implying
that  behaviour  and  motivational  factors  are  constituted  by social  norms  rather  than
merely conditioned by them, is reductionist and does away with agency. This seems to
overstate the case, implying a 'social' entity external to the individuals within it; such an
entity  has  been  strongly  argued  against  by,  among  others,  Latour  (2005;  see  also
Lincoln  and  Guba  2000).  As  a  final  critique,  social  construction  may  be  taken  as
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claiming that there is no material basis to knowledge, that the official statistic is entirely
discursive. This is a misreading; constructionism argues that the meaning of the material
world is entirely discursive. It is possible for observers to agree that the object of the
official statistic exists, but this is separate from the question of what that object is. That
question  can  only  be  answered  through  socially  shared  meanings;  it  is  perfectly
possible, to take the above example, to deny that there is such a thing as 'human capital',
even accepting the existence of humans, their educations, and so on.
2.4.2. Agency in the statistic-making process
This  social  process  of  official  statistic-making  happens  across  multiple  sites  and
multiple  scales  as  the  'social'  itself  is  multiply  constructed.  In  the  human  capital
example, the ideas of the economy and the population acted as givens, but the theory
that humans could be treated as capital was taken to require justification. That theory
had been developed by economists, primarily at the University of Chicago, as part of a
larger  theoretical  project  pushing the bounds of  their  methodology outside its  usual
areas of application.  The Statistical  Actors grounded their  work within this  body of
theory, where their arguments were accepted, and within wider international contexts,
where  the  official  statistic  was  accepted,  while  acknowledging  wider  public
disagreement or incomprehension towards the measure (Office for National Statistics
2012c). The Statistical Actor, then, has a role in moving theories across social contexts.
They must act within the limitations of theory, looking for what they believe to be there,
but that belief is the product of a subject position which may not be universally shared.
They are, themselves, embedded within social contexts, so are equally limited by their
circumstances. That is, not only are Statistical Actors reacting to each other and to the
wider theoretical currents of their society, but they are also interacting with non-human
objects  and structures such as institutions,  technology and resource constraints  (c.f.,
Latour  1987, 2005,  who would see non-humans and humans as  'actants'  with equal
importance in the creation process).  Hacking (1999) describes this  as the 'matrix'  in
which construction occurs, an interaction of institution, media, social setting and social
actors  in  which  an  idea  is  situated.  The  object  of  the  statistic  sits  within  a  matrix
involving:  historical  economic  and  statistical  theory;  ongoing  developments  within
academia;  international  policy  networks;  domestic  political  arguments  and  debates;
media generated moral panics; the institution of the ONS with its internal hierarchy,
equipment, funding; and so on. The Statistical Actors navigate this matrix, acting on it
and with it.
Various  aspects  of  this  matrix  have  been  examined  along  constructivist  lines,
particularly  the  body  of  statistical  methodology  and  theory  which  official  statistic-
making draws on. Atkins and Jarret (1979) observe the arbitrary nature of statistical
significance  testing  as  a  check  on  'reality',  highlighting  the  close  link  between  our
methods of claiming validity for scientific knowledge and the nature of the knowledge
we attain.  MacKenzie  (1981)  observes  the  political  or  philosophical  projects  which
formed the background of many statistical techniques themselves, such as the way that
basic correlation techniques arose out of the eugenicist conceptions they sought to test
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(for example, see Galton 1909). Hacking (1999), Barnes (1991) and Latour and Woolgar
(1986)  extend  this  further,  noting  that  the  structures  of  scientific  and mathematical
enquiry themselves are built around contingent aims and needs. The native approach in
which statistics are neutral, technocratic representations of the world is challenged by
this approach; instead they are a particular mode of thought which arose for specific
reasons but which has now become naturalised.
As Hacking (1999) claims, all stories of social construction are histories, in as far as
they relate to decisions which have been made over time. In addition to the practice of
statistic-making and the ideas which it rests on, official statistic-making bodies exist for
historical reasons. Their current institutional forms are the result of various funding,
political and administrative decisions. Their personnel have aims and desires shaped by
their immediate circumstances and their lives. On a social constructivist reading, all of
these impact on the practice of statistic-making into which any specific statistic fits.
That is, the practice of statistic-making is a social process which could be otherwise; the
nature of this social process interacts with the specific situation of any given statistic, its
theories or political context. 
This approach allows a fleshing out of the idea of the conjectural framework introduced
in Chapter One. That model suggested a simple division of responsibility within the
statistic-making  process,  with  a  specialised  Statistical  Actor  standing  between  those
who commissioned the statistic and their audience. Social construction theory suggests
the  range of  influences  and  restrictions  which  the  Statistical  Actor  works  under  by
positing them as part of a dynamic system, acting and reacting to their theoretical and
functional contexts. This approach goes beyond those surveyed previously; it does not
deny the theoretical positions they claim (those of control or of an empirically verifiable
external world) but questions the influence of those positions in the process. While they
may potentially motivate the act of statistical production, they are not, on this reading,
the end of the story.
2.5. Conclusions and empirical questions
The present  chapter  has  moved from the  conjectural  model  of  Chapter  One,  which
emphasised the role of individuals with agency in the making of official statistics, to a
consideration of two broad accounts of statistics and official statistics. In what have
been  called  'critical'  accounts,  those  written  from  a  Foucauldian  or  a  Marxian
perspective, official statistics are technologies of control. They exist for an instrumental
purpose,  imposing frameworks on the world to shape behaviour.  In what have been
called  'native'  accounts,  those  offered  by official  statisticians  themselves,  there  is  a
similarly  instrumental  purpose  but  one  which  involved  abstracting  from  the
complexities of an observable external world with the aim of making that external world
manageable for policy-makers.
It has been argued that both these accounts overlook the act of statistical creation by
supposing that the instrumental purpose is unproblematically achieved; that there is a
direct relation between the intention to control and the official statistic, or the external
world and the official  statistic.  This has the effect  of reducing the understanding of
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official statistics to a post hoc exercise: they take the form they do because they seek to
control  or  to  represent  reality,  so  their  features  occur  as  expressions  of  this  aim.
However, Chapter One argued that the intention to control or to represent was not the
only potential influence on the statistic-making process. While control or representation
may be the over-riding objective for Statistical Actors, they are objectives which would
be  balanced  against  others  and  against  other  constraints,  such  as  those  offered  by
resources, technology, statistical theory and so on. If this argument is correct, the form
and  content  of  the  official  statistic  are  not  simply  an  expression  of  control  or
representation,  but  partial  expressions  of  these  within  the  context  of  the  statistic's
creation.
The  present  chapter  expanded  on  this  argument  by  examining  literature  on  social
construction. This literature is sensitive to the social process of creation, presenting it as
a  dynamic  system  of  interactions  between  creators  and  their  contexts.  The
representations produced by creators are highly contingent and, in the hands of other
Statistical Actors in other places with other aims, may have been otherwise. It was noted
that this approach could be used as a complement to critical and native understandings,
uncovering the pathways through which such accounts would need to operate.
There is, on the arguments of these two chapters,  a gap in the literature around the
making of official statistics and particularly its social aspects. On the basis that official
statistics play a major role in public life and academic thought, this gap is one which it
is important to fill. The present research aims to fill this gap, asking the question:
Does an examination of official statistic-making as a social process add to
the understanding of official statistics' form and content?
If the process of official statistic-making has not been previously examined, as has been
argued, it may be for good reason. The critical or native accounts may be correct, and
the  relation  between  desires  for  the  statistic  and  the  output  of  statistic-making  be
relatively  unproblematic.  The  ontological  model  of  Chapter  One,  which  suggested
points  of agency and disagreement,  may be incorrect  or over-stated.  Having offered
justifications  for  conceiving  of  official  statistic-making  as  a  social  process,  it  is
necessary to investigate whether such beliefs hold. The test of this will be whether or
not such a conception allows the explanation of aspects of the form and content of
official statistics that could not be explained by pre-existing theories. Are there elements
of the official statistic which were previously inexplicable that can be explained when
the activities of agents are taken into account?
This over-arching aim can be broken down into four research questions:
(1) How can the official statistic-making process be understood as a social 
process?
(2) What are the components (institutions, theories, individuals, 
technologies, &c.) of that process?
(3) How do these components interact to produce the official statistic?
(4) What are the implications of this for an understanding of the official 
statistic?
34
HOW HAVE OFFICIAL STATISTICS PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNDERSTOOD?
The first of these seeks to fill the gap in the literature around official statistics which is
created by the black-box approach of both critical and native accounts. At the moment,
it is not clear what happens when an official statistic is made. The ontological model of
Chapter  One  has  provided  reasons  for  exploring  it  from the  perspective  of  agents
interacting with each other and their contexts. However, the treatment in Chapter One
was, necessarily, abstract and suppositional. There is left an empirical question of what
official statistic-making actually entails and what its social aspects involve.
The second research question builds on this. Social construction theory suggests that
individuals exist in dynamic systems of interaction, rather than in the static relationships
between intention and process suggested by critical and native theories. Such systems
will  be different  for  different  statistics  as  both individuals involved and the context
which they must negotiate will be different. However, at a higher level, there will be
commonalities  between  statistics,  arising  from  their  common  assumptions  around
commensurability and instrumental purpose. The black-box nature of existing accounts
creates an explanatory need for question one, as what official statistic-making entails is
unknown. Question two organises this into a more general theoretical framework.
If the process is dynamic, as the social construction literature suggests, then agents are
continually shaping the outcomes of official statistic-making by their interactions with
each other and their context. As in question two, this will be observable both on the
level  of  the  specific  statistic  and  more  generally.  Question  three  asks  how  these
interactions  shape the form and content  of the official  statistic,  taking seriously the
arguments put forward in the first two chapters of the contingency of the final form.
How do the components of social process come together to create the statistic?
The fourth question asks how considering official statistic-making as a social process
provides insights different from the critical and native accounts surveyed in the present
chapter. It has been argued that they underplay agency and contingency, taking official
statistics as relatively unproblematic outcomes of relatively linear processes. Are there
elements  of  official  statistics  which  are  better  explained  when  the  statistic-making
process  is  attended  to,  rather  than  being  taken  as  a  given?  If  so,  how  does  this
complement or challenge the existing theories?
Taken together, these four research questions capture the aim of the research project, by
using a new approach to explore the official statistic-making process and examining
whether this approach offers new ways of explaining the official statistics which are
produced.
Having  established  the  aims  and  questions  which  the  research  will  address,  the
following chapter  will  outline a  methodology and research design which will  allow
them to  be answered through exploring  the  particular  case  study of  the  'Measuring
National Well-being' programme.
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Chapter Three
Epistemology, methodology and research design: how might official
statistic-making be examined and understood?
Chapter One outlined some broad ontological claims about official statistics: that they
were  objects,  made  by  individuals  within  social  relations  and  contexts,  specific
conditions of opportunity and constraint. Chapter Two related this to existing accounts
of official statistics, arguing that both native and critical models disagreed with this set
of claims. It proposed instead that the ontological claims of Chapter One were better
represented by taking a social constructionist approach towards official statistics. The
present chapter works through the implications of this suggestion. If an official statistic
is a social construction, what can be known about it; what epistemology is implied by
this ontological claim? Having established this, it will be possible to outline a way of
investigating official statistics which is sensitive to their nature. The success or failure
of such an investigation will provide an answer to the overall research question outlined
in Chapter One, 'Does an examination of official statistic-making as a social process add
to the understanding of official statistics' form and content?'.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1. will build on the ontological claims of
Chapter One to develop an epistemology of the official statistic, outlining what can be
known about  it.  Section  3.2.  will  move from this  epistemology to sketch  a  general
research methodology capable of capturing its features. Section 3.3. will argue that the
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme,  briefly  introduced  in  the  first  chapter,
provides opportunities for gaining such knowledge. A research design which is sensitive
to the nature of the programme will then be outlined in Section 3.4.. A consideration of
ethics will be made in Section 3.5., and a general framework for analysis outlined in
Section 3.6.. The final section, 3.7., will provide a summary of the arguments of the
chapter.
3.1. Epistemology: what sort of thing is an official statistic?
The claim of Chapter One was that official statistics were created by Statistical Actors,
standing  between  Commissioning  Actors,  who  require  statistics,  and  a  Statistical
Audience, who receive statistics. It was argued that each of these sets of actors were
heterogeneous  within  themselves,  involving  multiple  individuals  with  differing
objectives, interests, influence and power. Such individuals embody these objectives,
interests, influence and power, relating to each other as social representatives of these. It
was also argued that the set of actors was porous: interacting and exchanging ideas,
resources  and  influence  with  agents  and  agencies  outside  of  itself  (for  instance,
Statistical Actors may include those who have acted as Commissioning Actors and those
who are primarily members of the Statistical Audience). The interactions and abilities of
Statistical Actors were shaped by multiple factors, such as the institutions they are a part
of, technology, theory, material resources such as finance, staffing levels and time; and
their control over these. 
On this model, the making of official statistics is a complex set of interactions, with its
outcome contingent  in  the  sense  that  a  change in  the  conditions  that  the  Statistical
Actors need to negotiate, or a change in the Actors working on the statistic, could result
in  a  very  different  official  statistic  being  created.  From  this  it  was  argued  that
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knowledge  of  the  statistic-making  process  and  its  components  was  important  to
understanding the official statistics which were produced. This is because the form and
content of the official statistic is a product of the interactions both between Statistical
Actors and between Actors and their context.
Such knowledge would take into account the fact that the Statistical Actors themselves
and their context differ substantially across time and space. What will be counted in a
statistic is a function of diverse factors, such as what is considered politically feasible to
count,  what  it  is  technologically possible  to  count,  what  can  be  coherently counted
given resource constraints, what agents consider to be theoretically valid to count, and
so  on.  These  will  partially  be  a  function  of  institutional  form,  making  the  official
statistics of one nation or collective somewhat different from those of another. It will
also  partially  be  a  function  of  time,  as  technologies,  access  to  material  resources,
institutional  settings,  and  so  on,  change.  These  two  factors,  institutional  form  and
historical capabilities, are in constant interaction, as will be seen in the development of
statistics by the Devolved Administrations of the UK (see Chapter Four); devolution
creates a new demand for official statistics to serve new political bodies and purposes,
new institutions in which to make such statistics, new desires to innovate in statistics as
a form of differentiation from existing UK-level approaches, and so on. In this example
can also be seen roles for place and for scale; new political geographies have created
new  places,  devolved  nations  which  didn't  exist  previously  for  many  statistical
purposes,  the  devolved-national  being  a  scale  which  for  many  official  statistics
previously did not exist.
However, despite this heterogeneity across statistical contexts, there will also be points
of  commonality  between  different  Statistical  Actors.  For  example,  many  official
statistics are subject to international guidelines on their construction, which will restrict
the freedom of Statistical Actors to innovate and which will work to standardise the
conditions  of  official  creation  across  bodies.  Similarly  where  a  single  institution
produces multiple statistics, as is the case in the UK's Office for National Statistics or in
the  various  Whitehall  departments  which  maintain  statistical  collections,  the
institutional context for those multiple statistics is held in common. Statistics here will
be subject to the same quality controls, the same professional culture, Statistical Actors
will be subject to the same training programmes, and so on.
As  outlined  briefly  in  Chapter  One,  this  conception  of  Statistical  Actors  draws  on
Giddens'  structuration  theory  of  agency  (Giddens  1984).  In  particular,  it  notes  the
interaction of individuals and their environment, suggesting that structures and agents
are  co-constitutive  of  each  other.  However,  as  observed  by,  among  others,  Archer
(Archer 1982), Giddens' account collapses structure into agency by characterising the
former as a lived set of rules and behaviours. While this does reflect the interplay of
structure and agency, with each shaping the other, it underplays the relative strength of
structure. Structure precedes agents, it is something they confront  (O’Boyle 2013). In
the case of Statistical Actors in the UK, they are confronting the institutional structures
of the Office for National Statistics and UK policy-making, and the various theoretical
bases  for  the  statistics  they  are  making.  As  Burkitt  (2015),  and  authors  taking  the
strategic-relational  approach (Allen  and Cochrane  2010;  Jessop 2001,  2008;  Jessop,
Brenner and Jones 2008; Jones 2007) suggest, it is more accurate to think of structures
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as social  relations.  That is,  structures are  flexible,  but  variably so; agents will  have
varying degrees of freedom of action. Statistical Actors may have influence over the
statistic, but this is limited. How limited, and in what ways, is an empirical question.
 
These considerations mean that the knowledge of the production of a single official
statistic  will  be,  in  many ways,  particular.  A full  description  of  the statistic-making
process, were it possible, would describe only the creation of a single official statistic,
created by a single set of time- and space-bound Statistical Actors. However, the impact
of  time- and space-bound factors  of  some sort  is  a  necessary feature of  all  official
statistics. A sensitivity to these factors as influencing the form and content of the official
statistic will, then, allow transferable conclusions about the creation of official statistics
to be drawn.
Given the emphasis placed in this account on the social nature of the statistic-making
process, high-level accounts such as the critical and the native accounts examined in
Chapter Two (Sections 2.2.  and 2.3.)  are  necessarily incomplete.  They view official
statistics as in some way inevitable: their form follows from the role that they are to
fulfil, be it the faithful representation of external reality or some form of social control.
On the argument of Chapter One, this  inevitability is more apparent than actual. To
understand the form that the official statistic takes, it is necessary to understand how it
was made and so what possibilities of form were open to it.
Two  ways  of  obtaining  such  understanding  suggest  themselves.  One  would  be  to
become a  Statistical  Actor  and  participate  in  producing  statistics,  in  the  manner  of
Government Statistician’s Collective (1979), or to observe Statistical Actors at work.
Such participation or observation would allow a knowledge of matters of institutional
form, technology, professional opinions and understanding, theoretical debates between
Actors,  and  so  on.  Alternatively,  similar  knowledge  could  be  gained  by talking  to
Statistical  Actors  about  their  work,  and  through  triangulating  this  with  secondary
material such as policy documents, meeting minutes and public statements. This method
would also capture issues of institutional form, technology and so on, the social contexts
which official, technical, accounts do not record.
In some ways, the former method of direct participation or observation is preferable. It
provides access to elements of the statistic-making process which Statistical Actors may
feel, consciously or otherwise, are too quotidian to merit discussion but which none-the-
less influence what official  statistics are possible.  For example,  Latour and Woolgar
(1986), in their study of 'laboratory life' note the ways in which only certain forms of
'solution'  are  acceptable  within  scientific  discourse,  and  that  these  were  applied  to
'problems' which only appeared as such as a result of the structure of that discourse. For
the scientists in question, their approaches and the problems they approached were self-
evident;  for Latour and Woolgar, they were open to critique from outside the social
context that the scientists moved in. It took outsiders entering that world to make its
assumptions apparent (similar arguments are made by Knorr Cetina 1999). A similar
entry into the world of official statistical creation, into its 'hidden abode of production'
(Marx  1990,  p.279),  could  uncover  both  the  actively  hidden  and  that  which,  for
Statistical Actors at least, is hidden in plain sight.
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On these grounds, attempts were made to gain access to two different national-level
official statistic-making bodies as both an observer and as a participant observer. In one
case, no reply of any sort was received from the statistic-making body; this was likely
the result of having no access to gate-keepers within the organisation but relying instead
on publicly available forms of contact. In the second case, it appeared that access would
be granted but, having secured involvement from the Statistical Actors themselves, their
'Human Resources' department refused access. There are a number of potential reasons
for this, primary among them the likely lack of a procedure for allowing temporary
access to an environment where confidential data is handled on a daily basis.  While
these failures do not prove that direct observation as research method is not possible, it
did prove impossible in this particular case.
The  second  method,  that  of  discussion  with  Statistical  Actors  accompanied  by  an
examination of their outputs, is less likely to pick up on subtleties of day-to-day life of
Statistical  Actors,  but  it  does  have  some  advantages  when  compared  with  direct
observation. In particular, it establishes a distance between the Statistical Actors and the
particular statistic they produce by calling on them to actively reflect on the process of
statistic-making.  Thus  while  the  knowledge  of  the  specific  statistic  is  likely  to  be
impaired, it may be possible to get a firmer understanding of generalities as Statistical
Actors and the secondary material arising from their work place their work within a
wider context of statistic-making. 
However, such methods also have clear disadvantages, most pressingly that all data is
mediated rather than collected by the researcher, and thus subject to the potential re-
writings  of  memory  or  deliberate  institutional  manipulation.  A further  difficulty  is
created by the distance between the creation of the official statistic and its investigation.
As the statistic-making process becomes more remote in time, it will become harder to
access the documents and personal accounts of its creation.  The majority of official
statistics  have  been  being  collected  for  a  very  long  time,  meaning  there  are  few
individuals able to talk about the conditions of their creation. Unless there is a historical
account explaining how decisions were made, this means that knowledge of the social
production of statistic-making is lost. To study the social processes of official statistic-
making, there needs to be an example of a statistic developed recently, whose creators
and their accounts of creation are still accessible.
3.2. Methodology and research design
These  requirements,  of  a  recent  official  statistic  whose  Statistical  Actors  and  their
outputs remain accessible, suggests a case study approach. Stake (2000) distinguishes
three forms of case study: intrinsic, where the case is studied as an interesting subject in
its own right; instrumental, where the case is examined as a means to understanding
wider processes of which it is an example; and collective, where numerous cases are
studied with a view to establishing a picture of the population of which they form a part.
Although he acknowledges that this delineation is approximate, and that any particular
study may have multiple aims, it is a useful distinction. Given the arguments above that
the nature of the official statistic-making process is social, and so that any particular
official statistic embodies, to use Lund's (2014) typology, a concrete case of both the
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specific and the general, an instrumental case study or studies is most appropriate to the
present research question.
The possibility of multiple case studies was ruled out by the failure to gain access to
multiple official statistic-making bodies. While access was possible with one national-
level body, attempts to access sub-national level bodies were unsuccessful (see below
for a fuller discussion). Given the limited number of official statistics which are newly
created  and  so  accessible  for  study,  and  the  inability  to  access  other  national-level
bodies discussed above, this lack of access meant that only one case study was possible.
Following the observations above and the inability to conduct direct observations of the
Statistical Actors, this case study would need to be accessed using interviews.
Like the official statistic-making it seeks to investigate, an interview is a social process
(Briggs 1986). As Kvale (1996) and Silverman (2000) observe, an interview is not an
empiricist  uncovering of external  truth,  with the participant  offering up facts  to  the
interviewer.  Rather,  interviews represent the simultaneous and two-way processes of
interpretation,  validation  and communication;  they  are  texts  negotiated  between  the
interviewer and participant (see also de Sola Pool 1957; Fontana and Frey 2000; Briggs
1986). As a result, the interview process (and subsequent analysis) needs to be sensitive
to  its  narrative  nature  (Holstein  and  Gubrium  1995);  a  sensitivity  which  inclines
towards semi-structured interviews offering the participants the maximum opportunity
to direct the conversation, reciprocity in information-giving between interviewer and
participant,  and  a  sharing  of  interpretations  by  the  interviewer  with  the  participant
(Oakley 1981; Phillips and Johns 2012; Terkel 1988, 2004).
The  negotiated,  and  so  partial,  nature  of  interview  texts  places  a  premium  on
triangulation  between  interviews  within  the  case  study.  It  also  again  highlights  the
desirability of multiple comparable case studies. However, as Silverman (2011), makes
clear,  comparison of cases is not the only way of validating interpretations of those
cases. As a result of various open data initiatives in the public sector, there is a large
amount of secondary material surrounding official statistic-making, including meeting
minutes and commentaries on statistical outputs. In addition to these records there are
also documents (to use Lincoln and Guba's 1985 distinction); Statistical Actors publish
discussions within theoretical and professional literatures. These can be drawn on to
supplement accounts from a specific case study, allowing more reliable conclusions to
be drawn than could be drawn from interviews alone.
The  triangulation  and contextualisation  process  can  also  go  further  than  this.  If,  as
argued,  an  official  statistic  is  an  object  made  by  individuals  under  conditions  of
opportunity and restraint, then the materials drawn on in a case study can be read as
artefacts created under particular material conditions and embedded within social and
ideological  systems  (Hodder  2000).  That  is,  there  is  a  background  to  the  official
statistic,  a  set  of  institutional  and theoretical  conditions  which  form the  framework
within which the Statistical Actors operate, and this can be examined prior to embarking
on the case study as a way of situating it. For example, national-level official statistics
in the UK are largely the responsibility of the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The
institutional form of the ONS – its history, structure, professional make-up, relation to
government  and policy,  integration into international  frameworks of  statistic-making
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practice, and so on – will set some of the opportunities and restraints within which the
statistical  programme is  constructed.  Similarly,  the statistical  programme must  be in
dialogue with existing bodies of theory around the statistical object, and with previous
efforts at measurement; these form the theoretical landscape in which a new statistical
programme  will  sit.  Both  institutional  form  and  theoretical  background  can  be
examined,  giving  an  understanding  of  the  social  context  with  which  the  Statistical
Actors must engage. These will be specific to the case study, but transferable in as far as
all official statistics must engage with a social context of some kind (Law 2004).
This suggests a two-stage investigative process, similar to that of Lincoln and Guba's
(1985) 'naturalistic inquiry'. Once a case has been selected, the first stage will need to
examine its broad social context. What are the institutional and theoretical situations
which Statistical Actors must deal with? While offering a grounding for the particular
official statistic, this will also point to more generalisable aspects of the official statistic-
making process. The knowledge gained from this will allow the direction of case study
interviews,  enquiring  of  participants  how their  social  context  was  negotiated  in  the
statistic-making process. This can be done in dialogue with secondary materials, using
interview responses, official outputs and 'grey' literature as triangulation points against
each other to gain an understanding of the case.
3.3. Selection of a case study: The 'Measuring National Well-being' programme
The  UK Office  for  National  Statistics'  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme
meets  the  requirements  as  a  case  study  for  this  research.  At  the  time  of  the
commencement of the interviews for this study (Autumn 2014), the programme was
four years old (as dated from its launch, see Cameron 2010; Matheson 2011; and figure
3.1.  below)  and  was  still  under-going  development.  Indeed,  it  did  not  get  its  first
statistical release until late-2012 (Office for National Statistics 2012b), and its novel
components were not awarded 'National Statistic' status (the methodological kite-mark
awarded to official statistics in the UK by their ombudsman) until two years later (UK
Statistics Authority 2014a). This meant that it was still possible to speak with those who
had been involved in its creation about the statistic-making process and what it entailed;
there were Statistical Actors available who were able to recall how the statistic-making
process  had  been  conducted.  The  importance  of  this  recency  was  underlined  by
approaches  to  some individuals  involved  in  the  early  stages  of  the  statistic-making
process who, just three years later, were unable to recall what their role had entailed.
This  recency is  unique,  certainly for a  large-scale  programme;  it  is  rare  for  official
statistic-making  bodies  to  embark  on  entirely  novel  statistical  programmes.  The
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme allows  an  insight  into  official  statistic-
making which is not often available.
There  is  also  a  certain  amount  of  secondary  literature  surrounding  the  'Measuring
National Well-being' programme which can be triangulated with the opinions of those
involved  in  the  statistic-making  process.  This  includes  meeting  minutes  of  various
committees established to advise the ONS on the creation of the programme, minutes of
committees  outside  the  ONS  who  advised  on  the  quality  of  the  programme,  and
accounts and critiques written by those involved in the statistic-making process (such
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(Allin 2013, 2014; Allin and Hand 2014; Tomlinson and Kelly 2013). This is, relatively
speaking, a wealth of material: statistics developed earlier, particularly those which pre-
date the ability to easily and publicly publish minutes and reports online,  lack such
evidence of the statistic-making process. Its presence makes it easier to triangulate and
expand on the interview accounts of individuals involved. It also allows for improved
targeting  of  questions  by  highlighting  areas  of  particular  interest  or  expertise  for
participants, ensuring that in interviews conversations occur on subjects which they are
able to comment on.
While there exist other novel statistical programmes, such as those looking at 'human
capital'  or  environmental  accounts  in  the  UK  (Jones  and  Fender  2011;  Office  for
National Statistics 2014d) and developments of the national accounts at the European
Level (Eurostat and European Commission 2013), these lack the size or scope of the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme. Indeed, in the case of human capital and
environmental  accounts,  they are developed either  in  conversation  with or  as  direct
components  of  the  programme  (Office  for  National  Statistics  2012e).  Such  efforts
provide  fewer  opportunities  for  investigation:  their  output  is  smaller  and  fewer
Statistical Actors are involved in their creation. They are also less prominent than the
first statistical programme to be launched by a Prime Minister since the 1960s (when
Harold Wilson launched the journal  Social Trends,  see Allin and Hand 2014; Moser
2000), reducing the incentive for Statistical Actors to make time to explain them to a
researcher.  The  climate  of  publicity  around  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'
programme is likely to improve access to research participants by making scrutiny both
more usual and more legitimate.
The  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  also  developed  within  a  wider
international context; similar programmes were being developed in 2010 at European
and Organisation  for  Economic Co-operation  and Development  (OECD) levels,  and
comparable efforts were also made at the national level in other countries and at the
sub-national level of the Devolved Administrations within the UK (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2012; Commission of the European Communities 2009; Directors General of
the National Statistical Institutes 2010; European Statistical System Committee 2011;
Scottish  Government  2011).  This  offered  another  way  to  consider  questions  of
generalisability, by opening up space for comparisons between the work of the ONS and
that of other organisations. This would provide more insight into the way that particular
institutional peculiarities shaped programmes across territories.
In terms of interviews, this international and sub-national comparative research proved
impossible.  An  attempt  to  secure  access  to  Statistical  Actors  within  a  Devolved
statistical body proved unsuccessful as internal guidelines precluded statisticians from
talking to external actors, including academic researchers, about their work (essentially
closing this particular activity of the state from external scrutiny). While access  was
gained to Statistical Actors working within an international statistical body, the resulting
interview was withdrawn by those more senior in the organisation as it was not deemed
compatible with the official statements of the organisation's practice (unattributed email,
10 July 2014). This latter body subsequently failed to fulfil a promise to vet and answer
written questions. Both the offer to answer only questions which they could control, and
their  subsequent  failure  to  do  so,  equally  closes  this  body  to  external  scrutiny;
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subsequent enquiries only met with directions to their website which contained high-
level accounts of the concepts and purposes of the programme but little engagement
with the process of its creation.
However, while interview access to external bodies was not possible, their outputs were
still  available  for  scrutiny,  as  was  high-level  information  about  their  institutional
arrangements and histories. This makes it possible to compare some aspects of the UK
programme  with  its  international  counterparts,  helping  to  isolate  aspects  of  the
programme which arise from peculiarities within the economic, social, political, cultural
and institutional contexts of the UK which Statistical Actors working on the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme must navigate.
Equally valuably, the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme was produced by a
public  institution.  The  Office  for  National  Statistics  is  the  central  government
department  responsible  for  the  production  of  many  of  the  UK's  official  statistics,
legislated for by the  Statistics  and Registration Services Act 2007.  This allows the
contextualisation  of  the  programme,  as  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  institutional
literature that can be drawn upon, as well as public pronouncements of politicians, on
the nature, funding and strategic direction of the organisation. This will serve to inform
and to contextualise interviews with Statistical Actors. 
The  selection  of  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  also  allows  for  a
greater generalisation of the findings of this study to other official statistics. While not
the only creator of official statistics in the UK, the ONS is the central specialised body,
and so a great many of the official statistics which play a role in public discourse in the
UK will  share with  the 'Measuring National  Well-being'  programme an institutional
background,  professional  context  and  agential  worldview  for  Statistical  Actors,
constraints and opportunities provided by technology, and so on. In many cases, the
same  Statistical  Actor  will  work  on  multiple  official  statistics.  This  provides  the
potential that findings will be generalisable from the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme to the majority of other official statistics in use in UK public discourse.
Similarly,  there  exist  internationally  similar  models  of  centralised  official  statistical
creation, meaning that a focus on the work of the ONS may provide insights into official
statistic-making outside of the UK context.
For these reasons, the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme is a good candidate
as  a  case  study  for  an  investigation  of  the  official  statistic-making  process.  It  is
accessible using methods which are appropriate to the epistemology outlined above, and
has aspects which make it broadly representative of official statistic-making practice.
3.4. The research methodology as applied to the 'Measuring National Well-being' 
programme
Having outlined an epistemology,  the methodology that flows from that,  and a case
study suitable for the application of that methodology, it is possible to specify how that
methodology will  be  applied  in  practice.  The  methodology detailed  in  Section  3.2.
above had two stages: an initial stage in which the institutional and theoretical context
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of the case study would be investigated,  and a second stage which drew on this  to
inform interviews and analysis of secondary material related to the case study.
The first stage will deal with the institutional and theoretical context of the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme as it stood in 2010. The context of the official statistic
has economic, social, political and cultural dimensions, so this first stage seeks to situate
the Office for National Statistics within the historical and socio-political context of the
UK and to situate 'well-being' within its historical, theoretical and statistical contexts
more broadly. These will be explored through a review of relevant secondary literature
(Chapters Four and Five). Once this background to the programme has been sketched, it
will  be possible  to  proceed with an empirical  investigation of  how this  background
influenced and shaped the statistic-making process.
This  exploration  of  the  institutional  and  theoretical  context  represents  an  original
contribution  to  the  literatures  around  statistic-making  in  the  UK  and  well-being
(although, in relation to the latter, in places it replicates the work of others, such as Scott
2012). It is necessary because if, as the preceding two chapters have argued, an official
statistic is a social construction, it is important to know what it is constructed out of. If
those creating official statistics have agency in the sense outlined in Chapter One, it is
important to know where they will be called upon to make decisions and what the likely
limitations  on  their  decision-making  powers  are.  Establishing  this  context  involves
examining secondary data around key institutional and theoretical structures, principally
the Office for National Statistics, the role of statistics within the UK policy-making,
well-being and statistical developments around well-being. These structures act as pre-
requisites  for  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme,  and  the  programme
represents an expression of them. It is important, then, to understand their histories and
the  debates  which  informed their  current  forms.  Such forms  and such  debates  will
inform the actions of Statistical Actors, and so an understanding of them will inform the
questions that put to them in the second stage of the research.
The broad outlines of the statistic-making process in the case of the 'Measuring National
Well-being' programme are sketched in figure 3.1. below. It runs from the public launch
of the programme in July 2010, through the first statistical release in July 2012 to the
point at which the subjective well-being measurements, which were the programme's
most  novel  component,  were  granted  the  'National  Statistics'  kite-mark  by the  UK
Statistics Authority. At this point the programme can be said to be 'constructed', as it has
reached a stable and approved form (see also Self 2014, the ONS' reflections on the
'Measuring National Well-being' project).  Also indicated are two public consultations
(the 'National Debate' and a consultation on proposed components of the programme)
and two key advisory committees in which the staff of the Office of National Statistics
were supplemented by Statistical Actors from outside the organisation. (Outputs of the
programme are given in Appendix D.)
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Figure 3.1. A schematic time-line of the statistic-making process in the case of the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme
These two advisory panels are moments of interaction between the three categories of
actor  sketched  in  Chapter  One,  where  the  aims  and  objectives  of  different  groups,
embodied in individuals, come into contact. They are the Advisory Forum, which met
twice in early 2011, and the Technical Advisory Group, which had its  first  and last
meetings  in  February  2011  and  April  2013  respectively.  On  these  bodies  sit
representatives from Whitehall Departments, Devolved Assemblies, non-governmental
organisations, international statistical organisations, and academics (see Appendix A).
The Advisory Forum also includes representatives from business. These are extensions
of the Office for National Statistics, incorporations to inform its activities of additional
actors of varying knowledge, positionality, power and influence. As extensions of the
Office for National  Statistics,  these individuals become temporary Statistical  Actors,
internal  to  the  official  statistic-making  process.  As  such,  they  provide  pools  of
individuals  who  can  be  interviewed  regarding  the  process  of  construction  for  the
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  in  addition  to  those  at  the  Office  for
National  Statistics  itself.  The  two  advisory  bodies  also  produced  sets  of  minutes,
available  online  (with  varying  degrees  of  clarity  and  exactitude),  which  can  be
scrutinised to provide context and support to participants' accounts. The interviews and
secondary material, as well as the contextual materials of Chapters Four and Five, serve
to triangulate and substantiate each other, allowing greater confidence in the robustness
of their analysis than any of them could in isolation. Both bodies also produced a certain
amount  of internal  written material,  principally email  communication discussing the
development of the programme. This was, unfortunately, inaccessible.
The composition of the two different bodies necessitated two different approaches to
gaining access to participants. As the minutes of the Advisory Forum do not list who
attended meetings, it is impossible to say what extent of engagement individuals had
with the group, and so all members were contacted and asked for information on their
involvement. However, as will be discussed further in Chapter Six, the Advisory Forum
predominately consisted of individuals who were in the elite in their fields – winners of
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Nobel memorial prizes in the case of academics, holders of public honours in the case of
civil servants and leading members of the business world (see Appendix A). Initially
these individuals were approached through a personalised email invitation, sent to email
addresses made public online, accompanied by the explanatory letter given as Appendix
B.  The  email  indicated  why  the  individual  was  being  invited  out  of  all  possible
participants, emphasising the knowledge and expertise that they would offer the project.
Where  contact  details  were  not  available  online,  inquiries  were  made  by phone  to
potential gatekeepers within their organisations, such as press offices.
Due to the seniority of the individuals recruited for the Advisory Forum, it was difficult
to secure interviews with this group; initial queries gained only three interviews (out of
a potential pool of 46). As an adaptation in response to this lack of availability, those
who had  declined  to  be  interviewed and those  who had  not  yet  been invited  were
contacted by email asking for a brief written account of their involvement. 18 responses,
either from the individuals themselves or their staff, were gained in this way. Combined
with  the  three  interviews  gained,  between  these  two  approaches  this  represents  a
response  rate  of  a  little  under  half  (21  of  46,  46%).  To increase  uptake  in  written
responses, it was made clear that these would be used in an exploratory, off-the record
fashion, would be anonymised and would not be quoted in the research.
The Technical Advisory Group was a larger body, with 37 listed members but with a
further  53 individuals  attending one or  more meetings.  The minutes  of  the Group's
meetings list attendance, which made a purposive sampling strategy possible based on
potential interviewees'  level of involvement in meetings.  For example,  six of the 37
listed members did not attend any meetings, and 59 individuals in total  attended no
more than one of the eight meetings held (see Appendix A). On the assumption that
involvement in meetings proxied for involvement in the statistic-making process as a
whole (including non-meeting-based activities), this information allowed the focusing
of interviews on Statistical  Actors who had been closely involved with the advisory
process. In total, thirteen interviews were held with Group members, a little over a third
of those approached (35 were approached, giving a 37% response rate).
In  total  across  the  two  groups,  16  interviews  were  conducted.  These  covered
representatives of all  the major groups involved as Statistical  Actors in the statistic-
making  process:  the  ONS  (two  interviews),  international  bodies  (one  interview),
Whitehall  Departments  (six  interviews),  Devolved  Administrations  (one  interview),
international bodies (one interview) and academics (five interviews). One interview was
secured through personal  connections  between staff  within the University and those
within the Office for National Statistics; similar connections were used in unsuccessful
attempts to secure interviews with actors in other statistical bodies. Another interview
was secured through contacts made by the researcher in person at a research conference.
Efforts  were  made  to  expand  the  pool  of  interviewees  through  snow-balling;  in  a
number of cases interviewees recommended other actors for interviews, and allowed the
researcher to use their names as an introduction. This was notably unsuccessful when
trying to secure more participants from the ONS: the senior figure interviewed acted as
a gate-keeper and refused requests to speak with further members of their team. Any
lack of  quantity  of  interviews  is  compensated  for  by quality:  the  two ONS figures
interviews represented key actors within the construction of the programme and the
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interviews  conducted  with  them  were  the  most  lengthy  in  the  research  (both
approaching an hour in length).  In general,  due to  the theoretical  sampling strategy
undertaken,  the sixteen interviews represented many of  the individuals  most  closely
involved in the programme and so those most able to offer information on it.
The interviews also capture a range of Statistical Actors: from those who can be thought
of  as  'permanent',  in  the  case  of  those  at  the  ONS  itself;  through  those  regularly
involved in  statistic-making,  which includes both academics and government actors;
and  down to  those  who  were  involved  only  in  the  construction  of  the  'Measuring
National Well-being' programme, as was the case with some of the academics. These
differences  were  reflected  in  the  interviews:  some  Actors  spoke  with  an  eye  to
maintaining on-going relationships, others in light of their regained outsider status.
The interviews were conducted by telephone over the summer of 2014. This method,
rather than face-to-face interviewing, was selected partly as a result of the dispersal of
interviewees across the UK and Europe (with further potential interviewees in North
America). Another factor was the difficulty in scheduling face-to-face meetings with
academics, civil servants and representatives of international organisations, all of whom
had pressures on their time. Where face-to-face interviews were attempted, they were in
all  cases  cancelled  as  more  pressing  priorities  arose  for  participants.  Telephone
interviewing allowed the flexibility for participants to select a time to be involved in the
research,  which may have increased the response rate.  Interviews lasted between 30
minutes and an hour, depending on how much the participant wanted to say.
The style of the interviews drew on work around language ideologies, particularly that
of  Briggs  (1986,  2007),  and  also  the  literature  around  the  negotiated  nature  of  the
interview discussed above (Kvale 1996). This literature argues that interviews do not
represent straightforward transmissions of thoughts contained within the interviewee's
mind, but instead that they are dynamic responses to the constraints of the interview
setting. The interviewer cannot be neutral within the interview process; the very fact of
asking questions influences the information obtained (Collins 1998; Kitchin and Tate
2000). Neither is the interviewee neutral, as they are able to an extent to control the
information  provided  in  their  responses.  As  a  result,  the  interview  represents  a
negotiation of the relationship between the positions of researcher and researched; a
negotiation  which  occurs  alongside  other  relationships  of  relative  power,  distance,
solidarity,  and  so  on  (Koven  2014).  (That  is,  both  interviewer  and  interviewee  are
treated  as  agents  within  a  social  relation,  in  keeping  with  the  suppositions  of  the
research.)  Considering  this,  as  much  as  possible  interviews  were  conducted  as
conversations,  with  the  researcher  interspersing  questions  with  comments  on
participants'  replies  and responses  (Koven 2011;  see also Oakley 1981).  As will  be
discussed below, interviews were written up as narrative notes, rather than transcripts,
allowing participants to respond to the representation of what they had said and adjust
the tone as they felt appropriate.
Interviews were semi-structured, built around themes identified in the research into the
programme's  institutional  and theoretical  context  (see Chapters  Four  and Five),  and
were conducted without a standardised interview schedule. This was partly because the
diversity  of  participants  meant  that  a  standardisation  of  questions  would  have  been
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inappropriate, and partly because it allowed questions to be revised and developed both
within and across interviews. This meant that many of the themes discussed in later
interviews were different from those discussed in earlier ones as new aspects of the
statistic-making  process  became  apparent.  Instead,  conversations  were  built  around
broad  themes  based  on  what  was  known  about  the  participant's  background  and
institutional  or  theoretical  position,  and  developed  in  response  to  the  participant's
replies. This ensured that questions could be sensibly directed to participants and that
time was not wasted on asking material that was a matter of public record. Following
Mikecz (2012), this also reduced opportunities for interviewees to offer 'public relations'
accounts  of  their  work.  (Indeed,  as  noted  above,  one  interview was  retrospectively
withdrawn  from  the  study  precisely  because  managers  within  the  interviewee's
organisation felt it to be have strayed far from the publicly available account of their
work. While disappointing, this can be taken as an indication that the interview was
successful in its aims.)
Interviews  were  not  recorded.  In  some  early  cases  this  was  because  of  explicit
opposition  by  interviewees;  with  later  interviews  it  was  done  partly  to  ensure
consistency in approach across participants and partly as a deliberate tactic to avoid
formality within the interview setting as discussed above. Notes from these meetings
were then written up, clearly labelled as non-verbatim narrative accounts, and sent to
participants to comment on if they so they wished. Again, this was an attempt to avoid
the appearance potentially given by a transcript that it, and the interview it records, are a
straightforward representation of thoughts within the interviewee's mind. As Bucholtz
(2000) makes clear, transcripts are not neutral objects but contain within them a series
of representational decisions (see also Hodder 2000). Producing narrative notes made
the representational nature of the account of the interview clear, gave warning of the
representational nature of the account which would be taken in later work, and offered
the  opportunity  for  these  representations  to  be  challenged  as  an  extension  of  the
negotiations of the interview itself. This seemed a natural expression of Lincoln and
Guba's  (1985) observation that  interviews should be handled narratively,  as it  made
clear to participants that  this  was how their  interviews were being handled.  Several
participants took this opportunity, correcting misunderstandings and adjusting for tone,
and  these  were  incorporated  into  the  interview notes.  In  a  small  number  of  cases,
participants  did  not  respond to  the  sending  of  the  notes;  comments  were  invited  a
second time from these participants, and they were told that non-correction would be
taken  as  a  sign  of  acceptance  that  the  notes  were  a  fair  representation  of  the
conversation that occurred.
In one case (a seventeenth interview), as discussed above, the participant requested that
the notes be withdrawn as their manager did not feel that they represented the views of
the organisation. This was done, and this interview does not appear in the research.
Although that participant offered to respond to written questions, they did not, and they
also  failed  to  respond  to  requests  to  reproduce  the  email  correspondence  between
themselves and the researcher. As a result, this correspondence is also excluded from
this research.
For reasons discussed in the section below (3.6.), participants were fully anonymised. A
list of interviews appears as table 3.1..
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Date Participant 
(anonymised)
Institutional Position
5 June, 11am Oliver Academic (Statistical theory)
2 July, 4pm Jack International organisation (Statistician)
17 July, 10.30am Harry Academic (Economics)
23 July, 10am Jacob Devolved Administration
4 August, 12pm Charlie NGO (Social policy)
8 August, 4pm Amelia Central Government (Whitehall)
22 August, 11am Jessica NGO (Public health)
2 September, 3pm Ava Academic (Public health)
9 September, 12pm Thomas Academic (Sociology)
11 September, 11am Oscar ONS
11 September, 2pm Emily Central Government (Whitehall)
12 September, 2.30pm William ONS
8 October, 10.30am Isla Central Government (Whitehall)
8 October, 2.30pm James Central Government (Whitehall)
10 October, 10.30am George Academic (Psychology)
14 October, 2pm Alfie Central Government (Whitehall)
In addition,  there are  5 sets  of  emails  declining involvement,  18 written
responses  to  the  enquiry  "What  was  your  involvement?",  1  withdrawn
interview and a number of off-record conversations. These are not used as
primary data within the research, as they all lacked formal approval from
participants for such a use.
Table 3.1. Interviews conducted
In  addition  to  interviewing  and  eliciting  written  comments  directly  from Statistical
Actors, material around the Advisory Forum and Technical Advisory Group were also
analysed. This represents two sets of minutes for the Advisory Forum and eight sets of
minutes for the Technical Advisory Group; also the Terms of Reference for both groups
and a number of supporting presentations and discussion papers which were presented
to the Advisory Group. These were all available on the Office for National Statistics'
website at the time of the research. An email enquiry to the programme team in July
2014 confirmed that these represented all the meetings held by both groups (a question
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which arose partly because several scheduled meetings,  particularly of the Advisory
Forum, did not take place).
The  evidence  gathered  from  interviews  and  this  secondary  material  produced  by
Statistical Actors was supplemented by minutes of the Government Statistical Service
Methodology Advisory Committee (GSS MAC), a group which sits  above the ONS
within the UK official statistical hierarchy, and whose role is to inspect and advise on
official statistics which have been brought before them. They discussed the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme in their meeting of 19 June 2013, and these minutes
were included in the research because this inspection procedure is a key part of the UK
official  statistic-making process. On similar grounds, the report  of the UK Statistics
Authority  considering  whether  the  personal  well-being  component  of  the  ONS'
programme  was  of  sufficient  quality  to  be  badged  a  'National  Statistic'  was  also
considered (UK Statistics Authority 2014a).
Finally, a certain amount of non-meeting-related secondary material was collected and
synthesised  with  the  primary  data  obtained  in  interviews.  This  secondary  material
includes published outputs of the programme written by those at the ONS; and 'grey
literature', material about the programme written by those involved in it but not written
under the official auspices of the ONS. As with the interviews, this secondary material
reflects  the  range  of  permanent  and  impermanent  Statistical  Actors,  including  both
material written by those at the ONS and those who were only involved in the short-
lived Advisory Forum (as in the case of Tomlinson and Kelly 2013).
The purpose of this synthesis is to contextualise and triangulate the material gained in
the primary interviews. It serves both to inform interviews, by offering official accounts
of events within the statistic-making process, and to situate the accounts of interviewees
within the impersonal (but not impartial) official narrative. This is important in a study
such as this, because the individuals involved in a social process are socially positioned;
they have interests, objectives, beliefs, and so on. This means that experiences of events
may differ across Statistical Actors. How these experiences are expressed by different
interviewees, and how they are recorded in the official accounts, may differ. An account
of the social nature of the process of official statistic-making needs to take account of
such differences.
A complete list of materials considered appears as table 3.2..
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Date Type Author Title
2011 Terms of 
reference
ONS Advisory Forum, Terms of Reference
2011 Membership 
list
ONS Advisory Forum, Membership List
2011 Terms of 
reference
ONS Technical Advisory Group, Terms of 
Reference
2011 Membership 
list
ONS Technical Advisory Group, 
Membership List
5 January 2011 Minutes ONS Advisory Forum, minutes, 1st meeting
February 2011 Consultation 
paper
Dolan, Paul; 
Layard, Richard; 
and Metcalfe, 
Robert
Measuring subjective well-being for 
public policy
4 February 2011 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
1st meeting
11 April 2011 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
2nd meeting
21 June 2011 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
3rd meeting, seminar on measuring 
children's and young people's well-
being
25 July 2011 Minutes ONS Advisory Forum, minutes, 2nd 
meeting,
26 January 2012 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
4th meeting
29 March 2012 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
5th meeting
30 May 2012 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
6th meeting
3 December 
2012
Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
7th meeting
15 April 2013 Minutes ONS Technical Advisory Group, minutes, 
8th meeting
19 June 2013 Agenda/Min
utes/Papers
GSS 
Methodology 
Advisory 
Committee
GSS MAC, minutes, meeting to 
discuss 'Measuring National Well-
being'
2013 Journal 
article
Tomlinson, 
Michael; Kelly, 
Grace P
'Is everybody happy? The politics 
and measurement of national 
wellbeing'
2013 Conference 
paper
Allin, Paul 'New statistics for old? The case of 
the UK Measuring National Well-
being Programme'
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2014 Book chapter Allin, Paul 'Measuring wellbeing in modern 
societies'
2014 Book Allin, Paul; Hand,
David
'The wellbeing of nations; meaning, 
motive and measurement'
Table 3.2. Key documents consulted
3.5. Framework for analysis
As outlined in Chapter One, the social process of official statistic-making is envisaged
as the interactions of agents with each other and with their context. This context is both
institutional  and  theoretical,  and  will  have  social,  economic,  political  and  cultural
dimensions. The first  stage of the research methodology,  as outlined in Section 3.4.
above, is to explore those institutional and theoretical contexts. 'Context' in this sense is
the conditions of enablement and constraint that faced agents when the work on the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme commenced in July 2010; what powers did
they have to create official statistics, and what limited these? Or, in the terms of the
theory of agency laid out above, what are the structures which agents are confronting,
and how flexible are they?  Such structures are the products of historic processes of
contestation  around institutional  or  theoretical  features.  To take  a  concrete  example
which will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four, throughout the history of the Office
for National Statistics and its predecessor organisations there have been debates over
whether statistic-making should be centralised or dispersed. Such debates are expressed
through institutional arrangements, which provide the Statistical Actors with particular
responsibilities for producing national statistics, but particular powers around what data
they can access and what other bodies they must deal with.
As a result,  the exploration of institutional  and theoretical context  takes a historical
approach to the Office for National Statistics, the role of official statistics in the UK
policy-making context, the development of 'well-being' theory and the development of
well-being  measurement,  and  looks  for  areas  of  contestation.  These  areas  act  as
potential  landmarks  in  the  institutional  and  theoretical  context  which  the  Statistical
Actors must navigate. This takes the form of an exploration of primary literature such as
government position-papers and theoretical academic articles and secondary literature
such as institutional histories. These are analysed to draw out key themes and debates
which  Statistical  Actors  face  in  2010  when  the  'Measuring  Well-being'  programme
opens. These themes and debates give an idea of the structures which agents face, the
flexibility of these structures and of how agents have previously dealt with them.
The extent to which such themes and debates impact on the process of official statistic-
making  is  an  empirical  question  which  frames  the  handling  of  the  interview  and
secondary material. There is thus a bi-directional triangulation involved in this method,
with the exploration of context serving to situate empirical analysis, and that analysis
acting to validate the exploration of context. Again, the model of Chapter One posited
Statistical Actors as agents, so the interviews and secondary material was analysed in
relation to context with agency in mind. Where did Actors interact with each other and
their context, and how? As a starting point, the areas of contestation identified in the
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exploration of institutional and theoretical contexts were used to frame questions; to re-
use the example above, Actors were asked about the ways in which they interacted with
bodies  outside  of  the  Office  for  National  Statistics.  As  well  as  reacting  to  context,
however,  Actors  reacted  to  each  other  as  embodiments  of  theory  and  institutional
position,  so attention was paid to areas where Actors agreed or disagreed with each
other. In both cases, the interest lay in how Actors, as agents, resolved the challenges of
official-statistic making.
Primary data from interviews and secondary data such as meeting minutes were used in
an iterative manner. Prior to interviewing participants, minutes were examined to see
what participants' contributions, if any, had been, and how they related to the themes
identified in the examination of the theoretical and institutional context. Based on the
interviews, secondary material  was re-visited to  develop or corroborate  claims.  This
allowed the positionality of interviewees to be explored more fully;  interviews with
different Actors could provide distinct viewpoints on the same interaction, with meeting
minutes providing a more distant (although often no less interested) standpoint.
Information from early interviews was used to inform later interviews, allowing newly
discovered areas of agential interaction to be explored. This was possible because of the
semi-structured nature of interviews; no attempt was made to keep questions consistent
throughout  interviews,  instead  questions  were shaped to  the interviewee.  Again,  the
interest  of  the  interviews was  in  uncovering  areas  of  agential  interaction  with  their
context and each other, so questions focused on the themes and debates raised in the
exploration  of  institutional  and theoretical  context  and  on the  ways  in  which  were
expressed in interactions between agents. Of particular interest were areas of agreement
and disagreement between agents, and the ways in which agents acted to influence the
outcome of the official statistic-making process.
Material  was  coded  manually,  around  the  themes  identified  in  the  theoretical  and
institutional context, using the on-screen highlighting tools of the LibreOffice Writer
software for Linux (The Document Foundation, 2013-5, main-build versions 4.1. and
4.2.). Wherever possible, printing was avoided to minimise the research's environmental
footprint. Material from the interviews around the themes was concatenated into master
thematic  documents,  which  were  then  supplemented  with  similar  extracts  from the
secondary material. While more labour-intensive than using bespoke qualitative analysis
software,  the  cumbersome  and  repetitive  nature  of  this  process  ensured  a  close
familiarity with the  empirical  material  and served to  establish the arguments  of  the
empirical chapters iteratively as the material was examined.
3.6. Ethics
The research process raised a number of ethical issues, both at the design stage and as it
developed.  The design was approved by the Ethics  Committee of  the University of
Newcastle (email from Wendy Davison, 5 May 2014). When issues arose later in the
research,  particularly around the  use of  material  which participants  hadn't  explicitly
approved for use such as emails declining involvement, the Committee was referred to
again. In all cases, their decisions were followed.
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As a matter  of  course,  participants  were anonymised to  ensure both that  they were
comfortable speaking of issues which may prove sensitive (for example, where there
were  disagreements  between  Statistical  Actors)  and  to  protect  their  confidentiality
should anything sensitive be said. Anonymisation was achieved using the most recent
list of 'Baby Names in England and Wales' (Office for National Statistics 2014a). As a
list of the most common names given to new children in the year of the research, this
was felt to be neutral way of assigning names to participants. Alternative schemes which
did not use names were discounted on the grounds that they risked obscuring the social
nature of both the statistic-making process and the research process by de-emphasising
the human nature of  participants.  No attempt was made to  ensure that  the assigned
names 'matched' those of participants, for instance on grounds of ethnicity or class; such
a process would have involved too many assumptions on the part of the researcher and
could potentially have weakened the anonymisation. Instead, the first male interviewee
was  given  the  most  common  male  name  for  newborns  ('Oliver'),  the  second  male
interviewee was given the second most popular ('Jack'), and so on.
As will be clear from this method, while names were not 'matched' to participants on
ethnicity or  class  grounds,  they were 'matched'  on the basis  of gender.  This proved
unavoidable,  as the gender of actors within the statistic-making process was felt  by
some research participants to have impacted on the way the statistic was made (see
Chapter Seven). Gender-identification was not a question that was asked in interviews;
although it was considered in some of the later interviews, when it became apparent that
it  was  important  for  the  research  process,  it  was  always  discarded  as  sitting  too
uncomfortably with questions about the statistic-making process.  As a result,  it  was
necessary to make ascriptions of gender to participants which may not reflect the way
that they self-identify. This has a knock-on effect on the analysis of gender as an issue
within the statistic-making process; the fact that gender in this study is ascriptional acts
as a caveat on any conclusions drawn. Where it is explicitly discussed, the gender of
participants  will  be  asterisked  to  signify  its  ascriptional  nature  (i.e.,  “*male”,
“*female”).
To fully achieve anonymisation, the full job titles of participants are also not used in this
study. To do so would have allowed participants to be identified. Instead, participants
were categorised into broad categories by professional background: ONS, international
organisation,  academic,  Whitehall  Department,  Devolved  Assembly  and  NGO  (see
Appendix A). In some cases it was necessary to identify academic participants further,
giving some idea of their discipline as a framing for their interview responses. Again,
this was done as broadly as possible: economics, public health, sociology, psychology,
statistical theory. The vagueness of these labels was necessitated by the relatively small
numbers  of Actors from any given background involved in  the process:  while there
were,  for  instance,  seventeen  academics  listed  as  being  members  of  the  Technical
Advisory Group, eight were economists (either working in economics departments or
with 'economist' in their job title), leaving the remaining nine distributed across the four
other  disciplinary  backgrounds  which  have  just  been  identified.  Identifying  the
disciplines  of  this  remainder  (or,  identifying  more  precisely  the  sub-discipline  of
economics which the economists practised) would have compromised their anonymity.
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Similarly,  in  a  number  of  places  references  made  by interview participants  to  their
employers, or references that would have identified employers, have not been quoted in
this study.
While  these  measures  will  help  prevent  participants  from being  identified  by  non-
Statistical  Actors,  there  remains  the  danger  that  they may be  identifiable  by others
involved in the official statistic-making process as the pools of potential interviewees
are so small. This was raised by a number of participants throughout the research. The
approach  of  using  narrative  notes  rather  than  transcripts  mitigates  the  danger  of
identification  somewhat,  as  many  of  the  distinguishing  verbal  mannerisms  of
participants  are  lost.  Beyond  this,  the  content  of  the  notes  was  negotiated  with
participants;  all  interviewees were offered the opportunity to  correct  or  amend their
notes, and many of them did. In two cases, participants also requested and were given
copies of the parts of the research in which their interviews were cited. This allowed
them to amend or clarify their texts as appropriate; in one case, this led to a different
extract being used to ensure that the participant was comfortable that they were not
identifiable.  In one further case, an extract from an interview was used but was not
attributed,  even  anonymously.  It  is  unlikely  that  these  methods  will  have  been
completely successful in making participants unidentifiable, but they were sufficient to
make participants comfortable in the use of their material.
As discussed above, in one case a participant asked for the account of their interview to
be withdrawn from the research. This was done (email to unattributed, 10 July 2014),
and the interview is not referred to outside of the present Chapter. A later request to this
(non-)participant to include the email correspondence regarding the withdrawal within
the research went unanswered. As it was agreed between the Ethics Committee and the
researcher  it  would be inappropriate  to  include this  correspondence  without  explicit
approval from the (non-)participant, this too has been excluded from the research.
Informed  consent  for  the  interviews  was  obtained  using  a  standard  covering  letter,
informing participants  of  the  nature  of  the  research,  its  planned uses,  their  right  to
withdraw  and  to  refuse  to  answer  questions,  and  the  anonymisation  protocol  (see
Appendix B). In a number of interviews, this was expanded on verbally in discussion
with participants.  As discussed above,  in  addition to  considering the account  of the
conversation, a number of participants were also offered the option of seeing the use of
their material within the research; although they were not offered the right of veto on
anything written, this would offer them the opportunity to further discuss questions of
sensitive material with the researcher, allowing the researcher to adjust material to fully
protect their anonymity. This offer was taken up by two participants.
3.7. A note on positionality
In keeping with the arguments on agency above, the critique of empiricist approaches in
Chapter  Two,  and the  wide  body of  literature  around issues  of  reflexivity (see,  for
example, McDowell 1992; Oakley 1981; Rose 1997), some comments should be made
on the attitudes and approaches that I held during the research.6 Although perfect self-
6 For the avoidance of irony, this section breaks with the passive voice an is written in the first person. 
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knowledge is as implausible as full and neutral truth in any other situation, I think it is
possible to highlight some of the attitudes and beliefs which shaped my interactions
with  participants  (and  all  those  who  assisted  and  supported  this  research)  and  my
understanding of the data I gathered.
I would like to mention two things, which felt central to me at the time. One is my faith
as a Buddhist. Rightly or wrongly, I have always felt academia to be unwelcoming of
faith.  Despite  having largely abandoned the  idea  of  rationality,  there  are  still  some
things seen as irrational. I spent a lot of time re-justifying my attitudes in acceptable
terms; it was fine for me to believe in impermanence so long as I claimed it was because
I was a philosophical anti-essentialist, I could argue for the basic equality of all sentient
beings if I waved my hands at Marxian or Feminist literatures, I could talk about the co-
creation of person and universe on a moment-by-moment basis so long as I referenced
the debates around structure and agency. This felt slightly absurd; it is not possible to
avoid  having  an  ontology  or  an  epistemology,  and  ultimately  they  exist  beyond
justification; they are the point where reasons give out and we are left with something
basic and brute (see  Cohen 2000). One of the reasons I am so attracted to the arguments
of Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) is my sense that I have had to replace one ultimately
groundless epistemology with another more fashionable one in exactly the manner they
describe. 
However, were I not a Buddhist, I doubt I would have been drawn to the research topic I
was. It is hard for me not to see the acknowledgement of agency (both in statistics and
satistic-making)  as  normative,  rather  than  strictly  intellectual,  questions,  and  I  was
caught several times by my supervisors and at conferences unwittingly going beyond
what  could  be  justified  with  argument  because  I  felt  a  position  to  be  morally
questionable  (an  example  would  be  my approach  towards  neoclassical  economics).
When I understood that this was what I had done, I did my best to park my moral beliefs
in the interests of academic argument although this seems an odd thing for me to do.
These questions matter, ultimately, for normative reasons and it seems strange not to
acknowledge that.7
The other thing I felt to be shaping my thoughts and approach to the research is what
had been described as 'imposter syndrome' or 'perceived fraudulence' (a phenomenon
first identified by Clance and Imes 1978; see also Barcan 2014). I left university after
my undergraduate  degree  feeling  myself  to  be stupid and out  of  my depth.  Having
earned my way back in through a competitive process and now having several years
'passing' I do not feel any cleverer or more comfortable. I have accepted that I have
done well for a stupid person, but I would rather be at ease. This sense of fraudulence
expressed itself both in a tentativeness in my writing and in my interviewing. I was
acutely conscious that I, an unimportant and stupid person, was taking up the time of
For the purposes of full disclosure, it is written after the research was submitted for examination. 
While I was always conscious of the disconnect between the agential reading of the official statistic-
making process and the pretence of neutrality in its writing up, it was only when formally permitted 
by my examiners that I felt comfortable breaking with the dominant academic writing style. I am 
grateful for having been given that permission.
7 As a postscript to this: this section commenting on the fact that faith cannot be talked about in the 
Academy was originally somewhat longer. Those I passed it to for comment suggested I cut it back, 
which, I think, nicely underscores my point.
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my interviewees, important and intelligent people. The sense of social awkwardness this
engendered made interviewing one of the most stressful and unpleasant experiences of
my life. When interviews went 'badly', the feeling of predicted and deserved personal
failure made it very difficult to continue them, when they 'well' the feeling that I could
have done more or asked 'better' questions was inescapable. Under such circumstances,
methodological texts calling for the establishment of rapport with participants felt like
cruel jokes. A more confident person would have handled things differently.8
3.8. Summary
Chapter One argued that the making of official statistics were underpinned by a social
process,  the  interaction  of  Statistical  Actors  with  each  other  and  with  their  social
context. Chapter Two argued that existing literature around official statistics was not
sensitive to this social process, and that this resulted in a gap in the literature. Building
on  social  constructionist  literature,  the  present  chapter  argued  that  a  social  process
requires a research methodology sensitive to Actors' own experience of statistic-making,
its context and their interactions with each other.
For this reason, a research methodology was outlined which focuses on interviews with
Statistical  Actors,  triangulated  with  secondary  material  originating  in  the  statistic-
making process. For reasons of access and of data availability, the 'Measuring National
Well-being'  programme was selected as a case study for investigation.  Applying the
research methodology to this programme resulted in two necessary steps. The first, to be
covered in Chapters Four and Five, is an examination of the institutional and theoretical
contexts in which the programme sits. These will outline the terrain which the Statistical
Actors will need to navigate. The process of navigation will be examined in Chapters
Six and Seven, through an exploration of the empirical material gathered.
This research methodology deals with the specific case of the 'Measuring National Well-
being' programme, but is applicable to other official statistics in other times and in other
places. It attempts to explore the institutional and theoretical contexts of the case, and
all official statistics will have an institutional and a theoretical context; and it attempts
to explore the interactions of agents with this context and with each other, and Chapters
One and Two have argued that all official statistics will involve Actors with agency in
their creation. The methodology should be valid beyond both the specific case of the
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  and  the  specific  circumstances  of  the
Office of National Statistics. How far this is the case will be examined in Chapter Eight.
8 I would like here to thank my supervisory team of Andy Pike, Mike Coombes and Joe Painter for 
their support throughout my studies. My sense of being out-of-place is my own, and is despite their 
acceptance and guidance of me as a scholar.
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The institutional context of the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme: the Office for National Statistics and the place of official
statistic-making within UK policy-making
The preceding chapters have argued that the 'Measuring Well-being' programme, as an
example of an official statistical programme, is a social construction. As such, it must be
constructed from something. This chapter examines the institutional context in which
the programme was made: the Office for National Statistics, who are responsible for the
creation of the programme; and institutional structures and policy-making processes of
government of which they form a part. This context is culturally- and place-specific;
while all modern nations have statistic-making bodies and practices of policy-making,
the UK has a specific history which includes fragmented governmental responsibilities,
centralised  control  and  devolution  of  power.  These,  and  other  peculiarities,  can  be
expected  to  have  an  influence  on  the  form  and  content  of  the  official  statistical
programme. An understanding of the form that these took in 2010, when the 'Measuring
National  Well-being'  programme  was  launched,  will  provide  indications  of  the
challenges and constraints, as well as opportunities, which the agents constructing the
programme must react to.
This  chapter will  explore the institutional  context of the ONS, focussing on themes
derived from an engagement with literature around the institution of the ONS, and from
the empirical material of Chapters Six and Seven. Section 4.1. opens with a brief history
of the Office for National Statistics and its institutional predecessors before proceeding
thematically, examining key themes in this history. Rather than attempting to recount
the much longer history of the UK state, Section 4.2. will focus on the last 15 years of
government, examining particularly the thematic areas which arose from the history of
the ONS. The challenges Statistical Actors face which are specific to the ONS and the
wider context in which the organisation sits will be drawn out.
This chapter provides a further critique of the theories examined in Chapter Two by
highlighting the specificity of the institutional context in which official  statistics are
produced. It also acts as a grounding for the empirical work of Chapters Six and Seven,
where those involved in the process of official statistic-making will discuss themselves
the context of their work and the impact this context has on it.
This  chapter  makes  a  contribution  to  the  literature  around  the  Office  for  National
Statistics, extending previous institutional histories such as Ward and Doggett (1991) to
incorporate the changes to the structure of official  statistics in the UK made by the
Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007. It also represents the fullest account of the
ONS not  written  under  the  organisation's  auspices,  which  allows  it  to  take  a  more
critical stance. The section on policy-making in the UK brings together material from
several  academic  disciplines,  notably  Geography,  Politics  and  Management  Theory.
This synthesis of material contributes to the literature around policy-making by offering
a wider perspective than any one of these disciplines offers alone.
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4.1. The Office for National Statistics
4.1.1. A brief chronology of official statistics in the UK
Official statistics are defined by the relevant legislation as those statistics produced by
agents  of  the  Crown  (Statistics  and  Registration  Services  Act 2007).  The  first
specialised institutional body for the production of such statistics in the UK was the
Statistical  Department  of  the Board  of  Trade,  established in  1832 (Shaw and Miles
1979). Prior to its establishment, statistics were created by state agencies, but in an ad
hoc manner in response to specific legislative requirements (such the Bills of Mortality
issued  by  the  Worshipful  Company  of  Parish  Clerks,  Collier  1854,  or  the  figures
collected by the Inspector General of Imports and Exports following its establishment in
1695, Shaw and Miles 1979). The Statistical Department differed from these in that it
was both a permanent structure exclusively tasked with the ongoing creation of statistics
and one with the purpose of making statistical returns more easily available and usable
(Ward and Doggett 1991). This latter purpose represents an expansion in the conception
of  statistics,  from  being  monitoring  devices  which  permit  reactions  along  pre-
determined  lines  to  being  information  sources  on  which  novel  state  and  non-state
interventions can be based (Porter 1986).
This shift in conceptualisation gradually extends across government; for much of the
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  there  is  a  slow  expansion  of  statistical
collection through an increasing number of state  bodies specialising in  statistics  for
discrete  purposes,  largely  restricted  to  statistics  demanded  by legislation  (Davidson
1995).  (This  can  be  compared  with  the  more  systematic  collection  of  data  for
administrative  purposes  undertaken  in  Germany  around  the  same  time  which  gave
'state-istics'  their  name,  Shaw and  Miles  1979).  These  result  in  statistics  which  are
limited in their coverage, are not co-ordinated to provide any overall picture of society
or economy, differ widely in coverage and methodology and which, as a result, do not
always  cohere  or  agree.  This  lack  of  coherence  and agreement  becomes  a  problem
during the Second World War, leading to the foundation of the Central Statistical Office
(CSO) to better co-ordinate the activities of the wartime state (Moss 1950). Following
the War, this was expanded to allow the conduct of a more interventionist social and
economic policy. Such policy and its informational needs necessitated the creation first
of a separate Business Survey Office and then of an Office of Population, Census and
Surveys in the late 1960s and early 1970s to handle increased legislative demands for
statistics and to centralise statistics previously produced across different branches of
government (Rayner 1980a, b; Ward and Doggett 1991).
This  proved  the  high  watermark  of  central  statistical  production  (Government
Statisticians’ Collective 1979).  In the years  that  followed, staffing levels and output
were reduced and public access to statistics restricted on the principle, articulated by the
Rayner Review (Rayner 1980b), that official  statistics existed primarily to serve the
needs of government. Over the next twenty years, statistics become more centralised as
diverse government statistical bodies were merged into the CSO. The two largest of
these  were the  merging into  the  CSO of  the  Business  Survey Office  and statistical
divisions of the Departments of Trade and Industry and of Employment in 1989 (Ward
and Doggett  1991),  and the  combination of  the  CSO and the  Office of  Population,
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Census  and  Surveys  in  1996  to  form the  Office  for  National  Statistics  (Office  for
National Statistics 1996). With this latter  merger,  the Director of the ONS was also
given responsibility over the Government Statistical Service, the professional collective
of  statisticians  working  within  government  departments,  as  well  as  acting  as  the
government's chief statistical advisor.
This  arrangement  was  confirmed  by the  Statistics  and  Registration  Services  Act of
2007,  which  merged  the  ONS  and  the  Statistics  Commission,  which  formerly
supervised  it,  to  form  the  UK  Statistics  Authority.  The  Authority  took  over
responsibility for monitoring the quality of official statistics, including those created by
the  Office  for  National  Statistics  as  the  Authority's  executive  agency.  The  Act also
created the role of 'National Statistician', taking on the ancillary roles, such as heading
up the Government Statistical Service, previously held by the Director of the ONS but
allowing the day-to-day operation of the Office to be undertaken by a full-time Director
General (UK Statistics Authority 2013). The UK Statistics Authority is a non-ministerial
government department, operating at arms-length from central government. In addition
to  producing  statistics  through the  ONS,  it  also  monitors  the  quality  of  all  official
statistics,  assessing  them  for  compliance  with  a  Code  of  Practice  (UK  Statistics
Authority 2009). In 2010-11 it had a budget of around £159 million (excluding one-off
funding for the 2011 Census and for special projects such as the development of the
'Measuring Well-being' programme, which between them accounted for a further £142
million) (Office for National Statistics 2010b).
4.1.2. Centralising and de-centralising impetuses in the history of UK official 
statistics
Statistical work in the UK is decentralised. This ensures that statistics are
close  to  policy  in  such  vital  and  diverse  areas  as  health,  education,
employment and crime.
National Statistics (2002, p.11)
Historically, statistics in the UK have been organised on a decentralised and devolved
basis, with government departments and Devolved Administrations producing statistics
for  their  own  purposes.  In  addition,  the  UK  Statistics  Authority  exists  as  a  non-
ministerial government department. Under the Statistics and Registration Services Act
2007,  which created the Authority,  it  acts  both to  create  statistics  itself  through the
Office  for  National  Statistics,  and to  regulate  official  statistics  produced  elsewhere.
'Official statistics' are defined by their origin, not by their content, as those produced by
“a government department, the Scottish Administration, a Welsh ministerial authority, a
Northern Ireland department, or any other person acting on behalf of the Crown, and
such other  statistics  as  may be  specified  by order  by a  Minister  of  the Crown,  the
Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, or a Northern Ireland department” (Statistics
and Registration Services Act  2007, Section 6). This creates a system of decentralised
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and devolved statistical creation with certain statistics, primarily those involving large-
scale surveys in their production, centralised within the ONS.
The great advantage of a decentralised system is that its statistics can be responsive to
the localised needs of users (Rayner 1980b), but this comes at the expense of a joined-
up  system capable  of  imposing  uniform standards  of  collection  and  analysis  or  of
creating a single coherent statistical picture of the nation (Statistics Commission 2008).
The 2007 Act is a compromise between these two possibilities, with the UK Statistics
Authority acting as a scrutinising body for official statistics across government and the
National  Statistician  as  both  chief  executive  of  the  UK Statistics  Authority,  and  so
ultimately responsible for the statistics produced by the ONS, and head of the body of
statisticians  distributed  across  other  departments,  the Government  Statistical  Service
(GSS).  In  practice,  the  National  Statistician's  focus  is  the  latter,  acting  to  maintain
professional identity and standards across the decentralised system, while the day-to-
day management  of  the  ONS lies  with  a  Director  General  (UK Statistics  Authority
2013). Within the ONS sits a 'Methodology Group', responsible for the quality of the
methods of statistics created, and at the level of the GSS is a 'Methodology Advisory
Committee',  which  considers  the  methodologies  of  statistics  from  across  the  GSS
(including the ONS) on an invitational basis.
Competing pressures for centralisation and decentralisation can be seen throughout the
history of the ONS and its predecessors, as the conception of official statistics shifts
from being one of ad hoc and isolated responses to particular administrative problems to
a broader conception as a “a window on society and the economy, and on the work and
performance of government” (UK Statistics Authority 2009, p.2). The earliest modern
example of a national-level official statistical record in the UK is the Domesday Survey
of 1086 (Wood 1999), which sought to calculate and record valuations of the land which
was owned by the King but managed on his behalf by tenants-in-chief (Galbraith 1974).
This was very much a one-off effort, designed to solve the difficulties that the Norman
conquest,  with  its  wholesale  changes  in  land  tenancy  from  English  to  French
proprietors, caused for tax collection. No central agency was established to carry out the
Survey; instead it utilised existing local land valuation records and local networks of
governance (Harvey 1971), which were returned to as sources for tax assessment in the
centuries which followed. There is no conception here of the statistic as a longitudinal
device to show change or progress, or as an open-ended tool for enquiring about social
and economic conditions; instead it is an administrative solution to an administrative
problem.
Similar observations could be made about the parish registers of baptisms and deaths
introduced by the Second Henrician Injunctions of 1538 (Cromwell 1910). While these
represent  an  on-going  form  of  data  collection  and  did  later  provide  the  basis  for
mortality statistics in major cities like London in the seventeenth century (Collier 1854),
they were not formally collected into centralised national records or official statistics
until  the  Births  and Deaths  Registration  Act 1836,  three-hundred years  later.  Their
introduction is initially a solution to the legal problems of parentage and inheritance at a
local level, they are later used, particularly in London, by the wealthy as a local index of
health,  but  they do not  form the  basis  for  any broader  assessment  of  national-level
demographics and are not collected and compiled to do so.
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The creation of the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade in 1832 can be read in
this  context  as  a  limited  centralisation  brought  about  by  (and  in  response  to)  the
development of multiple decentralised statistics. Starting with the  Corn Act of 1770,
Parliament  had  increasingly  legislated  for  specific  statistics  to  inform  policy,
particularly in the areas of taxation and tariffs.9 This resulted in an increasing burden of
data collection across central government departments and the problems caused by a
lack of co-ordination, leading to the Department's creation. The degree to which this
impulse to centralisation is limited can be seen by the rejection, in the same year that the
Statistical  Department  was  established,  of  the  Parliamentary  Committee  on  Public
Documents' recommendation that a Central Statistical Office be created. Despite a series
of  statistical  departments  appearing  across  government  to  deal  with  specific
administrative  problems,  while  lay  statistical  societies  were  being  established  to
examine social issues, such rejections continue throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth  centuries  (Ward  and  Doggett  1991).  The  grounds  for  these  rejections  are
similar to modern grounds, that centralisation would impede administrative flexibility,
that  uniformity  of  collection  and  analysis  is  neither  entirely  possible  nor  entirely
desirable and that a centralised body would over-reach itself and create statistics which
served no particular administrative need (see Allsopp 2003; Rayner 1980a).
However, in opting for a decentralised system, the problems of incoherence of data,
duplication of effort  and lack of coverage occur. This became a problem during the
Second World War when the needs of co-ordinating an entire economy necessitated data
covering that economy in its entirety. The piecemeal system which had grown up, with
its duplication and disagreement, was insufficient to meet these needs (Rayner 1980a;
Ward and Doggett 1991). However, the Central Statistical Office which arises does not
replace the decentralised system, but only absorbs parts of it. As the concept of statistics
as  a  'window on the  economy and society'  (UK Statistics  Authority  2009,  p.2,  see
above) takes root following the War, further bodies are set up to manage particular types
of  statistic  –  the Office  for  Business  Surveys  and Office  of  Census  and Population
Surveys – centralising aspects of statistical creation within bodies which form separate
nodes  within  a  fragmented  system.  This  fragmentation  is  geographical  as  well  as
organisational: the Scottish  and Northern Irish Censuses remain the responsibilities of
their respective Registrar Generals (Census Act 1920,  Census Act (Northern Ireland)
1969).
Mergers of these bodies, both with each other and with other statistical departments
within government, in 1989 and 1996 bring about an ONS which centralises a large
number of statistics covering numerous aspects of economy and society in one body, but
they do not bring about a fully centralised system. Indeed, in some respects, the system
has  become less  centralised  since  the  creation  of  the  ONS in  1996,  as  a  result  of
devolution and regional policy (Allsopp 2003). It is in this context the 2007 Statistics
and Registration Services Act sits: it attempts to provide uniform standards across all
official  statistics,  without  ceding  control  of  statisticians  not  managed  by  the  UK
Statistics  Authority  to  that  body,  without  granting  the  Authority  power  to  mandate
9 The Corn Act of 1770, attempted to regulate corn prices through a system of returns published in the 
London Gazette; it was followed by the Importation and Exportation Act of 1789, which centralised 
these returns as a responsibility of the Board of Trade. See also Barnes (1930).
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quality control  procedures  on statistics  it  does  not  create,  and without  allowing the
Authority to determine what a statistic is for the purposes of its legislative responsibility
to  monitor  statistics  (Public  Administration  Select  Committee  2013).  It  leaves  the
Authority  as  a  unitary  body with  the  dual  responsibilities  of  creating  statistics  and
inspecting  them  for  quality,  with  a  reporting  line  to  Parliament,  under  a  National
Statistician  with  reporting  lines  for  their  various  responsibilities  to  Parliament,  the
Prime Minister, the Chancellor (as Minister of Statistics), the Devolved Administrations
and to the courts. This complex of interlocking responsibilities and reporting lines can
be seen as an attempt to unify the centralised and decentralised views of statistics, as
simultaneously  offering  a  broad  picture  of  society  and  economy  and  as  restricted
responses to administrative demands. There is debate as to how successful it can be in
these aims (Holt 2008; Macfarlane 2007; Thomas 2007).
The  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS,  then,  are  in  the  position  of  creating  statistics
independently,  but  for  the  use of  others  and within a  diverse field of  other  official
statistical  creators.  Their  remit  is  'national',  while  that  of  Statistical  Actors  within
policy-making bodies are specific and thematic. The way the Statistical Actors of the
ONS  integrate  their  work  with  the  wider  fragmented  governmental  system  is  an
empirical question.
4.1.3. The geographical complexities of Official Statistics 
While the ONS is able to “produce and publish statistics relating to any matter relating
to the United Kingdom or any part of it” (Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007,
p.9), its ability to map or co-ordinate social or economic life as a central body operating
under  its  own initiative  is  limited.  It  operates  alongside  decentralised and devolved
bodies  who  make  their  own  statistics  outside  of  both  its  and  the  UK  Statistics
Authority's  direct  control,  and  is  unable  even  to  scrutinise  statistics  produced  by
Devolved Administrations without invitation. It is also constrained both by a reliance on
central  government  funding and by its  legal  responsibilities  to  produce  statistics  as
demanded by Parliament, Ministers of the Crown, existing legislation and international
agreements. The Statistics Authority, and through it the ONS, then, are centrally funded
but  subject  to  decentralised  demands,  limiting  their  room  for  manoeuvre  and  the
independence which the 2007 Act grants them.
Decentralisation  and  devolution  also  leads  to  a  complex  geography  of  statistical
production and output. The Allsopp Review (Allsopp 2003) noted both the large number
of  regional  bodies  at  varying  scales  either  requiring  or  producing  statistics  and the
inability of the ONS as it was configured to provide such statistics itself.  The ONS
predominantly produces statistics at a national scale. This means that it gears its samples
to national, not regional, estimates and so selects them to be nationally, not regionally,
representative. As a further complication, 'national' in this sense tends to mean 'English',
due  to  over-sampling  by  the  Devolved  Administrations  where  genuine  UK-wide
statistics are required. At the same time, economic figures tend to be collected at the
enterprise-level,  rather  than on any geographical  basis,  making it  hard to locate  the
impacts  of  economic  activity.  Both  these  factors  hamper  the  production  of  regional
estimates, making them “necessarily more subjective and less accurate than national
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equivalents.” (Allsopp 2003, p.5).
Things  are  further  complicated  by  the  historically  ad  hoc origination  of  statistics.
Allsopp (2003) noted varying geographies used for crime, health and education data,
arising from their distinct administrative boundaries. Various statistics exist on different
bases in the different constituent parts of the UK, both for historical reasons (as in the
existence of three separate Registrars General for England and Wales, for Scotland and
for Northern Ireland) and reasons of more recent devolution (as in the range of statistics
created  solely for  Scotland by the  Scottish  Government).  All  statistics  produced by
official sources that are not Devolved responsibilities fall under the Statistics Authority's
quality-control, and the 2007 Act gives them the right of inspection (Section 16 of the
Act;  although requests to inspect can be refused by the Minister responsible for the
statistic).  The  sheer  number  of  statistics  produced  by  various  bodies  limits  the
application of this right, leading the Statistics Authority to focus on those statistics it has
been invited to accredit and any high profile statistics which it hasn't (see, for example
the  request  for  inspection  by Scholar  2011,  and its  reply Duncan-Smith  2011).  The
diverse needs of creators necessitates a wide variety of methods, including the use of
diverse  geographical  and  temporal  units  and  differences  in  sample  coverage  and
differences in reporting and dissemination. These are not generally commented on by
the UK Statistics Authority unless they are explicitly brought to its attention.
As  a  further  set  of  influences  on  its  Statistical  Actors,  the  ONS exists  in  a  global
context, both subject to international standards and requirements and influential in their
creation (UK Statistics Authority 2009, 2013). This can be seen as a further tier in the
multi-level nature of official statistics' production, further limiting the autonomy of the
ONS. What statistics are produced and how are, to some extent, out of the ONS' control.
In  addition,  then,  to  navigating  their  position  within  fragmented  governmental
departments, the Statistical Actors of the ONS must navigate between fragmented scales
and geographic areas of government. Their 'national' remit creates challenges for official
statistics that need to be applied to smaller scales; the devolution of policy and with it
statistical monitoring is likely to have further complicated these challenges.
4.1.4. The interaction of funding concerns and policy need, and the limitations 
they impose on the scope of official statistics in the UK
The preceding subsections have noted shifts over time in ideas around the purpose of
official  statistics.  For  long  periods,  government  data  collection  was  resisted  as  an
inappropriate  state  intrusion into the lives of  individuals.  This resistance came both
from the individuals themselves, as in the case of the parish registers of birth and death
introduced  under  Henry  VIII  (Cromwell  1910,  p.40  fn.),  and  from  politicians  and
officials, as in the case of the long resistance to a national census (Shaw and Miles
1979).  This  stance  softened  considerably  in  the  period  immediately  following  the
Second World War, leading to the expansion of social statistics which culminated in the
establishment  of  Social  Trends,  the annual  compendium of  social  statistics,  in  1970
(Nissel  1970).  This  represented  the  high  watermark  for  statistics  as  tools  for
understanding  society.  The  Rayner  Review  of  1980  instead  argued  for  a  tight  link
65
CHAPTER FOUR
between statistics and policy need:  “We have found the [Central Statistical] office too
heavily committed to serving the public at large. We must ask whether value for money
is  encouraged when the  office  is  based  on meeting  regular  generalised demand for
statistics  (relatively  independent  from  current  policy  preoccupations)  through
publications.” (Rayner 1980b, p.7, emphasis as original). Those statistics not directly
tied to policy could be supported only if users were prepared to pay for them, and those
tied to policy would only be made available to outside users if they were prepared to
pay for their publication.
Rayner's  argument  against  statistics  meeting  generalised  needs  brings  together  the
concerns  of  a  decentralised  system,  aiming  primarily  at  solving  discrete  policy
problems, and a mistrust of the idea that broader social goals are an appropriate target
for statistics-based interventions. This position was disputed at the time by those outside
government  (Hoinville  and Smith  1982;  Thomas 1984),  and has  been relaxed more
recently,  at  least  rhetorically:  the  ONS claim that  their  work  has  the  broad aim of
'understanding the UK' (Office for National Statistics 2010a, frontispiece). However,
this  understanding remains partial  and tied to policy objectives and cost constraints,
with 'value for money' being written in to the Code of Practice for Official Statistics as a
requirement for their work (UK Statistics Authority 2009). This is illustrated by a recent
review and consultation by the ONS of its statistical outputs in response to budget cuts
(Office for National  Statistics 2014c).  This noted that  80% of the ONS' output  was
legislatively required, with the largest bodies of outputs being 'economic and business
statistics'  and  'labour  market  statistics',  with  additional  basic  demographic  statistics
inherited from the old Registrar General and statistics on income and living conditions
and  healthcare  (p.2).  This  establishes  a  central  core  of  statistics  engaging  with  the
economy at the heart of the ONS' work. Of those statistics suggested as candidates for
discontinuation, the majority related to social conditions: detailed statistics on mortality,
on inequality, on suicide, on health (p.3). Many of these survived the cut because they
were used by multiple government departments. Where statistics were more closely tied
to the aims and objectives of a particular department, such as statistics on deaths from
Clostridium  difficile,  they  were  to  continue  only  if  they  could  be  funded  by  the
department in question (Health, in this case) (p.4). Of the seven outputs cut completely,
only one could be thought of as 'economic', that relating to 'the UK Business Output',
while statistics on subjects such as adoption, cancer incidence,  injury and poisoning
mortality would cease to be produced in their current form (p.4).
This review highlights several things. One is the peripheral nature of social statistics
within  the  ONS'  wider  programme;  the  core  of  their  work  centres  on  legislated
requirements for economic statistics such as the National Accounts and inflation indices.
Another is the policy-specific nature of many of the statistics it collects; as an example,
the statistics relating to  Clostridium difficile were first  produced in 1999 (Office for
National  Statistics  2013a),  arising  out  of  the  politicisation  of  'hospital  superbugs'
(Washer and Joffe 2006). Their vulnerability in the recent review is at least partly a
function of a  decline in  their  political  salience as hospital  safety has  improved and
media attention has moved on to other things. This policy-specific nature of statistics
underlies  the  movement  of  statistics  from  the  ONS  to  Whitehall  departments;  by
shifting Clostridium difficile statistics to the Department of Health, the ONS makes the
statement that such statistics are a specific, rather than a general concern, tied to the
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objectives of a single department rather than forming a part of any wider 'understanding
of the UK'.
Another point to note is the social statistics which were deemed immune from possible
cuts. The ONS has an ability to collect statistics which is unmatched and unmatchable
by the private sector;  it  has a larger reach, established structures of collection, some
power  to  compel  replies  from individuals  (as  in  the  case  of  the  Census),  access  to
administrative records in certain areas, and a larger budget than anything realistically
available  in  academic  or  private  polling  institutions.  This  ability  is  exemplified  in
statistical  programmes  such  as  the  Annual  Population  Survey  and  the  British
Longitudinal Study. While these programmes were subject to 'efficiencies' in the 2013
review, they were not considered for curtailment (Office for National Statistics 2014c).
This is partly due to the role they play within legislated statistics, particularly those
relating to the labour market and required by European Union membership, but also
because of their role in 'understanding the UK'. There is a tension between the demands
for policy-linked statistics established by the Rayner Reviews and cemented by budget
limitations  on the one hand,  and the desire  to  maintain programmes  that  cannot  be
conducted  by  anyone  else.  In  this  can  be  seen  echoes  of  the  tensions  between
centralisation and decentralisation: the ONS, as the UK's central statistical producer, has
the  scope  to  produce  over-arching  statistics  which  might  inform  policy  across
departments, but often finds itself tied in to statistics where a specific policy use can be
demonstrated. These can be passed on to the departments they benefit, but this leaves
the ONS with statistics that are more peripheral to the concerns of any specific policy-
making department.
The combination of a decentralised system and a concern for cost will always privilege
those statistics with direct economic applications. There are a number of reasons for
this.  One  is  that  the  body funding the  ONS is  the  Treasury,  who act  as  the  major
consumer of economic statistics giving them influence as both funder and user. Another
reason  is  that  the  overwhelming  majority  of  statistics  required  by  statute  and
international  agreement  are  economic,  meaning  they  form  a  higher  proportion  of
statistics which are non-negotiable (Office for National Statistics 2014c). Finally, the
cost of large-scale social surveys means that, in a pinch, cutting them can provide large
and  instantaneous  cost-savings  and  that  they  are  less  cost-effective  to  establish  or
expand. While programmes of social monitoring may meet diverse policy aims and be
used by diverse users, these three factors restrain the ONS' freedom to expand on its
stated objectives of 'understanding the UK'.
The  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS,  then,  must  balance  not  only  the  needs  of  a
fragmented Statistical Audiences against their own national remit, but do so within cost
constraints. This balance is likely to be difficult to achieve: should their programmes be
too general, they will lack users; too specific and they lack a rationale for ONS, rather
than departmental, production. In either case, the justification for the funds to produce
the statistic will be hard to make. Once established, the programme must be set against
those protected by legislation in the event of funding cuts. Such a balancing act is likely
to influence the form and content of the statistic concerned.
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4.1.5. The tension between excellence and cost
Since its period of expansion in the 1960s, the CSO (and later ONS) has been subject to
continual pressures on staffing levels and budgets. A paper written by rogue statisticians
in the 1970s outlined the human costs of these in terms of increasing automation, de-
skilling  of  work  and  the  contracting  out  of  aspects  of  the  Statistical  Actor's  role
(Government Statisticians’ Collective 1979). These cuts were largely borne by junior
staff – Ward and Doggett state that the Rayner Review's cuts to staffing levels of 25%
came  without  a  single  Statistician  being  made  redundant,  a  fact  which  implies
swingeing cuts to those in lower pay-grades (Ward and Doggett 1991, p.85). These cuts
led to a series of concerns in the press and in Parliament over the quality of statistics,
culminating  in  the  Pickford  Review of  Economic  Statistics  (Pickford,  Cunningham,
Lynch,  et al.  1989). Concerns remained, being cited by, for example, the Chancellor
John Major in the foreword to a book celebrating the history of CSO (Ward and Doggett
1991,  p.ix)  and  Prime  Minister  Tony Blair  in  the  introduction  to  the  White  Paper
'Building Trust in Statistics' (Economic Secretary to the Treasury 1999, p.iv).
What such concerns and debates highlight is the trade-off between cost and quality of
official statistics. Even when supplied to the ONS by third parties, data is not without
internal cost – the process of compiling the statistic and disseminating it takes both time
and money. One of the consequences of the Rayner Review was a reduction of quality
checking (Rayner  1980a),  with resultant  declines  in  quality that  led to  the Pickford
Review (Pickford, Cunningham, Lynch, et al. 1989; although that review argued that the
cuts had not contributed to the loss of quality but were merely coincidental with it,
p.11). With such issues in mind, the National Framework document which accompanied
the creation of the ONS explicitly called for a balance between quality and cost, with
the National Statistician responsible for a continual assessment of which statistics are
necessary and which can be obtained elsewhere (Office for National Statistics 1996,
np.). By the time of the 2009 Code of Practice for Official Statistics this had softened
markedly, with statistical producers being called on instead to balance costs and quality
relative to the use of the statistic (UK Statistics Authority 2009, p.11).
There are a number of ways of achieving this. One is the use of alternative data sources;
both Rayner (1980a, b) and Allsopp (2003), separated by nearly a quarter of a century,
call for better use of administrative data, and this is one of the options currently under
discussion in a consideration of the conduct of the Census (Office for National Statistics
2013d). This is not something the ONS can control themselves, however; permission to
access such data can be difficult to obtain and in some cases will require legislation
(Public Administration Select Committee 2013), which offers a potential explanation as
to why this remains largely a suggested course of action and not a reality. Another is the
possible  opposition  on  privacy grounds  that  any opening  up  of  administrative  data
would cause; reminiscent of the 1538 objections to parish registers, above, the recent
creation  of  Care.data  to  centralise  medical  records  (and,  particularly,  that  database's
openness to third parties) has been strongly opposed on privacy grounds (Kirby and
Pickover 2014).
An alternative is the outsourcing of data collection to third parties, with management of
quality conducted through service-level agreements, as suggested by Pickford (Pickford,
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Cunningham, Lynch,  et al. 1989, p.31). This works to decentralise the system further,
the  ONS  becoming  primarily  a  sub-commissioning  body  (commissioning
operationalised statistics which were themselves commissioned by government actors),
responsible for quality control. There are also possibilities of re-using or re-purposing
existing data, as has been done in many of the components of the 'Measuring National
Well-being' programme.
What all these approaches represent, however, is solution to a problem of policy, and
not one of statistics. 'Value for money' is a product of both the cost of the statistic, and
of what purpose the statistic is meant to serve and for whom; it is a question of whether
the use value of the statistic justifies the exchange value (Hoinville and Smith 1982;
Working Party on the Measurement of Unemployment in the UK 1995). There can be
seen in the historic expansion and contractions of the ONS and its predecessors, and the
ongoing pressure for 'cost-effectiveness' and the reduction of burdens on data providers,
an implicit debate about what purpose statistics serve and how good they need to be.
The  suggestion  has  been  made  by  those  outside  government  (Thomas  2007)  that
'cheapness'  is  often  proxied  for  'value  for  money'  when central  funding for  official
statistics  is  made,  and that,  despite  a  shift  away from the  emphasis  on statistics  as
primarily for government use seen in the 1980s, the uses made by non-governmental
actors are still systematically discounted (Macfarlane 2007).
This, too, has implications for the Statistical Actors involved in the 'Measuring National
Well-being' programme. They must produce a programme which is reliable and valid,
on  a  budget,  balancing  statistical  integrity  and  cost.  This  will  be  impacted  by  the
discussions of the ONS' position within government earlier: if cost-effectiveness is a
function of a statistic's use, the onus is on the Statistical Actors of the ONS to provide
something usable.
4.1.6 Debates around the integrity of statistics
The complex relation of the ONS and government, caused both by the budgetary control
of the latter and by the use of statistics to further governmental aims, has produced
ongoing concerns about quality and political interference in official statistics. The most
famous of these was the debate around unemployment statistics in the 1980s where
definitional changes continually reduced the count downwards, a debate most clearly
analysed by Working Party on the Measurement of Unemployment in the UK (1995).
Governmental voices have periodically highlighted the dangers these concerns pose to
trust in statistics, particularly by the public as secondary users receiving statistics as
political pronouncements and justifications (Blair and Johnson in Economic Secretary
to the Treasury 1999, pp.iv-v; Matheson 2010, 20; Major in Ward and Doggett 1991,
p.ix; Public Administration Select Committee 2013; Rayner 1980b; for the same issue in
an international context see Kamen 2002).
Statistical  Actors, both official  and lay,  have argued that the source of such worries
about  integrity  tend  not  to  be  the  statistics  themselves  but  the  way they  are  used
(Thomas 2007; Working Party on Official Statistics in the UK 1991). Where concerns
have arisen over political interference, as in the case of unemployment statistics in the
69
CHAPTER FOUR
1980s, there was never any question of the statistic being inaccurate but only that the
definition  on  which  it  was  based  made  it  less  meaningful  than  statistics  based  on
alternative definitions (Working Party on the Measurement of Unemployment in the UK
1995). That statisticians themselves are not the source of mistrust is upheld by the three
studies the ONS has carried out into statistical trust (Bailey, Rofique and Humphrey
2010;  Simpson,  Beninger  and  Ormston  2015;  Wilmot,  Jones,  Dewar  et  al. 2005),
despite these reports being cited in official reports as evidence for public concerns about
integrity (e.g., Public Administration Select Committee 2013). The most recent survey,
for instance, suggested that fewer people trusted ONS statistics than trusted the ONS
itself (81% as against 88%), and that the most common reasons for mistrusting statistics
was political manipulation (29%) and vested political interest in the numbers (23%; see
p.12 of the report for these figures). In light of political fears around trust in statistics, it
is also worth noting that this 88% who express trust in the ONS is considerably higher
than the 42% who trusted the government in the same survey (Simpson, Beninger and
Ormston,  2015),  or  the  24%  who  trusted  the  government  in  the  most  recent
Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2013). While the Public Administration
Committee  opine  that  trust  in  statistics  is  essential  to  democratic  debate  (Public
Administration Select Committee 2013, p.5), they appear to be putting the cart before
the horse; if the politicians using statistics are not trusted, it seems unlikely that the
statistics themselves will be.
The Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007 presents an organisational solution to
this  political  problem,  merging  the  Statistics  Commission  into  the  ONS  as  two
components of the UK Statistics Authority, moving the ONS further from government
by  making  it  a  non-ministerial  department  and  giving  the  National  Statistician  an
explicit  role  in criticising misuse of statistics by political  actors.  As Thomas (2007)
predicted and the Public Administration Select Committee (2013) have shown, this has
not disentangled official statistics in perception or reality from the work of government.
However  independent  the  ONS  is  nominally,  their  products  are  inseparable  from
politics; their statistics are commissioned by political actors, used to illustrate political
points, and subject to definitional restrictions by (political) regulation and international
(political) agreement, and quality and coverage restrictions by (politically determined)
budgetary constraint.
Some effort has been made to resolve this through a kite-marking system introduced in
the Act, under which statistics meeting particular quality standards are labelled 'National
Statistics', and through an emphasis on explication of statistical data (both previously
required under the National Framework document, Office for National Statistics, 1996).
The Act also establishes a Code of Practice which includes guidelines on the separation
of  statistics  and  commentaries  on  them to  avoid  their  integrity  being  impacted  by
politicisation (UK Statistics Authority 2009, p.7); reference to this Code is also made
within the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office 2010). Both the kite-mark system and the
Code of Practice aim to establish a Chinese Wall between supposedly neutral empirical
facts and their political readings. The effectiveness of such walls, however, will always
be limited  when the origins and public use of statistics are largely political; however
trusted the ONS, there will always be doubts about the statistics themselves. A further
limitation  arises  from ignorance;  it  is  unlikely  that  anyone  outside  government  or
academia is aware of the difference between a badged and an unbadged statistic (a point
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made by Public Administration Select Committee 2013, p.19).
This  presents  a  further  set  of  challenges  for  the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  to
navigate. Not only must they produce a statistical programme with integrity, it must be
seen to have integrity. From the survey evidence above, this is difficult to achieve. The
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  was  launched  by  the  Prime  Minister
(Cameron 2010) giving it an explicit political construction which may have been to its
disadvantage.
4.1.7. Summary: the ONS as an institution
These five themes, which run throughout the history of the Office for National Statistics
–  centralising  and  de-centralising  tendencies,  questions  of  scale  and  geography,
financial pressures, tensions between excellence and cost and questions of integrity –
place the Statistical Actors of the ONS in a complex position in 2010 at the outset of the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme. They stand at the centre of a decentralised
system, subject to demands from diverse users, many of which they cannot negotiate.
They  must  maintain  both  a  fixed  number  of  statistics,  often  to  non-negotiable
international  quality  standards,  while  having  a  largely  non-negotiable  budget.  The
diverse  demands  and  supplies  of  data  result  in  uneven  temporal  and  geographic
coverage of its statistics. Their remit requires that they maintain quality at the same time
as  cost-effectiveness,  under  the  foregoing  constraints.  They  are  responsible  for  the
integrity of statistics which is generally only questioned for political and not statistical
reasons, while submitting to political oversight and demands which historically have
posed threats to the integrity of its statistics.
These  challenges  must  be  negotiated  by  the  Statistical  Actors  constructing  the
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme.  For  instance,  how  will  the  need  for
statistics  that  can  be  used  by  policy-makers  be  balanced  against  the  need  for
theoretically  valid  statistics?  How  will  demands  for  local  or  regional  coverage  be
balanced  against  concerns  about  cost?  Supporting  the  arguments  of  the  preceding
chapters, these challenges highlight the role of agency in the statistic-making process. It
is not simply a matter of articulating control or depicting empirical reality; such aims, if
held, are held within an institutional context which must be navigated if they are to be
achieved.
4.2. Policy-making and the UK state
The previous section has outlined the history of the Office for National Statistics, and
some  of  the  challenges  which  it  operates  under.  However,  the  ONS  cannot  be
understood separately from the wider context of government and policy-making in the
UK. As has been shown, within that context, the ONS acts as an arms-length producer
of  official  statistics  for  the  purposes  of  policy-making.  By  its  own  accounts,  key
amongst its roles is to ensure the evidence base on which policies can be made (see, for
example,  Office  for  National  Statistics  2010a,  p1,  "Our statistics  and advice enable
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informed decisions to be made."). For this reason it is important to examine the wider
policy-making  framework  into  which  the  ONS  fits,  to  understand  what  output  is
expected of it.
This section will proceed via a thematic examination of the last 20 years of UK policy-
making. The themes selected are versions of those which arise out of discussion of the
previous  section:  centralisation and decentralisation,  the integration of policy within
wider  decentralised  national  and  trans-national  policy-making  networks,  the  move
towards 'evidence-based policy' and the current shift towards the 'austerity state' within
a wider context of neoliberal state forms. These themes impact directly on the Statistical
Actors of the ONS in their role within an arms-length state body providing statistics for
other state bodies. The time period for examination has been selected to encompass
devolution,  which the last  section identified as being key to  the arrangement  of the
fragmented, decentralised system of official statistics in the UK.
4.2.1. Historic fragmented centralisation within UK policy-making
"Too often, the work of Departments, their agencies and other bodies has 
been fragmented and the focus of scrutiny has been on their individual 
achievements rather than on their contribution to the Government’s overall 
strategic purpose."
Modernising Government (Prime Minister and Minister for
the Cabinet Office 1999)
Historically, government and policy-making powers in the UK have been based around
discrete  agencies  at  numerous geographical  scales  (Department  of  the Environment,
Transport  and  the  Regions  2000;  Performance  and  Innovation  Unit  2000b;  Rhodes
1992). Foremost among these has been the Whitehall Department, agencies of central
government with responsibility across the whole of a broadly defined domain, such as
'Home Affairs' or 'Education'. Executive power within these departments is held by the
Minister,  a  temporary  political  appointee  of  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  elected
government, while administrative functions are performed by the apolitical, impartial
and more permanent Civil Service (Fawcett and Gay 2005). While many functions and
responsibilities,  particularly relating to policy implementation,  are devolved to other
branches of government such as Local Authorities, policy-formation, supervision and,
crucially, funding, are held at the centre (Rhodes 1992).
While this produces a centralisation of power within Whitehall Departments as the key
institutions  of  the  state  this  power  is  fragmented  along departmental  lines.  That  is,
central government holds the majority of policy-making power, but its responsibilities
are divided across departments with separate and sometimes competing aims, objectives
and  resources.  In  practice,  the  affairs  of  state  do  not  follow  sharp  classificatory
boundaries  and  there  will  be  some  occasions  where  the  interests  of  Whitehall
Departments directly conflict; the Strategic Policy Making Team of the Cabinet Office
offer the example of increasing tax rates, which may be desired by the Treasury for
spending  purposes,  but  opposed  by the  Department  for  Trade  and  Industry  on  the
72
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE PROGRAMME
grounds of harming international competition for business investment (Strategic Policy
Making Team 1999). Traditionally, where policy needs intersected, they would be dealt
with within the Cabinet system of government: at ministerial level the Prime Minister
would arbitrate policy conflicts, with cross-departmental committees operating at the
Civil Service level to co-ordinate informational needs (Fawcett and Gay 2005). This
system fell into abeyance from the Thatcher administration onwards, as Prime Ministers
asserted more control over policy, co-ordinated through their own departmental team
and the Cabinet Office (Jordan 1994; Rutter and Harris 2014). The result of this was
greater centralisation, but also greater failure of centralisation: under a Cabinet system,
overall governmental direction was, to some degree, a matter of shared vision; under a
system of Prime Ministerial command, this is no longer the case (Jordan 1994). While it
is possible to constrain the actions of Whitehall Departments through Public Service
Agreements with the Treasury or the system of Regulatory Impact Assessments (see
discussions below), it is less easy to direct them.
The limitations to this approach were laid out during the Blair administration, initially
in  the  White  Paper  Modernising  Government (Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  the
Cabinet Office 1999), but also in a series of follow-up reports by the Audit Commission
(2000), National Audit Office (2001), Office for Public Services Reform (2002), and
Performance and Innovation Unit (2000a, b). Broadly in line with the principles of New
Public Management theory (see below), these suggested that the world in which policy
was to intervene was increasingly complex and that the fragmented system, "though
necessary for administrative purposes" (Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet
Office 1999, p.23), was maladapted to deal with such complexity. The separation of
responsibilities meant, at best, a blind-spot for policies which cut across departmental
boundaries and, at worst, that departments had incentives not to deal with such policies
because they would cost in terms of resources but bring no benefits in terms of meeting
department-specific performance targets or Public Service Agreements (Butler 1993).
Policies were thus seen in isolation, rather than as part of an interactive system of actors
and aims (National Audit Office 2001).
These are problems which will not be resolved by the usual administrative solutions,
such  as  shifting  responsibilities  between  departments  ('skills',  for  instance,  has
historically moved around Whitehall,  between the Department for Education and the
Department  for  Business,  as  governments  and  government  priorities  change).  The
institutional weakness of the centre of government (Harris and Rutter 2014), means that
even a Prime Minister is limited in their ability to push through policy aims; they are
dependent  on departments  to  carry out  their  will,  which  means that  their  plans  are
subject to departmental priorities and buy-in.
To  respond  to  this,  the  Blair  administration  set  up  a  number  of  cross-cutting
methodology  bodies,  such  as  the  Performance  and  Innovation  Unit  (led  by  Geoff
Mulgan, who went on to sit on the ONS' Advisory Forum for the 'Measuring National
Well-being' programme) and the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit, to deal with policy-
development  and  implementation;  and  cross-cutting  policy  bodies,  such  as  the
Exclusion  Unit  and Rough Sleepers'  Unit,  to  deal  with  specific  policy areas  which
crossed departmental boundaries and which had historically fallen between departments
as a result. These had predecessors, most notably in light of the previous section the
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Efficiency Unit which operated under Rayner in the 1980s to review and rationalise the
activities of Whitehall Departments, but reached a prominence and a scale under New
Labour not previously seen (Rutter and Harris 2014). They also build on the work of
cross-departmental  networks,  think-tanks,  training  bodies  and  non-ministerial
government  agencies  such  as  the  Government  Statistical  Service,  the  professional
organisation of statisticians across government; the Institute for Government, a charity
promoting best practice in governance; the Civil Service College (and its successors),
which trained civil servants; and the Central Policy Review Staff (and its successors),
which reviewed policy (Jenkins 1992).
Reviewing the effectiveness of these new cross-cutting units, Rutter and Harris (2014;
Harris and Rutter 2014) note the intractability of the fragmented system. Where units
were  successful,  it  was  due  to  a  combination  of  narrow  remit  and  focused  Prime
Ministerial backing; where the problem was more diffuse and the issue less central to
the Prime Minister's concerns, departments could safely ignore the efforts at centralised
control without repercussions. An insight into this can be found in a document by the
Strategic Policy Making Team (1999) surveying best practice in Whitehall: when trying
to find out how departments were using evidence in policy-making, they were only able
to gain responses from half the departments surveyed; in following up non-responses,
some  departments  were  not  even  reachable  by  phone  (p.16).  Even  in  this  cross-
departmental project which made light demands on the departments' time and almost no
demands on their resources, it was difficult both to access and engage departments. As a
further  insight  into  the  embeddness  of  the  fragmented  culture,  the  same  report
concluded that  departments should establish their  own,  separate,  best  practice units.
This  is  despite  the  near  contemporaneous observation  by the  National  Audit  Office
(2001)  that  many  policy  decisions  were  not  even  vertically,  let  alone  horizontally,
integrated and so were failing to consider the needs of those arms of government which
would be implementing the policies which Whitehall departments had devised centrally.
Quite how best practice was to be discovered independently under such conditions is
unclear.
Summarising  this  period,  Fawcett  and  Gay  (2005)  suggest  that  the  New  Labour
government were able to improve policy-making capacity at the centre of government,
but  not  increase joined-up activity.  New Prime Ministers Brown and Cameron both
initially cut back on central administration, and were then forced to expand it again, a
result  of  what  Lodge  (2014)  describes  as  the  tension  between  the  desires  for  co-
ordination and decentralisation. Brown and Cameron shared a mistrust of an expansive
central apparatus, preferring to leave departments to their own devices, only to find that
cutting back on the central apparatus left them unable to co-ordinate the actions of those
departments (Harris and Rutter 2014, p.14). This desire for control over departments at
the heart of government is echoed in the relationships between those departments and
the  local  and  regional  administrative  bodies  who  implement  policy;  departments
mistrust the capabilities of these bodies to carry out policy and fear the financially and
politically costly mistakes which might arise if they are given freedom to devise their
own policies (Jordan 1994).
While the Prime Minister has limited power to ensure that policy objectives are met by
independent departments, the Treasury, as ultimate funding body, is able to exercise a
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considerable amount of influence.  The first  Comprehensive Spending Review of the
New Labour  administration  (Chancellor  of  the Exchequer  1998) noted the need for
cross-cutting policies, and suggested that the way funding was allocated to departments
on yearly cycles precluded their development. As a result, the Treasury under Brown
moved  to  a  three-year  funding  cycle,  supported  by  a  system  of  Public  Service
Agreements (PSAs). These made departments (and ministers) directly accountable for
performance  by  setting  a  series  of  measurable  targets  (again,  in  keeping  with  the
managerialist theories of New Public Management, see below). While largely avoiding
these  somewhat  crude  measures,  the  Coalition  government  of  2010  retained
accountability  to  the  Treasury  through  the  implementation  of  'business  plans',
departments proving they are 'sound' in advance of being given funding, rather than in
assessment of the funding they have already received (Harris and Rutter 2014; Rutter
and Harris 2014).
The fragmented system is naturalised within thinking about policy-making in the UK
(as evinced, again, by documents such as the  Modernising Government White Paper,
Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999, which consider the lack of
joined-up  policy-making  to  be  a  side-effect  of  an  otherwise  functional  system,  not
evidence that the system is non-functional). Yet it is worth noting that it is not the only
way in which government functions can be organised. The Scottish Government since
the election of the SNP administration in 2007 has organised around specific aims and
objectives,  codified  in  the  'Scottish  National  Performance  Framework',  rather  than
departmental  remits  (Scottish  Government  2011).  Such  an  approach  avoids  the  co-
ordination problem faced by the fragmented system by diffusing responsibility across
portfolio-holding ministers and civil service teams.
This  fragmented  policy  landscape  is  the  other  side  of  the  fragmented  statistical
landscape described in Section 4.1.2.. Statistical Actors within the ONS have a national
remit for a cross-cutting concern; they are to measure 'national' 'well-being'. The policy-
makers  who  use  such  statistics  have  more  specific  concerns,  such  as  'defence'  or
'education'. The extent to which they are interested in such a broad programme, and the
ways in which a programme might be made useful to them, are empirical questions.
4.2.2. Regionalisation, devolution and internationalisation as counters to 
centralisation
The  previous  sub-section  has  suggested  that  power  is  geographically  centralised  in
Whitehall, but fragmented across different departments. These operate through largely
separate networks with dispersed agents, implementing policy at a variety of scales. The
Modernising Government White Paper (Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet
Office 1999) noted, for instance, over 100 different sets of regional boundaries used in
the United Kingdom: while much was done at the Local Authority level, there were
different  boundaries  for  the  delivery of  health  services,  the  police,  the  fire  service,
waterways,  water  authorities,  and  so  on.  As  Hogwood  (1996)  points  out,  this
fragmentation of delivery mirrors the fragmentation of central policy: borders are drawn
by function, not by territory. The result is a panoply of agencies of varying size and
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powers, sometimes competing in aims and objectives (and producing and demanding
official statistics, see Allsopp 2003). While generally dependent on central bodies for
funding,  direction and legitimacy,  this  does  not  equate  to  dominance by the  centre;
rather  the  dispersal  of  power  which  comes  from local  implementation  leads  to  an
unevenness  in  the  expression  of  central  policy.  While  devolution  has  brought
intermediary levels of government to London, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, in
England there is no intermediate regional tier between central government and other
sub-national or regional delivery bodies. This makes co-ordination and quality control
more difficult for the centre, and standardisation all but impossible.
This is most noticeable at the Local Government level, which is difficult for the centre
to control both because of its large number of local actors and because of the legitimacy
they gain from local democratic processes. Relevant to the well-being agenda which the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme forms a part of are the 'power to promote
well-being' written into the 2000  Local Government Act, and extended to other local
policy  actors  through  the  2008  Parish  Councils  (Power  to  Promote  Well-being)
(Prescribed Conditions)  Order (Healey 2008) and 2008  Local  Transport  Act.  These
granted  Local  Authorities  an  ability  to  act  to  promote  the  economic,  social  or
environmental well-being of their areas, without defining what 'well-being' entailed in
this context. This allows greater diversity of activity by Local Authorities by providing
new grounds of justification for acting outside legislated responsibilities where the new
action doesn't  contravene existing laws limiting function.  The 2007  Local Authority
Targets  (Well-being  of  Young  Children) regulations  (Hughes  2007)  specifically
incorporate  well-being into existing statutory responsibilities,  the 2011  Localism Act
legislates the power to promote well-being into a general duty of consideration when
applications  were  being  made  by outside  bodies  to  take  on  the  provision  of  Local
Authority services, and the 2012 Public Services (Social Value) Act extended this duty
to all public contracts. Again, all three fail to specify what 'well-being' means in this
context. Both the power and the duty can be seen as central attempts at policy-making,
but their effect is to create diversity in modes and methods of provision. This effect is
strengthened by the  lack  of  vertical  integration between policy-makers  and delivery
bodies outlined in National Audit Office (2001).
Devolution (through the Scotland Act 1998, Northern Ireland Act 1998 and Government
of Wales Act 1998, the last of these replaced by the Government of Wales Act 2006 and
the first amended by the  Scotland Act 2012) has further complicated this picture by
providing new sub-UK power centres.  Although the precise powers devolved to the
Administrations differ,  as a broad outline the Westminster Parliament retains control
over matters such as the constitution (including the devolution settlement itself), foreign
affairs and defence, leaving the bulk of policy in health, education and social welfare to
the Devolved Administrations. Williams and Mooney (2008) point out the unevenness
of  this,  in  the  sense  of  the  greater  powers  which  apply  to  Scotland,  and  its
incompleteness, in the sense that the Treasury retains financing power. These two issues
combine in the limited tax-raising powers which apply to the Scottish Executive: the
1998 Act provided the ability to adjust income tax upwards or downward by three pence
in the pound, the 2012 Act increased this to ten pence while also allowing the Executive
to borrow. This provides the Scottish Executive with more freedom to act over their
greater  fields  of  responsibility  than  is  the  case  in  Northern  Ireland  or  Wales.  The
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devolved system is thus both asymmetrical and hierarchical in terms of the powers it
redistributes.
Despite these limits, even in Wales and Northern Ireland, the power of policy-making
and distributing funds in devolved areas has led to a reconfiguration of geographies of
social policy delivery. Willams and Mooney (2008), for example, note that numerous
charities operating in the area of social provision have acted to separate their Welsh
operations from their English ones, incorporating the former as separate bodies. This
results in essentially new stakeholder bodies, accessing newly-specific funding streams,
in the pursuit of local political objectives (see also Jones, Goodwin and Jones 2005).
Those  objectives  themselves  are  set  partially  in  contradistinction  to  policies  set  at
Westminster, as Devolved Administrations have attempted to assert their independence
(particularly in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party government asserted their
political  independence  from  Westminster  by  successfully  demanding  that  the  UK
government agreed to a referendum on national independence). The result is a dispersal
of power into regionalised bodies which directly compete with the centre for influence
with their local electorate and have the scope to compete also in ideological aims. At the
same  time  administratively  speaking,  much  of  what  they  do  must  interact  with
Whitehall,  particularly where  funding is  concerned,  because  central  policy over,  for
instance, health will have a knock-on effect on Devolved institutions (Goodwin 2013;
Goodwin,  Jones  and  Jones  2005).  These  new  administrative  relations  change  the
audiences  and  uses  for  existing  statistics,  and  create  demands  for  new  ones  (UK
Statistics Authority 2014b).
As a final complication to this sketch of the UK administration, various powers and
functions have been dispersed to multilateral bodies – economic, political and civil –
and various duties imposed by them. A statistical example is the United Nations System
of National Accounts (United Nations, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, International Monetary Fund and European Union 1993): by treaty, the
UK is bound to producing certain kinds of data in certain kinds of ways. This is further
legislated as the European System of National Accounts, which also sets time-frames by
which  this  data  must  be  produced (Eurostat  and European  Commission  2013);  and
agreements exist to provide this data to organisations of which the UK is a member such
as the OECD and World Bank. While representatives from the UK have input into the
form these take, influence is limited meaning that the design of official statistics as a
function of government is out of domestic hands. The responsible domestic body, in this
case the ONS, is then obliged to do their best with the requirements they receive from
the international body. While the impetus may be international, the funding for action on
the part of the domestic organisation tends to be strictly national, dividing the demand
for action from the supply. This can have the consequence of squeezing the organisation
fulfilling the policy as they face more onerous requirements without a corresponding
change in resources. (This is one potential explanation for the difficulties the ONS came
into when meeting the new requirements that  GDP include the black economy;  see
Magnanti,  2014.)  This  pattern  is  repeated  across  Whitehall  departments,  who  are
beholden  to  laws  and  regulations  implemented  at  the  European  level,  and  through
international treaties.
The  policy-making  landscape  in  the  UK is  thus  an  asymmetrical,  variegated  and  a
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complex one,  with myriad policy-making bodies,  networks,  stakeholders and actors;
distributed at multiple scales; with numerous centres of power. This is not unusual for
modern  government,  and  might  be  expected  in  a  mature  and  advanced  political
economy. However, the UK system holds these features while simultaneously seeking to
retain power in the centre of government, producing a system which is centralised but
fragmented.  It  is  into  this  that  the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS step,  through  the
Statistics and Regulation Services Act 2007,  as both a central provider of statistics to
stakeholders at multiple scales. They must interact with these diverse bodies and their
diverse interests, balancing these against their own needs as discussed in the previous
section.
4.2.3. New Public Management theory, evidence-based policy-making and cost-
benefit analyses
At several points in the discussions above, 'New Public Management' (NPM) theory
was mentioned as a guiding principle for recent state actions. While there is arguably no
single coherent NPM paradigm (Barzelay 2002), the theory represents an approach to
the  organisation  of  public  services  based  on  the  principles  of  marketisation  and
managerialisation. These principles suggest that services will perform best when they
are subject to market or quasi-market competition and where staff are subject to clear
performance  monitoring  (Denhardt  and  Denhardt  2000;  McLaughlin,  Osborne  and
Ferlie 2002). 'Perform best' here is articulated in terms of efficiency; increasing unit
output per unit of funding (Newman 2002).
Although the early writings on NPM are published in the early 1990s (Hood 1991;
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Pollitt  and Harrison 1992), reforms of the Civil  Service
going back to the 1980s share features with the theory as it came to be articulated. The
Rayner efficiency reviews (Rayner 1980a, b), for example, emphasised the opening of
routine  government  functions  to  the  market  and  the  re-organisation  of  monolithic
departments  into  separate  'executive  agencies'  which  were  self-contained  and
specialised. These would have independence from central government in their day-to-
day operations but operate according to aims and objectives set centrally (Brown 1992).
The ONS' predecessor, the Central Statistical Office, was made such an agency in 1991
(Office  for  National  Statistics  1996;  Ward  and  Doggett  1991).  This  move  was
accompanied by the 'Financial Management Initiative', which presented the managers of
new executive agencies with strict financial targets (Gray and Jenkins 1992). The New
Labour administration continued this trend, both breaking up departments through full
and semi- privatisations, and through extending systems of performance management
(see, particularly, the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review Modern Public Services
for  Britain,  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  1998).  The  effects  of  this  increased
fragmentation of government,  and the resultant need to find ways to re-join diverse
functions, have already been discussed; they are noted in the White Paper Modernising
Government (Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999), and highlight a
tension in NPM theory between the desire to increase efficiency through giving bodies
more independence and the need to co-ordinate those bodies to achieve greater goals
(Newman 2002).
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One way of ensuring such co-ordination is through greater scrutiny of the activities of
independent parts of government, both in the form of greater auditing and inspection
burdens (Office for Public Services Reform 2002; see also Power 1997) and through the
establishment  of 'Public  Service Agreements',  sets  of performance targets for  public
service agencies which were set  in return for funding  (Chancellor of the Exchequer
1998).  The  Coalition  Government  replaced  these  with  'Business  Plans'  which  are
structurally similar but which are less strongly tied to performance outputs (House of
Commons Treasury Committee 2010). Both of these have relatives in the form of the
Treasury's  Green Book and Magenta Book (HM Treasury 2011a, b), which outline the
conditions under which departmental or local governmental schemes will be eligible for
funding. A key requirement of funding is the performance of a cost-benefit analysis on
proposed schemes, showing that the proposal brings the most benefit for the least cost
when compared with other  feasible  options.  As Siltala  (2013) observes,  this  acts  to
centralise power within the Treasury, rather than decentralising it to departments and
agencies.
In these ways, co-ordination is at least partially secured by limitations on what bodies
can do if they are to secure the funding they need to continue operating. The move from
performance  targets  to  business  plans,  combined  with  the  Green  Book's  ongoing
concern with cost-effectiveness, privileges economic rationality as an underpinning of
policy. The current (2011) edition of the Green Book is the 2003 version with additional
guidance based on Fujiwara and Campbell (2011) concerning the use of subjective well-
being measures in the evaluation of non-monetary goods (HM Treasury 2011a, p.1; see
also next chapter). This represents a shift in the evidence-base acceptable for policy
from the qualitative and normative and towards the quantitative and monetary (e.g.,
Cabinet Office 2013). It is no longer enough to say that a policy will improve people's
lives, there now needs to be an assessment of by how much, for a given investment, and
whether the same expenditure could have improved lives by more elsewhere. This is in
keeping with a re-imagining of citizens receiving public services as “customers”, actors
who choose within a market for services (see particularly Office for Public Services
Reform 2002).
This should not be overstated. 'Cost effectiveness' remains a matter of judgement and
does  not  completely  replace  political  concerns.  Additionally,  large  sectors  of
government  such  as  Local  and  Devolved  Authorities,  do  not  have  to  submit  their
policies to scrutiny of this kind unless they are securing non-routine funding. However,
when the ONS sought funding for the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme in
2010, they will have needed to follow the 2003 Green Book guidelines, and the data the
programme produces,  particularly that on subjective well-being,  can now be utilised
across government agencies under the 2011 Green Book guidelines. When the ONS says
of the programme, “[pertinent well-being measures are] crucial to allow for effective
development and appraisal of policy for individuals to use information to identify ways
of  improving  well-being”  (Matheson  2011,  p.2),  this  is  the  context  in  which  the
statement sits.
The use of cost-benefit analyses and subjective well-being are tokens of a broader type
of the New Public Management programme, that of 'evidence-based policy'. From the
Modernising Government White Paper onwards (Prime Minister and Minister for the
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Cabinet Office 1999), the Blair administration called for policy to be more clearly based
on evidence, and to be evaluated as a source of evidence for future policy (Legrand
2012). Through this, it was hoped that the “old arguments about government” (such as
“big government against small government” or “interventionism against laissez-faire”,
p.1)  could  be  dispensed  with,  re-basing  policy  technocratically  around  issues  of
'modernisation'  and  “getting  government  right”  (p.1).  The  Strategic  Policy  Making
Team (1999) observed that while there were some areas, such as health, which had a
tradition  of  evidence-based  practice,  social  policy  was  very  rarely  based  on  tested
interventions. This they blamed on the view that there is “little consensus amongst the
research  community  about  the  appropriateness  of  particular  methodologies  or  how
research evidence should be used to inform policy and practice” (p.35), although a later
report by the Performance and Innovation Unit (2000b) also noted that “that demand for
good  analysis  is  not  fully  integrated  in  the  culture  of  central  Government”  (p.12),
suggesting  that  the  problem  of  evidence  lies  as  much  with  civil  servants  as  with
academia. This is supported by the work of Smith (2010), who interviewed 61 academic
researchers, civil servants, ministers, journalists and research funders involved in public
policy work around health inequalities and found that “not a single interviewee claimed
that  post-1997  health  inequalities  policies  had  been  significantly  based  on  research
evidence” (p.180, emphasis as original). Instead, a policy was formed and then evidence
was found to support it.
Various academics, in response to criticisms around a lack of evidence-use in policy-
making, noted the limitations of research in a policy context. Davies and Nutley (2002)
note that the Strategic Policy Making Team (1999) report was itself incredibly loose on
what counted as evidence, ranging from stakeholder consultations, through model-based
estimates,  to  results  from split-sample  trials.  While  there  was  a  clear  hierarchy  of
evidence-types  in  health,  ranging  from meta-analyses  at  the  top  to  qualitative  case
studies at the bottom, the same wasn't true in social policy due of the contested nature of
desired  outcomes,  and contestations  around what  would  count  as  evidence of  those
outcomes.
Pawson, Wong and Owen (2011) note that the practical domain into which policy enters
is non-uniform over both time and space; and interactional, impacting on practitioners
and recipients who in turn impact on it. These facts limit the generalisability of what
evidence  there  is,  limiting  the  usefulness  of  initial  evidence  relative  to  an  ongoing
iterative process of evidence-based adaptation across the life (and spaces) of a policy.
As above,  this  acts  as a  limit  on centralised policy-power:  such power is  exercised
locally by local agents, and is thus uneven in its expression. Frey and Lederman (2010)
suggest that the overlooking of this by central agencies is based on a two-fold optimism:
that policy can be rationally assessed, and that policy-making can be made rational. In
this context, hopes of moving beyond 'old arguments' and into an era of technocratic
rationality  (Prime  Minister  and Minister  for  the  Cabinet  Office  1999,  p.1;  see  also
comments by Legrand 2012) are sadly misplaced; what is treated as evidence and how it
is  used  are  political  questions  in  the  same  way  that  debates  over  'big  or  small
government' are.
Where 'evidence' does exist in a form broadly accepted by the academic community,
there is little sign of it being utilised. Bambra, Smith, Garthwaite, et al. (2011) noted the
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similarity of recommendations made by three major, government-commissioned, public
health inquiries thirty years  apart:  Black (Department  of Health and Social  Security
1980), Acheson (1998) and Marmot (see Marmot and Bell 2012). While the evidence-
base had shifted somewhat (there was more evidence on which to base claims about the
social determinants of health and ill-health in the later reports, for example), the policy
recommendations produced were fundamentally the same. Where they did differ, this
can be read as due to an understanding by the later authors that they needed to tailor the
evidence to the government  in power,  since anything,  however  solidly-based,  which
countered ideological preconceptions would be ignored. The author of the latest review,
writing half  a decade before his report  (Marmot 2004), foreshadows this reading by
arguing that there is a limited role that evidence can, or should, play in the political
process.  Evidence  is  merely  one  of  many factors  which  should  influence  a  policy,
meaning that there is a distinction between evidence and its policy implications. As an
additional challenge to the theory of New Public Management, Levy (2010) argued that
central government in the twenty-first century remained hierarchical and bureaucratic,
rather than horizontally organised and innovative.
Such  behaviour  complicates  the  claims  made  in  Performance  and  Innovation  Unit
(2000a) that official statistics, produced by the ONS and guaranteed by the National
Statistician  (as  proposed  in  the  Building  Trust  in  Statistics White  Paper,  Economic
Secretary to the Treasury 1999, and legislated in the Statistics and Regulation Services
Act  2007),  will  act  to  provide  an accepted  and shared  knowledge-base  from which
policy-making  actors  can  proceed.  The  'evidence'  of  the  official  statistic  is  always
evidence  of  something (Thomas 1996);  and as  Porter  notes,  it  fills  a  known gap in
knowledge; it reports on things that the administrator does not know first-hand (Porter
1986). It was noted above that the most common reasons given for mistrusting statistics
was that they were misused politically (Simpson, Beninger and Ormston 2015), and this
remains an insurmountable problem as the gaps that are being selected for evidential
intervention are selected not by statisticians but by politicians. The hopes of New Public
Management that a technocracy is possible rest on an over-optimism about 'evidence';
even when it is itself neutral, it is only one part of a larger set of bases for decision-
making and will be interpreted within the context of that larger set.
This  further  complicates  the  role  of  Statistical  Actors.  They  are  creating  official
statistics  as  a  form of  evidence,  but  it  is  evidence  of  a  potentially  contested  and
uncertain kind. This relates back to the questions of use and integrity raised in sections
4.1.4. and 4.1.6.; any statistical programme must be valid, but will survive only in as far
as it is used by policy-makers. Its use is political, but its construction cannot be.
4.2.4. Fast-policy networks and best practice
An aspect of the evidence-based policy movement has been the movement to what Peck
(2002) describes as 'in-sourcing'  of external knowledge, bringing those from outside
formal  democratic  politics  and  the  Civil  Service  to  lead  departments  or  sit  on
committees.  This  can be seen as  an  extension of  the traditional  use of  outsiders  as
portfolio-holding ministers within the House of Lords, and on Royal Commissions and
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similar Parliamentary Enquiries (see Burton and Carlen 1979). Rutter and Harris (Rutter
and Harris 2014; also Harris and Rutter 2014) note an expansion of the traditional pool
of relevant expertise used over the last 20 or so years, with the inclusion of private-
sector consultants and self-appointed 'think tanks' within the process of policy-making
(extending the role they had previously played advising party-political policy). Crouch
(2013)  attributes  this  trend  to  the  New  Public  Management  movement,  which
encourages government agencies to behave more like private sector corporations, hiring
in expertise when needed rather than nurturing and maintaining it in-house, and turning
to  corporate  figures  as  advisers  and  managers.  Increasingly,  this  undercuts  the
democratic basis of governance, as power and decision-making are vested outside of
domestic frameworks in international bodies and agreements, and outside of popular
franchise,  in  lobbyists,  corporate  political  sponsors  and  'revolving  doors'  between
politics and business (Crouch 2004). New Public Management theory legitimises this
through its emphasis on service delivery over service provision; politicians are able to
rationalise  the  reduced influence  of  democratic  structures  on the  grounds  that  what
matters is how efficiently something is done, not who does it (Crouch 2013). As an
example of this, the Office for Public Services Reform, established during the second
New Labour administration, stated: “It is the Government's job to set national standards
that really matter to the public, within a framework of clear accountability, designed to
ensure that citizens have the right to high quality services wherever they live.” (2002,
p.10). The role of government here is as procurer and inspector, not deliverer or owner,
of services.
An effect of this broadening of the advice base has been the creation of what Peck
(2002) describes as 'policy communities' which operate cross-nationally and form 'fast
policy networks'. The temporary in-sourcing of expertise to advise on policy-making
establishes external actors as policy experts, whose temporary position frees them to
advise  on  policy elsewhere.  They thus  move between  organisations  at  national  and
international  scales  and  across  public  and  private  sectors,  transmitting  knowledge
between them.  At the  same time,  the nesting  of  regional,  national  and international
structures (for instance,  the role the ONS plays in its  interactions with Eurostat,  the
OECD and the United Nations, as well as the professional membership of Statistical
Actors  within  the  ONS  in  the  UK  Royal  Statistical  Society  and  the  International
Statistical  Society),  leads  to  a  similar  sharing  and  exchange  of  knowledge.  Peck,
Theodore and Brenner (2012; see also Peck and Theodore 2012) argue that the effect of
this is not a simple transferral of policy models, but the co-construction of models in
multiple places at similar times. They argue that what is travelling, with the mobile and
inter-linked  members  of  policy  communities,  are  not  designs  of  policies  but
transformative conceptual schemas (Peck and Theodore 2010). Peck (2002) gives the
example of 'workfare' policies, schemes to encourage the unemployed to take up work
through a combination of training and the reduction of their welfare benefits; this policy
started as a small-scale local innovation, and travelled across the Anglophone world, not
as a set of concrete prescriptions but as a collection of general principles adapted to
local conditions.
Such a network necessarily runs somewhat counter to the trends of regionalisation and
fragmentation discussed above. As Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2012) point out, while
the underlying rationale of policies may be multilaterally endorsed, their expression is
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site-specific. The regional implementation of a national policy runs into the problems of
vertical non-integration found by the Performance and Innovation Unit (2000b), with
non-heterogeneous actors attempting to fulfil broad policy aims with non-heterogeneous
means. Thus while the centre can set Public Service Agreements or other targets to be
met, how they are met is beyond their control. This is of obvious import for official
statistics, which gain part of their value from their ability to compare circumstances
across polities. A performance standard must be standardised across locales if it is to
indicate relative success or failure; however, while the performance standard may be
standardised, the conditions under which institutions perform are not; the same output
represents a different outcome in different times and places. The central standards and
the central tools, such as official statistics, which enforce them, in this way exemplify
the 'model logic' of Peck, Theodore and Brenner's (2012) networks. They dis-embed the
local output from its local inputs, pre-emptively depoliticising them as 'successes'  or
'failures' according to standards set outside of the locale on which their output impacts.
For the Statistical Actors of the ONS, the 'insourcing' of knowledge and the existence of
fast-policy  networks  establishes  a  further  set  of  social  relations  to  be  negotiated,
alongside  those  with  Central  and  Devolved  government.  It  brings  the  'Measuring
National Well-being' programme into dialogue with those at European and international
levels. How these are navigated and what effect they will have on the form and content
of the official statistic is an empirical question.
4.2.5. Austerity and moves toward 'smaller government'
A final trend which will be pertinent to the ONS' work in 2010, at the origins of the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme, is the governmental austerity agenda and
the attendant reduction in public social provision. There have always been debates over
the legitimate role and scope of government: in addition to the examples discussed in
section  4.1.2.,  initial  attempts  to  collect  a  national  Census  were  rebuffed  as  over-
reaching (Shaw and Miles 1979). Over the last 30 years, the New Public Management
approach has seen an increasing shift from state delivery of services to state provision of
privately  delivered  services.  On  top  of  this,  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'
programme occurs at a time of contraction in the national economy during which all
three  major  UK-wide  parties  shared  a  narrative  that  government  had overspent  and
needed to cut  back on the services  (and attendant  costs  of  those  services)  which it
delivered.
In practical terms, Pearson, Page and Trafiacante (2014) observe that the 2010 Spending
Review, under which the ONS received funding for the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme, specified deep cuts to central Whitehall staffing numbers as well as wider
cuts to budgets for activities. In real terms, budgets were cut by 19% across Whitehall,
with “a particular focus on cutting senior Civil Servant posts” (Gay 2010, p.8). This
meant that less people were available to departments with more thereby required of
those remaining. How departments handled this varied widely, but the authors report
widespread disaffection amongst civil servants who found themselves personally having
to do more with severely constrained resources.  There are echoes here of the rogue
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Government  Statisticians  Collective  (1979),  who  wrote  their  account  of  official
statistical production at a similar time of government redundancies (or, as Pearson, Page
and Traficante, 2014, obscenely put it, a period in which people were 'managed out of
the organisation', p.22).
Konzelmann (2014) notes both the lack of theoretical basis for policies of austerity, and
a wealth of empirical evidence which suggests it is counterproductive. From this he
suggests, echoing arguments made by Peck (2010), that austerity is an ideological end
in itself,  not a  means to  any political  or  policy goal.  This  ideological  base,  and its
presentation of this in terms of economic necessity, has led to what Schäffer and Streeck
(2013) describe as a 'decline in democratic buy-in', as the public no longer feel capable
of  changing  things.  In  this  context,  it  is  possible  to  read  various  aspects  of  the
Conservative manifesto (Conservative Party 2010) – such as commitments to localism
or the devolution of social  provision to 'The Big Society'  – as ways of discursively
recasting the withdrawal of government support and competence as an empowerment of
individuals and communities. 'Well-being', and the commitment to it through a public
statistical programme, is also amenable to such a sceptical reading. Not only does it
deliberately shift the basis of national performance away from a GDP figure which, as a
result of the financial crisis, was not looking healthy (Cameron 2010), it also provides a
discursive commitment to 'well-being' at a time when austerity is likely to negatively
impact on it. This commitment to 'well-being' makes it easier to justify austerity as an
economic rather than a political project; austerity is something that has to be done, but
the Government remains concerned about 'well-being'.
This, again, creates questions for Statistical Actors concerned with the integrity of the
official statistics they produce. The relationship of the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme to wider trends in policy-making raises questions around the presentation of
the programme and around the balancing of policy-makers and the public as members
of the Statistical Audience.
4.2.6. Summary: official statistics within the UK policy-making context
This  last  point  returns  to  the  concerns  about  statistical  integrity  discussed  above:
although nominally independent of central government, in 'Measuring National Well-
being' the ONS will be producing a statistical programme about a political issue and in a
political context. This raises immediate questions about what items will be included in
the programme, whether the programme will be used to produce a single headline figure
or be left as a series of indicators, and so on. At the same time, the ONS is fitting within
a larger system of government, with potential users of the programme distributed across
Whitehall,  Devolved  Administrations  and  local  government.  This  raises  questions
around how the programme is designed and constructed to take account of, or to ignore,
the interests of these users. The ONS is also fitting within larger international networks,
both of statistical practice and of well-being theory, which will add competing aims and
objectives to those of domestic bodies. And they will do all of this on a fixed budget, at
a time when resources, both in terms of finance and personnel, are being squeezed.
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4.3. Some concluding remarks on the institutional context of the ONS in 2010
This  chapter  has  briefly outlined  the  institutional  history of  the Office  for  National
Statistics, and its place within the wider context of UK policy-making both as an agency
of government and as a producer of tools and materials used in organising government.
It has shown the complicated terrain in which the Statistical Actors of the ONS stand –
part  of  an  apolitical  organisation  producing  data  for  political  use,  engaging  with  a
fragmented  but  centralised  system of  governance,  and  so  on.  This  terrain  must  be
navigated: there is no obvious 'right answer' which the ONS can produce which will
allow either  the  political  control  of  statistical  objects  (as  suggested  by the  'critical'
theories  surveyed  in  Chapter  Two)  or  which  will  guide  a  neutral  empirical
representation of an external reality (as suggested in the 'native'  theories of Chapter
Two).  Rather,  the  evidence  of  this  chapter  supports  the  relevance  of  a  social
constructionist  approach;  by  highlighting  some  of  the  constraints  under  which  the
statistical programme is made, constraints which the Statistical Actor must negotiate.
The survey in this chapter has emphasised the themes which run through the literature
around the ONS and UK policy-making. How these themes play out in the day-to-day
lives of Statistical Actors and what themes have importance in their lives do not appear
in the literature but are empirical questions which will be tackled in Chapters Six and
Seven. Before then, it is necessary to survey the theoretical material from which the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme might be built. This will be done in the
chapter which follows.
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Chapter Five
The theoretical and policy context of the 'Measuring National Well-
being' programme: well-being theory and statistical practice
The  previous  chapter  examined the  institutional  context  of  the  'Measuring  National
Well-being' programme: the Office of National Statistics and the broader policy-making
structure of the UK state. This highlighted a number of potentially competing aims and
objectives,  constraints  and  considerations  which  flow  from  the  ONS'  institutional
history and form,  and from its  place  within  the  wider  institutional  structure  of  UK
policy-making. These will necessarily impact on the form of the statistics which the
ONS produces, including outputs from the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme,
as these set the context in which Statistical Actors operate. As explored in Chapter One,
actors have agency, so this context does not determine the official statistic which will be
produced but it will shape it by providing a structure in which action takes place. It is an
empirical  question  how,  and  to  what  extent,  this  is  the  case;  this  question  will  be
examined in Chapters Six to Eight.
Before that examination can be undertaken, it is necessary to examine the theoretical
context of the programme: both of 'well-being' as it is constituted in academic literature,
and of previous attempts to translate this conception into statistical programmes. The
justification  for  this  is  the  same  as  that  for  the  examination  of  institutions  in  the
previous  chapter;  in  attempting  to  understand statistics  as  social  constructions,  it  is
necessary to  consider  what  it  is  they are  constructed  from.  With  that  in  mind,  this
chapter  will  progress  by  examining  the  literature  surrounding  well-being  and,
separately,  UK  and  international  attempts  to  create  well-being,  or  well-being-like,
indicators over the last 60 years.
While the second of those tasks will undertaken in the same chronological fashion as the
two  prerequisites  examined  in  Chapter  Four,  the  first  will  instead  be  undertaken
taxonomically.  The reasons for  this  will  become obvious,  but  can be briefly stated:
'well-being' is a chaotic conception (Sayer 1981, 1985, 2000), incorporating a number of
distinct constructs approached in a number of different ways.  To try and expound a
history  of  the  development  of  these  would  be  an  overly  complex  and  uncertain
endeavour which would risk losing the fundamental differences between conceptions
under a weight of similarities in development. By examining the concept taxonomically,
it  is  possible  to  indicate  historical  development  and  origins  while  highlighting  the
disparate nature of the ideas that the Statistical Actors of the ONS have available for
incorporation  into  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme.  One  of  the
contributions  which the present  study makes is  to  the literature on well-being;  it  is
unusual for a study to survey the construct as it is used in multiple disciplines.
Section 5.1., then, will explore the diverse nature of concepts of well-being, examining
divergent terminologies which appear in discussions around 'well-being'. Section 5.2.
will examine how these differences are expressed in empirical research and note the
implications this has for programme construction. As a lot of ground is covered by these
sections, a brief Section 5.3. will recap some of the major themes raised. The chapter
will  then  proceed with  Section  5.4.,  which  addresses  the  history of  well-being  and
related statistical programmes, both official and unofficial. Again, due to the breadth of
material covered, a summary of this material will appear as Section 5.5.. The chapter
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will end in Section 5.6. with a brief summary of the key points raised in Chapters Four
and Five, and the complexities that the programme's context create for the Statistical
Actors of the ONS in their construction of the programme. This provides the working
material  for  the  empirical  research  of  Chapters  Six  and  Seven,  which  will  ask  the
question of how important the various complexities are, if at all, and how the ONS went
about negotiating them in the case of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme.
This chapter makes an original contribution to the literature around well-being, bringing
together  accounts  from multiple  disciplines  which  do not  normally interact,  notably
economics and positive psychology. In some respects it replicates the work of others,
such as Scott (2012), however in the breadth of material surveyed and the taxonomic
approach it takes it represents an extension of such work. The section on the history of
well-being measurement also represents an extension of existing work, such as that of
Bache (2013; Bache and Reardon 2013) and Allin and Hand (2014).
5.1. The diverse nature of concepts of 'well-being'
Any attempt to understand 'well-being' is immediately complicated by indeterminacies
of terminology. Stoll, Michaelson and Seaford (2012), in a sympathetic review of the
research  around  the  concept  and  its  possible  implications  for  national  policy,  note
slippages in  usage between 'well-being',  'life satisfaction',  'happiness'  and 'subjective
well-being' (p.8). As will be seen in the discussion of taxonomy below, these are distinct
constructs: 'subjective well-being' refers to individuals' assessments of their well-being,
which may include assessments of their happiness or their satisfaction with life, while
'well-being' can include non-subjective measures such as health or income. To this list
of terms can be added 'quality of life', which is used both interchangeably with 'well-
being'  and  as  an  aspect  of  it  focussing  on  the  material  conditions  of  life  (as  in
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and  Development  2013a).  There  is  also
'progress',  which  suggests  a  teleology to  human  conditions  and  to  'well-being'  and
occurs particularly in policy-contexts (as in Cameron 2010; see also the work of former
Cabinet  Secretary  Gus  O'Donell;  O'Donnell,  Deaton,  Durand,  et  al.  2014) or  as
correspondent of well-being (as in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development 2013a model). Sometimes used is 'welfare', which has a longer history
within social policy and  tends to refer to material conditions rather than to individual
capabilities; in the context of well-being, it is usually preceded by the word 'economic'
(as in Fujiwara and Campbell 2011). Often, these words will be used interchangeably or
thrown  together  without  distinction,  making  it  unclear  exactly  what  'well-being'  is
believed to consist in (Kearns and Andrews 2010).
 
Such ambiguities of usage stem both from the close relatedness of concepts and from
the  diverse  sources  of  discussion.  For  example  while  there  are  clear  technical
distinctions which are recognised in the psychological literature, for instance between
'happiness' (an affective state) and 'life satisfaction' (an evaluative state) (Diener, Suh,
Lucas and Smith 1999; Diener and Seligman 2004), these do not always carry through
to other academic fields. For instance, Layard (2003, 2005), treats answers to both 'how
happy are you' (affective) and 'how happy are you with your life' (evaluative) as data on
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'happiness'. Such distinctions are further obscured when empirical data is encompassed
within  a  broader  discourse  of  'well-being',  both  by  researchers  (see,  for  example,
Blanchflower  and  Oswald  2004,  2008,  who  title  their  papers  with  'well-being'  but
review research into 'life satisfaction') and policy-makers. As an example of the latter,
the Whitehall Well-being Group (2005), in their review of the use of 'well-being' across
central government departments in the UK found that while the term was widely used, it
was normally not specifically defined and was used differently by different departments.
However,  distinctions  between  constructs  do  exist  and  they  follow  quite  clear
conceptual boundaries, and obscuring them under the rubric 'well-being' can give a false
impression of a  coherent  programme looking into a closely-defined holistic  concept
subject to empirical analysis. As Diener and Seligman (2004) assert, such a programme
does not exist. In its place are top-down attempts which start from the researcher's idea
of what 'well-being' comprises, and then attempts to draw together research on specific
constructs felt to be relevant (see, for example, Dolan, Peasgood and White 2006). This
leads to the slippages noted above, as research from diverse fields are gathered under
the label 'well-being', sometimes being distorted in the process to make sure they fit.
Such diversity of conceptions of 'well-being' and its components is not new. What has
been considered as 'the good life' or 'true happiness' (both of which are concepts related
to  but  distinct  from 'well-being')  has  been  debated  for  at  least  as  long  as  there  is
recorded debate (see White  2006).  This feeds  directly into well-being research:  one
strand of research, the 'eudaimonic', takes it name from Aristotle's discussion of what it
meant  to  'live  well'  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics (Aristotle  2002);10 other  strands,  of
'preference satisfaction' and the 'hedonic', owe debts to Utilitarianism (Bentham 1962;
Mill  1962).  Already in  disagreement  with  each other,  both these attempts  to  define
happiness have been rejected by other philosophers for a variety of reasons. Kant, for
example, suggested it was impossible for an individual to know in advance what would
make  them happy,  debarring  both  Aristotle's  pre-planned  individual  excellence  and
Bentham and Mill's centrally-planned social system (White 2006). Similar arguments
being  made  by modern  critics  of  well-being  research  (see,  for  example,  Johns  and
Ormerod's, 2007, claim that “the concept of happiness is inherently subjective and is not
necessarily connected to what most people would deem moral”, making it impossible to
plan  or  legislate  for,  p.20).  Given  the  openness  of  the  historical  discussion  around
happiness, it is unsurprising that the research context around its modern cousin 'well-
being' is similarly diverse.
The effects of that diversity are shown in figures 5.1., which are a series of conceptual
frameworks produced by different  organisations  interested in  the questions  of 'well-
being' or 'quality of life'. Again, there is a difference in terminologies, the ONS (figure
5.1.a)  and  OECD (figure  5.1.c)  models  discussing  'well-being'  and  Eurostat  (figure
5.1.b) choosing instead 'quality of life'. There are also differences in what is included:
for example, Eurostat suggest 'economic and physical safety', which has a parallel in the
OECD's 'personal security' but no correspondent in the ONS' model. The OECD bring
four types of capital to the fore as necessary for the sustainability of well-being, while
10 Although, it should be noted that little more than the word 'eudaimonia' is taken from Aristotle's 
philosophy, that being a theory of ethics based on the 'excellences' of the 'soul', which are functions of
human rationality. Importantly, the 'flourishing' individual for Aristotle is one whose attainments are 
believed by their peers to be worthwhile, not someone who feels their own life to be worthwhile.
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the other two distribute them across their domains. In general, while there are overlaps
in the concepts the three models are using, at this high level there are clear differences
in  emphasis  and  composition.  There  are  obvious  potential  explanations  for  such
differences in approach: the three organisations vary in political aims, access to data,
abilities to collect and aggregate information, the nature of their audiences. Nonetheless,
they are all talking about a single (or, at best, a small number of very tightly interlinked)
concept  in  different  ways.  This  selection  does  not  exhaust  the  possibilities  for
conceptualising  well-being  either,  as  Tomlinson  and  Kelly  (2013)  show  when  they
highlight issues of social cohesion, national identity, the sustainability of development
and the distribution of assets as missing from the ONS' programme (and, they might
have added, also largely missing from the Eurostat and OECD programmes).
a. The ONS framework (redrawn from Beaumont 2011, p.2)
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b. The OECD framework (redrawn from Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development 2013a, p.4)
Note: 'Regrettables' in this framework are 'negative externalities', by-products of
GDP which are harmful to well-being.
c. The Eurostat framework (redrawn from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-
beyond/quality-of-life/data, accessed 9 May 2015)
Figures 5.1. The well-being frameworks of the ONS, OECD and Eurostat
91
CHAPTER FIVE
As a final observation on the ambiguities of terminology, in as far as a holistic concept
'well-being' is developing or being sought by researchers and policy-makers at all, this
does not mean that academics and policy-makers were not previously interested in what
might now be called 'well-being'. As HM Treasury (2008), somewhat defensively, make
clear, “Governments already factor well-being considerations into the overall balance of
economic, social and environmental policy. Economic policy does not generally seek to
prioritise growth  per se, but as a means to higher aggregate welfare.” (p.3; see also
Atkinson 2005). There is here, again, an equating of 'well-being' and 'welfare', and the
claim that well-being (or welfare) is the ultimate aim of policy. Donovan, Halpern and
Sarjeant  (2002),  reviewing  the  status  of  research  into  life  satisfaction  and  its
implications for policy, make a similar point, arguing that nations, generally, are trying
to  'progress'  in  some sense (p.43,  although they acknowledge that  what  nations  are
progressing towards is a politically disputed question). From this perspective, recent
explicit  focus on 'well-being'  as a holistic concept,  as in the case of the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme, are not radical departures from pre-existing concerns,
but  attempts  at  making  such  behaviour  more  scientific  by linking  judgements  with
evidence (O'Donnell, Deaton, Durand, et al. 2014).
This  diversity of conceptions  of 'well-being'  is  not necessarily problematic:  if  'well-
being' is a subjective state then a plurality of approaches may be more useful than any
monolithic construction. However, the lack of any established and agreed model raises
questions for the Statistical Actors of the ONS about what counts, and what to count, as
'well-being'.  They will  be in the position of creating a monolithic construction,  as a
statistical  programme  is  necessarily  a  closed  set  of  measures,  without  any existing
agreement of what to include and the real possibility, given the history of disagreement,
that no such agreement is possible.
5.2. The diverse approaches to conceptualising and measuring 'well-
being'
There has been widespread research across a number of disciplines into 'well-being',
most notably in psychology and the behavioural, developmental and environmental sub-
branches of economics. However, as discussed above, these disciplines have not agreed
on  what  'well-being'  consists  in,  leading  to  the  development  of  several  distinct
approaches. Figure 5.2. is an attempt to order the diverse literatures around well-being,
based on Schyns (2003, as reproduced in Noll 2005) and updated with material from
Dolan, Peasgood and White (2006) and Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe (2011). It outlines
the key strands of well-being research and the measures which have been developed
within  them.  A major  division  in  approaches  can  be  discerned within  the  literature
between observed and stated measures. 
In  observed  measures,  the  researcher  decides  what  contributes  to  well-being  and
measures this directly. An example would be indicators of unemployment – in as far as
unemployment is considered detrimental to well-being, its levels can be observed and
the conclusion drawn that well-being is increasing when unemployment is falling and
vice versa. In stated measures, individuals are asked directly for their evaluations of
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their own well-being, which leaves them to define for themselves what contributes to
that evaluation; an example would be subjective well-being measures, where individuals
are asked to assess their own happiness or satisfaction with life without there being any
prior assumptions by the researcher that employment status, to take the example already
used, contributes to this.
Figure 5.2. A taxonomy of well-being research
Within these two divisions, three major approaches towards constructing and observing
well-being can be discerned (highlighted in bold in  figure 5.2.):  stated  evaluations,
where  individuals  give  a  personal  assessment  of  their  internal  states  and  opinions;
preference  satisfaction approaches,  where  individuals  indicate  through  real  or
hypothetical actions how much they would give up to secure an outcome; and objective
lists, where observations are made of phenomena or objects thought to contribute to
well-being. These approaches will be briefly explored below.
It will be argued that these three approaches and their various sub-categories do not
relate to a holistic construct of well-being, but that they are all at least potentially valid
components  of  a  larger  construct.  Further,  none of  them is  exhaustive:  assessments
which  rested  solely  on  stated  personal  evaluations  while  ignoring  observed  social
conditions (or vice versa) would be incomplete; as separate constructs, it is possible for
these  two  approaches  to  reach  different  conclusions  about  overall  well-being.  This
creates  a  challenge  for  the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS;  if  they  are  to  avoid
incompleteness in the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, they will need to
find a way of making diverse approaches to 'well-being' cohere.
5.2.1. Stated evaluation approaches
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A broad body of research in the disciplines of psychology, health and economics looks
at stated evaluation approaches, which ask individuals to assess various aspects of their
lives.  This  research  encompasses  evaluations  of  the  self,  hedonic  and  eudaimonic
personal assessments, and evaluative assessments of social conditions.
Stated evaluation approaches ask individuals to give a global judgement of their life, its
conditions or of an aspect of these. The standard approach used in economics is ask
individuals  'how satisfied are you with… ?',  allowing them to respond using binary
options  or  Likert  scales.  This  approach  can  also  be  used  to  obtain  individual
assessments of collective organisations or phenomena (as in, 'how satisfied are you with
the government?' or 'to what extent do you feel safe?'). Hedonic approaches look at the
experience of individuals, asking them to record their affective or psychological state
rather than a assessment of satisfaction. Eudaimonic or 'flourishing' approaches ask the
individual how worthwhile or meaningful they feel their life is, or the extent to which
they have a sense of purpose. In all  cases, individual assessments are aggregated to
reach conclusions about how larger entities such as countries are doing: the entity is
happy in as far as the majority of its citizens are happy (Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe
2011).
This approach has been widely used in economics with authors such as Dolan, Layard,
Metcalfe, Donovan and Oswald, all of whom went on to advise the Office for National
Statistics  on  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme,  developing  lines  of
research utilising it  (Dolan,  Layard and Metcalfe  2011;  Dolan,  Peasgood and White
2006,  2008;  Dolan,  Peasgood,  Dixon,  et  al.  2006;  Layard  2005;  Blanchflower  and
Oswald 2004, 2008). It is relatively cheap and easy to administer, requiring as little as a
single question which can easily be slipped into established surveys to yield a large
dataset. Doing so provides data amenable to statistical analysis; by treating this data as
an outcome measure, regression modelling can be used to 'explain' well-being in terms
of other measures in the survey. Existing surveys which ask for stated evaluations of
well-being, such as the Gallup World Values poll,  provide large datasets  going back
decades which allow 'satisfaction'  or affect ratings to be linked with other variables
(Heukamp and Ariño 2011). The fruits of this research is summarised by Dolan, Layard
and  Metcalfe  (2011),  Dolan,  Peasgood  and  White  (2006,  2008),  Dolan,  Peasgood,
Dixon, et al. (2006), Donovan, Halpern and Sargeant (2002) and Layard (2005).
The underpinning for such work was laid by psychologists who showed that constructs
such as 'happiness' or 'satisfaction' were robust and valid (Diener and Seligman 2004).
Historically  there  were  concerns  that  individuals,  while  able  to  have  meaningful
discussions about such constructs, may not have meant the same thing by them. This
was of particular concern cross-culturally, where there were fears that cultural biases
would influence responses. More broadly, there were also concerns that emotional states
were  susceptible  to  performance  biases  under  experimental  conditions;  and  that
responses were volatile and unstable over time. Together, these response effects would
lead to unreliable measures. A large amount of early research in psychology centred on
clearing  away these  concerns,  and  showing  that  individuals  could  accurately  report
conditions like 'happiness' and 'satisfaction', which were impacted in expected ways (for
example, that 'happiness' declined in the wake of negative events), were relatively stable
over time, and were impacted by biases in experimentally controllable ways (Diener,
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Suh, Lucas and Smith 1999).
This  body of  psychological  research  allowed  economists  to  build  on  their  existing
Utilitarian  preference  models.  Mainstream  economic  theory  models  individuals  as
rational  actors  seeking  to  maximise  'utility'  through  purchases  in  the  market  (Keen
2011). This leads to a post hoc nature to economic argument: purchasing decisions are
assumed to express utility-maximising behaviour, but cannot be shown to (Brockway
1995). Subjective well-being allows a way of characterising 'utility' directly, allowing it
to be related empirically with both market and non-market activities. This led to a body
of research, summarised by, among others, Dolan, Peasgood and White (2006, 2008),
Donovan, Halpern and Sargeant (2002), Layard (2005) and Johns and Ormerod (2007),
which used regression techniques to separate out the determinants of stated evaluations.
The  majority  of  findings  of  this  research  are  not  greatly  surprising:  divorce,
bereavement, unemployment and insecurity are associated with more negative stated
evaluations and affect, while marriage, faith and social ties are associated with more
positive ones. There has been great debate, however, around income: Easterlin (1974),
using data from a series of international polls found that within countries greater income
was  associated  with  more  positive  personal  stated  evaluations,  and  that  between
countries  greater  income  per  head  was  associated  with  higher  average  positive
evaluations. However, within countries, as income per head increased over time there
was no corresponding improvement in average stated evaluations. This finding became
known as the 'Easterlin Paradox', that income appears to impact on stated evaluations at
any given point in time, but not to influence it over time.
This  paradoxical  finding  is  cited  by  Cameron  (2010)  and  the  Conservative  Party's
policy-review team (Quality of Life Group 2007) in justifying statistical programmes
which  look  beyond  national  economic  output.  It  has,  however,  been  disputed  on  a
number of grounds. One is that the stated evaluation data it is based on was largely from
a  discrete  three-point  scale,  meaning  that  any  average  change  in  national  stated
evaluation would require a large-scale movement of individuals between points on the
scale (which means,  in  practice,  a  large number of people moving from the middle
category  to  either  the  top  or  bottom).  This  gives  average  ratings  a  high  degree  of
stability.  Further, unlike the income with which it is being compared, the evaluation
scale is necessarily bounded, meaning that at the hypothetical point where the whole
population  is  giving the  maximum possible  positive  stated evaluation,  their  average
happiness cannot increase with their income (see Johns and Ormerod 2007 for a fuller
exposition of this argument). Counter to this, authors such as Layard (2005) have noted
that  there  are,  in  fact,  differences  in  average  national  stated  evaluations,  and  that
individuals do change stated evaluations over time, suggesting that these measures are
valid.  Increasingly,  data  is  available  using  longer  scales,  which  also  reduces  the
practical, if not the conceptual, severity of the critique.
A second objection is  that  the  paradox arises  from a mistake  in  the  scales  used.  If
income is placed on a logarithmic, rather than an absolute, scale, the relation between
income and positivity of stated evaluation is restored (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). If
accepted, this explanation shifts the focus of debate by suggesting diminishing returns
to income.  This represents  a  challenge to  simple GDP-based measures  of  economic
welfare; if income is of different values to different individuals, then happiness is best
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maximised by a focus on equalising distribution rather than maximising totals.
Authors such as Layard (2003, 2005), whose work became influential in policy-making
circles and who went on to contribute to the ONS programme (see following chapter),
and policy-makers such as Cameron (2010), accept the paradox to be genuine. If this is
so, there are a number of potential explanations: that income is only weakly related to
positive stated evaluations; that income is a positional good, so absolute income is less
important than relative income; that increases in income are important in the short term,
but  that in the long term individuals become habituated to  them and so return to a
baseline level of stated evaluation (the so-called 'hedonic treadmill' argument) (Layard
2005).  These  explanations  are  not  mutually  compatible  and  lead  to  diverse  policy
recommendations, but are all supportable given present research and the acceptance of
the Easterlin Paradox.
Again,  some  terminological  ambiguity  should  be  noted  in  the  research  above;
economists do not always distinguish different measures of subjective well-being from
each other or from 'well-being' more generally. Layard in particular tends to talk about
this  in  terms  of  'happiness',  but  rests  his  findings  largely  on  evaluative  statements
around 'satisfaction', rather than on affective ones (e.g., Layard 2003).
Research  into  affectual  states  has,  however,  distinguished  them  from  measures  of
'satisfaction'. 'Satisfaction'  as an evaluation seems to incorporate both assessments of
immediate conditions and a comparison of these conditions with desires or expectations;
Linley, Maltby, Wood,  et al.  (2009) in a review of the field separates such 'subjective
well-being'  measures  from  'psychological  well-being'  measures,  which  are  directly
concerned  with  immediate  psychological  functioning.  The  most  basic  of  these
'psychological  well-being'  measures  are  measures  of  affect;  questions  related  to
happiness, sadness or anxiety.
As a further complication to the confounding of self-evaluation and affective measures,
there  are  questions  whether  the  latter  can  be  captured  by  single  questions  at  all.
Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, et al. (2004) and Watson, Clark and Tellegen (1988) note
that  affect  measures  fluctuate  over  time,  so  devised  methods  for  the  more  detailed
observation of movements in evaluations of affect. These methods required much more
intensive data collection, such as the collection of multiple single-question responses
over an extended period of time. Researchers in the field of positive psychology have
taken this  further.  Observing that  much prior  research had focussed on pathologies,
researchers looked instead at what led to positive functioning (see Diener and Seligman
2004 for a review). A variety of instruments and approaches have been used, such as the
Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Survey (WEMWBS), designed for NHS Health
Scotland (Stewart-Brown, Platt,  Tennant,  et al.  2011; Tennant, Fishwich, Platt,  et al.
2006). Such approaches are very different from single-item stated evaluations: while
they rest on self-report,  they consider well-being as a set of capabilities, rather than
outcomes,  to  be  imputed  from responses  not  simply read  from them.  This  requires
multiple-item  surveys  which  are  much  harder  to  relate  to  external  factors  through
mechanical causal models.
Two  things  should  be  noted  about  the  distinction  of  'subjective  well-being'  and
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'psychological  well-being'  measures.  One is,  as  above,  it  is  a  distinction that  is  not
always  made when using  stated  well-being  evaluations.  Where  'happiness'  data  and
'satisfaction'  data  is  used  interchangeably,  for  instance in  building an  evidence base
around correlations between well-being and other factors, there is a clear danger that
like is not being compared with like: in the one case there is an evaluative state which
incorporates both present conditions and beliefs about what those conditions should be;
in  the other  there is  simply a  judgement about  affective state.  (Layard,  Mayraz and
Nickell,  2008, argue that such an equivocation of measures is justifiable, as country
rankings  based  on average  citizen  satisfaction  scores  and average  citizen  happiness
scores are similar. This only shows that the measures are partially collinear, however,
the critique that they are distinct theoretical constructs remains.)
The second is the difference in data generated by the two approaches: 'subjective well-
being' measures are single answers to single questions; while the same can be true of
simple affective measures, there is the danger that these are capturing short-term and
unrepresentative states.  More extensive research instruments  which try to  avoid this
danger produce data much less amenable to mechanistic, causal analysis of regression
model.  Instead,  the data  they produce is  more detailed and seeks understandings  of
individual situations rather than generalisable conclusions. This makes it less easy to
generate  policy conclusions  from in  the  manner  of  Layard  or  Dolan  (Layard  2005;
Dolan,  Layard  and Metcalfe  2011;  Dolan,  Peasgood and White  2006,  2008;  Dolan,
Peasgood, Dixon, et al. 2006).
That such extensive instruments are not utilised in policy-orientated research is due to a
difference  in  aims  and  outlook  between  their  economist  authors  and,  particularly,
positive  psychologists.  These  authors  treat  single  evaluative  measures,  such  as
'happiness' or 'life satisfaction', as outcome measures (see, particularly,  Blanchflower
and Oswald 2004, 2008; Layard 2005). Subjective well-being here takes on the simple,
mechanical  form  of  the  regression  models  used  to  analyse  it,  collapsing  complex
personal evaluations and states into simple generalisations about the relation between
stated  evaluation  and everything else  on  the  survey.  For  the  psychologists,  such as
Stewart-Brown (Stewart-Brown, Platt, Tennant, et al. 2011; Tennant, Fishwich, Platt, et
al.  2006),  who  sat  on  advisory  panels  for  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'
programme, 'well-being' is not simply a state, but is a component of a wider self; it is a
capability  which  mediates  interactions  with  the  external  world,  rather  than  being  a
simple product of factors within that world. This points to divergent ethoses of well-
being; to put it somewhat crudely,  for the economists well-being is a universal state
subject to universal patterns and laws, for those in public health it is a personal state to
be understood in a personal context. 
Eudaimonic  measures  are  different  again,  conceptually  falling  somewhere  between
stated evaluations and hedonic statements. They ask individuals how 'meaningful'  or
'worthwhile' their lives are, which is a global evaluation which will be influenced by
psychological functioning and refer to how the individual feels they are doing in terms
of personally-held values. Research in this area is new and developing, and there are
disagreements over whether this constitutes a distinct construct from, particularly, stated
evaluations  (see  Delle  Fave,  Brdar,  Freire,  et  al. 2011).  However,  a  battery  of
eudaimonic questions have been incorporated into surveys feeding the European Union
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Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) (Huppert, Marks, Clark,  et al.
2008), suggesting that the field is taken seriously by researchers and official bodies.
A final set of stated valuations are those which deal with an individual's opinions about
the context in which they live their lives; for instance whether they feel safe after dark,
or  how strongly  they  trust  institutions.  This  has  been  widely  used  in  sociology in
research around the 'quality of society' (Berger-Schmitt and Noll 2000; Cummins 1996;
Veenhoven 1999, 2005, 2009; Wallace and Abbott 2007). This is a separate component
of  well-being  alongside  personal  evaluations;  one  can  be  happy  in  one's  self  but
unhappy with society. Questions around satisfaction with institutions have been features
of social surveys for decades; examples would be the surveys on confidence in statistics
surveyed in the last chapter (Bailey, Rofique and Humphrey 2010; Simpson, Beninger
and Ormston 2015; Wilmot, Jones, Dewar,  et al. 2005). Scale, here, is interesting: the
approach moves from individual assessments to conclusions about much bigger entities:
the 'nation' is doing well or badly because a plurality of its citizens believe it to be.
This  first  group  of  measures  of  'well-being'  exemplify  a  set  of  challenges  that  the
Statistical  Actors  of  the ONS will  need to  navigate.  As a  starting point,  they show
disagreements in theorisation between different academic disciplines: the 'well-being' of
Dolan or Layard is a state which can be mechanically related to input measures, while
for positive psychologists such as Stewart-Brown it is more a capability which acts to
mediate  experience.  Such  differences  impact  both  on  the  data  which  needs  to  be
gathered and on the way that data is conceptualised: the mechanistic conception can be
implemented as single questions which can then be used as outcome measures within
larger models. Even within this single-question approach, there are multiple questions
which  might  be  asked;  about  satisfaction,  about  affect,  about  'meaningfulness'.
Alongside these, there are questions about 'the quality of society', and which aspects of
society  are  to  be  examined  in  this  way.  Such  challenges  in  conceptualisation  and
implementation do not admit of straightforward answers, Statistical Actors with agency
will need to resolve them.
5.2.2. Preference-based approaches
Preference-based approaches  grow out  of the Utilitarian economic models discussed
above. If individuals are assumed to be pursuing the maximum utility available to them,
then the utility of a good or service can be measured in terms of its price. This underpins
the use of GDP as a measure of welfare or well-being, as more economic activity entails
more expenditure and so the securing of more well-being. It also underpins judgements
of  'value  for  money'  or  'cost-effectiveness'  in  the  provision  of  public  services  (see
Section 4.1.4.), as it suggests that the value of a service is directly related to revealed
preference displayed in its demand (see Fujiwara and Campbell 2011).
There are obvious difficulties with such interpretations, which stem in part from the
assumptions required by economic theory if the stated preference approach is to work.
One is that individuals are rational in the economic sense, with their preferences being
consistent over time. That is, if they prefer GDP expansion over the environment in the
present,  it  is because they understand the difficulties environmental degradation will
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bring  them in the  future  and have  decided that  the  benefits  of  GDP in  the  present
outweigh them (Keen 2011).
However, economic theory now recognises that individuals are not rational in this sense,
but that often they either lack the information necessary to determine preferences, or fail
to process such information and so, at best,  are boundedly rational (see the work of
Akerloff,  e.g.,  2002).  Additionally,  as  individuals  have  limited  resources,  it  is  not
possible to distinguish between things which individuals would like to have but can't
afford  and  things  which  they don't  want  at  all.  This  is  related  to  the  fact  that  the
approach  is  only possible  where  choices  are  apparent;  most  often  this  is  based  on
economic markets, but markets do not embody unconstrained choice. So while revealed
preferences are central to decisions around specific government activity, the method is
very difficult to interpret as reflecting 'well-being' in any broader sense.
Where markets do not exist, 'stated preference' approaches are used. These attempt to
circumvent  the  problem  of  a  lack  of  observable  behaviour  from  which  to  derive
judgements  of  utility  by  asking  individuals  about  decisions  they  would  make  in
hypothetical situations.  These have similarly been used in cost-benefit  analyses  (see
Fujiwara and Campbell 2011) and underpin programmes such as the 'natural capital'
approach to valuing 'ecosystems services' (see, for example, de Groot, Brander, van der
Ploeg, et al. 2012) and the Quality Adjusted Life Years approach to valuing healthcare
interventions (see Tsuchiya and Dolan 2005). These move preference-based approaches
from the economic to the social domain, showing their potential as ways of expressing
non-monetary value. As with stated preference approaches, these have not been adopted
in large-scale statistical programmes, partly because of the inherent unreliability of the
process; there are many things individuals refuse to put a price on when asked (see work
by Frey, e.g., Frey and Gallus 2013). As with observed preferences, it is hard to interpret
such  measures  as  concerning  'well-being'  in  any  broad  sense:  they  reflect  choices
offered  to  individuals  and  not  the  relation  of  those  choices  to  broader  individual
conditions (Archer 2000).
However, the belief that 'utility' can be measured directly through single-question stated
evaluations  has  led  to  research  which  substitutes  preference-based  approaches  with
stated evaluation methods for the pricing of non-market goods. The logic is that if it is
possible to reliably relate a given life event with a given increment of stated well-being
evaluation, then the value of this life event can be expressed in terms of the increment
without the need for unreliable stated preferences (Fujiwara and Campbell 2011). This
leads to claims such as “an adult learning course which improves life satisfaction has a
value to those who receive it of between £750 and £950 on average – derived using
techniques  advocated  in  the  Green  Book  Annex  on  Social  Cost-Benefit  Analysis.”
(Cabinet Office 2013, pp.2–3). The evaluative state has been monetised, allowing it to
be  assessed in  terms of  efficiency or  value  for  money and makes stated evaluation
amenable to inclusion in economic models.
It is possible that comparability is being confused with substitutability. That is, the fact
that different things have the same apparent level of impact on well-being does not
mean that the impact is the same. To take an alternative example, while Blanchflower
and Oswald (2004) find that divorce leads to a reduction in stated evaluation to a value
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commensurate  with  a  reduction  of  income  of  $100,000  per  month,  it  remains  an
empirical question whether giving a divorcee $100,000 returns them to their prior level
of stated evaluation. It seems possible that it would not, that the individual involved
would remain unhappy about the divorce however happy they were about their windfall,
that  the  one  would  not  compensate  for  the  other.  Part  of  the  problem here  is  that
research in psychology has shown that positive and negative affect are distinct, and not
two sides of a single construct (Diener and Seligman 2004), meaning that removing one
does not entail the other. This causes difficulties for a cost-benefit analysis approach and
economic research on well-being of the type explored above, as both happiness caused
and  unhappiness  avoided  are  expressed  in  the  same  terms.  In  common  with  other
approaches which take well-being to be a state, they also fail to take account of any
broader context in which the happiness or unhappiness occurs, such as its sustainability;
the approach cannot deal with delayed gratification, or temporary hardships undertaken
in the expectation of later gains.
These  may  not  seem  at  first  to  be  questions  which  will  affect  Statistical  Actors.
However, as shown in the previous chapter, the Office for National Statistics sits within
a wider context of UK policy-making. It was argued that this context was driven in part
by concerns  around cost-effectiveness  and  value  for  money.  With  the  use  of  stated
evaluations as a methodology for cost-benefit analysis written into UK policy-making
practice through the Treasury's Green Book (HM Treasury 2011a), there is potentially a
pre-existing policy need which well-being statistics could meet. This feeds back into
considerations  around  the  theoretical  debates  between  economists  and  positive
psychologists discussed above, giving economic conceptions of well-being a practical
weight which psychological conceptions may not have to the same extent.
5.2.3. Objective lists
'Objective  list'  approaches  define  a  list  of  conditions  thought  by  their  designer  to
contribute  to  well-being,  and  observe  these;  examples  could  include  educational
achievements, unemployment or GDP. This approach entails only counting something
considered  to  be  important,  meaning it  is  possible  to  read  all  social  and economic
indicators  as  expressions  of  objective  list  approaches.  Even  something  as  basic  as
demographic data could inform policy-makers on some aspect of a nation's 'well-being'
(indeed, the 'Father of Statistics', William Petty, used demographic data in just such a
way, with population breakdowns indicating how secure the nation was from war with
France; see Buck 1977; Petty 1899). Such a reading brings within the scope of 'well-
being' a large body of research from the developmental and environmental literatures.
For  example,  the  UN  Millennium  Development  Goals,  UN  HDI  and  Gender
Development Indices, and the New Economics Foundation's 'Happy Planet Index' tend
to describe themselves  in  terms of 'progress',  'development'  or  'sustainability',  all  of
which can be read as correlates of well-being which take into account the future states
of individuals and polities. Related to these are various economic measures designed as
alternative  to  GDP, such as  the  ISEW, MEW and Genuine  Progress  Indicators  (see
details in the appendix to European Economic and Social Committee 2012). These seek
to amend GDP either by including things not currently included (such as the value of
non-market  labour)  or  by re-categorising  items  already within  GDP as  costs  rather
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income (such as resource depletion,  defence expenditures,  negative externalities like
pollution; see discussion below).
Such lists necessarily deal with observable or imputable phenomena, but beyond this
restriction their range is limitless covering both inputs and outputs (e.g., expenditure vs.
life  expectancy),  measures  of  presence  or  absence  (e.g.,  income per  capita  vs.  fuel
poverty)  and  levels  or  distribution  (e.g.,  income  per  capita  vs.  GINI  coefficient  of
income inequality).  It  is  also  possible  to  collect  data  at  multiple  scales:  both  from
individual observations which are aggregated, and directly from entities at higher scales,
such as 'the nation' or 'the economy'.
What an objective list includes will vary across observers, partly due to differences in
opinion over what constitutes 'well-being' (discussed above), partly over whether these
constituents are seen as components of well-being or as drivers of it, and also due to
differences  in  aim  and  outlook.  For  example,  the  United  Nations'  Millennium
Development  Goals  (Annan  2000;  United  Nations  2014;  United  Nations  General
Assembly 2000) are a list of tightly defined measures, selected for their impact on 'well-
being',  translated into nation-level targets for achievement,  and aimed at  developing
nations.  As countries develop,  these minimum benchmarks become less appropriate;
improving literacy rates is replaced as a component of well-being in the UK context by
levels of qualifications obtained.
Similarly,  the  differing  priorities  of  the  organisations  compiling  the  lists  leads  to
diversity: the UN's 'Human Development Index' and its related 'Gender Development
Index' (see United Nations Development Programme 2014) is similar in construction to
the  New  Economics  Foundation's  'Happy  Planet  Index'  (see  New  Economics
Foundation 2012), but the latter includes a measure of environmental footprint. Both are
composite indicators, which combine measures from a short list into a single overall
figure, and the inclusion of different lists of measures result in different overall results.
Countries which on the UN Human Development Index list appeared to be doing well
on  the  New Economics  Foundation's  account  often  do  less  well,  highlighting  their
contention that their  'success'  comes at a price which,  when considered,  reduces the
value  of  their  achievements.  The  simplicity  of  these  indices,  particularly  their
expression as single figures, serves their purpose as campaign tools.
Such efforts are relevant given the ambitions for the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme  to  complement  GDP  (Cameron  2010).  This  is  an  open-ended  aim,
representing little more than 'count something other than economic growth'. What could
be counted under such circumstances is almost unlimited, and the range of different
objective lists  undertaken mirrors the range of different constructions of 'well-being'
discussed above.  As Hand (2004) observes,  statistics are  pragmatic  responses to the
problem of representation; they are representations with a purpose (see also Dalenius
1968). The variety of different objective lists and indices arises from differences in data
availability,  goals  and uses.  The institutional  context  of  the Statistical  Actors  of  the
ONS, discussed in the previous chapter, means that they will not be using the statistical
programme themselves; rather the use of the programme will fall to other state bodies.
This highlights a set of challenges which will face the Statistical  Actors both in the
selection  of  objective  list  measures  for  inclusion  and  in  the  composition  of  the
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programme  more  generally:  the  needs  of  multiple  potential  users  will  need  to  be
considered, and balanced against the need to construct a coherent programme.
5.2.4. The composition of programmes: putting diverse measures together
In  addition  to  there  being  multiple  ways  of  conceptualising  well-being,  there  are
multiple ways of combining measures within an official statistical programme. One way
would be to have a series of separate measures, either taken from a single approach or
from several, reported and tracked separately; the other would be to weight and combine
measures into a  single overall  'well-being'  figure which could be used like GDP to
indicate overall conditions across the programme. There is also the possibility of a half-
way  house  between  the  two,  with  a  single  index  figure  presented  alongside  its
disaggregated components.
Each approach has its advantages: a single number is easy to report and interpret as an
indicator of a general area of measures, while multiple measures offer more detail and
sit  closer  to  direct  policy  interventions.  For  example,  the  Scottish  Government's
'Scotland Performs' indicator set (see Scottish Government 2011) ties its measures to
national targets, allowing the overall performance of the programme to be measured
against the success or failure in meeting these targets (a similar model is used in the UK
'Sustainable  Development  Indicators',  Department  for  Environment,  Food and Rural
Affairs 2013). Indicators which are consistent across areas or polities can be used to
situate performance in a wider context, as The European Statistical Committee's 'GDP
and  Beyond'  set  of  indicators  hopes  to  do  (see  Sponsorship  Group  on  Measuring
Progress,  Well-being  and  Sustainable  Development  2011).  However,  broad  sets  of
indicators can be difficult to interpret, so campaigning groups in particular often opt for
composite indicators, as in the case of the UN HDI and Gender Development Indices,
and the New Economics Foundation's 'Happy Planet Index' discussed above.
There  is  also  a  broader  question  about  how  diverse  measures  fit  together.  This  is
particularly the case with single index numbers: if questions of positive and negative
affect are measuring different constructs (as Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith 1999 argue
that they are), how are they to be combined as part of an overall 'well-being' figure?
How is  data  collected  at  the  individual  scale,  such  as  subjective  well-being,  to  be
balanced against data collected at the level of the nation as an entity in its own right,
such as environmental objective list measures? This remains a problem for multiple-
item programmes, although here the challenge of interpretation is left to the Statistical
Audience rather than the Statistical Actors; it is they who must make sense of disparate
measures in determining whether 'progress' has been made.
This again presents the Statistical Actors with challenges around the potential uses of
the programme by diverse parts of the Statistical Audience. Not only will the Actors
need to select measures, but they will also need to present them. Neither question can be
separated  from the  purpose  of  the  programme  which,  as  discussed  in  the  previous
chapter, is a function of the fragmented policy-making structure of the UK. Here there is
a clear interaction of institutional and rhetorical questions which the Statistical Actors
will need to resolve.
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5.3. Summary: the diversity of the field of well-being research
From the above, well-being research may be characterised as a multi-disciplinary field
of disparate programmes which do not always agree on what 'well-being' is. In as far as
'well-being'  as a concept exits,  it  is  as a chaotic conception in Sayer's (1981, 1985,
2000) sense: an abstract idea which gathers together multiple, potentially incompatible,
ideas under the guise of being a concrete entity. It is for the Statistical Actors to make
sense  of  this  field,  negotiating  between  different  approaches  on  their  way  to
constructing an official statistical programme. From the discussion above, there is no
obvious or non-controversial way to do this. A programme which followed mechanical
conceptions  of  subjective  well-being  which  treated  it  as  a  state  would  be  open  to
criticism from theorists who disagreed that 'well-being' was actually measured by such
approaches. The reverse is also true. Even if a subjective well-being approach could be
agreed  on,  there  may  be  disagreement  on  which  subjective  measure  to  use.  A
programme which included objective list measures would be open to critique from those
who disagreed with the measures included or omitted; similar disputes could occur over
evaluation questions related to particular areas of society or the environment.
The Statistical Actors will also face questions about users and usage. Given the role that
economic conceptions of well-being play in cost-benefit analyses, there is a potential
tension within the programme around whether it is for 'measuring progress' in a general
sense  or  for  'costing  progress'  in  relating  expenditure  to  well-being  'outcomes'.  In
addition to this question of which measures to include, users and anticipated usage will
impact  on the way in  which the programme as  a  whole is  constructed,  as  a  set  of
measures or as a single index number. There is also a question of the scale of data
collection and reporting: for data to be usable at a regional or local level, it must be
sufficiently  granular  to  reliably  report  on  that  level.  These  questions  highlight  the
interaction of the theoretical questions raised above and the institutional questions of the
previous chapter and again show the necessary role of agency in shaping the form and
content of the official statistical programme.
Contrary to  the  theories  examined  in  Chapter  Two,  then,  the  subject  matter  of  the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme does not present a straightforward domain
which can be translated into either an empirical representation or a mode of control. It is
a contested, messy domain, chaotic in Sayer's (1981, 1985, 2000) sense and must be
navigated by Statistical Actors. How they do this, according to what beliefs, aims and
objectives, is an empirical question which Chapter Seven will explore.
5.4. Historic statistical indicators of well-being in the UK and internationally
With the taxonomy above in place, it is possible to characterise a great many historical
statistical  programmes  under  the  heading  of  well-being.  Indeed,  extending  HM
Treasury's  (2008)  claim above that  governments  have  traditionally  considered  well-
being when formulating policy, it would be possible to cast every official indicator as a
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measure of well-being of the observed list type. In as far as official statistics monitor
things which are to be promoted or suppressed, or are designed to allow action to that
effect, they can be read as attempts to improve well-being. Such an expansive reading
would be unhelpful,  as  it  would  obscure the differences  between existing statistical
indicators  and  current  and  historical  attempts  at  creating  'well-being'  programmes.
These differences  are  of  intent;  indicators are  designed to observe particular  things.
Taking the example of national income, the GDP figures which the 'Measuring National
Well-being'  programme  is  to  complement,  their  creator  Kuznets  said  that  national
income “gauges the net positive contribution to consumers' satisfaction in the form of
commodities and services; the burden of work and discomfort are ignored. …Though
unable to measure them, we must recognize that their omission renders national income
merely  one  element  in  the  evaluation  of  the  net  welfare  assignable  to  the  nation's
economic activity.” (1946, pp.127–8). National income is believed to be a contributor to
welfare, so is tracked; but it is tracked as national income, not as well-being.
However, with this distinction in mind, it is possible to draw strong parallels between
historical  statistical  efforts  and  present  self-described  'well-being  indicators'.  One
framework which draws such parallels is that of Bache, who distinguishes two 'waves'
of  well-being  research  (Allin  2013;  Allin  and  Hand  2014;  Bache  2013;  Bache  and
Reardon 2013). The first wave is built around the social indicators movement of the
1960s, the second describes the present international attention to well-being. While this
framework does pick out two clear periods of international interaction and co-operation
on  statistical  programmes  which  go  beyond  the  immediate  needs  of  social
administration and seek instead to assess the conditions in which individuals are living,
it doesn't recognise more broadly conceived programmes created between these periods.
This creates the danger of an artificial periodisation, with the second wave becoming
little more than an updated version of the first, rather than being a distinct movement
which draws extensively on national and international efforts immediately prior to it.
Such an approach would not fit with the conception of official statistics as created by
agents acting in context.
With  that  in  mind,  rather  than  attempting  a  chronology with  implied  or  expressed
periodisation, this section will attempt to categorise statistical movements by concern:
social  description,  correction  to  GDP,  extension  of  GDP,  and  holistic  'well-being'
programmes. This relates more clearly the aims and objectives of statistical creators to
statistical outcomes, rather than collapsing disparate actors into flat time periods. In this
manner,  it  is in keeping both with the methodology of Chapter Three,  and with the
discussion of theoretical context above.
5.4.1. Early frameworks for social description
It was shown in the previous chapter how official statistics in the UK adapted first to the
needs  of  the  Second  World  War,  and  then  to  increased  social  responsibilities  of
government  arising  from  the  creation  of  the  Welfare  State  and  an  interventionist
economic  policy  (see  Section  4.1.).  While  this  led  to  an  increased  focus  on  social
indicators, the concerns of emergent statistics were primarily administrative and sharply
focused. While it is possible to see increased statistical output in terms of observed lists
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approaches  as  components  of  well-being,  this  would  be  misleading;  there  was  no
holistic aim or construct that indicators such as 'unemployment rate' were serving, such
indicators were designed to serve specific administrative objectives.
Broader  conceptions  of  'society'  and 'progress'  start  to  develop within  the  statistical
policy discourse in the 1960s in America, against a backdrop of social unrest and fears
of social decline. Robert Kennedy delivers a hustings speech suggesting the limitations
of GNP11 against a backdrop of civil unrest arising from the Vietnam conflict and the
Civil Rights Movement; he explicitly lists as among the things counted by GNP which
do not contribute to well-being the napalm being dropped on Vietnam and the policing
of inner city riots (Kennedy 1968). This speech built on the 'Great Society' speech of
Lyndon B. Johnson a few years earlier, which highlighted growing anomie and social
inequality in the aftermath of the post-War boom (Johnson 1964). The background to
this move to broaden indicators away from GDP shares features with the modern setting
for Cameron's (2010) launch of the ONS' programme and his party's earlier work on
well-being (Quality of  Life  Group 2007).  These  came at  a  similar  period  of  social
disquiet, prompted by a collapse of the financial system with attendant declines in living
standards, a scandal involving rampant expenses fraud by politicians and a decade-long
involvement in unpopular military actions overseas; Cameron quoted Kennedy's speech
in launching the ONS programme (Cameron 2010, np.).
Although  it  would  be  easy to  see  the  1960s  development  of  the  'Social  Indicators'
movement as a reaction to this growing sense of a gap between social well-being and
measures of wealth, it is hard to draw any concrete relation between the two. The first
development  in  the  movement  was  an effort  at  outlining  an  'accounting  system for
society' by administrators of NASA (Bauer 1966b), an explicitly technical solution to
the technical problem of trying to assess what impact NASA's work was having on
society12. Bauer reasoned that to understand the impact on society, you needed both a
baseline of where society is and a conceptual apparatus that allowed you to track how it
changed and which enabled you to ascribe the sources of that change. The proposed
framework for doing this is explicitly systemic: social elements and activities are to be
categorised and treated as stocks and flows passing through the system, agglomerating
into units of varying scale (household, family, company, city, and so on). Such a system
would  allow  the  design  and  assessment  of  government  policy  to  influence,  and
potentially rationally plan, the direction of the system in the same way that monetary
and fiscal policy could for the economy (Gross 1966; Innes 1989; Schneider 1976).
This first attempt at a system of social indicators cannot easily be described as directed
at  well-being.  However,  as it  was  targeted at  understanding society as a whole,  the
11 The distinction between  GNP and GDP is minor – the first looks at all production by citizens of a 
nation regarless of their location, the second all production by citizens and non-citizens within 
national borders. Up until the late 1970s, GNP was the preferred measure for governments and 
international comparisons, more recently GDP has been used. As they are structurally near-identical 
figures used for almost the same purposes, they will be treated as interchangeable in the present 
analysis.
12 As an indicator of the  potential scope of this impact, which the statistical programme would ideally 
observe, Bauer observed that a potential knock-on effect of  the space programme was in changing 
“how we feel about God” and that such changes would need to be measured by any comprehensive 
social indicator programme (Bauer 1966a, p.3).
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movement was taken up by a disparate group of social researchers explicitly relating
social outcomes to political and economic activity, with a view to modifying the latter to
improve the former (Smith 1981). In the UK, the General Social Survey was launched
in 1971 (Office for National Statistics 2011), allowing the interaction between social
factors such as socio-economic group and health status to be drawn clearly and in real-
time.  A  year  earlier,  Social  Trends was  launched,  collecting  together  social  data
collected  across  government  in  one  annual  publication  and  collecting  additional
information  to  fill  in  perceived gaps.  The Head of  the  Central  Statistical  Office,  in
launching  Social Trends noted that limitations on this programme – while stating that
the CSO were working towards a system of integrated social statistics, he also noted
that it was not clear what aspects of society should be measured, or how. However:
“Be that as it may, one can readily agree that the things in life about which
people are most concerned include having enough to eat, being healthy and
living out a natural span of life, being housed in a congenial environment,
carrying out some form of satisfying activity at work and in leisure hours,
having sufficient education to be able to make the most of their abilities,
having security against war and crime, being assured of personal liberty and
justice, and so forth. The sum total of these things adds up to the quality of
life but the particular value, or weight, put on each of the components varies
from person to person. Even on the assumption that it is possible to agree on
an overall  measure of health,  housing, etc.,  the various indicators cannot
satisfactorily be  combined into  a  single  index as  there  is  no objectively
agreed weighting system, such as the price system employed in the National
Accounts,  which  would  assess  the  value  of  improved  health  against
improved housing.” (Moser 1970, pp.10–11)
Moser  here  suggests  that  the  approach  used  to  understand  society  should  be  the
objective list. He observes though that there is no a priori way of arriving at such a list,
or combining its measures into a single index; these are subjective questions. These
questions foreshadow those of modern well-being programmes: as was shown above,
what constitutes well-being, and what should be prioritised, remains a live question for
the Statistical Actors of the Office for National Statistics in 2010.13 
Internationally,  the  UN  developed  a  programme  of  statistics,  aimed  at  creating  a
coherent system of national social accounts (United Nations Department of Social and
Economics Affairs  Statistical  Office 1975),  as did the OECD, who actually labelled
their programme as concerned with 'well-being'  (see Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation  and  Development  1973).  Similar  programmes  were  instituted  across  the
world, including the first publication of the 'Gross National Happiness' index of Bhutan
in 1972 (Ura,  Alkire,  Zangmo,  et  al. 2012).  However,  the systematic  framework of
social stocks and flows imagined by Gross (1966), does not ever materialise (see Smith
1981 and Innes 1989 for further comments on the limitations of the movement). The
disparate collection of measures, which in the UK are largely collected by decentralised
departments for discrete  policy aims despite  their  collection in  Social  Trends,  never
13 It is worth observing that similar questions were raised around Utilitarian philosophies and ideas of 
'the good', Spencer 1970.
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inform a holistic programme of government. The programmes established in the 1970s
are subject to severe retrenchment in the 1980s, with  Social Trends becoming shorter
and more expensive for users as the decade wore on (Levitas 1996b).
However, the movement led to the creation of many social statistics which still exist, as
does the sense that social well-being is something which can be measured beyond the
merely pragmatic aims of administrators in pursuit of discrete policy aims (Innes 1989).
New social  indicators  and  programmes  of  measures  are  developed  much  later  than
Bache's (2013) 'two wave' model would suggest: the OECD first publishes Society at a
Glance,  a  publication  analogous  to  Social  Trends, in  2000  (see  Organisation  for
Economic Co-Operation and Development 2014). There are also ongoing extensions to
the areas that social indicators survey: the European Community releases its 'Laeken
Indicators' looking at poverty and social exclusion in 2001 (European Economic and
Social Committee 2012), and this builds on conceptual developments which lead to the
UK creating both statistics and a government agency around 'social exclusion' in 1997
(see Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2004). While these do not represent holistic
programmes  trying  to  conceptualise  society  in  the  manner  of  the  Social  Indicators
movement they do represent  a continuing development in non-economic markers of
social progress.
5.4.2. Attempts to modify GNP and GDP
An alternative approach to the problems with GNP raised by Kennedy (1968) and others
was attempts to modify GDP. Kuznets, as the key figure in the development of GNP in
America during the Second World War (see Kuznets 1938) was always clear that it was
a limited statistic for a limited purpose (see Kuznets 1946, quoted above). That purpose
was  as  a  measure  of  economic  activity,  not  as  a  measure  of  economic  or  broader
welfare; it  offers no judgement on what the activity is. In as far as this leads to the
counting of illth (Ruskin 2001), such counting is a design feature and not a flaw. It does,
however, become a flaw when the statistic is used in a manner for which it was not
designed; economic output and economic welfare are distinct concepts, one quantitative
and one qualitative. This led to a number of attempts to adjust the calculation of GNP to
incorporate qualitative judgements and so provide a indication of 'success' or 'progress'.
The first  of these is Nordhaus and Tobin's (1973) 'Measure of Economic Wellbeing'
(MEW). This utilised the base data used to calculate US GNP but recategorised certain
items: defence expenditure, for example, became an intermediate good rather than an
output, on the basis that it is a necessary feature of produced goods and services which
is funded by taxation, so should be included in the price of those goods and services.
Counting it separately in addition to produced output is, on this argument, a double-
counting  which  artificially  raises  GNP.  After  a  number  of  such  adjustments,  they
showed that their MEW was normally lower than GNP, but strongly correlated with it.
This allowed them to conclude that GNP was thus actually quite a good measure of
progress, if not absolute levels of success. The finding, however, is unsurprising, as the
MEW made relatively small adjustments to GNP and was based solely on data from the
National Accounts making it likely to correlate with it (Daley and Cobb 1994).
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The modest extent of these adjustments was criticised by later authors who sought to
include different or more extensive sets of 'illth' or negative externalities. Subsequent
efforts  include Zoltas'  (1981) 'Economic Aspect  of Welfare'  index,  Cobb and Daly's
(1989)  'Index of  Sustainable  Economic  Wellbeing'  (ISEW) and Cobb,  Halstead  and
Rowe's  (1994)  'Genuine  Progress  Indicator'  (see  European  Economic  and  Social
Committee 2012 for a  time-line of these well-being measures,  and Daley and Cobb
1994;  and  Fioramonti  2013  for  discussion).  These  indices  are  arbitrary  in  their
composition: all their adjustments could be justified given their disparate aims, just as
the calculations of GDP could be, but there is no internal logic to a concept like 'GDP'
or 'Sustainable Economic Wellbeing' to determine what should be included and how it
should be characterised. In addition to the value-based criteria of inclusion, inclusions
and adjustments shift over time and space as new data and analysis methods become
available. These two factors can be seen in the shifts in the inclusion of externalities
over time. For example, Nordhaus and Tobin (1973) count defence expenditure as an
intermediate good and pollution as a negative externality but felt that technology would
overcome the problems of resource depletion; Daly and Cobb (1994) reject this second
argument, and are able to add resource depletion as an externality, partly because they
are interested in sustainability, and partly because it is possible to calculate resource
depletion in ways not available to Nordhaus and Tobin. 
5.4.3. Attempts to extend or replace GDP
It  should  be  noted  that  the  above  adjustments  to  GDP can  never  advance  beyond
economic concerns.  Ultimately,  the data they are based on are economic inputs and
outputs expressed in markets (or, as in the case of Daley and Cobb's 1994 inclusion of
production in the domestic sector, outside of markets but with imputed values). GDP
can take account of other concerns, environmental, sustainability or social, only through
pricing these as externalities or stock depletions. This is both difficult to perform and
often runs counter to the aims of authors: if Kennedy's (1968) admonitions that there is
more to life than GNP are read to mean 'there is more to life than the economic', trying
to  price  the  smiles  of  children  for  inclusion  in  a  “GNP-plus” measure  is  a  grossly
inappropriate response (in this  light,  see Franklin and Tabb's 1974 critique of GNP-
adjustments;  the  problem,  they  argue,  is  not  what  is  included  in  neoclassical
calculations, but neoclassical calculations themselves; c.f., Gibson-Graham 1996; Illich
1978; Lefebvre 1976)
Thus a number of authors and organisations have sought to re-contextualise GDP as a
single  item in  a  multi-item index or  composite  indicator,  either  denying GDP as  a
central aim or placing it in a broader context of alternative social goals. In the former
category  are  Morris'  (1979)  'Physical  Quality  of  Life'  Index  and  Miringoff  and
Miringoff's  (1986)  'Index  of  Social  Health'  (for  these,  see  European  Economic  and
Social Committee 2012), and, it could be argued, the various UK Indices of Multiple
Deprivation (see Payne and Abel 2012). These are limited statistical efforts designed to
highlight  particular  aspects  of  well-being,  and  not  attempts  at  holistic  conceptions.
Objective list approaches such as the UN's 'Millennium Development Goals' (United
Nations General Assembly 2000) or Sen's Capability Approach (Sen 1985) could also
108
THE THEORETICAL AND POLICY CONTEXT OF THE PROGRAMME
be included.
In  the  latter  category  are  several  efforts  by  the  UN  and  its  agencies  –  the  UN
Development  Programme's  Human  Development  Index  and  Gender  Related
Development Index (see United Nations Development Programme 2014), and the UN
'Sustainable Development Indicators'  (see United Nations 2001).  Also notable is  the
New  Economic  Foundation's  'Happy  Planet  Index'  discussed  above  (see  New
Economics  Foundation  2012),  another  model  created  by  the  New  Economics
Foundation  for  domestic  use  (New  Economics  Foundation  2011a;  this  model  also
informed Foresight Mental Capital  and Wellbeing Project 2008),  the World Wildlife
Fund's  'Living  Planet  Index'  (see  WWF  2012)  and  the  Economist's  'Economist
Intelligence  Unit  Quality  of  Life  Index'  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit  2005).  These
approaches tend to take a small number of indicators in addition to GDP (often at least
literacy rates and life expectancy) and combine them to produce a single indicator. This
approach is partly dictated by the purpose of the research efforts: the UN and, to a lesser
extent, the New Economics Foundation indices are interested in the standards of welfare
in less economically developed countries. The data which is available for such countries
is  limited,  restricting  the  possibilities  open  to  organisations  seeking  to  produce
consistent and comparable measures. At the same time the aims of these indices and
measures, which include consciousness-raising and, in the case of the UN, to aid in the
targeting of resources are aided by small, easy-to-interpret programmes.
In comparing the attempts to modify GNP and those to provide alternatives, one thing is
immediately  apparent.  Adjusting  GNP  is  largely  an  unofficial,  academic  exercise
(although both the MEW and ISEW were later  taken up by national  governments),
while alternative indicators often bear the stamp of international cross-governmental
organisations.  One  reason  for  this  may  be  the  existence  of  a  tight  international
framework which governs the production of GNP; the UN administer the System of
National Accounts (see United Nations, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, International Monetary Fund and European Union 1993), the OECD act
as intermediaries disseminating interpretation and best practice at the level of the major
economies, and the European Union do the same at the European level. It would be very
difficult to shift the focus of GDP at an international level, and countries unilaterally
attempting to do so would lose the ability to judge their national conditions in a wider
international context.
5.4.4. Recent attempts at holistic measures of well-being
One of the features of the various statistical programmes above is their relatively small
centre  of  focus.  The  Social  Indicators  movement  of  the  late  1960s  and  1970s  was
predominantly about national measures of social phenomena. Measures attempting to
adjust  or  build  on  GDP  move  through  phases,  incorporating  first  social,  then
environmental,  then  sustainability concerns.  While  in  the  academic  context,  we can
often see all three (Daley and Cobb's 1994 ISEW is one such example), at the level of
NGOs and cross-governmental organisations the focus has been on composite measures
of  a  small  number  of  indicators  (such  as  the  UN Human  Development  Index),  or
indicator sets with specific aims and targets (such as the UN Millennium Development
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Goals or the disparate social indicators collected in Social Trends).
If the claims of a 'second wave' by Bache (2013) and Bache and Reardon (2013) are
pointing at something distinct from this continual and on-going work on aspects of well-
being, they are pointing at measures which explicitly set out be holistic programmes
looking at  'well-being'  in  a  broad sense  that  includes  individual  and social  welfare,
environmental concerns and, increasingly, the interests of future generations. The first
of these in an OECD nation (remembering that Bhutan had published its 'Gross National
Happiness'  indicator  set  for  the  first  time  in  1972),  was  Australia's  'Measures  of
Australia's Progress' in 2004 (see Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012). This indicator
set includes measures of sustainability, economic welfare and social cohesion (although
the last of these only exists in place-holder form, no satisfactory measure having yet
been  developed),  bringing  together  the  multiple  concerns  of  earlier  disparate
programmes to compile a set which characterises 'progress'.
The agenda for such holistic measures is largely set internationally, making approaches
to well-being measurement less pluralistic than the domestic developments of the Social
Indicators movement.  The OECD held their  second world forum on 'Measuring and
fostering the progress of societies' in Istanbul in June 2007. The communiqué which this
meeting produced, 'The Istanbul Declaration' (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and  Development  2007),  signed  by  representatives  of  the  European  Commission,
Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  UN,  UNDP  and  World  Bank,  called  on
domestic  statistical  offices  to  develop  or  further  develop  their  existing  societal
indicators. In November of the same year, the European Commission and Parliament,
the Club of Rome and WWF held a conference titled 'Beyond GDP', calling for social
and  environmental  indicators  to  complement  GDP  and  inform  policy.  This  was
formulated by the Commission as the 'GDP and beyond' communiqué, which instructed
Eurostat to start developing such measures (Commission of the European Communities
2009),  a  programme  supported  by  both  the  European  Parliament  (see  European
Parliament  2011)  and  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (European
Economic and Social Committee 2012; Radermacher, Mercy, Leytheinne, et al. 2010).
The G20 Leaders' Summit in Pittsburg (2009) and UN General Assembly (2012) issued
similar calls to its members. These efforts have encompassed both the development of
frameworks for well-being (see, for instance, figures 5.1.b and 5.1.c above) and best-
practice  guidance  for  measurements  of  novel  components  (see,  for  instance,
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2013b on the measurement
of stated well-being).
A key influence to the later development of statistical programmes was the report of the
Commission  on  the  Measurement  of  Economic  Performance  and  Social  Progress
(Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009, generally referred to as the 'Stiglitz' or 'Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi'  report, after its lead authors). This commission had been established by the
French President in the wake of the most recent financial crash as a GDP-adjustment
programme,  and its  recommendations  included a  call  to  develop environmental  and
social measures to extend GDP. Since its publication, this report has been widely cited
to give legitimacy to new statistical programmes (see, for example, Commission of the
European  Communities  2009;  Matheson  2010;  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
Operation and Development 2013a) and numerous of its members went on to work on
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well-being programmes elsewhere (see, for example, Section 4.2.4.'s discussion of fast-
policy networks). The Commission's emphasis is on GDP extension, and not well-being
(Noll 2011). It includes calls to measure subjective evaluations of well-being, but with
the goal of contextualising GDP. The majority of the Commission's recommendations
relate to extending the production boundary, bringing items such as human knowledge
and the natural world within the scope of national accounts.
5.4.5. Statistical and policy developments in the UK in the lead-up to the 
'Measuring National Well-being' programme
The ONS' 'Measuring National Well-being' programme can be read as a development
arising from the international attention given to metrics well-being; it was launched in
2010  (see  Section  1.3.),  many  of  its  justificatory  documents  cite  the  Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi  report  (2009,  see,  e.g.,  Matheson  2011;  Beaumont  2011),  and  it  comes  as
Eurostat,  who  have  the  power  to  require  national  bodies  to  collect  statistics,  are
developing their  own programmes.  However,  while  the  ONS'  programme is  closely
linked to international development, its driving force was local. Allin, who was closely
involved with the development of the programme, suggests that the initiative lay with
the ONS (see Allin 2007, p.46;  2013, pp.8-9),  while Matheson (2011),  the National
Statistician at the time, suggests the programme came at the suggestion of the Prime
Minister (p.2). Whichever of these it was, there was clearly a desire to avoid merely
following external programmes; Cameron (2010) in launching the programme making it
clear that “I would rather we were in the vanguard of doing this rather than meekly
following on behind.” (np.).
Cameron's  concern may be partially around the fear  that international  developments
were taking away some of his thunder; he was talking about 'Gross National Happiness'
as an alternative to GDP as early as 2006 (Cameron 2006). On becoming leader of the
Conservative Party, he formed the Quality of Life Policy Working Group, whose report
A Blueprint for a Green Economy (Quality of Life Group 2007) covered a range of
social, economic and sustainability concerns, conceptualised in one chapter under the
heading of 'well-being' and called for the use of Daly and Cobb's Index of Sustainable
Economic Well-being as an alternative to GDP. By the time of the 2010 election, this
was a manifesto commitment to 'develop a measure of well-being that encapsulates the
social  value  of  state  action'  (Conservative  Party 2010, p.38),  a  much  more  limited
commitment but one which is fulfilled a matter of months later in the launching on the
ONS programme.
We might find some explanation for this interest in well-being in the ability of well-
being discourses to provide legitimacy for policy-makers and policies (Scott 2015). On
becoming leader of the Conservative Party, Cameron set out to define 'a compassionate
conservatism'  (Cameron  2005),  shifting  the  Party's  image  from that  which  one  key
figure within the party had identified as being 'the nasty party' (May 2002). This was
followed by a financial crash in 2007 and a political expenses scandal in 2009, both of
which contributed to a general lack of trust in politicians (see European Commission
2013). This primary need to improve the standing of politicians and of Conservatives
specifically was supplemented after the financial crash by the more prosaic fact that
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material conditions had rapidly deteriorated for many as house prices and employment
fell.
However, while Cameron and the Conservatives may have taken the lead in prompting a
holistic statistical programme described as 'well-being', support for the concept came
from across the political spectrum (see the multi-party contributions to New Economics
Foundation 2011b). The previous Labour administrations had also developed detailed
statistical  sets  dealing  with  similar  issues  in  the  form  of  the  Department  for  the
Environment's  'Sustainable  Development  Indicators'  (see  National  Statistics  and
Department  for  Environment,  Food  and  Rural  Affairs  2004a,  b).  While  their  name
suggests a focus on environmental policy and sustainability, the indicators come out of
the White Paper  A Better Quality of Life (Department for Environment, Transport and
the  Regions  1999),  which  ties  concerns  around  sustainability  with  issues  of  inter-
generational fairness. Both this and the subsequent policy update 'Securing the Future'
(HM Government 2005) call for the development of a 'tool kit' of indicators to monitor
and guide government action. The measures which are produced (National Statistics and
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2004a, b), are very detailed: the
set has 154 indicators with 18 'headline' indicators, covering issues ranging from fuel
poverty  to  mortality  rates  from  circulatory  diseases  in  the  under  75s.  This  is
predominantly an observed list approach which combines presence data (e.g., 'levels of
crime') and absence data ('fuel poverty'), absolute levels ('new business start-ups net of
closures') and distributions ('regional variations in GDP'), stocks ('qualifications at age
19') and flows ('education participation rate'); and which includes a small number of
stated measures such as fear of crime. Measures are both inward and outward looking
(in  addition to  statistics  about  the UK, there are  figures  of  the  state  of  the world's
fisheries and global population), present- and future-focussed.
Such a diverse set of statistics doesn't allow the co-ordination of government action
towards a single aim, but instead collates measures already collected to target multiple
policy areas. This is not dissimilar to Social Trends, but adds to that publication a sense
of purpose: statistics are gathered together not based on their domain of reference, but
because they relate to a particular purpose ('sustainable development'). The measures
were presented in historical context, with indications as to whether they had improved
or  deteriorated  over  time,  closely  tying  them  to  ideas  of  government  action  and
intervention. As a programme, it is hard to interpret; as some measures rise, others fall
or stay stable, so it is difficult or impossible to say that 'sustainability' is being attained
or  even  moved  towards.  This  is  further  complicated  by  the  contested  nature  of
'sustainability' itself. The question of how to interpret the programme is a problem that
will  be  common  to  all  multi-measure  sets.  The  programme  also  lacked  any
consideration of stated evaluation, hedonic or eudaimonic issues, being focussed instead
on social, economic and environmental conditions, not what individuals felt about them.
5.5. Summary: Pre-existing statistical programmes as guides for the 'Measuring 
National Well-being' programme
Although the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme is a novel development in
British statistics, the preceding sections have shown that it is not unprecedented. It has
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parallels in the expansion of social statistics in the 1960s and early 1970s which were
part of a larger theoretical project to establish systems of social indicators. While such
systems never materialised, they increased the range of social  statistics produced by
official  bodies  and,  in  the  UK,  led  to  the  creation  of  Social  Trends,  the  previous
repository of British social statistics. The retrenchment seen in UK official statistics in
the 1980s did not lead to an abandonment in the development of social indicators. In
academic circles, there were continued efforts to reform GNP and GDP calculations,
taking account of issues such as negative externalities, distribution and sustainability. In
campaigning  circles,  there  was  increased  attention  to  indicators  of  health  and
environmental stress as counterpoints to well-being. These alternative conceptions of
'progress' or 'success' are available to the Statistical Actors of the ONS in 2010 when set
the challenge of measuring well-being.
This challenge arises in a specific political context; it is championed in the wake of
social disquiet about both the financial and political systems. It also occurs at multiple
political  scales,  as  European  and  international  bodies  pursue  policies  of  well-being
monitoring  and  promotion  separately  from  direct  domestic  policy  concerns.  This
potentially establishes divergent pressures or policy commitments which the ONS, as a
domestic body within an international statistical framework, will need to respond to.
As with the theoretical debates over 'well-being', it can be seen that the Statistical Actors
of the Office for National Statistics have neither a blank sheet of paper nor an obvious
'correct' answer to the question of well-being measurement in 2010. Instead, there are
diverse precedents, influences and demands which will need to be responded to. Such
responses will be made by the Statistical Actor, agents operating within the institutional
frameworks discussed in the previous chapter. This, again, confirms the suitability of
'Measuring National Well-being' as a case study of a social process; there are clearly
contextual issues which agents will need to navigate together.
5.6. Conclusion: the contexts of official statistic-making must be navigated
The present and the preceding chapter have outlined the institutional and theoretical
context in which the ONS 'Measuring National Well-being' programme sits. They have
shown some of the complexities of these contexts. They suggest that, contrary to the
literatures explored in Chapter Two, there is no straightforward relationship between the
intention behind the official statistic and the outcome of the statistic. The putative desire
to construct  a  technology of control,  or to  objectively count  aspects  of  the external
world to inform policy, occurs within a setting of multiple and competing concerns and
pressures. In as far as they are desired,  they must be expressed under conditions of
resource constraint, competing institutional and theoretical influences, competing and
sometimes conflicting aims and objectives.  The form and the content of the official
statistic which is made are not independent of these conditions, but will be shaped by
them and by the responses to them of Statistical  Actors.  The extent  to  which these
Actors are conscious of the conditions, how they conceive of them and what they do in
response to them, are empirical questions. It is to those questions that the following
chapters  turn.  Chapter  Six  will  focus  on  the  ways  in  which  institutional  structures
examined  in  the  previous  chapter  were  responded  to  by  Statistical  Actors.  Chapter
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Seven will explore responses to the theoretical context. It should be noted that this is a
slightly artificial  distinction,  and that in  practice these contexts will  bleed into each
other.  Their  distinction  here  and  in  the  following  chapters  is  followed  as  an
organisational device for the purpose of clarity, rather than a claim of actual divisions
and boundaries in the external world.
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Questions of practicality: how the institutional context of UK
statistic- and policy-making shaped the 'Measuring National Well-
being' programme 
Following  the  methodology  set  out  in  Chapter  Three,  the  preceding  two  chapters
looked, respectively, at the institutional and theoretical context in which the Office for
National Statistics stood in 2010 when the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme
was launched. This chapter, and the chapter which follows, builds on this by examining
the ways in which Statistical Actors responded to this context. These chapters ask the
question,  'How  did  Statistical  Actors  create  the  "Measuring  National  Well-being"
programme?'. They do so through an examination of interviews with Statistical Actors,
both those formally part of the Office for National Statistics and those who served on
the programme's two advisory panels. These are supplemented with the minutes of these
panels,  and  of  the  one  meeting  of  the  General  Statistical  Services'  Methodological
Advice Committee which discussed the programme. (An overview of the various panels
and consultations are given as figure 3.1., a list of documents consulted is given as table
3.2..) Following the protocol set out in Chapter Three, interview participants have been
anonymised and their responses as given in interviews appear in single quotation marks
to  indicate  that  they  are  not  verbatim quotes,  but  reconstructions  of  conversations,
approved by the participants. (A list of interviews is given as table 3.1..)
These two empirical chapters loosely follow the division established by Chapters Four
and Five between institutional  contexts for the statistical  programme and theoretical
ones. As discussed previously (see Section 5.7.), this is an artificial distinction; as will
be seen in what follows, there is a great deal of interaction between institutional and
theoretical factors. However, making this distinction helps bring to the surface a tension
which runs throughout the work of Statistical Actors: they are seeking a statistic which
is theoretically coherent but which also meets the practical aims of the programme's
commissioners  and  users.  There  is  a  continual  balancing  of  these  practical  and
theoretical requirements, which runs through both the inclusion of advisers as Statistical
Actors, and the debates that these have. This balancing will be a running theme in what
follows, which focuses on the way that institutional structures shaped the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme.
The chapter will proceed as follows: Section 6.1. will outline the impetus behind the
programme, arguing that it owed more to international networks of Statistical Actors
than it did to domestic policy-making concerns. Section 6.2. builds on this by showing
the difficult balancing act Statistical Actors at the ONS had in co-ordinating the specific
desires of policy-actors with the very general aims of the programme and the specific
goals of international actors. It will be argued that this resulted in a programme which
pleased relatively few policy actors. Section 6.3. will note the challenges of budget and
the ways in  which these impacted on the programme,  suggesting that  they acted to
restrict the possibilities of the programme by limiting what questions could be asked.
Section  6.4.  will  note  the  difficulties  the  Statistical  Actors  had  in  conveying  the
programme,  and  the  effects  this  had  on  design,  arguing  that  scepticism  and
misunderstanding on the part of the media led to features which were accessible rather
than theoretically pure. The chapter will end with Section 6.5., which summarises the
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interactions of the Statistical Actors with each other and with their context. 
To aid in the understanding of the specific issues which Statistical Actors were debating,
the 41 measures of the programme are listed as Appendix C, with outputs from 2014/15
given in various forms in Appendix D.
6.1. Origins: 'well-being' as a domestic solution to an international question
'I suppose there were two key things which happened. 2009 was probably
the  starting  point,  when  the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  Commission,  the
Commission on Measuring Economic and Social Performance, reported to
the  then  President  Sarkozy  [of  France].  They  argued  that  GDP  was
inadequate as a measure of social performance, that you needed to take in
wider measures encompassing society and the environment as well as the
economy. That had world-wide impact, and in the UK was influential on
David  Cameron.  In  2010,  as  Prime  Minister,  he  asked  the  National
Statistician to take forward work on providing measures of well-being. This
meant  taking  practical  steps  to  ensure  the  government  was  focused  on
quality of life, not just on growth. Jil Matheson [the National Statistician]
acted on this to establish the Measuring National Well-being programme.'
(William, senior figure in MNW programme, ONS)
'Our  efforts  ramped  up  with  the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  [CMEPSP]  report.
That was formally set up by President Sarkozy to report to him, but had the
backing  of  the  OECD  and  Eurostat,  and  had  a  view  to  producing
recommendations with international resonance. The UK had an interest in
that – three UK academics sat on the Commission, so we couldn't ignore it.
It  was  also supported  administratively by the  ONS'  French counterparts,
INSEE, so we were getting messages through the standard channels and had
to  pay  attention.  It  was  very  helpful  for  the  ONS'  efforts  to  have  the
CMEPSP report.' (Oscar, senior figure in MNW programme, ONS)
It was noted in Section 5.4.4., which addressed international programmes and calls for
programmes  which  looked  at  well-being,  that  the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  Commission
(also  known by its  formal  title,  the  Commission  on the  Measurement  of  Economic
Performance  and  Social  Progress;  Stiglitz,  Sen  and  Fitoussi,  2009)  was  used  as  a
touchstone  to  justify  the  academic  and  policy  worth  of  well-being  measurement
projects. It is apparent both from interviews and meeting minutes that this is not merely
a rhetorical device, but that the Commission genuinely set an agenda. The two interview
excerpts  above  are  typical;  when  asked  where  their  involvement  with  the  MNW
programme  started,  institutional  actors  both  within  government  (such  as  Alfie  and
Emily) and the ONS itself (Oscar and William, quoted above) cited the Commission as
a starting point. Oscar, a key figure in the development of the programme at the ONS,
suggested that the Commission's framework was the one limitation on the programme,
laying out the requirements that the programme needed to meet.
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This grounding of the programme in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report is notable because
that Commission's remit was as a GDP-extension programme, as discussed in Section
5.4.4.. While the Commission's report draws on the wider literature around social and
environmental gaps created by the use of economic statistics as a primary policy-driver
(and thus owes much to the debates explored in Section 5.4.3.), its focus is on bringing
these currently non-economic areas within the scope of the 'economic', extending GDP
to  include  them.  The  effects  of  this  can  be  clearly  seen  in  the  presentation  which
Stephen Hicks of the ONS makes to the General Statistical Services' Methodological
Advisory Committee  (GSS MAC) on the  intellectual  framework which  the  ONS is
developing. That presentation lists the priorities for the programme, which include both
“valuing  the  activities  outside  of  the  production  boundary”,  such  as  household
production, and “recognis[ing] the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi conclusion that it is important
for Statistical Offices to look at the value of the stock of all types of capital that have a
bearing on the quality of life, including produced, human, natural and social capital”
(GSS  MAC  Minutes,  19  June  2013,  p.29;  Stiglitz,  Sen  and  Fitoussi 2009,  are
specifically  interested  in  the  use  of  stocks  in  understanding  sustainability,  see  their
Recommendation 11, p.17). This approach brings the ONS into direct conflict with the
public:  the  Technical  Advisory  Group  minutes  of  29  March  2012  (p.3)  record  an
extensive debate over the appropriateness of stock measures within the programme, a
point  which  runs  through  the  National  Debate  (Evans  2011).  The  influence  of  the
Commission's  report  as  an  external  exemplar  pushes  the  programme  in  particular
directions.
This international influence occurs within a domestic context. As was shown in Section
5.4.5.,  domestic politicians in the UK had previously drawn on and developed well-
being discourses (for instance in the Labour Government's 'Sustainable Development
Indices',  Department  for  Environment,  Food  and  Rural  Affairs,  2013  and  National
Statistics and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2004a; and in the
Conservative Party's 'Quality of Life Group, 2007). Oscar, a senior figure within the
programme from the ONS, claimed a similar national statistical interest, pointing out
that the ONS directorate for social statistics had changed its title to 'Societal Well-being'
at some point in the mid-2000s and that the Commission is merely giving impetus to
work  the  ONS  already  has  in  train.  As  President  Sarkozy's  sponsorship  of  the
Commission strengthens the political case for well-being (as indicated by its citation in
Cameron 2010, np.), the involvement of INSEE, the French official statistical agency, as
the Commission's  secretariat  creates  a similar  statistical  impetus.  As Oscar  put  this,
'Developing a programme as a response to CMEPSP would allow us [the ONS] to look
Eurostat in the eye, showing that we were taking the report seriously'.
In light of the material  reviewed in Section 4.2.4.,  Oscar's comment can be seen as
pointing to the existence of a fast-policy network, characterised by policy-advocates and
-actors moving between different international instantiations of the same policy idea.
Three UK-based economists (Atkinson, Oswald, Stern) sit on the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
Commission, and all three come to advise the ONS through the Advisory Forum. More
than  this,  two  of  the  Commission's  lead  authors,  Sen  and  Stiglitz,  also  sit  on  the
Advisory Forum. Giovannini, at the time head of the Italian official statistical agency,
who Bache (2013) lists as being a key figure in advocating for well-being statistics in
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Europe, also sits on this panel; as does Cotis of INSEE and Radermacher and Durand,
who head up similar projects at Eurostat and the OECD respectively (Advisory Forum
Membership  List).  The  UK  programme,  however  strong  its  national  roots,  draws
heavily  on  similar  projects  elsewhere,  with  key  figures  moving  between  projects,
carrying ideas in both directions.
It should be noted here that Oscar's 'looking Eurostat in the eye' is a national statistical
office  concern,  and  not  a  government  one.  Hicks,  in  his  GSS  MAC  presentation
discussed above, claims the presence of “The demand for wider measures of quality of
life and progress” (GSS MAC Minutes, 19 June 2013, p.28), a high-level and abstract
demand  which  is,  at  best,  only  very  abstractly  expressed  in  the  development  of
measures of the “stock of all types of capital” (p.29). The decentralisation of official
statistics  into  a  separate,  arms-length,  department  of  government  (as  discussed  in
Section  4.1.2.),  strengthened  by  the  Statistics  and  Registration  Services  Act  2007,
creates a distinct identity and context for the ONS' work.  This creates a divergence
between the political narrative of well-being, and the statistical project: the Statistical
Actors  of the ONS seek to create  a  statistic  which meets  international  standards  of
coherence and coverage, with domestic needs as a separate concern. This results in a
programme containing elements of both national and international concern: well-being
is articulated in ways which express international theoretical concerns (such as those for
stock measures) as well as ways which draw more strongly on issues coming from local
policy need and views presented in the National Debate.
This can be seen clearly in the minutes of the first meeting of the Advisory Forum, in
which Cotis and Radermacher give a presentation on international work on well-being
(AF Minutes, 11 February 2011, pp.1-2). This presentation is interesting, because the
Forum is explicitly set up to advise the National Statistician on how to translate the
national debate 'What matters to you?' into a well-being programme (“The Forum's role
will be to discuss the main themes emerging from the national debate and help design
new  measures.”;  Advisory  Forum  Terms  of  Reference,  p.1).  There  is  an  explicit
contextualisation here of national grass-roots opinions within the work of international
statistical  organisations;  it  is  the  international  which  forms  the  framework  for  the
interpretation of the domestic and not the other way around. Radermacher goes further
than this, highlighting the possibility of the UK becoming a nodal point within a larger
network of well-being statistical programmes: “The UK could play a key role in helping
Europe and the Commonwealth countries and the US to work together in developing
standardised measures of well being.” (p.2). ‐
This international outlook is thorough-going: it appears that the ONS themselves would
have liked more international guidance. In interviews with Oscar and William of the
ONS,  at  several  points  they  referred  to  the  difficulty  of  being  first-movers  in  the
international field. As William put it, 'It's exciting, but also a little scary. It is easier to
follow the rulebook than to write it.'. Stephen Hicks, at the GSS MAC meeting of 19
June 2013 (reported in GSS MAC Minutes, 21 November, p.6) states the observation of
the National Statistician that, “The OECD has created a better life index and guidance
on measuring subjective well-being, Eurostat will publish a quality of life index later
this year or early next year and the UN, World Bank, EU and OECD countries are all
looking to the UK as world leaders.” This was supported by an interview with Jack, a
118
HOW INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT SHAPED THE PROGRAMME
statistician from an international NGO who sat on the Technical Advisory Group, who
cited  the  ONS'  work  as  influencing  that  of  his  own body.  This  creates  a  complex
interplay between the domestic concerns of the national debate and the international
networks of which the ONS is a part. The Statistical Actors of the ONS need to create a
programme which both captures domestic well-being and which forms a part of a wider
emergent international statistical conception of what well-being is. At the same time, by
being  a  nodal  point  within  that  wider  emergent  international  conception,  domestic
innovations become influential at a greater scale.
The dual contexts of domestic politics and international statistical networks leads to
some dispute over the ownership of the project. Hicks explains the programme's origins
to the GSS MAC in this way:
“This  came  to  a  head  in  October  2010,  when  David  Cameron  and  Jil
Matheson attended a  policy conference  hosted  by then head of  the  civil
service, Lord Gus O’Donnell. There was an identified need to measure the
impact of policy on well-being.” (GSS MAC Minutes, 21 November 2013,
p.5)
William, another senior figure at the ONS, offered a similar origin tale in his interview.
Oscar, however, who by the time of our interview had left the ONS, was much less
willing  to  credit  politicians  with  any involvement  beyond  the  public  launch  of  the
programme. From his account there is an impression of an ONS-directed project which
goes through the rigmarole of securing funding in the 2010 Spending Review in an
effort  to  produce  a  programme  meeting  international  requirements  of  quality  and
coherence, only to see it hijacked by the Prime Minister and be labelled ever-after as
'Mr Cameron's Happiness Index':
'I can't say if he [David Cameron] wanted to launch the programme or was
invited to, but he formally launched it alongside the National Statistician Jil
Matheson. After which point the media always badged it as 'Mr Cameron's
Happiness Index', which is wrong on all three counts really – it wasn't his
programme, he only launched it; it isn't just about happiness; and it's not an
index, you can't put all the components into a single number.' (Oscar, senior
figure at the ONS)
The neutrality of civil servants makes this account impossible to substantiate (neither
Stephen Hicks nor William would be able to criticise Prime-Ministerial  bandwagon-
jumping if it were the case), but the fact that Oscar offered such an account underscores
the tension between the political and statistical. Statistical Actors are creating official
statistics as professionals, but their work is used within a political context; this can lead
both to a sense of appropriation of their work for political purposes and, as in Oscar's
quote, a sense that their work is being misused or misunderstood.
This tension between professional and political leaves the Statistical Actors of the ONS
with something of a balancing act. There are national requirements established by the
Prime  Ministerial  launch  and  central  government  funding,  but  these  are  incredibly
vague and aspirational. The desire for 'measures of how the country is doing' (Cameron
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2010, np.) are not, as will be shown in Section 6.2. below, supported by precise policy
needs. Against this, there is international network of policy-advocates and actors, and
the potential for future international policy requirements. This balance can be seen in
play by noting the TAG minutes of 11 April 2011, with the AF minutes of 25 July 2011:
“ONS also have to consider future international compliance with Eurostat,
OECD etc.” (TAG Minutes, 11 April 2011)
“The group discussed further the balance between national and international
requirements.  The view was  that  a  flexible  approach was  needed  which
allowed for national differences (there may be some key indicators which
are  country-specific)  whilst  retaining  a  common  set  for  comparability
internationally.  A research  programme  should  be  in  place  to  converge
measures internationally over time.” (AF minutes, 25 July 2011)
These extracts possibly allow an understanding of the GDP-extension focus outlined by
Hicks above: if  there is  a movement in the European context towards,  for instance,
measures of  Human Capital,  the ONS needs to  be prepared for that.  The ONS can
present it alongside measures highlighted by the public in the national debate, or those
specifically  required  by  government  stakeholders,  meeting  current  and  future
requirements for international compliance within a currently-funded programme. Where
the national aims of the programme remain abstract, the concrete needs of international
bodies allow the programme to be given definite form.
The desire for international compatibility discussed in the quotes above does not come
only from the ONS, but also from Statistical Actors from academic communities who
sat  on  the  Advisory  Panel  and  Technical  Advisory  Group.  However,  the  academic
interest in comparability is justified by appeal to an international knowledge-community
rather than an international statistical one. For instance, the TAG meeting of 4 February
2011 concludes by discussing the wording of the four proposed subjective well-being
questions:
“The meeting ended on a discussion of the international consensus and how
the work of the ONS will fit into this. The group opinion reflected the view
that by moving from established questions there is a risk of not leading the
international agenda and being open to criticism. … Dr Eric Harrison (City)
–  Life  experience  questions  have  been  on European  Social  Survey core
since the start. Why are government doing this when it is already done in
academia, polling organisations?” (TAG Minutes, 4 February 2011, p.3)
This point is  later reiterated by Michelson (of the New Economics Foundation) and
Kroll and Layard (of the LSE) (p.4). For the academics, there seems to be a perception
that the Government, through the ONS, are repeating work previously well-studied by
academia, and not building on academic findings. This is illustrated by an extract from
the  interview  with  Thomas,  an  academic  sociologist:  'They  decided  on  different
wording. It was slightly frustrating, but the inclination with any new project is to start
from scratch, rather than to see what has already been done.'
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As will be seen in the next chapter, the claim to 'starting from scratch'  is somewhat
overstated; the point in dispute here is the precise wording of four questions selected, in
part, for their comparability with existing measures (Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe 2011).
This  highlights  a  tension  between  Statistical  Actors,  who  come  from  diverse
backgrounds and read questions of well-being differently.
There are thus three different competing sets of aims and beliefs around the statistic:
policy-makers are looking for a high-level discursive 'measure of how the UK is doing',
the ONS are looking for a coherent programme which both stands up in an international
(and  particularly  European)  context  and  which  insures  against  future  legislative
requirements, and academics are looking for varying degrees of theoretical purity. The
picture  which  emerges  from  this  is  one  of  complex  intersecting  aims  within  the
programme. The sources of this were highlighted in the previous two chapters, and the
current section has shown how they played out. The ONS as an institution is beholden
to  UK  policy-makers,  but  fits  within  a  wider  international  framework  of  both
requirements  and  expertise.  It  is  reacting  to  an  issue  with  both  domestic  and
international roots. For this programme, it incorporates as Statistical Actors academics
who are integrated in international networks to various extents; networks both related to
the specific statistical question of well-being (as in the case of those who've previously
sat  on  agenda-setting  bodies  such as  the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  Commission)  and the
theoretical questions it incorporates (as in the case of economists such as Layard). This
creates competing demands – for solutions which satisfy national domestic requirements
such  as  cost-effectiveness,  which  meet  professional  standards  both  locally  and
internationally held,  which are compatible  with other  statistics  both statistically and
theoretically.  The  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme reflects  a  multi-level
geography of official statistic-making which impacts on the form and content of the
official statistic.
6.2. 'Well-being' as a statistic with users but no use
'The aim was to produce an accepted and trusted set of National Statistics
which help people to monitor national well-being.' (William, senior figure at
the ONS)
The previous section has noted the influence of the ONS' international position on the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme. However, this was largely an institutional
need – a matter of 'looking Eurostat in the eye' and ensuring future compatibility with
legislative requirements – and doesn't reflect the guidance of actual policy need. Going
up a level, and examining the work of organisations like the OECD or European bodies
who form the international policy context for the programme, their aims are vague and
aspirational: “Better policies for better lives” (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development 2014, p.21) or “to provide indicators that do what people really want
them to do, namely measure progress in delivering social, economic and environmental
goals in a sustainable manner” (Commission of the European Communities 2009, p.11).
Domestically, there is a mirror in the programme's stated aim “to develop and publish an
accepted and trusted set  of National  Statistics  which help people to  understand and
monitor national well-being” (Matheson 2011, p.3; faithfully reproduced by William of
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the ONS above), and the political discourse around 'How we are doing' (Cameron 2010,
np.).
In  the  current  section,  it  will  be  argued  that  there  is  a  disconnection  between  the
statistical programme and any potential  policy applications; that the programme was
designed prior to and largely unrelated to any defined policy need. This section will
draw  heavily  both  on  interviews  with  ONS  personnel  and  with  stakeholders  from
government  departments  who  were  involved  in  the  design  of  the  programme  as
Statistical Actors. It does not deal with the life of programme once it enters the policy-
making world, as this is outside of the control of Statistical Actors. Instead, it recognises
the role which potential end-users played in its construction and the way they brought
policy needs (or lack of them) into the statistic-making process. That is, it looks at the
aims  Statistical  Actors  tried  to  meet  with  the  programme,  rather  than  how  the
programme has actually been used
The traditional model of statistic-making is what Oscar,  a senior figure at the ONS,
described as the 'producer model':
'ONS is a non-ministerial department, but it's part of government, so there
are  established  processes  of  consultation.  A  consultation  goes  out,
respondents are given time to reply, the ONS produces something which it
thinks will meet the needs revealed. This underplays the process slightly –
ONS actively  encourages  responses,  for  example  from user  groups,  and
there are supporting cross-governmental bodies who offer advice as things
develop, but at the end, the ONS sees itself as the statistic producer. We
know best, and we then check that people are happy.'
That was inappropriate as a way of moving forward on measuring national well-being,
'All the time we were conscious that we didn't know what the requirements
of the programme were, how the data would be used, even what 'well-being'
was – so we set out to consult. It was so wide and open-ended I don't really
want to call it a consultation,  What Matters to You? was a national debate.
We needed to formulate a programme of work that would be open.'
This openness comes, in part, because well-being is constructed as a corrective to an
existing statistic, GDP, and not from any pre-existing conceptual framework. We can see
this in the use of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report discussed above, and in the discursive
framing  of  policy-makers  at  the  domestic  and  international  levels  (Cameron  2010;
Commission of the European Communities 2009; United Nations General Assembly
2012; this lack of a framework is also discussed in the previous and the next chapter).
The challenge the ONS was given by policy-makers and by its own need to respond to
the international context was merely to 'count something different', without any specific
instructions as to what that something was.
This created immediate problems for the Statistical Actors of the ONS. As William, a
senior figure at the ONS, expressed this:
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'The starting point for every statistical collection is the end use – you start
with what it will be used for. That gives you an idea of how accurate the
collection needs  to be – how often you need to collect it,  how detailed.
Survey design is almost exclusively about how accurate you need to be – are
you going to have to disaggregate it, and by what, so you know how large
the  sample  size  needs  to  be.  We  had  that  in  mind,  but  for  'Measuring
National Well-being' we also had a funding envelope. So it wasn't a fully
blank page, but there was a patch of blue sky.'
More than lacking any definite end-use, the programme also lacks definite end-users.
Stephen Hicks in the GSS MAC meeting of 19 June 2013 (p.6) reports the thinking of
the National Statistician as being that: “These statistics should be used in policy, but
also wider in society by the public.”, that is, their target audience is 'everyone'. The
resulting  remit  of  the  programme  is  incredibly  broad,  as  illustrated  in  William's
paraphrasing of the aims and scope of the programme given at the start of this section.
The ONS' response to the breadth of this remit was to incorporate as many potential
users  as  possible;  the  Advisory  Forum  and  Technical  Advisory  Group  contain
representatives  from Whitehall  Departments  and  the  Devolved  Administrations,  the
programme is backed by a consultation process within government which interviewees
described  as  'unprecedented'  (Thomas,  an  academic,  and  Emily,  from  a  Whitehall
Department),  the  programme  is  based  on  a  national  debate  which  received  around
34,000  separate  responses  and  involved  around  175  public  events  (interview  with
William,  of  the ONS;  c.f.,  Matheson 2011).  In  lieu  of  direction,  the  ONS went  for
inclusion.
Contributions by Statistical Actors within government will be covered in more detail
below (Section 6.3), but here it is worth noting the way that the opinions of the public
were,  necessarily,  filtered  through  existing  conceptual  frameworks  at  the  ONS.  As
Emily, at a Whitehall Department, expressed this: 'their public consultation (they asked
people “what matters most to you?”) and the range of answers they got is enormous –
everything from “work is important” to “going to the beach and making sandcastles
with my children is important”. Some poor soul then has the job of making sense of
that.' Describing this sense-making process, William, of the ONS, said:
'It's more of an art than a science. We read through them all and looked for
common themes we could fit them under. And there were common themes.
In a way they were subjective decisions – do we split the environmental
domain into natural and built, or the "What we do" domain into work and
leisure to get a sense of the work-life balance, but generally the themes were
clear.'
The TAG minutes of 21 June 2012 note the constraints on this 'art' (p.6): “Julie Newton
(BRASS) pointed out that there are many different domains that are important for well-
being for all ages. However, at some point measures have to be cut down so that they
can be used by policy makers, as it is not practical to ask survey questions on every
single  aspect  of  well-being.”  Thus  'going  to  the  beach  and  making  sandcastles'  is
collapsed into a higher level of abstraction, determined by ONS, with the dual aims of
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having something which,  though not  currently required,  might  be of  use to  policy-
makers and which fits with internationally emerging statistical conceptions. There is
also the additional constraint that the 'funding envelope' is not limitless (interview with
Oscar, of the ONS, above) .
A further element of this is the scale at which the programme reports. As Oscar, of the
ONS, expressed the programme, 'The ultimate point of the ONS programme was not to
produce a detailed map of individual well-being'. However, as Charlie, an NGO-head
with a policy-making background, pointed out, this almost precludes use at the national
level as the national levels of well-being are insensitive and reasonably immobile; they
cannot show the impact of policy. The national level is also inappropriate for regional
policy-makers;  Amelia,  an academic in public health,  felt  that local actors needed a
comprehensive picture of well-being in their areas if they were to identify pockets of
abnormal well-being. The lack of direction from policy-makers resulted in a programme
which was potentially unable to fulfil any need at all.
The lack of connection between the official  statistic and any pre-existing policy use
challenges the accounts of official statistics presented in Chapter Two. Their strongest
challenge is to critical readings of statistics that suggest they are technologies of control:
if this is the intention of Commissioning Actors, this is not reflected in the work of the
Statistical Actors. Indeed, it is not even clear that there  is anyone commissioning the
statistic;  it  is launched by the Prime Minister but is largely left  as an ONS project,
shaped by their wider professional needs. There is also a challenge to readings of the
statistic as reflecting the external world, as the project proceeds without much direction
over what in the external world should be counted or why. Instead, the Statistical Actors
are presented with a task with almost no limitations, and are left to draw on the views of
Statistical Audiences, interpreting and balancing these views as they attempt to compose
a programme which is useful, or at least usable, for both Actors and Audience. The
specific complexities of this task are explored further in the following sections.
6.2.1. Geographies of well-being: devolution and its impacts
As discussed in Sections 4.1.3. and 4.2.2., the devolution process confirms and extends
pre-existing limited independence on the part  of  Scottish,  Welsh and Northern Irish
(and, to an extent, London) policy-makers and statistical bodies. Formerly they acted as
autonomous Whitehall  departments,  with their  own statistical  teams;  they remain as
autonomous bodies with independent statistical teams but now also have the impetus of
additional  responsibilities  and  separate  governments  answerable  to  separate  local
electorates with policies separate from those of the UK government. This independence
creates areas of potential conflict, where the ONS collect statistics at a UK level for
policy-areas now reserved to devolved administrations.
These  conflicts  surfaced  in  a  number  of  interviews  and  official  documents.  The
Membership List for the Advisory Forum, for instance, notes a desire for autonomy on
the part of the Scottish administration:
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“Scottish Government officials are working with ONS to co-ordinate, as far
as it is practical, the UK-wide Measuring Well-being Programme. The work
in  Scotland  will  be  co-ordinated  through  the  Measuring  National  Well-
being: Cross-UK Steering Group. Scottish Government officials, however,
stop short of full membership of the Advisory Forum.” (p.2)
The commitment to work “as far as is practical” is telling; the Scottish have their own
established statistical work on well-being through the  Scotland Performs framework,
which the UK programme cuts across (Scottish Government 2011). As a result, the UK
programme  is  of  limited  use  or  interest  to  the  Scottish  Administration,  and  not  a
productive  use  of  their  resources.  While  they  were  represented  on  the  Technical
Advisory Group, they appear to have had a watching brief, as indicated by the minutes
of the meeting of 11 April 2011:
“Will this be an ONS or joint publication with other departments? Given
this is a devolved issue; the Scottish Chief Statistician would wish to consult
about publication with the National Statistician.” (p.3)
Again,  independence  is  asserted:  the  Scottish  representatives  see  'well-being'  as  a
devolved issue. This means both that a UK programme runs the risk of commenting on
an area it has no remit to comment upon, and that 'well-being' stands as an issue for the
Scottish Administration itself  to  define.  Given that  their  programmatic  aims diverge
from  that  of  the  UK  government,  their  definition  is  somewhat  different;  Scotland
Performs,  for  instance,  includes  the  Warwick-Edinburgh  Mental  Well-being  Scale
(WEMWBS;  see  Chapter  Five)  which  the  ONS  eschewed  in  favour  of  their  four
subjective well-being questions (Scottish Government 2011). Ava, an academic working
in public health, characterised this as, 'The Scottish approach is different, they'd started
earlier and saw well-being as explicitly multidimensional'.
While  the Devolved Administrations  are  in  the  position of  pursuing local  aims and
seeking to avoid UK impositions, the Statistical Actors of the ONS are in the reverse
position.  They are  answerable  to  the  UK government,  and thus  need  a  programme
which covers the Devolved Administrations but which doesn't necessarily meet any or
all of their needs. As Oscar, of the ONS, commented on the inclusion of WEMWBS in
Scotland, 'If it works for them, then great.'  The divergent programmes are almost an
advantage to the Statistical Actors of the ONS, resolving disagreement by allowing both
sides of the argument representation somewhere. This does, however, act to strengthen
the divides between polities created by devolution; there are now distinct electorates
using  distinct  statistical  programmes  to  inform  themselves  of  the  performance  of
distinct governments; and also distinct policy actors using distinct statistics to inform
distinct policies.
This is most clearly expressed in the Advisory Forum minutes of 11 February 2011:
“This was followed by a discussion about what was meant by ‘national’.
Forum members felt it  was important to harmonise across the UK where
possible.  However,  potential  differences  in  requirements  across  the  four
countries of the UK were noted. The need to have large enough samples to
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provide relevant statistics at small area level (e.g., through sample boosts in
sparsely  populated  areas)  was  also  raised.  Jil  [Matheson,  the  National
Statistician]  confirmed that  the subjective well being  questions  asked on‐
surveys from April 2011 onwards will cover England, Scotland, and Wales,
because  that  is  the  coverage  of  ONS's  integrated  household  survey.  The
intention is to work with NISRA [Northern Ireland Statistics and Research
Agency] and include questions in their Northern Ireland household survey,
although this still needs to be confirmed. Some members stressed the need
to  harmonise  across  Europe  and  beyond.  This  was  discussed  further  in
agenda item 3.” (p.2)
Alongside  the  differences  in  policy  requirements,  this  quote  highlights  particular
technical  problems posed by devolution.  Samples  now need to  be representative  of
multiple polities rather than a single one, meaning that in certain places they need to be
larger. Surveys of potential areas of well-being, such as the Citizenship Survey, would
not meet such requirements in their current form. This provides technical and financial
challenges to the Statistical Actors of the ONS. There are also questions again of the
international context, which impacts on the Devolved Administrations as much as on the
ONS.
This  should  not  be  read,  however,  as  a  story  of  conflict.  Jacob,  at  a  Devolved
Administration, suggested that the ONS were much easier to work with than were many
(unnamed)  Whitehall  Departments  with  similar  cross-UK remits.  The ONS,  he  felt,
understood  that  there  were  needs  for  information  in  the  Devolved  Administrations
which were distinct from those in the UK as a whole. In response to problems arising
from the 2001 Census, the ONS had established structures to promote the sharing of
best practice throughout the constituent nations of the UK, including a specific four-
nation committee on well-being.14
In a similar way to the influence European statistical developments have on the ONS'
work,  the  existence  of  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  influenced
developments in the Devolved Administrations. While the Administrations can conduct
their own surveys with their own measures, for instance both Scotland and Wales now
include  WEMWBS in their own national surveys, the use of the four subjective well-
being questions rather than  WEMWBS in the rest of the UK makes the results hard to
contextualise (interview with Jacob, of a Devolved Administration). The response of his
Devolved Administration to this has been to include the ONS questions on their own
national survey in addition to WEMWBS, alongside a booster sample taken by the ONS
for  the  Annual  Population  Survey.  Jacob noted the greater  flexibility that  Devolved
Assemblies had in adjusting their surveys to include additional questions, suggesting
that such relative eclecticism 'wouldn't be possible for the ONS, who had, I believe, a
struggle  with  their  methodology  committee  to  include  any  subjective  well-being
questions on the Annual Population Survey at all.' The existence of a supra-national (in
this  case  UK)  context  influences  action,  leading  to  a  spill-over  of  particular
14  Parenthetically, while this committee is alluded to in the quotation from the Membership List of the 
Advisory Forum above, this deep-structure of UK statistic-making would not have been apparent to 
me had Jacob not mentioned it in passing in his interview. This discovery points to the benefits of the 
interview approach followed in this research in uncovering aspects of the official statistic-making 
process not publicly documented.
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operationalisations of well-being. However, this is adjusted accordingly to meet local
needs.
It can be noted that this perception of localised variation is not shared by Statistical
Actors at the centre of the well-being creation. In interview, for instance, Oscar, of the
ONS, painted a picture of a much more homogeneous well-being movement:
'I recently came across the term 'multilevel governance', which sounds quite
grand but that is what was going on. After the ONS programme started there
was a UN Resolution calling on member states to pursue measures of well-
being. The OECD also started work through their 'Better Life' programme.
Eurostat,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  all
released commitments relating to the 'GDP and Beyond' programme, which
Eurostat  is  taking forward with national statistical  offices on a voluntary
basis. The constituent nations of the UK also took it up – Wales recently
launched a Well-being for Future Generations bill.15'
It is clear, both from the variations introduced into the UK programme discussed in the
previous section, and from the variations present within the Devolved Administrations
of the UK, that such a reading is too simple. The statistical programmes that the well-
being agenda informs are distinct, with ideas being re-characterised to suit local needs.
That Oscar does not perceive this highlights differences arising from positionality: the
Statistical Actors of the ONS are in a position to define well-being for the Devolved
Assemblies, they do not need to take on board variations, subversions or corrections.
Such alternative conceptions remain invisible to them.
Diversity in measurement is also the case at sub-national levels. Emily (in a Whitehall
Department) and Ava (an academic in public health) both noted that, despite the uniform
legislative context of Local Authorities discussed in Section 4.2.2., the use of the ONS'
data was varied. Jessica, an academic working for a public policy NGO, went further,
saying, 'But well-being has increasingly become part of the local agenda over the last
five years,  and Local  Authorities have started to generate  local  data  and ignore the
national  results  as  irrelevant.'.  Basing  her  claim  on  knowledge  of  Public  Health
England,  Jessica  suggested  that  Local  Authorities  were  generating  model-based
estimates of well-being as a way of getting around limitations of sample size in the ONS
data. Here the claim of Oscar, from the ONS, above that the ONS saw the purpose of
the programme to produce a broad national picture of well-being comes up against local
requirements to consider well-being in a policy context. Without the ability to conduct
their own research in the way that the Devolved Administrations can, local policy actors
are limited in their use of the ONS data.
There  are,  then,  complex  interactions  between  the  Statistical  Actors  involved  in
producing  official  statistics,  partly  created  by  the  divergent  needs  established  by
Devolution and the responsibilities of local government. These impact both on the way
in which the Statistical Actors of the ONS go about their work, as they seek to balance
national  and  sub-national  aims  and  objectives.  They  also  impact  on  the  work  of
15 Passed into law as Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, this builds on Social Services 
and Well-Being (Wales) Act 2014.
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Statistical Actors and users at the sub-national level, who seek both to influence the
national statistic and are influenced themselves by it.
6.2.2. Competing purposes of potential end-users: decentralisation of policy and 
its impacts
'There  is  always  going  to  be  difficulty  for  the  ONS,  who  need  to  create  a
statistical  set  which  makes  sense  to  measure  a  complicated  concept,  which
doesn't  tie directly into the government  priorities.  The ONS approach covers
everything, but the focus of government departments is specific. It's useful to
have the two types of programme [our specific and the ONS' general], and it's
useful to have commonality between the two. So [we] may have a different set
of specific measures to the ONS, but we share subjective measures to allow us to
make comparisons.' (Jacob, Devolved Administration)
As discussed in Section 4.2., the status of the Devolved Administrations can be read as
an  extension  of  the  status  of  Whitehall  Departments,  a  new geographical  twist  on
historic policy-making fragmentation. It was argued at the start of the present section
that official statistic-making in the UK is normally determined by policy needs and that
the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme had no such needs beyond its broad
programmatic aims. This sub-section seeks to better substantiate that latter claim.
Self, Joloza and Beaumont, in the GSS MAC meeting of 19 June 2013 (p.37) report
that, “The National Statistician has stated that any indication provided by the MNW
programme as to whether measures of national well-being are getting better or worse
should have appropriate methodological background and be endorsed by appropriate
stakeholders.” This is  problematic,  as the stakeholders listed elsewhere by the ONS
include nigh-on everyone in the UK (see above). Looking at policy-making bodies, it is
notable how patchy is  the representation of Whitehall  Departments on the Advisory
Forum and Technical  Advisory Group.  The Department  for  Work and Pensions,  for
instance, attend only a handful of meetings, the Ministry of Justice and Department of
Business, Innovation and Skills attend only one, and ministries such as Defence, and
Culture, Media and Sport don't attend any (TAG Minutes, all; see also Appendix A). In
the case of the last,  a  representative of Sport  England is  listed as a  member of the
Technical  Advisory  Group,  but  doesn't  attend  any  meetings.  On  the  other  hand,
Education send a representative to the first  few meetings of the Technical Advisory
Group before tailing off, while Defra, and the Departments for Communities and Local
Government; and Health send representatives to all or almost all meetings. There is thus
very  different  levels  of  buy-in  to  the  programme  across  Whitehall,  reflecting  the
difficulty of cross-cutting programmes which was highlighted in Section 4.2.1..
In addition to these formal meetings, interviews highlighted the importance of informal
structures of official statistic-making. Emily, who worked for a Whitehall Department
which did regularly attend meetings, noted discussions outside of these formal face-to-
face gatherings: 'We've been consulted on that [children's well-being] twice in the last
year [2013-14], so the conversation is still open. And you work with them for so long
that you form close working relations, you can normally just pick up the phone and talk
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to them, rather than waiting for a consultation.' These structures are largely the result of
agency on the part of Statistical Actors; a 'picking up the phone' to make a point to an
Actor believed to have influence. Alfie, who worked for a Whitehall Department, noted
that  these  working relations  were often  personal,  a  result  of  the  circulation  of  civil
servants  within  Whitehall;  he  himself  had  come  to  the  project  not  because  of  any
particular departmental buy-in but because he had formerly worked at the ONS. This is
evidence of a distributed network of relevant statistical expertise outside of the ONS,
similar to the network of well-being advocates in the European setting. The influence
these informal structures and networks have on the final form and content of the official
statistic is unclear as their informality hides them from official records, although it is
worth noting that they did not form a major part of interviewees' accounts of the process
of production of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme.
Caution should also be taken in reading involvement in meetings as the Department
having  any  particular  desire  or  use  for  well-being  data.  Alfie,  from  a  Whitehall
Department,  was  explicit  on  this,  'I  wasn't  there  to  represent  the  Department,  the
Department didn't really have a position beyond “We would like to see this done well”.'
Further, as will be discussed in Section 6.2.3. below, most Departments who provided
interview participants were not using data from the programme in their policy-making.
The exception to this was Emily's department, who had already incorporated the well-
being agenda into their work prior to the creation of the programme:
'We do use the data, particularly the subjective well-being data, because it's
new  and  unique.  [Our  departmental  responsibility]  and  well-being  get
caught up together, they're almost seen as synonymous, so they're inherent
in what we do. So we don't struggle with the question of 'what is this for?' as
much as some other departments might. Well-being should sit coherently in
what we do.'
This response was not typical, however, which may not be surprising. Departments have
always had the power to collect data to support their work, and have used it. Those not
already considering well-being were thus unlikely to have specific policy-aims which
well-being data could inform, and were thus limited both in their involvement and in the
contribution  they  sought  to  make.  This  is  a  factor  in  the  failure  of  the  broad
programmatic  aims  to  translate  into  the  sort  of  specific  requirements  that,  on  the
accounts  from the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  above,  normally  inform statistical
development.
However, while generally lacking any positive vision for the statistic, departments did
come into conflict with the ONS over the relation between the programme's aims and
their  own  departmental  ones.  For  example,  Amelia,  from a  Whitehall  Department,
related discussions she had with the ONS over the representation of sub-groups of the
population which her department were responsible for. She argued that that the 'national'
in 'national well-being' meant that this sub-group needed sampling, which the surveys
the ONS were using as vehicles for the subjective well-being questions failed to do. The
same  objection  can  be  seen  in  two  extracts  from  the  TAG  meeting  minutes  of  4
February 2011 (both p.3):
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“It was also noted that the survey will not pick up those not in households or
[under]16 sixteen. This could lead to allegations of it not being a measure of
national well-being.”
“Karen Hancock (DfE) – IHS misses out all those not in a household or
[under] 16; prisoners, armed forces, children etc.”
This complaint is similar in structure to the sampling questions raised by the Devolved
Administrations  above.  Those,  however,  were  questions  of  reporting:  are  sufficient
individuals in a relevant population being sampled to allow their results to be analysed
separately; and is this 'well-being' as the Devolved Administration understands it? The
current objection is one about coverage: are the relevant population being included in
the programme at all? As a further element to this, there are theoretical questions about
whether the concept of 'well-being' itself is uniform across population sub-groups. The
TAG meeting of 21 June 2012 is devoted to discussing the question of children and
well-being, with Tim Andrews of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
being quoted as commenting that “different SWB questions may be needed at different
stages of life” (p.4). Ultimately, this line of argument was successful, with the ONS
launching a separate well-being programme for children in 2014.
There is an interplay here between departmental desires for coverage and limitations on
cost,  which  are  accentuated  by  the  fragmented  nature  of  Whitehall  policy-making.
Amelia's  disagreement  with  the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS over  their  claim to a
'national' statistic was seen as an effort on her part to shift responsibility (and so cost)
from her department onto the ONS. As she expressed this:
'at  the  2010  Spending  Review,  the  Secretary  of  State  cut  funding  for
[survey],  the  Department's  survey  of  [sub-population]  opinions,  which
would have been a  potential  vehicle  for questions about well-being.  The
ONS  felt  we  were  trying  to  shift  responsibility  to  them,  so  that  the
additional sampling of [sub-population] would come out of their budget and
not ours. My point was that there was nothing in their remit which said they
shouldn't be addressing [sub-population's] well-being – they were measuring
"National" well-being'.
When asked about  this,  the response of  Oscar,  from the ONS, was to  return to  the
argument that the programme was intended to be a high-level national picture:
'There were [criticisms from Departments saying "you need to cover this
group"], and we responded in two ways. One is to point out that the ONS
sample is huge, so they can normally do some analysis with the group they
need – the information is there for them to get out. The other is to say that
the  ONS  has  no  proprietary  interest  in  the  questions,  so  government
departments can take them and supplement them. … The ONS programme
sets the broad national picture – you can drill down, but only so far. And
then comes the time where you have to pick it up yourself.'
16  The minutes here use 'over', which is factually incorrect, and so likely to be an error. It has been 
corrected for sense here and in the quote following.
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At the same time as some departments were seeking to extend the ONS' remit (as the
ONS saw it), there is the possibility that others sought to keep certain statistics (and
their attendant funding) under their control. Jessica, an academic, suggested that 'There
was also  a  period where Defra got  quite  upset  because they'd  already been putting
together sustainable development indicators and they thought this was a duplication.
They wanted a lot more sustainability in there.' A similar point was made by Thomas,
another academic. Their accounts were, however, was not supported in interviews with
representatives  of  the  ONS  or  of  Whitehall  Departments.  It  is  interesting  that
responsibility for the Sustainable Development Indices shifted from Defra to the ONS
midway through the programme, which may have short-circuited any potential dispute
about institutional power-centres.
These  can  be  read  as  conflicts  between  Statistical  Actors,  arising  from  typical
institutional disagreements about resources and responsibilities. Another way of reading
these  is  as  the system of  consultation working as  it  should,  allowing the Statistical
Actors  of  the  ONS  to  co-construct  the  statistic  with  the  Statistical  Audience,
accommodating their needs as far as the ONS' overall requirements allowed. On this
reading, the role Statistical Actors from Whitehall and the Devolved Administrations
played was in  modifying the  ONS'  proposals  to  ensure  they were generally usable,
rather than being able to shape the programme to meet their own specific policy needs.
For example, Emily described her department's role in adjusting the questions in the
“Health” domain of the programme:
'They then proposed their set of ten domains and headline measures within
each domain which went out to consultation which is probably where we
had most impact. For example, within the initial set of domains, the health
domain had one really weird question – something like "Are you satisfied
with your state of mental health" – and we were able to adjust that, to tell
them that it wasn’t an appropriate question to ask people and there were
more relevant measures which could be included in the health domain.'
This account is supported by comments in the minutes of the TAG meeting of 29 March
2012 (p.3), which record “'Satisfaction with mental health' was not considered to be a
good question;  there are  many excellent  measures  of  mental  health  available  which
could be used instead.” Isla, from a Whitehall Department, describes a similar process,
where the expertise of her department was, with external NGOs working in the same
area, able to fill a gap in the ONS' proposed programme:
'We wanted local indicators if possible, but also considered how well the
indicators  reflected  key  policy  areas  and  the  evidence  in  those  areas –
initially  the  suggested  measures  didn't  include  any  indicator  on  [policy
area]. … [Policy area] was something that had come up in the public debate,
although not prominently. I think it was initially excluded  from the list of
proposed indicators because  the  ONS had done a  lot  of  analysis  on the
Understanding Society survey to see what drove well-being. But that survey
is didn’t include [policy area] question, so there was a lack of evidence on
[policy area] and wellbeing in the source they had used.'
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This response is also interesting in the light of William's comments earlier about the
processing of the national debate. It was argued at the time that this debate is necessarily
filtered through existing modes of thought by the Statistical Actors of the ONS, and
Isla's  comments  support  this.  However,  by  consulting,  these  Actors  are  able  to
incorporate thinking from a wider group of Statistical Actors, which compensates for
their oversights.
This sub-section has shown the impact of the fragmented governmental system on the
process  of  official  statistic-making.  Statistical  Actors  from  Whitehall  had  varying
degrees of interest in the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, and a diversity of
aims:  to  obtain  measures  which  would  fit  their  pre-existing  policy  needs,  to  shift
responsibilities for measurement from their department to the ONS, to ensure they are
not  lumbered with unsuitable statistics.  These aims were separate  from those of the
Statistical Actors of he ONS, which was to produce a general programme which met
international standards and which had the potential for use. This meeting of the specific
and the general needed to be negotiated by the Statistical  Actors,  emphasising once
more  the  role  of  agency  in  determining  the  final  form and  content  of  the  official
statistic.
6.2.3. A programme which pleases most people a little, but not a lot
 'My motto is 'use it or lose it' – if we're not using data then why are we
spending  money  collecting  it?  It's  starting  to  be  used,  I've  heard  of
departments using it as before and after data for policy evaluation, and for
considering the design of longer-term policies. I'd like to see it used more in
considering joined-up policies – so health people aren't just looking at the
health data, but they're thinking about employment, because that impacts on
health. The OECD coined this, but I like thinking of this as 'Better policies
for better  lives'.  Ultimately that's  what we're trying to do – provide data
which  will  allow  the  design  of  policies  which  improve  people's  lives.'
(William, senior figure, ONS)
The previous sub-section argued that there was little desire within Whitehall for the data
the programme was producing and, where there was, it often fell into conflict with the
aims and objectives of the ONS. This section develops this argument, by suggesting that
the  programme which  the  ONS produced  was  not  generally  found to  be  useful  by
Whitehall  Departments.  This  lack  of  use  confirms  the  gap  between  the  desires  of
stakeholders and those of the Statistical Actors of the ONS, arising from the lack of
involvement of Commissioning Actors in the statistic-making process. 
Continuing the story of Amelia, in her Whitehall department, from above: following her
dispute over whether her policy group were covered by the surveys on which subjective
well-being questions were being placed, she turned to her Secretary of State to see how
far the point should be pushed:
'I sounded out the Secretary of State to get their views on well-being, and it
was apparent that they were not interested. They thought we already had
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measures of well-being [in a Departmental KPI] and additional measures
were superfluous.'
Interestingly, given the Prime Ministerial backing to the programme, the Secretary of
State  in  question  had  actually  reversed  departmental  policy,  which  had  historically
included well-being as a core aim, preferring instead to fall  back on specific output
measures as a performance yardstick. Their thinking was that this output was the marker
of the department's success and so, in as far as the Department could improve well-
being at all it was through this output. We can see here a version of the problems raised
in Section 4.2. regarding cross-departmental schemes; departments have specific aims
and  objectives,  and  will  pursue  these  unless  incentivised  to  do  otherwise.  This  is
particularly the case with something as diffuse as well-being, where the contribution of
any given department's work will be invisible at the national level at which the data is
reported.
Elsewhere,  departments were less openly resistant to the programme, but carried on
using  the  measures  they  already  had.  Elsewhere  in  Whitehall,  for  instance,  James
suggested: 'Some of the indicators come from elsewhere, and have been re-packaged as
part of the programme. We still use those we used before, but possibly in their original
sense rather than as 'well-being' statistics.'. The newer data, particularly subjective well-
being, did not inform policy, while the data designed with policies in mind continued to
be used.
Again, the picture was not uniform across departments. As mentioned above, Emily,
who felt her department was already involved with well-being prior to the programme's
development, reported that she and her colleagues were making use of the new data in
an experimental fashion. Isla said something similar, reporting that some of the ONS'
subjective evaluation questions were being added to their existing departmental surveys:
'We'll be getting the data on that soon, which I'm really excited by. For us it's
not so much the measure itself but the relationship between measures – if
well-being goes up, that's not especially interesting unless we know why.
When I told the story about well-being having risen because unemployment
had fallen, colleagues were interested in that because of how it linked to our
policy areas. Hopefully we'll get data which allows us to do the same with
[policy area].'
This use of the ONS' questions in their own existing surveys follows the suggestion of
Oscar,  a  senior  figure  at  the  ONS,  above,  for  departments  to  undertake  their  own
research using the programme's measures and establishes it as a touchstone or reference
point, itself outside of direct policy usage. The problems of scale discussed above, both
in terms of geographical samples and coverage of policy sub-groups, leaves Whitehall
departments in a similar position to the Devolved Administrations. They are presented
with a national picture but one which is often too broad to integrate with their policy
aims. Explaining this, Jacob, from a Devolved Administration, said:
'This  highlights  a  difficulty  that  the  ONS have  as  an  independent  body
which  we  don't  –  they  are  trying  to  produce  a  programme  which  is
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conceptually  sound  and  which  makes  sense  across  all  government
departments. Our work has to be conceptually sound, but instead aligns with
government aims – we are a policy-delivery body, so our indicators expose
policy effects.' 
Lacking  any  direct  policy  need,  the  national  programme  falls  between  stools:  the
Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  work  to  create  something  coherent  and  cross-
governmental, but this results in a non-specific programme which departments have to
modify if  they are to  make it  useful.  This  leads to a  lack of uptake,  particularly in
departments where there isn't any obvious overlap between their work and well-being.
As Alfie, in a Whitehall Department, put it, 'There hasn't been as much movement as
some might have hoped though. The trouble is that the answer is always roughly the
same – 7.2,  or  there-abouts.  There  are  distributional  differences  between regions  or
groups, but I don't think the thinking's gone very far as to what the causal chain is or
how you'd intervene. It's not very much used – if you set it as a target, how would you
drive it?' In line with this, the TAG minutes of 3  December 2012 (p.2) note: “It would be
helpful to have a policy link for each of the domains (e.g., for the health domain the
Department of Health) in order to get take up from government departments.” (p2)
This leaves the programme in the situation William, of the ONS, outlines at the start of
this sub-section: not greatly used, particularly in a cross-cutting sense (a point also made
by Isla, at a Whitehall Department, 'For me, the question is to what extent does it allow
us to design holistic policies to influence well-being. And we're not really there yet.').
Possibly,  however,  his  hopes  are  unrealistic;  echoing the  critique  of  evidence-based
policy outlined in Section 4.2.3., Amelia, at a Whitehall Department, pointed out that
well-being can only ever be one consideration of government: 'It's part of the evidence
that you can use in making the case for the funding of programmes, for instance, but
only part  – there are  still  the questions around whether the programme is  effective,
feasible, &c.'
The picture that arises from the statistic-making process is thus one which is quite close
to the 'producer' model that Oscar, at the ONS, had felt was inappropriate for well-being
(quoted above). The national debate is filtered through existing frameworks of thought,
and then adjusted in light of feedback from potential parts of the Statistical Audience.
This feedback is limited by the perception by many Whitehall departments that they are
not and will not be users. Not only does this mean there is no direct policy-aim which
the programme fulfils, but also that the Statistical Actors of the ONS act to ensure that
the programme is too broad to fulfil such aims. Instead, departments supportive of well-
being as an aim either use what measures the programme has which they were already
using, or add subjective well-being questions to their own existing surveys. The Cabinet
Office acts to ensure that any new departmental surveys address subjective well-being
questions, but cannot make well-being a priority where it isn't already (interview with
Alfie,  Whitehall  Department).  This  fits  the  model  of  previous  attempts  at  cross-
governmental  programmes  where,  unless  incentivised  or  coerced,  independent
departments continued to act independently (see Section 4.2.1.).
The previous  sub-section  argued that,  against  the  critical  accounts  of  Chapter  Two,
Whitehall  Departments  were  not  trying  to  influence  the  design  of  the  'Measuring
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National Well-being' programme to ensure social control; the present section argues that
there was little attempt to shape its outputs for control (or much else) either. In this
sense,  the programme better  resembles native accounts,  where the external world is
counted without political interference; although, as was shown previously, the factors
determining what aspects of the world are counted, and how, are not independent of
political context.
6.3. The role of finance and structure: money is a limiting factor
'The programme was and still is presented as developmental, and it occurred
during a period of austerity. We got the funding we needed, but it wasn't
exhaustive, we still need to recycle things from elsewhere.' (Oscar, senior
figure, ONS)
Setting the context of the programme, the minutes of the GSS MAC of 3 November
2010  (p.2),  state  that  the  2010  Spending  Review  means  that:  “there  would  be  a
reduction in resource [for the ONS] from £144 million to £131 million by 2014/15; a
decrease  of  8.5%  (17.4%  in  real  terms).  The  biggest  component  of  this  was  the
reduction in capital … additional funding was approved for the Beyond 2011 Census
project  and for  Societal  Well-being (now being known as  National  Well-being);  an
extension of the measure of GDP to cover a broader scope”. (Also notable in this quote,
in light of the discussion of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report as a basis for the programme
above, this characterisation of the MNW as a GDP-extension project.) The minutes go
on to  say that  an  area  for  cost-saving would be  work done with  other  government
departments, but that there was severe limitations on the scope for cutting these: “As
most of this work is statutory, early indications are these joint projects will continue, but
redesign of sample sizes may be necessary.” (p3; see also Penneck 2014).
This  financial  constraint  continues  throughout  the  programme,  both  for  Statistical
Actors within the ONS and within Whitehall more broadly. The minutes of the GSS
MAC meeting of 14 November 2012 report (p.4): “Martin [Brand, chairing the meeting]
spoke of the financial challenges to ONS for 2013-14. ONS was going through another
cost savings exercise; the government had set challenging targets. ONS now had to pay
VAT on some transactions, and there had been a significant cost involved in improving
the ONS website. ONS would be awaiting the autumn statement to see if departmental
budgets would undergo further cuts.” While this does not appear to have led to staffing
cuts at the ONS, as it did in Whitehall more broadly, this will have constrained options
for increasing staff numbers to assist with the new programme.
There are two major effects of this financial constraint. One is that the Statistical Actors
of the ONS are reliant on existing statistics for much of the bulk of the programme,
having  been  given  additional  funding  only  to  develop  the  subjective  well-being
measures  proposed by the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  report  and to  carry out  the  national
debate. As Oscar, at the ONS, put this, 'So we needed to put a proposal in to fund this
work – the resources were there to set it up, but we weren't funded for the collection of
subjective well-being data. So we had to make a bid for money to fund the programme
at the Spending Review, which at the time was providing funds for several years.' This
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is additional money over the top of a budget which is being cut, allowing the creation of
a new stream of work at a time when others are being shut down.
The second is that the ONS are able to use the funding for the programme, and its
prestige  as  a  Prime  Ministerially-endorsed  project,  to  support  their  core  activities.
Stephen Hicks, in the presentation to the GSS MAC of 19 June 2013 (p.29) introduced
above, says:
“The Office for National Statistics (ONS) approach to measuring National
Well-being has been to make better use of already existing socio-economic
indicators  and supplementing  those  with  subjective  well-being  estimates.
Highlighting alternative measures of national economic activity other than
GDP is  necessary to  better  reflect  the material  well-being  of  the nation.
However, equally important is to develop further, and make better use of,
household survey information on income, consumption and wealth and to
link, where possible, to data from the National Accounts.”
It  was  previously  argued  that  Hicks'  presentation  had  emphasised  the  role  of  the
programme as a GDP-extension programme. Here that emphasis is tied to the recycling
that  Oscar,  at  the  ONS,  was  talking  about  above:  with  money  constrained,  the
programme provides the justification to develop information on income, consumption
and wealth. Putting aside arguments over whether or not these are integral parts of well-
being, these are all core areas for the ONS. It appears that the programme is being used
to insulate these areas from cuts, allowing development work to happen which may not
have occurred otherwise.
There  were  claims  by  participants  of  more  concrete  impacts  of  austerity  on  the
programme, in the form of cuts to surveys which could have been used to test or carry
questions.  Thomas,  an  academic  working  principally  on  national  and  cross-national
surveys, said, 'It was unfortunate that the programme started under austerity. It started
out as an experimental programme, but as soon as it gets going, the Citizenship Survey
is axed and space frozen on the Integrated Household Survey, which limits the room to
experiment.  It's  unfortunate,  but  understandable.'  Jessica,  at  a  Whitehall  department,
also  cited  the  loss  of  the  Citizenship  Survey as  a  problem  for  the  programme's
development,  as  did  the  minutes  of  the  TAG  meeting  of  29  March  2012  (p.3).
Interestingly,  when  asked  directly  about  this,  Oscar,  at  the  ONS,  claimed  that  'the
Cabinet Office found ways of doing the Citizenship Survey by other means', while not
commenting on other surveys. This response is interesting, because it doesn't quite reach
the heart of the question: Thomas and Jessica both point to material in the Citizenship
Survey (which,  among other  things  asked questions about the practising of religion,
ethnic integration and various aspects of community involvement) which would have
been of  use  to  the  consideration  of  well-being.  The decision  by the  Department  of
Communities and Local Government to defund the survey represents a withdrawal of
information.  This  information  would  have  been  of  particular  relevance  to  the
investigation of  policy sub-groups,  such as  ethnic minorities.  With  the exception  of
information  on  volunteering,  none  of  the  information  that  was  available  in  the
Citizenship Survey now appears in the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme.
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The loss is particularly notable in a context of recycling of measures. As Jessica, at a
Whitehall department, put this, 'As an effect of recession, one of the things which ended
up driving the inclusion of measures was data availability, so where no measure already
existed, it was harder for the ONS to justify inclusion.' This is supported by the ONS'
responses  to  comments  on  the  National  Debate  which  asked  for  an  inclusion  of
measures of faith (see Beaumont 2012). Those comments noted the lack of existing
measures on which the ONS could draw, and come at  a time when the  Citizenship
Survey,  which  had  such  measures,  was  out  for  consultation  with  a  presumption  of
cancellation.
This is an extreme example of a more general point: the reliance on existing surveys
necessarily  limits  what  can  be  asked,  both  in  terms  of  the  number  of  additional
questions and their type. Existing surveys are a source of time-series data, which may be
threatened if the survey is changed too dramatically. As the TAG meeting minutes of 11
April 2011 (p.3) put this: “For each survey and choosing between them, there was a
limitation  on  the  number  of  questions  to  ask  because  of;  finance,  response burden,
difficulty of asking some questions on a household survey. It is possible for more than
four questions to be used on the Integrated Household Survey but it is a balancing act.”
Thomas, an academic who works on national and cross-national surveys, reported that
the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  had  met  resistance  from  the  GSS  Methodology
Advisory Committee when trying to expand the Annual Population Survey at all, a point
which Jacob, at a Devolved Administration, also alluded to when commenting on the
greater flexibility he had to collect data through his own National Survey.
William, at the ONS, put a more positive spin on all of this:
'So we looked at what matters to people – we asked the public, academia,
looked at the recommendations of the Stiglitz Commission. They called for
better attention to the household, things outside the market, human, social
and environmental capital. We then looked at whether we had data already
available. Is there administrative data, do we need to create a new survey
instrument? For subjective well-being, there was no administrative data we
could use, but there was the Annual Population Survey, which could serve as
a vehicle for questions. That had the benefit of providing all sorts of other
information, which means you can assess the influence of other factors on
well-being.'
This comment seems to set up a decision between the use of existing administrative data
and the creation of a new survey instrument, to resolve it through the use of an existing
survey instrument. This has the advantage of offering information on other factors, but
this could also have been true of a new survey instrument. The decision to proceed with
existing surveys precludes many of the options for well-being questions which were
discussed in Technical Advisory Group meetings. For example, it excludes alternative
measures  of  mental  well-being:  'Space  and  cost  are  limiting  factors.  Take  Felicia
Huppert's work – if you have room for 50 items, her EU-SILC module [EU Statistics on
Income  and  Living  Conditions,  an  annual  Eurostat  survey  conducted  by  the  ONS
through  the  Annual  Population  Survey]  is  the  best  there  is.'  (Jessica,  Whitehall
Department). Huppert's work could be carried out because there was an entirely new
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survey instrument created at the European level for it administered to those taking the
Annual Population Survey, its fifty questions (or the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-
being Scale's 14) could not be slipped onto an existing and on-going survey.
As a counterpoint to this, it seems inevitable that space and cost would have always
ruled out certain options. Alfie, at a Whitehall Department, for instance, commented:
'The ONS were trying to get a large sample, so didn't want a long questionnaire. Think
about the implications of what was being asked – go through every household and get
information from every member on their  education,  their  health status,  and so on –
you'd  end  up  with  something  mammoth.  The  ONS  needed  to  turn  out  something
quickly, with a limited budget.' This may be somewhat overstating the case, however:
both the  EU-SILC containing Huppert's 50 questions,  and the  WEMWBS,  containing
Stewart-Brown's  14,  have  been  carried  out  at  the  scale  of  either  the  UK  or  its
component nations (albeit with much smaller samples), and the APS itself is not a short
questionnaire. The problem seems to be not the ambition of any new survey instrument,
but its costs, particularly at a time when detailed surveys on a smaller scale, such as the
Citizenship Survey, are being cut back.
What this means is that the Statistical Actors of the ONS must, to a large extent, re-use
data collected for other  purposes,  spreading the programme across multiple sources.
These are both vulnerable to future cuts by the Whitehall Departments conducting them
(in the manner of the  Citizenship Survey), and are subject to differences in coverage,
time, period, granularity and salience. This is a statistical expression of the problems
caused by the fragmentation of responsibilities discussed in Chapter Four; departmental
silos create distinct official statistics. It also produces the inverse of the problems of the
programme's use: rather than departments not using the programme because it doesn't
speak to their specific targets, the programme itself is vulnerable to losing data should it
stop  being  useful  to  the  department  collecting  it.  A lack  of  'joined-up'  government
means both that the programme isn't used consistently, and creates the danger that it will
itself break up.
More positively, the specialised nature of the ONS, arising from the fragmented system
of government, allows it to do things that would not be possible for a non-specialist
organisation. Despite the overall constraints of budget, the funding the ONS received
allowed them to conduct a large and impressive amount of testing on the subjective
well-being questions. As Jack, a statistician at an international organisation, put this:
'The  ONS  did  some  very  valuable  work  on  their  subjective  well-being
questions.  They ran  questions  in  the  monthly household  opinion  survey,
using split-samples, which allowed them to perform randomised trials on the
wording, order of questions, and so on. This was fantastically useful, and
absolutely  transformative,  teaching  us  a  huge  amount  about  how  the
questions worked. The ONS were able to test in a way that no civil research
programme could.'
This point is reiterated by Smith in the TAG minutes of 30 May 2012 (p.4), who notes
the influence this work had on the OECD's creation of best-practice guidelines for the
measuring of subjective well-being, and again by Smith and Kroll in the TAG minutes
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of 3 December 2012 (p.7). In interviews, both Thomas (an academic) and Jessica (at a
Whitehall Department) were similarly impressed, the former in an interview which was
otherwise somewhat critical of the development process.
Even  here,  however,  concerns  about  money  had  an  impact.  Discussing  the  testing
programme in the GSS MAC meeting of 19 June,  the following exchange occurred
(p.20):  “Patrick [Sturgis of the MAC] thought the 160,000 sample size [in the Annual
Population Survey, which carries the four subjective well-being questions] might  be
more  than  enough and suggested randomising  the  questions  to  get  more out  of  the
sample. Stephen said the main problem here was cost.” This highlights a general trade-
off which runs throughout the programme between quality (whether in terms, as here, of
tested validity or, as discussed above, of coverage or cohesiveness) and cost.
Through a number of discussions of the interactions between Statistical Actors and their
impact on the form and content of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, this
sub-section  has  highlighted  the  interaction  of  Statistical  Actors  with  resource
constraints. The financial restraints on the Statistical Actors of the ONS necessitated a
recycling of existing statistics within the programme and limited its scope. As a result,
the 'well-being' programme included a large number of statistics designed for reasons
other than well-being, and was less ambitious in its innovations than it might have been.
Both these points will be returned to in the following chapter, where the theoretical
implications of these decisions are examined. For the present, it is worth noting again
the role of agency in determining the form and content of the programme, and the way
in which this conflicts with existing understandings of official statistics which portray
design decisions as determined either by the state of the external world, or by desires to
create technologies of social control.
6.4. Explaining the programme: producing something comprehensible 
Without a policy-need to direct them, the Statistical Actors of the ONS turned to the
public as a Statistical Audience, both in the national debate and later on. However, at the
same  time  they  were  attempting  to  produce  a  programme  which  met  international
requirements  and  was  coherent  sometimes  ran  into  conflict  with  this.  This  section
explores this conflict.
The national debate had a role both in surveying the public and in engaging them. As
the Terms of Reference for the Advisory Forum put this, the Debate aimed “to engage
the public, civic society organisations and experts in an extensive and well conducted
debate in helping to develop appropriate measures of national well-being and presenting
them effectively, independent of government.” (p.2), with the result of delivering “an
agreed and trusted set of National Statistics which people turn to first to understand and
monitor national well-being.” (p.1). In the light of the discussions of integrity in section
4.1.5., it is worth noting the explicit depoliticisation of the programme raised by that
first point. The success of this attempt will be examined in more detail below.
While  the  Debate  was  broad  in  its  outreach,  decisions  about  what  constitutes  an
'appropriate'  measure rest  with the ONS, rather  than the public.  This leads  to  some
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difficult decisions. For example, the TAG minutes of 11 April 2011 record concern:
“That the measures converse with the public was felt by all to be vital to the
success  of  the project.  However  this  should not  result  in  trivialising  the
measures” (p.3)
This  concern  is  mirrored  by  earlier  discussions  on  the  balance  between  wording
questions in such a way that respondents could understand them and wording them in
such a way that they were theoretically valid (TAG minutes, 4 February 2011); and later
discussions on the presentation of findings (TAG minutes 30 May 2012). As discussed
above, the decision did not always fall on the side of the public: measures on faith were
requested and not  included, while 'Human Capital'  was not requested but was.  This
inclusion  was  sufficiently  controversial  that  the  GSS  MAC  queried  whether  the
Measuring National Well-being programme was the appropriate place for it (GSS MAC
Minutes, 21 November 2013, p.16). In this case, the need for a measure to meet the
requirements of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report seems to be over-riding public opinions
of appropriateness: the ONS response to such objections is that the indicator needs to be
explained better, rather than being replaced (see Beaumont 2012, p.19).
While  not  always  deferring  to  public  opinion,  efforts  were  made  throughout  the
development process to present the programme in a comprehensible way. Oscar, at the
ONS, reported that the Advisory Forum were recruited as ambassadors to help promote
the  programme  at  National  Debate  events  and  in  fora  they  were  already  part  of,
although this is not reflected either in the Terms of Reference of the Forum, or in the
interviews conducted with Advisory Forum members. However, there were members of
the Technical Advisory Forum recruited specifically for their presentational expertise.
Charlie, who worked for a public policy NGO, identified himself as such, and described
the  problem  of  striking  the  balance  between  the  validity  of  measures  and  their
presentation: 'I argued, and I don't know how successful I was in this, against focusing
on aggregate well-being figures. They are pretty meaningless, they don't vary much.
Instead I argued for focussing on the section of the population reporting low well-being.'
This, for him, was necessary to bring the public on board: not only is it difficult to alter
the aggregate figures very much, but also there is 'a scepticism in the public around
whether it [well-being] is a legitimate area that the government should intervene on'.
This comment, and Oscar's citation of the media mocking of 'Mr Cameron's Happiness
Index' above, suggests there are limits on the form the programme can take which arise
from what the public as Statistical Audience will accept.
This feeds into concerns about the integrity of statistics which were discussed in Section
4.1.6.;  there  was  a  concern  throughout  the  programme  that  it  would  be  seen  as
illegitimate,  and evidence  that  this  concern  was  justified.  For  instance,  Tinkler  and
Snape, in their presentation to the GSS MAC of 19 June 2013 (pp.64-8) report on the
findings of a 'citizen users' panel looking at the presentation of subjective well-being
data. This data had initially been presented with thresholds, reporting the findings from
a 11-point Likert scale as being 'High', 'Medium', 'Low' or 'Very Low'. These thresholds
were based on the underlying distribution of the data which was different for the three
positively-worded questions  from that  of  the  negatively-worded one.  This  disparity,
while  making sense from the point of view of statistical  coherence,  confused users:
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“People are unclear why the thresholds have been set where they are and related to this,
some citizen users questioned whether ONS might be trying to present the figures in a
particular light.” (p.67). Similarly Self, Joloza and Beaumont in the GSS MAC minutes
of 19 June 2013 minutes (p.45), discuss the amount of thought which was devoted to
developing a sophisticated and methodologically valid indicator of change in well-being
measures and the limitations imposed by the need to explain these indicators to a lay
audience.
The ONS were not helped in this by “mis-reporting by the press”, as Tinkler and Snape
put it (p.67). Disappointment with press coverage was a running theme in interviews.
Thomas, an academic, summarised the position:
'As much as your [researcher's] brief is looking at where the programme
comes from, from the public's point of view everything rests on how it is
presented. We had dilemmas as a Group about how to deal with the press.
We knew that there was a lot of effort going into creating robust, credible,
accessible, multiple measures, but when the press got it they always sold it
as 'happiness'. Even broadsheets saw it as trivial,  thinking it 'was not the
business of government to measure happiness'. On the libertarian left there
was a sense that the government should leave us alone; there was a touch of
1984-style  paranoia,  that  this  was  a  measure  to  pacify  the  masses.  …
Outside  of  the  Technical  Advisory  Group,  I  thought  the  ONS'  outreach
programme was enormously impressive. They went to a massive number of
public meetings, it  was a formidable piece of public social science. They
really tried to engage with the public.'
Those involved in the development process knew how much work was going in to the
programme, but saw their efforts undermined by press over-simplification. Emily,  in
Whitehall, too, criticised the press' focus on happiness: 'I don't think it was reflected
well in the media. Stories like 'Rutland is the happiest place in the UK' – it's always
Rutland  –  or  'We've  found  the  meaning  of  happiness  and  it's  7'.  They always  use
happiness, and it frustrates me.'
The ONS' initial response was to involve the press more in comprehensive briefings to
ensure that they had the opportunity to understand the programme. William, at the ONS,
described this:
'The thing about the press is that they have a story to tell. One of the big
efforts we made was in bringing journalists in, having media briefings: it's
not just about about happiness, this is the difference between evaluation and
flourishing, happiness and anxiety are separate. We took people through this
– here are outcomes, here are inputs and you can't understand them without
looking at the set overall. You can't just look at GDP, or at happiness, this
area feeds into that and you need to look at the broad spectrum, I call it the
'wide lens'. And then they report it as happiness. You get it a lot less now,
we've worked hard. There's the occasional cheap shot: 'why is government
spending  money  on  this?',  but  the  recent  reporting  has  been  more
considered. You can't guarantee good quality coverage, you can't guarantee
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the press.'
He later expanded on 'working hard'; the efforts of the Statistical Actors of the ONS can
be read as an attempt to turn the press' lackadaisical approach to their advantage: 
'We've done more with infographics and podcasts. That makes things easier
for them, they can take them and use them, and we're happy for them to do
that. We don't charge, and as long as they source us we're happy. It's the
same with the story,  if  we can write a good commentary which explains
what things mean, they can just copy and paste it – it makes their job easy
and it means there isn't a problem with misunderstanding.'
Something of this effort can be seen in a comparison between figures D.1. and D.2.2 in
Appendix D; the former is from the statistical release on personal well-being in the UK
in 2014/15 (ONS 2015b), the latter is an info-graphic which accompanied that release.
This second figure is simpler in the message it conveys, more visually arresting and has
a pictographic representation of 'satisfaction' to aid in comprehension. That journalists
found this approach useful can be seen in the fact that ITV's online news pages use the
figure.17
This does not speak volumes for the quality of the UK press; what is happening is that
the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS are  securing  accurate  coverage  by producing that
coverage themselves. They are in something of a Catch 22 situation: to ensure that the
programme is accurately represented, and so trusted, they must themselves write the
accounts of the third parties who are supposedly scrutinising them. To be clear, this is
not in any way to accuse the Statistical Actors of the ONS of misrepresentation, but to
highlight the lack of scrutiny which results from a press who need their job to be made
easy and the way that this influences the actions of Statistical Actors. This feeds into
questions  of  integrity  raised  in  Section  4.1.6.:  the  guarantor  of  that  integrity  is  the
professionalism of the statistic-makers themselves, in lieu of the professionalism of the
media.
The present  section has  argued,  as  the  previous  ones  have,  that  institutional  factors
shaped the actions of Statistical Actors. In this case, the lack of obvious policy use for
the programme and the need to it  to be accepted by the public led to a  large-scale
outreach and public consultation programme. This did not result  in the public being
incorporated  as  Statistical  Actors  and  co-designing  the  programme;  rather  their
contributions  were  weighed  against  other  objectives  held  by  Statistical  Actors  and
included or excluded accordingly. The need for public acceptance also determined the
ways  in  which  the  programme  was  presented,  with  Statistical  Actors  devoting
substantial  efforts  to  ensuring  that  the  programme  was  correctly  reported,  and  so
understood by the public.
17  http://www.itv.com/news/2015-09-23/happy-list-reveals-uk-towns-and-cities-where-people-feel-
most-positive-and-where-they-dont/ (Accessed 10 December 2015)
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6.5. Summary: interactions between Statistical Actors and their institutional 
context and the influence of these the form and content of the statistical 
programme 
This chapter has surveyed the complex interactions between various Statistical Actors,
principally those in Government and at the ONS, and the way they have moved within
the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme's  institutional  context  (outlined  in
Chapter Four). Drawing on interviews and material from meetings of various bodies, it
has suggested that Actors have responded to various aspects of this institutional context,
and that this has influenced the final form and content of the statistical programme.
A key argument of this chapter is that there was no specific policy need underpinning
the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme,  but  only  vague  and  aspirational
rhetoric around complementing GDP. This had a number of consequences. One was that
Statistical Actors from within the ONS moved to develop a programme built around
international Statistical Actors and statistical conceptions of well-being, hedging against
future requirements to produce data such as 'Human Capital'. Another was that there
was only limited buy-in to the programme by Statistical  Actors from outside of the
ONS.  Those  in  Devolved  Administrations  sought  as  much  as  possible  to  make  the
programme compatible with their own efforts, but did not see the programme itself as
especially important. Those in Whitehall sometimes sought to incorporate their policy
concerns into the programme, but generally ignored it as irrelevant to their needs. In
place of this, Statistical Actors within the ONS sought to ensure public buy-in, but this
too was limited by the aim of ensuring a fit with international objectives. Throughout,
Statistical Actors reacted to limitations on financial resources in the face of austerity,
shaping the measures they included in the programme and the survey devices used to
convey them.
This  account  supports  the  claims made in  Chapters  One and Two that  the  statistic-
making process was an inherently social one, and that the over-looking of this had led to
an  explanatory  gap  in  the  literature.  This  is  not  a  case  of  a  neutral  organisation
developing measures which simply transmit class or biopolitical control in a Marxian or
Foucauldian manner; instead, this is set of actors with agency negotiating a variety of
requirements within distributed networks of power and influence. Nor is this the case of
an organisation able to unambiguously record an external reality in a positivist or an
empiricist  sense;  instead  actors  are  continually  adjusting  and  compromising  their
measures in the light of competing aims and objectives to achieve something which is
workable rather than something theoretically pure.
This argument will be further developed in the following chapter, which addresses some
of the theoretical disagreements which arose within the development process, and seeks
to situate them within social interactions between individuals.
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Chapter Seven
Questions of theory: how the theoretical context of UK statistic- and
policy-making shaped the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme
As outlined in Chapter Three, the present and preceding chapters examine directly the
statistic-making process. Taking the structural and theoretical context of the 'Measuring
National Well-being'  programme identified in Chapters Four and Five, this empirical
material investigates how the Statistical Actors who constructed the programme went
about  their  work.  The  previous  chapter  looked  at  the  institutional  context  of  the
statistical programme, and how this was navigated by Statistical Actors. This chapter
will  look  at  the  theoretical  context:  given  the  breadth  and  diversity  of  theoretical
positions outlined in Chapter Five, how did the Statistical Actors go about resolving
theory into a statistical programme?
This  chapter  focuses  quite  closely  on  the  Actors  themselves,  their  theoretical
interpretations of 'well-being'  and the interactions between them. While the previous
chapter argued that  there was no direct policy need which informed the 'Measuring
National  Well-being' programme,  it  did  observe  a  competition  between  practical
demands  and  theoretical  positions.  The  example  that  arose  several  times  was  the
inclusion of the  Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS), which had
been in use in Scotland but which was not included in the ONS programme until very
late on in the process. This chapter will expand on that debate, which proved to be a
relatively important (and, in places, contentious) one within the consultations the ONS
held with expert groups. It will be noted that what appears, on paper, as a theoretical
debate became, in practice, a personal one. The ideas which were being debated were
embodied in individuals, and the seemingly impersonal debate about the general shape
of the programme was experienced as a personal process.
To situate this debate, it is worth briefly returning to the taxonomic material laid out in
Chapter  Five,  Section  5.1..  This  argued  for  two  major  divergent  approaches  in
subjective well-being research.  Public  health  approaches  focused largely on positive
mental functioning, using detailed barrages of questions to gain deep understandings of
individuals  or  small  groups.  Economic  and  non-applied  psychological  approaches
tended towards using smaller question sets, and often single questions, within wider
surveys, which could then be fed into regression models to gain broad understandings of
drivers and correlates of well-being. While the former is interested in the nature of an
individual's  well-being,  the latter  is  more interested in the generalities of well-being
itself. In this difference in focus there is contained a larger theoretical disagreement over
whether 'well-being' is something holistic, and so requiring a multi-item assessment, or
whether  it  is  something  that  can  be  captured  by a  single  question  relating  to  life-
satisfaction,  affect  or flourishing. There is  also a question about  the nature of well-
being: whether well-being is a state which is caused and observable, or whether it is a
set of capabilities which are only imputable. These differences are played out in the
material discussed below.
The  chapter  will  proceed  as  follows:  Section  7.1.  will  look  at  the  ways  in  which
Statistical Actors within the ONS recruited external advisers. It will argue that there was
a  predisposition  to  the  recruitment  of  economists  which  in  turn  predisposed  the
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programme towards conceptions of well-being dominant in economics and of subjective
well-being in particular. Section 7.2. notes the ways in which the dispute around the
nature  of  well-being  became  embodied,  with  theoretical  disputes  experienced  by
individuals as personal ones. This is a key example of Statistical Actors acting as agents,
for reasons unrelated to the formal institutional or theoretical structures they operate
within. Section 7.3. extends the discussion out from considerations of subjective well-
being and towards the programme as a whole and the measures it incorporates. It argues
that the measures were included in the programme because they were considered useful,
not because they were specific to the question of well-being. The chapter ends with
Section  7.4.,  which  gathers  together  the  arguments  of  the  chapter,  underscoring  the
argument that agency is central to explaining the form and content of official statistics.
7.1. Setting up the dispute: a new area, with old contacts 
'There is always going to be difficulty for the ONS, who need to create a
statistical set which makes sense to measure a complicated concept, which
doesn't  tie directly into the government  priorities.'  (Jacob,  TAG member,
Devolved Administration)
'Subjective well-being is probably the most vague aspect of the programme
– what is it we are trying to measure? If it's functioning, then 'satisfaction'
doesn't cover it. Satisfaction is useful, but misses key aspects of success or
achievement and context.' (Jessica, TAG member, NGO in the area of public
health)
As discussed in the previous chapter, and highlighted by Jacob's quote above, there was
no direct policy need to direct the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme. This
made the statistic-making process more open-ended than it would normally have been,
and increases the importance of theoretical debate in shaping the decisions of Statistical
Actors.  Theoretical  soundness  became relatively more important  than any particular
practical end-point, given that there was no such end-point to work towards. This can be
seen in the range of Statistical Actors involved: alongside the government departments,
Devolved Administrations and representatives of international statistical organisations
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  two  Advisory  Groups  included  a  very  large
number of academics from a variety of fields. This extensive academic involvement was
of a piece with the large-scale public and governmental consultations discussed in the
previous  chapter.  Asked  how  typical  this  was,  Jacob,  a  Technical  Advisory  Group
member and representative of a Devolved Administration who was regularly involved in
statistical consultations said:
'Not all that typical. You see elements of it across their [the ONS'] work, but
not to that extent. The nearest parallel would be the Census, where there's a
long-term  programme  of  discussions  with  users  and  advisory  groups  –
business, academics, the public sector, government departments. Normally
things happen on a much smaller scale though – there are usually technical
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groups  (mostly  made  up  of  government  analysts),  sometimes  there  are
invited expert advisers such as academics (which happens with population
data, and probably happens with key economic data). The difference with
the MNW was the scale and the extent.'
This  resulted  in  the  ONS establishing  two  different  advisory  panels.  The  Advisory
Forum was a high-level group chaired by the National Statistician, whose membership
included  four  winners  of  the  Swedish  Bank  prize  for  Economics  (Sen,  Stiglitz,
Kahneman, Krueger), and no academic below the grade of Professor. Additionally, it
included four knights (Atkinson, Marmot, Etherington, Rose) and two lords (Layard,
Stern), as well as a number of holders of lesser honours; in all, a quarter of those group
members who were eligible for British honours possessed them (see Appendix A for an
annotated list of members of the two groups). The Technical Advisory Group was both
larger and has a more diverse membership in terms of seniority:  while some of the
academics from the Forum move across to join the Technical Advisory Group (Layard,
for example),  most do not and the group also includes a relatively large number of
individuals below the rank of Professor (including doctoral candidates such as Kroll). 
The aims of the two groups were also somewhat different: the Advisory Forum aimed
• "to  provide  advice  to  the  National  Statistician,  to  deliver  credible
measures of subjective well-being, and of wider national well-being,
to meet policy and public needs 
• to  offer  advice  on  the  progress  of  the  national  debate  to  develop
appropriate  measures  of  well-being  that  the  National  Statistician  is
leading."
(Terms of reference for Advisory Forum)
while the Technical Advisory Group aimed
• "to  provide  advice  on  the  development  of  subjective  well-being
measures for inclusion in ONS social surveys
• to  consider  and provide advice on other  broader  measures  of  well-
being, for example development of income measures relating to the
national  accounts  and  environmental  accounting  and  sustainability
issues
• to  advise  on  the  development  of  conceptual  frameworks  for  the
measurement of national well-being
• to provide advice on the presentation and reporting of national well-
being statistics"
(Terms of reference for Technical Advisory Group)
The former is slightly broader in its aims, addressing high-level questions about how to
interpret the national debate and produce a statistical programme. The latter's aims are
more detailed, focusing on the measures actually included in the programme. As Oscar,
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of the ONS, described the aims and membership of these two groups:
'The two groups had different roles. The Advisory Forum was high-level. It
was partly chosen by asking ourselves 'who do we want?' - we were trying
to get as many people from as many backgrounds as we could: business,
academics, NGOs – so we tried to think about who would best be involved.
Certain  names  were  suggested  by  the  Cabinet  Office  and  the  Prime
Minister's Office, which we didn't automatically accept. We were looking
for  advocates  for  the  programme,  for  friends.  They  would  be  pursuing
things that they were already interested in – Matthew Taylor, for example,
the  head  of  the  RSA [Royal  Society  for  the  Arts],  was  previously  in
government, he had people he could bring aboard, and signalled an interest.
It was good if they had things to say, but they were really there to advocate,
to help the National Debate go well. This was a challenge particularly when
talking to business, and that is still a problem. The Forum doesn't meet all
that often, but it keeps in touch by email, and at the time of the National
Debate was encouraged to do things through their own channels – media
pieces, blog-posts and the like. The Technical Advisory Group were there to
focus especially on subjective well-being, which was a new area. We knew
Paul Dolan, Richard Layard, a number of academics in North America had
views. We didn't  expect them to drop everything to take part,  and didn't
think they would be able to, but would be able to steer the programme and
comment on our work.'
One thing to note about this comment is the distance between Oscar's account of the
purposes of the Advisory Forum ('to advocate, to help the National Debate go well') and
the aims as set out in the Terms of Reference quoted above ("to provide advice... to
deliver  credible  measures").  This  distance  was  reflected  in  interviews  and
correspondence  with  Advisory Forum members:  when discussing  their  involvement,
they tended to see it entirely in terms of meeting attendance (or, in most cases, they saw
their lack of meeting attendance as representing a lack of involvement). One spoke of
attending events as part of the National Debate, but suggested this was something they
had done of their own accord rather than as part of their duties. This distance suggests
either a miscommunication between those selecting the groups and the group members
themselves, or a development of aims as time went on (potentially, ultimately, ending as
a post hoc re-writing of the aims of the group after it had closed).
It seems likely that the latter is at least partially the case. The Advisory Forum was
initially  slated  to  meet  "around  every  two  months"  (Advisory  Forum  Terms  of
Reference), but in fact met only twice, four months apart, in February and July 2011
(AF  Minutes,  11  February  2011  and  25  July 2011;  confirmed  in  email  from ONS
Measuring  Well-being  Team,  29  July  2014).  The  second  of  those  opens  with  the
National Statistician observing a "low turnout" (AF Minutes, 25 July 2011, p.1), making
it possible that the group faded away through lack of participation. This would certainly
fit  with the weight of accounts received from Forum members suggesting that  their
contribution was slight. Such accounts are supported by the problems experienced in
attempting to interview Advisory Forum members: reflecting their seniority, they were
very hard to access and generally too busy to offer anything other than a cursory email.
148
HOW THEORETICAL CONTEXT SHAPED THE PROGRAMME
An initial  round  of  five  emails  to  Forum members  was  met  with  replies  by  their
assistant staff declining involvement due to other commitments. Subsequent requests for
written information on involvement garnered 14 responses, of these ten replied to say
that their involvement was slight.
It seems likely that the ONS faced similar problems: while it made perfect sense to turn
to  leaders  in  various  fields  as  a  way of  securing  expertise  and  legitimacy  for  the
programme,  such people were potentially too busy to  involve themselves  fully in  a
consultation process. This will have been particularly the case for those based in North
America (Kahneman, Krueger, Sen, Stiglitz, Helliwell) for whom attending meetings in
person would have proved very difficult, reducing opportunities for involvement and,
possibly, the sense of connection to the programme as a project.
Members may have engaged in the Forum through email; Oscar, of the ONS, suggests
above that this was the encouraged means of communication. It was not possible to gain
access to these emails as part of the present research, and this lack arguably may be
obscuring a vibrant and engaged group. However, the responses received to enquiries
regarding the involvement of Forum members suggests that, if this was the primary
mode of engagement with the group, it was taken up very unevenly. Several individuals
listed  as  members  replied  that  they  had  no  involvement  whatsoever,  several  more
suggested that their involvement went no further than attending a single, press-friendly,
event (such as a 'round-table on well-being with David Cameron', unattributed Advisory
Forum member). From this, it seems sensible to take attendance at meetings as a proxy
for wider engagement, supporting the picture of a Forum which was big on names but
somewhat smaller on outputs.
This lack of activity by the Forum suggests it was limited in its ability to meet its stated
aims of  offering advice.  However,  the approach of  recruiting 'big names'  may have
offered other benefits, such as conferring legitimacy onto the project. That this is an
ancillary aim of the recruitment process is suggested both by the seniority of the panel
and  by  Oscar's  quote  above:  he  expresses  a  keenness  to  recruit  'from  as  many
backgrounds'  as  possible.  In  this,  the  ONS were  partially  successful:  alongside  the
academics and representatives from government sit a small handful of representatives
from business (Havelock, Price, Rose) and the charitable sector (Etherington, Phillips).
As Oscar observes, this is not a large segment of the Forum, but their presence serves to
indicate  the  inclusive  aims  of  the  programme.  In  this  way,  Forum  members  have
indirect impacts on the programme: while they do not act to directly influence the form
and shape of the programme, they offer it  a prestige and a legitimacy that makes it
easier for other Statistical Actors to act.
In contrast, the Technical Advisory Group was somewhat more successful in meeting its
stated aims: it does meet about as often as intended and its minutes show a relatively
large core of committed members. This too may be the result of the manner in which
members  were  recruited.  While  Oscar,  above,  spoke  of  Advisory  Forum  members
coming from a brainstorm-like process for people who could advocate, William, another
senior figure at  the ONS, described a much more focused process for recruiting the
Technical Advisory Group:
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'Often [members were selected] by connections – people knowing people.
That sounds stranger than it is – if I were doing new work on [statistic], I've
previously worked with [your supervisor], I know he knows about them, so
naturally I'd ask him if he was free to offer advice. Because this was a new
area  for  us,  there  were  limits  to  that  approach,  so  we  also  reviewed
published literature,  and asked academics who had written in this area –
people like Layard and Dolan. It's not just a pool of academics, their work
was  all  relevant.  Obviously it's  dependent  on who's  available  and who's
willing. We don't pay them, but hopefully they find it helpful. It's a two-way
thing, they help us and we help them.'
This account was supported in interviews; when asked how they came to be involved,
several academics spoke of relationships with the ONS going back years. Harry (TAG
member, academic in economics), for instance, first worked with the ONS in the 1980s
and both he and Oliver (TAG member, academic in statistical theory) had spent time on
the Government Statistical Services' Methodology Advisory Committee (GSS MAC).
This approach to recruitment, as William said, is not strange:18 the first people Statistical
Actors within the ONS are likely to think of when looking for advice will be those who
have given them advice previously. Such people are both visible and have proven that
they can fit into established modes of statistical production.
Such an approach did, however, lead to a preponderance of economists sitting on the
Group; while, as was seen in Chapter Five, there are bodies of well-being theory outside
of economics, their theorists are not likely to have previously interacted with the ONS.
A good example of this is the inclusion of Stewart-Brown, one of the lead authors of the
Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (see Stewart-Brown, Platt, Tennant, et al.
2011;  Tennant,  Fishwich,  Platt,  et  al.  2006).  As  an  author  of  a  key  well-being
instrument,  in  use  in  the  United  Kingdom  at  the  time  of  the  programme  (and  so
surveyed  in  Waldron  2010,  the  ONS'  desk-research  on  what  statistics  were  already
collected on well-being), she is someone who it would be natural to turn to. However,
several interviewees suggested that she was overlooked initially, and it was only on the
advice of Actors within the Department of Health that she was included (interviews with
Jessica,  TAG member,  NGO in public health,  and unattributed).  Stewart-Brown was
known to the Department of Health, who, via bodies such as Public Health England,
collect the majority of official statistics in the area of mental functioning; she was not
known to the ONS, whose work rarely ventures into the realm of public health.
Versions of this story were repeated by other non-economist academics. Jessica, who
worked for a public health NGO, suggested she was included 'possibly as a second
thought',  because  her  organisation  had  expertise  in  data  collection.  Thomas,  an
academic sociologist, felt he was there 'in someone else's stead', because his manager,
who the ONS had originally turned to for their expertise in survey design, felt they had
a conflict of interest given that they were currently sitting on the GSS MAC, and so
would be evaluating the programme for the GSS. George, a psychologist, wasn't invited
himself,  but  was  sent  by his  professional  association.  In  all  four  cases,  these  non-
economists are there by accident or through the involvement of a third party. 
18 Indeed, as noted in Chapter Three, one interview with an actor at the ONS was secured through 
existing connections between them and a supervisor – the social links operate in both directions.
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Up to a point, this shows the ONS' recruitment systems working; a diverse panel was
secured, and there was room for interested parties to push themselves or their nominees
forward.  At the same time, however,  this  does lead to a continuity in approach. By
turning to people they know, the ONS ensure a panel which has economists making up
more  than  half  of  its  members,  whose  views  are  built  around particular  models  of
subjective well-being.  Their  approach is  consonant  with the work of the ONS: they
utilise large datasets and relate small numbers of well-being questions to larger sets of
inputs and outputs; such large datasets are exactly what is produced by official social
surveys. The proponents of such models also suit the Statistical Actors of the ONS: as
people who have worked with them before, they know the limitations and constraints of
the ONS' processes,  they know what  is  possible  and what  it  likely to  feasible.  The
recruitment process, then, sets up a group divided between a bulk who were invited in
and are likely to give the Statistical Actors of the ONS an answer in line with the usual
approach,  and  a  remainder  who  are  included  less  automatically  and  who  are  less
habituated to the ONS' practices and conventions.
The construction of a committee which is  sympathetic  to pre-existing approaches is
strengthened by the involvement of international statistical organisations, as discussed
in the previous chapter. It was argued there that there was a potential tension between
national needs, as embodied in the national debate, and international ones, which were
converging on particular forms of statistical programmes which would be shared (and so
comparable)  internationally.  Jack  (TAG  member,  representative  of  an  international
statistical organisation), for instance, spoke of being selected for involvement because
he  was  producing  guidelines  on  subjective  well-being  for  his  own organisation.  As
argued  in  Chapter  Five,  such  measures  arise  out  of  the  Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi  GDP-
extension  project  and  calls  at  a  European  level  for  additions  to  GDP,  placing
international Statistical Actors on the side of economists in seeing well-being as a state
rather than a capability.
As  a  final  point  in  the  establishment  of  theoretical  disputes,  it  is  worth  briefly
considering  geography.  Not  only were  most  academic  Statistical  Actors  economists,
most were based in London. The London School of Economics, for instance, regularly
sent three members to meetings of the Technical Advisory Group. Partly this is good
fortune:  it  happens  that  the  LSE  has  a  strong  research  programme  in  economic
conceptions  of  subjective  well-being,  based  around the  work  of  Layard  and Dolan.
However, while these two would have been natural choices for invitations to join the
programme  even  had  they  been  at  institutions  outside  of  London,  the  same  is  not
necessarily true of their colleague Kroll, at the time a doctoral candidate. It was easier
for those based in London to attend meetings, which, in this case, meant the presence of
an LSE-bloc, altering the dynamics of discussions. (For more casual members, even the
distance involved in getting across London to the ONS proved too difficult: Harry, an
academic economist, reported that a change of job, from an office around the corner
from the ONS to one in East London, spelled the end for his attendance.)
For  those not  in  London,  teleconferencing was  possible,  but  immediately sets  up  a
barrier between those in the meeting and those phoning in.  Thomas (TAG member,
academic sociologist) reported that Stewart-Brown, based in Warwick, attended in this
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manner, and that this damaged the reception of the points she was making. (Although,
contrary to such accounts, the minutes of meetings which Stewart-Brown attended do
not  list  her  as  attending  virtually,  although  they do  list  others  as  such.)  It  can  be
observed here that  technology has,  in  one way,  acted to  collapse distance,  allowing
those outside of London to contribute in ways they could not have done fifteen years
ago,  making  possible  the  involvement  of  North  American  experts,  for  example.  In
another way, however, it does not bring people fully together; there is still a physical
barrier  intervening between individuals  in and out  of the room, they cannot  see the
impact their points are making or even if they are being attended to. Thus the locating of
TAG meeting in London made a difference to who was able to be a Statistical Actor and
the impact those individuals were able to have.
As with the  relatively poor  attendance  of  the  Forum meetings,  the  partiality  of  the
Technical Advisory Group may not represent any failure on the part of the Statistical
Actors at the ONS. The stated purpose of the Group, laid out in their terms of reference
quoted above, is to offer various types of advice. This does not specify what sort of
advice is sought;  the recruitment of Statistical  Actors who already think in terms of
large datasets and high-level aetiologies fall within such aims. The introduction, albeit
largely accidentally, of those previously unknown to the Statistical Actors of the ONS
may  introduce  some  creative  tension  and  serve  to  legitimise  the  project  as  being
theoretically broadly-based, but may equally hinder statistical-construction by resulting
in equivocal or unactionable advice. Even if Statistical Actors within the ONS do not
know in advance exactly what form and content they want the statistical programme to
have,  they will  have  beliefs  about  what  is  feasible.  Recruiting  sympathetic  advisers
ensures  that  advice  will  tend towards  the  feasible,  while  including non-sympathetic
advisers allows it to be said that a range of views were sought. As these latter views are
less likely to match beliefs about what is feasible,  they are always less likely to be
accepted, especially in the face of a weight of sympathetic advice.
This section has argued the use of academic knowledge in the statistic-making process
was not a simple matter of turning to available experts. There was a predisposition to
turn to particular types of experts, those who were then inclined to offer particular types
of advice. This meant that the process of developing a new statistical programme was
firmly inclined towards existing modes of thought. This was compounded first by the
difficulties of securing involvement by senior figures who might have offered broader
perspectives, and then by geographical constraints which encouraged the involvement
of particular groups of actors. To an extent, this is inevitable: the interpretation of advice
is always in the hands of Statistical Actors within the ONS, so what is treated as 'good'
or 'useful' advice is a function of pre-existing beliefs. Such beliefs will also shape who
is thought of as a 'good' adviser: those who have previously given 'useful' advice, or
those whose work suggests a sympathy with pre-existing thought. That this pattern was
not  broken  with  by  the  ONS  results  in  a  path-dependency  around  the  'Measuring
National Well-being' programme which is played out in the section below.
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7.2. The embodiment of theory: theoretical disputes as personal disputes 
'There isn't really something, “well-being”, out there in the world, so what
you have to do is define what you mean by “well-being” and, at the same
time,  say how you  are  going to  measure  it.  Different  people  may have
different definitions – I might say that I am not counting economic measures
in my definition, while you might feel that income questions are necessary
pre-requisites and so have to be included. Both are legitimate, but they don't
represent anything 'out there' – we are defining 'well-being' and counting it
at the same time, and if you change your definition you will gain different
results. There isn't a right definition, but there will be some which are useful
for certain purposes. You can define things in such a way that they allow
you to predict other outcomes, for example. So it's very different from a
representational  measurement,  but  still  useful.'  (Oliver,  TAG  member,
academic in statistical theory)
Building from the previous chapter, and above, there is a lack of clear policy-need for
the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, and many of those invited to advise on
it  are economists. They are not,  however,  all  economists;  by accident or design, the
Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  recruit  as  advisers  representatives  of  all  the  major
positions outlined in Chapter Five (see Sections 5.2. and 5.3.). While not true of every
member,  most  have well-established theoretical  positions.  For  example,  Layard  is  a
leader in the field of happiness economics, Stewart-Brown was a lead author on the
WEMWBS (above), Huppert led the team who put together the EU-SILC's psychological
well-being module (see Chapter Five), and Kinderman also developed a psychological
well-being  scale  (Pontin,  Schwannauer,  Tai  and  Kinderman  2013).  This  creates  the
space for a discussion around the nature of well-being and its measurement. As Jacob, a
statistician  for  a  Devolved  Assembly,  put  this,  'The  Technical  Advisory Group was
large,  with  over  20  people  at  meetings.  This  meant  a  lot  of  different  views  and
perspectives, which was helpful – there was a lot of input for the ONS to work with.'.
This point was reiterated by Alfie, a statistician at a Whitehall Department:
'The interesting thing was the range of people involved – it ranged from
people like Richard Layard, who's a hard-line Utilitarian, to people on the
more psychological and public health side of things who had completely
different views. Paul [Allin, who initially headed up the programme] did a
really good job in navigating towards a set of measures which were broad
enough not to rule any of those conceptions out – there is data collected
which will be useful regardless of starting position.'
This quote acts as a caution to the argument of the previous section, which was that the
Statistical Actors of the ONS were pre-disposed to particular interpretations of 'well-
being'. Alfie suggests instead that a plurality of views were presented and incorporated
into the measures, highlighting the role of Actors within the ONS in resolving differing
viewpoints.  This  reiterates  the  argument  of  Chapter  Five,  that  a  heterogeneous
theoretical context requires the agency of Statistical Actors if it is to be made sense of. 
Alfie's  sense  that  the  programme  offered  something  to  all  the  diverse  theoretical
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positions  represented  in  the  Technical  Advisory  Group  was  not  universally  shared.
Relatively quickly in the advisory process, a clear divide opened up in the Advisory
Group between academics working in economics and those working in public health. As
this was summarised by Ava, an academic working in public health:
'The Advisory Group were dominated by social science perspectives, which
see well-being as being determined by external factors. For economists, for
instance,  well-being  is  determined  by  income,  education,  access  to
resources.  They are  uncomfortable  with  the  idea  that  well-being  can  be
determined by internal factors. The ONS think in those terms, so those were
the groups they initially turned to – social scientists and economists.'
As outlined at the start of this chapter, the difference in approach which Ava is talking
about has two main aspects. One regards how well-being is determined: on the 'state'
side,  single-question  subjective  well-being  measures,  predominately  life  satisfaction
measures, are most widely used; those looking at well-being as a capability prefer multi-
item measures of functioning, as determined through an instrument such as WEMWBS
or the EU-SILC. The other, related, factor is what this means: whether subjective well-
being is amenable to analysis using mechanistic causal models. As discussed in Chapter
Five, such an approach is valued in economics because it allows the calculation of the
average  utility  brought  about  by an  intervention.  For  the  Actors  involved in  public
health,  however,  well-being was not seen as being subject  to  general  relations  with
external factors in the same way. The value of 'well-being' is not as an end-point in
calculations of utility and efficiency, but as a basis from which an individual can act in
the world. 
This can be seen in an example from the Advisory Group minutes of 4 February 2011:
"A key point of discussion was what variables go on the left hand side of the
equation. One view held that well-being was the only variable on the left
hand side and all over [sic] variables were determinants of it. The alternate
view  was  that  some  of  the  determinants  were  left  hand  side  variables
themselves and should be measured." (p1)
It  is  interesting  that  well-being  is  here  being  considered  as  'an  equation'  at  all.  In
principle, it need not be; the programme could instead be read as a non-formally related
basket of measures, with well-being rising as the measures as a whole rise. To think of it
as an equation is already to think about it in mechanical terms, as a matter of causes and
effects. Such a conception is useful for those interested in rational maximisation, as it
allows  the  question  'which  cause  has  the  largest  effect?'  or  'what  is  the  most  cost-
effective intervention in terms of effect-per-pound? For those for whom 'well-being' is a
set  of  capabilities  such  models  are  misleading;  well-being  does  not  appear  as  an
outcome measure, but stands in the background mediating other factors. As highlighted
in Chapter Five, economic research already considered subjective well-being measures
as outputs, and used existing social surveys to make arguments relating to the well-
being impacts of external factors. The discussion highlighted in the quote above shows
this methodology being built in to the ONS programme. This is possibly a function of
the  weight  of  economists  on  the  Advisory  Group,  both  in  terms  of  influence  and
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number.
A number of potential explanations for the dominance of the mechanistic, state model of
thinking were put forward in interviews by Statistical Actors with different theoretical
backgrounds. Jessica, an academic working for a public health NGO, suggested that the
recruitment discussed above was a key factor:
'Key to the programme was a split in the Technical Advisory Group between
two groups – economists  and psychologists.  Well-being was traditionally
seen as a health issue, until it  was picked up by the Sen-Stiglitz-Fitoussi
report,  which  made  self-report  measures  much  more  of  an  issue  for
economists. The Cabinet Office initially tried to appeal to economists and
ended up stacking the group with them.'
This 'stacking of the group' meant potential ignorance of measures and constructs which
don't  appear  in  the  economic  literature  (and  so  a  tendency towards  single-question
measures, such as satisfaction,  which appear in global surveys;  and a suspicion that
more complex measures could be collapsed into single-question measures anyway or, at
least, that single measures were good enough). As Jessica went on to say:
'Politically,  the  point  of  well-being  was  to  slant  away  from  economic
thinking, but the Cabinet Office had turned to economists because that was
what  they knew. Sarah Stewart-Brown had to  fight  to  even get  onto the
TAG. The economists on the Group then perpetuated the model they already
had. Which has its uses, but it isn't branching out. We had a number of big
discussions around this – we had the WEMWBS which is a validated, multi-
dimensional model used elsewhere in the UK, so why not make use of it?'
Added to this, the fact that the  Statistical Actors of the  ONS had started by recruiting
people they knew meant that there were many members of group who were already
comfortable with the practices of the ONS. They were automatically insiders, by virtue
of having been invited. From the perspective of the Statistical Actors of the ONS, even
the economists in attendance who they hadn't themselves invited were approaching the
problem in a familiar way, making them easier to listen to. As George, an academic
psychologist, put this:
'They [the ONS] were very welcoming, but there's an obvious hierarchy,
which  you  expect,  and  you  know  how  you  fit  in.  The  economists  are
comfortable, they've worked there before. It goes roughly: ONS, then the
economists close to the ONS, then other economists, social statisticians and
everyone else.'
Again, as with the question of recruitment, there is no implied criticism here (and there
certainly wasn't from George, who saw this hierarchy as a perfectly reasonable factor
for  him to  work  with  and  around).  As  argued  above,  it  is  understandable  that  the
Statistical Actors of the  ONS would first turn to those they'd worked with before and
that  they would  be  better  able  to  accept  the  arguments  they were  putting  forward.
Existing  social  structures  here  work  to  create  durable  social  networks  through  the
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actions of agents. This highlights the way that individuals and their decisions shape the
results of the statistic-making process, but also the subtle, unspoken constraints on that
agency. Had the Statistical Actors of the ONS opted to recruit via alternative channels
which  resulted  in  fewer  economists  sitting  on  the  Technical  Advisory  Group,  the
statistical  conception of well-being would be much less likely to be focused on the
mechanical relation between subjective well-being and its 'determinants'.
This can be extended: not only were the Statistical Actors of the ONS largely recruiting
from economists, they also turned to three of them to write a scoping paper at the very
beginning of the programme, surveying the field of subjective well-being. This paper,
Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe (2011), proposed that the ONS ask four subjective well-
being questions, covering satisfaction, eudaimonia and positive and negative affect (see
Chapter Five). As Oscar, at the ONS, described the importance of this paper:
'The Layard et al. paper was very important. The ONS had an intern for a
while doing desk research – what were the sources of well-being data that
already existed,  how was well-being understood19.  We felt  we needed to
commission  research  in  how to  move  beyond  this  –  we didn't  have  the
expertise in the office, so we commissioned advice really.'
'Advice'  underplays  the  role  that  this  paper  had:  the  questions  the  paper  proposed
became the questions  the Advisory Group were to  discuss.  While  they changed the
wording (over the protests of Layard, who was attending meetings and so 'advising' on
his 'advice', see AF Minutes, 4 February 2011), the four questions proposed in the 2011
paper  were  the  four  questions  that  were  tested  by the  ONS and which  formed  the
subjective  well-being  component  of  the  programme.  There  is  an  element  of  path-
dependency here, as the minutes of 30 May 2012, p.5, suggest: once testing had started,
there became costs attached to changing the questions or format. By the minutes of 3
December 2012, p.4, the Advisory Group are suggesting that the ONS should not even
adjust the wording of its subjective well-being questions for at least 10 years, to allow a
series of comparable data to be established. The subtext of this last point is that, even if
the questions being used are in some sense inadequate, it is better to be half-right and
have time-series data than to be fully-right and not.
As  Thomas,  an  academic  sociologist,  described  the  role  of  the  Dolan,  Layard  and
Metcalfe (2011) paper:
'It was obvious when I joined, as is often the case – policy never comes out
of a blue sky, some group always sets the agenda. So when the ESRC have a
new funding programme, someone always writes their evaluation criteria –
programmes are pre-steered. This had the handprints of the LSE all over it.
There was a background paper written by Paul Dolan which reviewed the
literature and they suggested members for the group. So the individualistic
approach was hard-wired in – at  the first  meeting of the group, the four
items they ended up using were already on the agenda. The ONS was clearly
steered towards the individual and modest in terms of the survey space it
was making available for the programme. The rules of engagement were
19 This will be Waldron (2010).
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very clear.'
Thomas'  reference here to  'the individualistic'  approach is  a different  version of  the
objection  to  the  mechanistic,  state  approach  to  characterising  well-being  discussed
above. The objection is that well-being is being treated as a property of individuals
rather than as one of larger entities such as communities.  This treats  'national well-
being', for instance, as the aggregation of individual well-beings, rather than something
separate or emergent.
While  Thomas'  claim that  the  authors  of  Dolan,  Layard  and  Metcalfe  (2011)  were
involved in the recruitment of members of the Advisory Forum and Technical Advisory
Group was not supported in other interviews (compare with Oscar of the ONS' account
of the recruitment process above), he was right to claim a key role for them in setting
the agenda. For example,  the first  set of Advisory Forum minutes (5 January 2011)
record:
"He [Paul Dolan] stressed the need to consider how the measures will be
presented.  Added to that he stated that subjective measures should cover
measures of experience (sense of enjoyment and other emotional responses)
and measures of  evaluation,  (a  broader  sense of  satisfaction),  as well  as
eudemonic  [sic] accounts  (a  sense  of  purpose,  meaning  and
‘worthwhileness’)." (p.3)
What is happening at this point is Paul Dolan is presenting to the Forum, the majority of
whom already share his position as economists working with subjective well-being or
are statisticians sympathetic to it, a paper which represents the only survey of the field
the ONS commissioned. Unsurprisingly, by the time the first Technical Advisory Group
meeting is held a month later, this 'advice' has become an operating position:
"Stephen Hicks (ONS) set out the current questions ONS plan to ask on the
Integrated Household Survey (IHS) from April." (p2)
There is already by this point very little room for manoeuvre. The decision has been
made to pursue subjective well-being along the lines of the 'state' model. The most that
critics  can  do  is  adjust  the  wording  and  try  to  secure  coverage  for  their  own
constructions of well-being elsewhere in the programme.
Again, this need not be taken as a criticism. Thomas, the sociologist who above was
noting the 'fingerprints of the LSE' was not surprised by this, as he says 'policy doesn't
come out of the blue'.  George, a psychologist,  was somewhat more forthright in his
assessment of his standing relative to the economists on the panel:
'Honestly,  I  felt  fine.  In  a  sense,  I  saw  part  of  my  role  as  being  a
representative, and that's two way – what would we say about this, what are
the ONS saying about this? I don't expect to say "Do it my way" or "Do it
our way", but we did influence this. And it's not about "us", there were other
bodies  who  were  influencing  and  pushing  similar  points.  Some  of  my
colleagues suggested that I should be more forceful and impose myself, but
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psychologists  need to understand that the ONS and politicians aren't  just
sitting there waiting for people to tell them how to do their jobs. They have
ideas and objectives, and what we're offering is just one facet of that.'
The  point  here  is  similar  to  that  made  earlier  when  talking  about  recruitment:  the
Statistical Actors of the  ONS have to start somewhere. It makes sense both that they
will seek out people who think along the same lines that they do, and that those people
are likely to deliver them ideas they find persuasive. Given that the starting-point that
Oscar  and  William of  the  ONS identified  in  their  interviews  was  the  Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi report (see previous chapter), a report written by economists who were looking
at GDP-extension using the ideas familiar to them from their field, it is unsurprising that
the  Statistical Actors of the ONS turned to economists and were sympathetic to their
suggestions.  The point remains,  however,  that the consultation through the Advisory
Forum and Technical Advisory Group was limited from the beginning; while the final
form of the programme was not predetermined, it was strongly prefigured.
There is an interplay here with practical and funding issues, which were flagged-up in
the  previous  chapter.  One of  the  benefits  of  focusing on four  subjective well-being
questions is that it is possible to add them to existing surveys without unduly extending
these surveys. By the same token, once they had decided not to create a bespoke well-
being survey instrument, the Statistical Actors of the ONS were limited in the space on
the existing survey they would be extending that they could devote to well-being (see
Sections 4.1.4. on the financial pressures underlying the programme and 4.2.5. on the
context  of  austerity  in  which  the  programme  arose).  Dolan,  Layard  and  Metcalfe's
(2011) four-question suggestion is thus a workable solution, and one which becomes
locked-in quite quickly.  The decision to opt for four subjective well-being questions
also  provides  the  background  for  the  debates  around question  wording which  were
discussed in the previous chapter: while one of the selling-points of the four-question
approach is that it allows international comparability, the wording becomes one of the
few  things  the  academic  Statistical  Actors  can  influence  (see  Sections  4.1.3.  on
geographical networks and 4.2.4. on fast policy networks).
It is within this context that the public health academics, sociologists and psychologists
are operating: they have been invited to advise, but find that a decision they might have
advised against has already been taken. To return to the public health academic Jessica's
explanation of the problem above, 'Economists have this idea of life satisfaction, but to
a  psychologist,  what  is  “life-satisfaction”?'  (see  also  Sections  5.2.  and  5.3.).  This
difference  in  conception  becomes  expressed  through  two  debates,  one  around  the
wording of the four subjective well-being questions, and on around whether or not some
measure of mental functioning should be included. An example of the former comes
from the Technical Advisory Group minutes of 4 February 2011:
• "Professor Felicia Huppert (Cambridge) – Life satisfaction muddles
experience  and  expectation.  Satisfaction  not  used  in  health,
advertising etc anymore. 'How good is your life' is a better question. 
• Sally  McManus  (Natcen)  –  Satisfaction  in  health  is  explained  by
demographic  variables  in  health.  Old  'Mustn’t  grumble',  young
'optimistic'. Experience is a much wider used measure in health." (p2)
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The thorough-goingness of these objections should be noted. What is being expressed in
the minutes as an objection to wording ('you should use “how good” not “satisfied"')
can be read as an objection to the question itself ('"satisfaction” doesn't mean anything').
Ultimately, it is an objection which fails: Layard argues against the use of 'good' as “not
being subjective well-being” (p.2) and the meeting concludes with Allin of the ONS
thanking  participants  for  their  contribution  and  promising  only  that  they  will  be
considered. Such consideration did not result in a change to the wording; the question
the  programme  currently  uses  is  "Overall,  how  satisfied  are  you  with  your  life
nowadays?" (see Office for National Statistics 2014b, p.7, fn.1)
The failure of Huppert, McManus and any others who agreed with them to alter the
wording is partly due to the pressure for international comparability (see TAG Minutes
of 4 February 2011, p.4) and partly because their objection is understood as being to
wording and not content. When 'good' and 'satisfied' are seen to be interchangeable, the
fact that 'good' is used in non-economic contexts does not provide a reason to break with
international  comparability  or  with  the  established  body  of  economic  well-being
research that rests on this comparability. That the move to change the subjective well-
being  questions  were  understood  as  objections  to  wording  rather  than  content  is
suggested  by the  fact  that  no interviewees  outside  of  public  health  and psychology
mentioned question wording as being an issue at all. Instead, they saw debates of the
Advisory  Group  as  focusing  on  attempts  by  non-economists  to  include  additional
measures of mental functioning alongside the four Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe (2011)
questions.
For example,  when Jack, a statistician with an international organisation,  was asked
directly about  whether  the diversity of  conceptions  of  well-being represented in the
Advisory Group led to disagreement, he said:
'No. There was striking consensus on the way to move forward. The only
real disagreement was between some of the health psychologists and some
of the economists over the framing of subjective well-being. Other than that
there was an extremely high consensus.'
When pushed on this disagreement, he said:
'It  was  an  isolated  disagreement,  connected  to  the  fact  that  some group
members had recently developed their own subjective well-being measures
which  they  championed  over  more  established  measures  with  existing
bodies of research support.'
This latter comment betrays a very limited view of the well-being literature. The two
group members he is most likely to be referring to are Huppert, author of the EU-SILC's
eudaimonic well-being module, and Stewart-Brown, who was author of the WEMWBS.
While it may be fair to say that these do not have time series of the same length which
subjective  well-being  questions  do,  it  is  completely  inaccurate  to  imply  they  lack
research support (see Chapter Five for a discussion). Again this arises naturally through
the process of seeking advice in the way the  Statistical Actors of the  ONS did: those
whose views are most likely to be appreciated are those whose advice is closest to the
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Statistical Actors of the ONS' starting position. Those who have been brought in from
other  fields  carry  with  them  knowledge  which  is  alien  and  which  may  seem  less
reliable. This is read by Jack as self-interest, in comparison with his reasoned appeal to
established research.
From the other side of the debate, Jack's attitude of suspicion was itself written off. In
the terms of Ava, an academic in the field of public health:
'There's a mindset thing, which is probably the arrogance of economists –
they have research which looks at this so it doesn't occur to them that other
people may also have looked into it.  So they make sweeping judgements
about  alternative  measures,  and  pick  up  things  from  other  disciplines
without necessarily fully understanding them.'
What comes out of the comparison of these two comments is the limited room that there
was within the Technical Advisory Group for dialogue, which arose because the two
camps didn't really understand each other. What is at stake is not a question of 'how do
we count well-being?', but the more basic question of 'what is well-being?'. WEMWBS
or the EU-SILC measures are championed by those in public health and psychology not
because it is the pet measure of one of the participants, but because those in public
health and psychology see it as counting well-being while questions of life-satisfaction
do not.  For those on the other side of the debate,  'well-being'  is  a relatively simple
output  measure,  assessed  by  individuals  and  more-or-less  captured  by  overlapping
subjective well-being questions. While conceivably there is room for improvement on
the wording of the subjective well-being questions, their essential correctness means
that concerns such as the existence of time-series datasets, rather than theoretical purity,
influence the decision over what measure to use.
In this context, the framing of Oscar at the ONS is interesting:
'The main schism in the group was between people who had a particular
approach and stuck to it, and those who thought the multiple approaches that
the  ONS  adopted  were  useful.  Those  from  a  psychology  background
particularly said 'we've been researching this for years, and you need to be
able  to  drill  down  into  people's  condition,  you  need  something  like
WEMWBS to properly understand well-being'.'
What this framing misses is that the 'multiple approaches the ONS adopted' were, in
fact, 'a particular position' which originated in the Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe (2011)
paper, and that was then 'stuck to' throughout the advisory process. The debate is not
between 'those championing multiple  perspectives'  and 'those championing one',  but
between a particular established set of subjective well-being questions and indicators of
mental functioning. The argument by the non-economist is that one is well-being, and
one is not. As Ava (TAG member, academic in public health) expressed this:
'Economists use life satisfaction, occasionally happiness, that's their starting
point.  That's  not  a  very  good  well-being  measure,  satisfaction  varies
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according to level of well-being. At the lower end of the scale, you evaluate
your life according to external referents, satisfaction is about how you're
doing relative  to  other  people  –  do  you  have  the  bigger  car,  the  bigger
house.  At  the  higher  end,  the  referents  are  internal,  and  it's  about  how
contented you are – the size of the car doesn't matter, you're happy with
smaller  car.  So it's  a  flawed measure,  a  lot  of  what  it's  asking is  about
comparison. But economists are coming in with this measure, and they think
they have the question stitched up.'
In  this  light,  what  Oscar  is  suggesting  is  something of  a  compromise  position  -  of
multiple measures because there is no agreement on what 'well-being' is - is nothing of
the kind. Instead, it is a position from a particular standpoint, that of the Dolan, Layard
and  Metcalfe  (2011)  paper,  strengthened  through  discussions  with  advisory  groups
largely made up of those who already work from that standpoint. Although Oscar may
genuinely  believe  this  to  be  a  compromise  position,  maximising  the  number  of
conceptions  the  programme  incorporates,  it  is  only  because  he  is  persuaded  of  the
essential correctness of the position to start with.
With Statistical Actors holding differing positions on 'well-being', personal dynamics
impacted on the way the debate was conducted. Jessica, who worked for a public health
NGO, described the difficulties those in psychology and public health had in conveying
their position:
'Sarah  Stewart-Brown  tended  to  hold  back  –  the  WEMWBS was  her
measure, so she didn't want to look like she was pushing it. My expertise
was more practical than theoretical, so I didn't feel I was in a position to
argue too strongly for it either. But after the meetings, I did circulate emails
to say – we have a measure, it's multidimensional, it's validated, we could
use it.... Both Felicia [Huppert] and Sarah are strong voices, but they were
both from the psychology side and both had their own measures, so possibly
they failed to pull together against the economists who were solid in their
opposition to WEMWBS. I don't know though.'
This quote is particularly interesting given Jack's earlier writing-off of the debate as
being between those with research evidence and those with their own new measures, as
it suggests that Huppert and Stewart-Brown were conscious of this as a weakness in
their  negotiating  position.  If  they did  hold  back  on those  grounds,  Jack's  comment
suggests that their modesty brought them no advantage. This highlights an additional
hurdle which psychologists and those in public health had to overcome: not only were
they in the minority and arguing against an entrenched position, they were also divided
amongst themselves and trying not to be seen to push themselves forward.
As  a  further  potential  hurdle  for  the  psychologists  and  public  health  specialists  to
overcome in securing recognition for their views, they were also predominantly**female
and facing an Advisory Group which was predominantly *male. As one participant, who
* Following the protocol set out in Chapter Three, gendered terms will be preceded by an asterisk to 
make clear that they are ascriptional. Gender was not asked about in interviews, so it is generally not 
known how Statistical Actors self-identified.
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didn't want to be identified, described her experience:
'There is also an element of male chauvinism.... These things work subtly,
but it was a factor. Women’s voices tend to not to be heard as strongly as
men’s  on  these  committees  and  it  was  primarily  women  who  were
contributing the psychology perspective.'
The participant's desire not to be identified is itself telling; she had already endured the
experience of having her views written off, partly, she felt, because of her gender, and
did not want the fact that she was conscious of this to be treated as another reason for
other group members to write her off. This quote can be compared with George, a *male
psychologist, who above said that *he 'felt fine' during the consultation process. George
had rationalised *his experience as one of a hierarchy which had economists at the top
and *himself somewhere towards the bottom, and so did not expect to be listened to.
This  allows  *him  to  depersonalise  the  experience  of  not  being  listened  to.  This,
possibly,  is  a  luxury  of  *his  gender;  as  a  *man  among  *men,  chauvinism  is  not
something *he is subject to and so will not be how *he experiences the situation.
To summarise the arguments of this section, the initial recruitment of an economist-
dominated panel, and the commissioning from economists of an early position paper
sets up the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme with economic conceptions of
well-being at its core. While holders of rival theories argue that such a conception is not
actually a conception of well-being at all, both economists and those at the ONS fail to
accept or perhaps understand this objection. They experience such objections as a series
of attempts to gain more exposure for pet measures,  or as arguments to change the
wording of questions. Those from non-economic backgrounds experience themselves as
ignored  or  sidelined.  These  disagreements,  on  the  non-economic  side  at  least,  are
experienced  personally,  as  'arrogant'  economists  ignoring  them,  with  a  potential
chauvinistic aspect in addition.
These interactions between Statistical Actors again show the importance of agency and
social  relations  in  determining  the  final  form and  content  of  official  statistics.  The
choice of advisers is partly the result of pre-held beliefs and social networks, and the
existence of these makes advice easier to accept, which in turn strengthens confidence
in  advisers.  At  the  same  time,  these  beliefs  make  contrary  arguments  harder  to
understand and still harder to accept. The ability of Statistical Actors to push forward
unpopular arguments is affected by a series of personal factors, such as the inability to
present  a  united  front  and  the  role  of  gender.  Throughout,  Statistical  Actors  are
considering  theory  as  embodied,  personal  factors;  associating  positions  with
preconceptions  around  the  individual  making  it,  second-guessing  their  reasons  and
using these as a reason to accept or reject them.
7.3. Conceptual issues beyond subjective well-being
While subjective well-being was a key focus of the advisory process, it  was not the
whole of the programme. Ultimately, the programme included 41 headline measures,
plus a raft of 'domain' measures released on a less regular basis, which amounts to a re-
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branding of the ONS' social statistics programme. The existence of domain measures
also allows an extension of the programme into areas where data  was not  formerly
collected by the ONS; for example, the TAG minutes of 11 April 2011 note, "Roughly
three-quarters of  WEMWBS questions are planned for the eudemonic testing module."
(p2). This provides some context to Oscar of the ONS's complaint, quoted earlier, about
the difference between those who wanted one measure and those who wanted multiple
measures; somewhere within the programme, all of the main conceptions of well-being
outlined in the taxonomy of Chapter Four were included. On one potential  reading,
those arguing for mental functioning measures were missing this bigger picture.
However, this is a bind that Statistical Actors of the ONS partially get themselves into
through the emphasis on headline measures. Introducing the TAG minutes of 26 January
2012 (p.1), Paul Allin, the meeting's chair and head of the programme at the time, notes
that  the  programme  is  about  much  more  than  subjective  well-being,  welcomes  the
group's support in getting away from the media misconception that the programme is
merely 'Mr Cameron's Happiness Index'... and then introduces a meeting which only has
subjective well-being on the agenda. This is in keeping Terms of Reference for both the
Forum and Advisory Group, quoted above, which focus on subjective well-being for
reasons of its novelty. The focus on subjective well-being, however, elevates it as part of
the programme, both in the minds of participants in the advisory process and within the
programme's conceptual framework.
William, of the ONS, describes this:
'We  found  a  range  of  indicators  from  various  sources,  but  had  gaps,
particularly in subjective well-being. We drew on advice, particularly from
academics working in this area, and developed four questions which were
included in the Annual Population Survey – looking at evaluations of overall
life  satisfaction,  reports  of  happiness  and anxiety,  and  eudaimonic  well-
being. Those are based on a scale of 0-10, with 0 being 'not at all' and 10
being 'completely'.'
Subjective  well-being  questions  are  being  developed  here  as well-being  questions.
Other  areas  which  appear  on  the  programme  –  from  unemployment  to  the  public
debt:GDP  ratio  –  are  pulled  across  as  they  are  from  their  existing  statistical
programmes. There is an interaction here with questions of finance, as raised in Section
4.1.5. and discussed in the previous chapter. However,  there are a set of conceptual
problems around whether a statistic developed for a particular purpose can serve as part
of a well-being programme.
This was touched on in the TAG meeting of 29 March 2012 (p.3), which raises "The
need to be mindful that when measures are taken out of context they can lose meaning,
there needs to be a lot of consultation on the draft new measures with the producers of
the statistics which are included." When this point was put to Jack, who worked for an
international statistical organisation, he brushed it off:
'Conceptually, there might be a problem there, but practically not at all – it's
almost a nonsensical question. Where you don't have data for a concept, you
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create a new measure, but if you already have a measure it would be foolish
to recreate it. Things like unemployment have a long history, large evidence
bases and are very well measured. Where there were gaps, like in subjective
well-being, the ONS sought expert advice – from health psychologists, non-
health  psychologists,  economists,  civil  society  groups,  the  OECD –  and
developed measures to fill those.'
This misses the thrust of the objection, which is whether or not it is appropriate for
existing measures  to be placed in  the context  of  well-being;  that  'unemployment as
counted' and 'unemployment  qua well-being' might be separate things (with the latter
constituting  a  gap).  Oliver,  an  academic  looking  at  statistical  theory,  was  more
sympathetic, but felt that the question was one of whether there would be sufficient
benefit to a re-calculation:
'But yes, in an ideal world perhaps, some of these contributory statistics and
data  streams  might  be  collected  differently  or  given  different  pragmatic
definitions. A lot of these are already collected and are incorporated into
international standards, and are already quite good.'
As in the previous chapter, there is an international context in which existing statistics
sit: taking the example of unemployment, its definition is mandated at the European
level (see Commission Regulation 1897/2000, Article 1.1. and Annex 1), which means
that any UK-level redefinition (for instance, one which counted distance from the labour
market in the manner of International Labour Organization 2013) would need to run
alongside the existing statistic. There would thus be a doubling up of unemployment
figures,  a  pattern  which  would  also  be  necessary  with  other  statistics  within  the
programme. It is from here that Jack forms his 'practically nonsensical' position. As an
additional explanation, the lack of specific policy driver offers little incentive to shift
away from statistics which are tied to other policy rationales and ways of thinking.
However,  this  distinction  between  the  practical  and  the  conceptual  highlights  the
construction of the programme as a set of practical responses. As William of the ONS
expressed things above, the Statistical  Actors of the ONS started from what already
existed and paid to develop new measures where they did not. But then there was the
problem of making the measures they had cohere with one another. As Jessica, who was
from a public health NGO, expressed this:
'One of the odd aspects of the programme was the conflation of measuring
well-being as an outcome (perhaps including subjective well-being, perhaps
as measures of how well people are doing in life), and measuring predictors
of well-being. What do you do with something like income – is it a driver or
a result? When psychologists look at the things which influence well-being,
income falls out of their models (when you control for debt). But there are
historic  conceptions  –  we  promote  income  because  we  assume  it's  an
enabling factor for a better life. So there were challenges – while income
was  being  pushed  for  inclusion  despite  being  unimportant,  relationships
were initially left out.'
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This description is supported by the TAG minutes of 3 December 2012 (pp.4-6) which
discussed at length the ONS' regression models which sought to explain the subjective
well-being data.  This discussion sits  very awkwardly with arguments that subjective
well-being are not the whole of the programme, but fits very well with a mechanistic
approach which  looks  at  large  datasets  and  aggregate  movements.  In  his  interview,
Alfie, a statistician working in Whitehall, distinguished between a 'cost-benefit' strand
of well-being theory, and a 'public health' strand. The former is interested in economic
questions of maximising subjective well-being output as efficiently as possible, so treats
subjective well-being as an output and everything else as an input. As discussed above,
the  'public  health'  strand  is  more  interested  in  well-being  as  a  mediator  between
individuals  and  their  external  conditions.  Alfie  argued  that  the  decision  to  place
subjective well-being questions on the Annual Population Survey served the former but
not  the  latter,  an  argument  in  keeping  with  Thomas'  criticism  of  'individualistic'
approaches (above) and with the public health academics' arguments against subjective
well-being  (above).  Retaining  existing  statistics  also  serves  a  cost-benefit  analysis
approach: without the trouble of creating new survey instruments, the Statistical Actors
of the ONS retain access to large datasets suitable for regression modelling, and so for
'discovering drivers' of well-being.
On a smaller scale, this can be seen in the way that the new measures are constructed.
The minutes of the TAG of 30 May 2012 (p.4) note that, conceptually, the two affect
questions make most sense as binary-response questions. However, "A binary response
to the affect questions would lose the ability to provide distributions - this is something
that  is  of  most  use  to  policy  makers".  This  goes  beyond  the  mere  recognition  of
importance of policy concerns, as when the minutes of the preceding meeting (29 March
2012, p.3) observe: "[An issue raised was] The importance of considering the measures
in relation to policy and the Cabinet Office". Rather, this is a call for data of a particular
type to drive policy, but in the light of the previous chapter, there is no specific policy to
be driven.  Conceptual  purity is  sacrificed for what  is  essentially a  hedging of  bets,
making the statistic as useful as possible by allowing differences and inequalities to be
visible in the data in the hope that this will make the data interesting to policy-makers.
However,  pragmatism  does  not  result  in  an  equality  of  viewpoints;  the  measures
selected and the emphasis given to them permits some actions while precluding others.
While two-thirds of the  WEMWBS measures were included on the eudaimonic testing
model (which is used for one of the measures of population mental health, see Appendix
C), ensuring mental functioning was represented as part of the programme, there were
four  subjective  well-being  measures  collected  on a  larger  scale  through the  Annual
Population Survey, on a more regular basis, released as headline measures and included
within the ONS' regression models. As Thomas, an academic sociologist, put this:
'The minutes the ONS put out aren't very detailed, so you won't have the full
shape of the discussions, but I'll sum it up like this – those interested in the
individualist  approach  saw  perceptions  of  society  as  driving  well-being.
They saw life satisfaction as the dependent variable, so everything else –
both perceptions of society, and its constituents like trust in government or
sense  of  community  –  as  drivers.  That  meant  any interest  in  them was
subsidiary  and  secondary  –  we  could  look  at  them  later,  once  life
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satisfaction was established and we were looking for things to explain or
predict it.'
On this reading, the media are not entirely incorrect in their focus on subjective well-
being; subjective well-being did become the focus of the programme. While alternative
conceptions, such as positive mental functioning or evaluations of the quality of society,
were not excluded from the programme, they were not central  to it.  While they are
available to be acted on in some form, they have a clear secondary status. Reviewing
subsequent policy papers, Alfie (TAG member, statistician in a Whitehall Department)
is  correct  in  arguing  that  the  'cost-benefit'  strand  of  well-being  thought  has
predominated;  the  Green  Book  (HM  Treasury  2011a),  papers  by  Fujiwara  of  the
Treasury (Fujiwara 2013; Fujiwara and Campbell 2011) and progress updates from the
Cabinet Office (2013) collapse well-being policy into the statistical relation between
interventions  and  movements  in  subjective  well-being.  This  is,  of  course,  what
happiness economists have been doing all along.
To summarise the arguments of this section, the emphasis on economic conceptions of
well-being spread beyond the new measures devised for the programme. By considering
well-being  as  a  mechanical  process,  with  inputs  and  outputs,  the  ONS  effectively
avoided conceptual questions about the appropriateness of 'input' measures. This also
fitted with wider cross-cutting needs to keep costs down and to not duplicate existing
statistics.  It  does,  however,  raise  questions  about  the  programme  as  a  'well-being'
programme,  rather  than  as  an  extension  of  existing  social  statistical  collection
programmes. Similar questions are raised by the construction of novel measures, which
were more influenced by questions of practicality than of theoretical purity. This again
highlights the role that Statistical Actors play in negotiating theoretical and institutional
contexts.
7.4. Conclusion: 'Measuring National Well-being' and multiple conceptions of 
'well-being'
'The aim was to produce an accepted and trusted set of National Statistics
which help people monitor national well-being'
William (ONS)
Question:  With  that  in  mind,  the  ONS  seem  to  be  in  a  thankless
position. 'They're  always going to  get it  wrong? Yes,  up to a point.  But
consider GDP – there are three different ways of measuring it, and the way
we currently count  it  is  due  to  change  soon as  a  result  of  shifts  at  the
European level. But people don't really think about it, they live with it. If
they  dug  down,  they'd  be  pulling  their  hair  out;  this  is  a  problem  for
something as well-established as GDP, it's not something novel in the case
of well-being.'
Oliver (academic, statistical theory)
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With only a few exceptions, everyone spoken to in the process of this research was
positive about the work of the ONS in constructing the 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme.  The extent  of  the  consultation,  and of  the  public  debate,  and the  roles
played  by first  Paul  Allin  and  then  Glenn  Everett  in  managing  the  debates  of  the
Technical Advisory Group were highlighted in interviews for particular praise.
However, while the conduct of the process was praised, the result did not meet with the
same levels of approval. For instance, Tomlinson, who sat on the Advisory Forum, and
Kelly (2013),  negatively characterise  the  programme as  evidence  of  a  “behavioural
social policy” (p.152); similar doubts over the framing of subjective well-being in the
programme are held by Scott (2015) and Sointu (2005). As Oliver, an academic looking
at statistical theory, suggests in the quote above there is a certain inevitability about
such  negative  readings;  the  ONS  gathered  together  Statistical  Actors  from  diverse
backgrounds and created a programme which was polyglot in its conception of well-
being. From the last chapter, there is also an element of difficulty which Oliver has
overlooked; in as far as there is no predetermined practical purpose for the statistic,
beyond  its  and  William's  vague  ambitions  quoted  above,  the  programme  is  more
vulnerable to theoretical critiques. This can be seen in the comments of Jessica (TAG
member, NGO working in public health):
'I think in the end the ONS did a fantastic job in balancing all the demands
on them, but they did end up with four distinct questions which can't be
combined into a single measure, which make them hard to summarise and to
communicate, and which leaves them slightly tokenistic.'
For  Jessica,  and  others  who  held  to  non-mechanistic  models  of  well-being,  the
programme doesn't measure well-being. It gestures towards well-being, but does so in a
way which serves existing agendas and ways of doing things; cost-benefit analyses and
regression models which look for drivers of life satisfaction. This can be understood
both  as  a  result  of  the  ONS  filtering  'well-being'  through  their  existing  modes  of
thinking, and through their recruitment of like-minded advisers to the Advisory Forum
and Technical Advisory Group. This made it very hard for the relatively few members
of these groups who did not hold to economic conceptions to get their points across.
While  the ONS did listen,  and did include alternative conceptions  within the wider
programme, the focus of the programme remained mechanistic.
As a balance to this, it is worth noting the thoughts of George (TAG member, academic
psychologist):
'The question isn't “was this a good job, is this the best we could do, have
they got it exactly right?”, but “what would things be like if we weren't
thinking about well-being?” It would be like Detroit, it would be shit. I think
some people have got hung up on trivialities, “you've done it wrong – you
should have done it my way”. They've done something, we can talk about it,
we can adjust it over time.'
While this is somewhat overstated – much of the programme already existed as social
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statistics  collected  by  the  ONS  or  government  departments,  and  the  elevation  of
particular  statistics  into  'headline  measures'  makes  others  correspondingly  less
prominent and visible – it highlights a point which Oliver also alludes to above. The
running down of the Technical Advisory Group and the elevation of the subjective well-
being measures to 'National Statistic' status does not entail the end of the development
of the programme; GDP, which the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme is to
complement, has been adjusted on a continual basis since its development in the 1930s,
most  recently  to  include  black-market  activities  (Abramsky  and  Drew  2014).  The
existence of a programme provides both a set of measures which can be adjusted and a
focus for debate around what well-being is.
The reverse of this is also true: the existence of a programme validates and entrenches
certain conceptions  of well-being while  obscuring others.  'Well-being'  in  policy and
debate is not the 'well-beings' of the multiple conceptions included in the programme,
but  the  'well-being'  of  the  headline  measures.  As  the  minutes  of  the  TAG  for  3
December 2012 (p.4) observe: 'It would not be sensible to change the wording for at
least 10 years'. George may be happy to work with the statistic he has for the next ten
years, but this was not a position universally held.
The contrast  in the readings of the programme made by Oliver,  Jessica and George
highlights the key argument of this chapter. In Chapter Five, the theoretical landscape of
well-being  was surveyed.  The present  chapter  has  seen that  landscape  embodied  in
debates  and  discussions  between  individual  Statistical  Actors.  Those  debates  were
largely  not  settled  on  theoretical  grounds,  but  on  interpersonal  ones:  by  who  was
trusted,  who  was  listened  to,  who  was  in  a  majority,  who  could  make  themselves
understood. Uncovering these debates has shown the value of understanding official
statistics as a social process by showing that the form and content of the programme is
influenced by Actors with agency interacting with each other and with their institutional
contexts. For example, it has shown how the four subjective well-being questions came
out of early decisions by Statistical Actors at the ONS to seek advice from those whose
work they were familiar with, and the way in which affinities with economic approaches
protected these questions from critiques from other disciplines. As will be discussed in
the final chapter, this does not preclude any of the readings of official statistics outlined
in Chapter Two, but does provide them with new questions to answer.
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Understanding official statistic-making as a social process
8.1. Summary of the thesis and its arguments
This thesis has set out to answer the question, 'Does an examination of official statistic-
making as  a  social  process  add to  the  understanding of  official  statistics'  form and
content?'. This question arose out of  Chapter One, which noted the literature around
the  'peopled  state'  (Jones  2007;  Peck  2001)  and  argued  that  official  statistics  were
objects constructed by agents within structures and institutions and, as a result of this,
an  understanding  of  statistics  required  an  examination  of  that  agency  at  play.  It
suggested that while official statistics are discussed in the academic literature, there is a
gap  in  that  literature  around their  construction.  It  was  argued that  this  gap  was  an
important one to fill, as the conditions of production will set the limits of possibility for
the official statistic, defining the opportunities and constraints which determine its form
and content.
Expanding  on  these  arguments  and  previous  work  on  the  complexity  of  the  state
(Rhodes  1992),  Chapter  One developed a  simple  conjectural  model  to  describe  the
production of official statistics. It posited a division between Commissioning Actors,
who  request  a  statistic,  the  Statistical  Actors  who  produce  it,  and  the  Statistical
Audience, who receive it. Even this very simple division of responsibilities creates a
necessary set of interactions between actors, where the finalised official statistic is an
outcome  of  these  interactions.  If,  as  seems  likely,  these  categories  of  actors  are
themselves are not homogeneous, but made up of multiple individuals with diverging
aims, powers and interests, then the outcome of the statistic-making process cannot be
read as a simple expression of the will of the Commissioning Actors, or as some neutral
expression  by the  Statistical  Actors  of  theory  or  empirical  fact.  Rather,  as  a  made
product,  the  official  statistic  is  highly  contingent,  the  result  of  the  interactions  of
individual  actors  with  each  other,  their  institutional  contexts,  resource  constraints,
technological abilities and so on.
Chapter Two contrasted this  set  of suppositions with two broad strands of existing
literature around official statistics: the 'critical', which mainly covered writings in the
Foucauldian and Marxian traditions, and the 'native', which covered writings by official
statisticians  and statistical  theorists.  The critical  literature suggested that  the official
statistic was a technology of control, designed to allow 'action at a distance' (Latour
1987) on populations, either as a broad expression of power (Miller and Rose 2008) or
as an expression of class control (Miles and Irvine 1979). While it was accepted that it
was  possible  that  official  statistics  were  used in  this  way,  it  was  argued  that  the
conjectural model of Chapter One meant that official statistics could not have been fully
intended in this  way.  The space between the Commissioning Actors who wanted to
control  and  the  Statistical  Audience  who  was  to  be  controlled  was  made  highly
contingent  by  the  presence  of  Statistical  Actors,  meaning  that  the  intention  of
Commissioning Actors could not be simply translated into a statistical output. Control
was in  no  way guaranteed  by the  statistic.  The native  explanation  of  statistics  was
insufficient for similar reasons, assuming that the statistic-making process was merely a
codifying of empirical fact (see, for example, Jones and Fender 2011). Given the nature
of  the  conjectural  model,  there  could  be  no guarantee  that  such a  codification  was
possible; constraints and limitations could prevent it, as could the social nature of the
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interactive process of construction.
Against  these  two  readings,  Chapter  Two  suggested  a  more  fruitful  way  of
understanding official statistics could be found in utilising the insights of the literature
on  social  construction  (e.g.,  Hacking  1999;  MacKenzie  1981).  This  literature  takes
seriously  the  fact  that  objects  are  made  by  people,  and  so  are  influenced  by  the
knowledge,  resources,  abilities,  interactions  and  environmental  constraints  of  those
people. Such an approach captures the premises of the conjectural model and suggests
methods through which it could be tested. This allowed the development of four specific
questions:  How  can  the  official  statistic-making  process  be  understood  as  a  social
process? What are the components (institutions, theories, individuals, technologies, &c.)
of that process? How do these components interact  to produce the official  statistic?
What are the implications of this for our understanding of the official statistic?
Chapter Three built on this social constructionist literature to propose an epistemology
of  official  statistic-making,  and  an  attendant  methodology  and  research  design.  It
suggested that, as a social process, official statistic-making is best explored socially,
through  direct  engagement  with  the  individuals  involved,  their  institutional  and
theoretical contexts and the interrelations of these. The 'Measuring National Well-being'
programme of the UK Office for National Statistics was proposed as a case study where
such  an  approach  could  be  undertaken.  Unlike  the  majority  of  official  statistics
produced globally, this programme is relatively recent in origin, which meant that the
individuals  involved  were  still  available  to  comment  on  the  process  of  production.
While it was not possible to observe directly the process of statistic-making, this could
be  partially  observed  through  interviews  with  individuals  involved  in  the  process,
supported by the examination of  meeting minutes  and other  secondary material.  By
allowing  the  explication  of  the  official  statistic-making  process,  this  methodology
makes a direct and original contribution to the literature around official statistic-making.
As  a  starting  point  to  this  examination,  Chapters  Four  and  Five outlined  the
institutional  and  theoretical  background  to  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'
programme. These were aspects of the world which Statistical Actors would be forced
to engage with, such as the institutional form of the Office for National Statistics and
the theoretical literature on 'well-being'.  These chapters noted the complexity of the
statistical programme's situation and the number of choices that would need to be made
by the Statistical Actors. This material further problematises the literatures of Chapter
Two by making clear that the official statistic cannot be a neutral object, but instead
must  be  the  product  of  negotiation  and  decision.  They  make  contributions  to  the
literatures around the Office for National  Statistics,  policy-making in  the UK, well-
being theory and well-being measurement.
Chapters Six and  Seven built on the previous chapters by showing how actors with
agency navigated the institutional and theoretical contexts outlined in Chapters Four and
Five.  There  were  a  number  of  key  findings  in  these  chapters  in  relation  to  the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme. It was shown that the programme owed
more in its origins and development to international networks of policy actors than it
did  domestic  policy-making  concerns.  These  international  networks  shaped  the
programme, leading to a result not greatly appreciated by domestic actors. The nature of
170
UNDERSTANDING OFFICIAL STATISTIC-MAKING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
the programme was further influenced by the recruitment processes of the Statistical
Actors of the ONS, which favoured those they already knew. It was shown that limited
budgets restricted the possibilities of the programme, leading to a recycling of measures.
The need for understanding in the face of a sceptical public and lax media led to further
features  of  the  programme  which  were  practical  rather  than  theoretically  pure.
Throughout the official statistic-making process, Statistical Actors engaged with each
other as embodied individuals, experiencing their theoretical or professional disputes as
personal ones, acting for reasons which were not fully practical or theoretical. More
generally, they show the contested and contingent nature of the outcome of the statistic-
making  process  by  linking  the  form  and  content  of  the  official  statistic  with  the
circumstances of its creation.
The present, final, chapter will return to the research questions posed in Chapter Two,
examining how the material in Chapters Four to Seven help in understanding official
statistic-making as a social process. From this, it  will be possible to re-examine the
conjectural model of Chapter One and the question of whether understanding official
statistic-making as a social process adds to the understanding of the form and content of
official statistics. It will also return to Chapter Three by noting the limitations of the
methodology and research design which were used. Finally, it will suggest directions
that further research might take. It notes a key contribution of the study, which is to
develop a way of explaining the form and content of official statistics. While this has
been shown in the case of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, it is more
widely applicable to official statistics in general.
8.2. How does approaching official statistic-making as a social process affect the 
understanding of its form and content?
The  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme resulted  in  41  'headline'  statistical
measures, with a raft of sub-measures. While a great many of these were statistics which
were already collected by the Office for National Statistics or other central government
departments, several, most notably those addressing questions of subjective well-being,
were novel. Does an understanding of the official statistic-making process as a social
process aid the understanding of the form that the programme took and the content that
it  included?  This  section  will  suggest  that  it  does  by  summarising  the  findings  of
Chapters Four to Seven, showing that various features of the 'Measuring National Well-
being' programme can be explained in terms of their origins in agential responses to
institutional and theoretical contexts.
As  Chapters  Four  and  Five  outlined,  the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  started  the
process  as  part  of  an institution  within  a  fragmented  system of  government,  where
power  was  dispersed  through  departmental  and  geographical  power  centres.  Their
datasets  were  used  within  a  hierarchy  of  'evidence'  for  official  policy-making,  and
subject to scrutiny on the grounds of integrity and legitimacy. In approaching 'well-
being', they were approaching a contested field, in which at least four distinct theoretical
constructs vied for position within a chaotic conception (Sayer 1981, 1985, 2000). They
were also approaching it in the wake of an international movement towards well-being
measurement, based around the GDP-extension work of the Commission for Measuring
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Economic and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009). Even stated at this high
level, it is possible to see how the Statistical Actors came to produce the programme
they  did:  one  which  included  all  four  conceptions  of  well-being  outlined  in  the
taxonomy of Chapter Five, but emphasised those with economic applications; which
offered  some measures  with  specific  policy uses  to  domestic  policy actors,  but  not
many; which closely resembled other programmes internationally. 
This  interplay  between  domestic  and  international  concerns,  in  particular,  was  not
something  which  would  have  been  easy  to  foresee  using  the  existing  approaches
outlined in Chapter Two. Particularly,  theories based on control would likely posit a
tighter relation between central  government policy-makers as Commissioning Actors
and the outcome of the statistical programme with the aim of securing a statistic suitable
for acting on populations. This was not the case, partly because central government was
not unambiguously the sole body of Commissioning Actors, with much of the impetus
instead  coming  from Statistical  Actors  within  the  ONS itself  as  a  reaction  to  their
international  context.  It  is  also  partly  because  of  the  fragmented  nature  of  UK
government: the ONS were a semi-independent body amongst other semi-independent
bodies. These latter bodies had little or no interest in the statistical programme, which
meant that they provided little steer to the development process. This left the Statistical
Actors within the ONS to pursue their own priorities, producing an official statistical
programme which was not primarily directed at the objects of government. This goes
some  of  the  way  to  explaining  Bache  and  Reardon's  observation  that  'well-being'
appears to be a policy solution in search of a problem (2013, p.909), and explains how
Statistical Actors within the ONS come to be disappointed that central departments do
not make more use of the data the programme produces.
Instead, the existence of a 'fast-policy network', in Peck's (2002) sense, gave rise to a
programme  which  closely  resembled  those  being  created  at  the  same  time
internationally. Indeed, it makes more sense to say that these international programmes
were co-created with the UK version. These programmes grew out of a central starting
point in the form of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009),
which emphasised economic conceptions of well-being. Combined with a tendency to
recruit economists as advisers, this gave rise to a programme which favoured measures
amenable to economic approaches: built around large datasets, suitable for mechanistic
causal analysis, based on the conception that 'utility' was an output of a set of largely
material  and emotional  drivers.  Tracking this  fast-policy network and observing the
ways in which Statistical Actors move between international programmes challenges the
appearance of an essential core to 'well-being' which is suggested by the convergence of
the  UK  and  international  models.  As  highlighted  both  by  the  debates  covered  in
Chapters  Six  and  Seven,  and  the  divergent  models  of  well-being  put  forward  by
Devolved Administrations within the UK, this convergence is less to do with the nature
of 'well-being' and more to do with the process of official statistic-making in the UK
and internationally.
This balancing of aims and objectives by Statistical Actors within the ONS – reflecting
their own institutional needs, the needs of domestic and Devolved government, and the
interests  of international  bodies and researchers  – shows the importance of multiple
political  and social  scales  in  the construction of statistics.  The agency of Statistical
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Actors is played out across and in reference to these scales; it is not the case that any
one scale fully restricted or shaped their actions. Rather, Actors navigated between the
needs and interests of parties at multiple scales, balancing a programme which offered
potential uses to domestic policy-makers while meeting international standards and the
internal objectives of Statistical Actors within the ONS.
In this way, it is possible to explain aspects of the form and content of the 'Measuring
National  Well-being'  programme by reference to  the social  process  of  production  it
underwent: elements like its foregrounding of the four subjective well-being questions,
its  recycling  of  existing  UK  statistics,  its  inclusion  of  Human  Capital.  That  this
advances the understanding of the programme can be seen particularly in this last point.
As discussed in  Chapter  Six,  this  was a  measure  that  the Methodological  Advisory
Committee  of  the  Government  Statistical  Service,  the  quality-control  and  standards
agency of  UK official  statistics,  could  not  understand  the  inclusion  of  (GSS MAC
Minutes, 21 November 2013, p.16). It can be understood in terms of Statistical Actors
within the ONS developing within the programme what they expected to be a future
internationally-required statistic while they had funding available to do so through the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme.
Having outlined a broad answer to the original broad research question of Chapter One,
this  chapter will  now proceed to  examine in more detail  the three specific research
questions of Chapter Two.
8.2.1. How can the process of official statistic-making be understood as a social 
process?
The first of the research questions set out in Chapter Two is a relatively simple one:
does it make sense to consider the statistic-making process as a social one? Chapters
Four to Seven suggests that it does; the statistic-making process has been shown to be
one of actors, interacting, negotiating situations and challenges which were created by
their institutional and theoretical circumstances.
Chapter  One  posited  a  simple  conjectural  model  in  which  Statistical  Actors,  in
producing the official statistic, interacted with Commissioning Actors and a Statistical
Audience. It was argued in Chapter Two that existing models ignored this interaction,
suggesting  either  a  direct  route  through  from  the  Commissioning  Actors  to  the
Statistical Audience, or an abstract process of empirical discovery on the part of the
Statistical Actors. This failed to represent the statistic-making process as envisaged by
the simple conjectural model, which instead suggested contingency in the outcomes of
programmes arising from the complex social nature of the process.
This  complexity  ran  through  Chapters  Four  to  Seven.  One  aspect  was  the  fuzzy
boundaries between Commissioning Actors, Statistical Actors and Statistical Audience.
For one, it is not entirely clear who the Commissioning Actors are in this case. While
the Prime Minister launched the programme, some Statistical Actors at the ONS were
keen  to  underline  that  it  was  an  organisational  interest  prior  to  his  involvement
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(interview with Oscar, Chapter Six; Allin and Hand 2014, p.221). The programme was
created  mindful  of  developments  within  wider  statistical  networks  internationally,
particularly  the  possibility  of  later  legislation  at  the  European  level.  It  is  also  not
entirely clear how to distribute actors between Commissioning Actors, Statistical Actors
and Statistical Audience. This complexity is deepened by the ways in which the full-
time Statistical Actors of the ONS incorporated Commissioning Actors, such as those
working in Whitehall and international statistical bodies, and members of the Statistical
Audience, through public and Civil Service consultations. The attitude of this research
has been to treat anyone working on the statistical programme as a Statistical Actor; this
has  the effect  of  incorporating individuals  of  diverse backgrounds and with  diverse
aims, objectives and interests, who were involved to varying degrees with the statistic-
making process. While this is justified on definitional grounds – these agents acted on
the statistical programme, so are Statistical Actors – their contributions were organised
by and filtered through the needs and interests of the permanent Statistical Actors at the
ONS.  Chapters  Six and Seven highlighted  the  ways  in  which  this  organisation  and
filtering was conducted, privileging certain Statistical Actors from certain backgrounds,
primarily those whose views could be harmonised with the interests of the permanent
Statistical Actors.
In  such complexities  can  be  seen  the  working  out  of  various  features  of  the  ONS'
particular institutional context. The ONS is an independent central government body,
moving  alongside  other  independent  central  government  bodies,  Devolved
Administrations  and Local  Authorities  (see Chapter  Four).  These organisations  have
diverse  and  sometimes  competing  aims  and  responsibilities,  reflecting  the
heterogeneous nature of 'the state' (c.f., Jessop 2008; Jones, Goodwin, Jones and Pett
2005; Jones 2007; Rhodes 1992). While the programme was launched by the Prime
Minister and had the backing of the Cabinet Office, as a cross-governmental programme
it lacked the grip on the fragmented objectives of government that specific departmental
aims  and  objectives  do.  This  left  governmental  actors  with  little  interest  in  the
programme beyond attempts to protect resources from the ONS (as Defra seemingly
tried in attempts to retain control of the 'Sustainable Development Indices'), or to secure
statistical  resources  at  the  ONS'  expense  (as  the  ONS  appear  to  have  felt  other
departments were doing; for both these incidents, see Chapter Six). This is something
revealed by an approach which pays attention to the social process of official statistic-
making; the balance of influence between Statistical Actors, Commissioning Actors and
Statistical Audience, and between agents within these groups, is not knowable a priori.
Without  engaging  with  the  social  nature  of  official  statistic-making,  it  may  have
appeared that the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme was unproblematically
commissioned by central government, with Statistical Actors at the ONS only balancing
policy  needs  against  restrictions  of  time,  resources  and  theoretical  coherence.  This
research  has  shown  this  not  to  be  the  case,  supporting  Chapter  Two's  critique  of
Foucauldian and Marxian accounts of official statistics as being too straightforward.
At the same time, as members of an independent body, Statistical Actors within the
ONS were free within a very vague remit to produce a statistical programme which met
their own professional standards. These standards were at least partially formed within
an international  context,  both in  terms of  legislative requirements  and industry best
practice. In this they were supported by academics acting as Statistical Actors, who had
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universalising concerns and were keen on using international models of well-being to
ensure comparable datasets for later study (see Chapter Seven). This meant that while
members  of  the  Statistical  Audience were drawn on in  formulating the  programme,
particularly through the  What Matters to You? debate, their folk conceptions of 'well-
being' were filtered through existing preconceptions within the ONS picked up from
international and academic discourses. In this way, consultations served to confirm what
was  already  known,  rather  than  to  create  new  knowledge  (see  Chapter  Six).  The
convergence of  the programme with international  comparators,  and of  its  subjective
well-being components with pre-existing research,  particularly in economics,  can be
explained  through  this  attention  to  the  social  processes  of  official  statistic-making.
Without  such  attention,  there  would  be  the  danger  of  essentialising  'well-being',
suggesting, as the native accounts surveyed in Chapter Two do, that official statistic-
making is simply a matter of finding valid numerical representations of the external
world. This is not the case, rather numerical representatives are selected form multiple
possible alternatives.
The advantages of understanding the official statistic-making process as a social process
can also be seen in the complex political geographies of the statistical programme. The
international context, which was both professional and legislative, has been touched on
above. Also relevant is the way in which Devolved Assemblies involved themselves in
the programme. The Scottish Government, in particular, used the programme as a way
of asserting a certain amount of independence, remaining away from the ONS' advisory
panels and at times questioning the legitimacy of the ONS' programme in the context of
their  own  measures.  Both  they  and  the  Welsh  Devolved  Administration  collected
statistics based around different conceptions of well-being, essentially establishing rival
conceptions for Statistical Audiences of their own electorates which challenged the UK
narrative. Chapter Six, in particular, showed the interactions between Statistical Actors
at the ONS and in the Devolved Assemblies, and the ways in which their opposing
programmes  shaped  the  efforts  of  these  Statistical  Actors.  The  existence  of  prior
Scottish work on the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale, for instance, led to
Stewart-Brown  becoming  a  Statistical  Actor,  laying  the  ground  for  the  theoretical
disputes of Chapter Seven. As was shown there, this ultimately resulted in the inclusion
of positive mental functioning measures on the periphery of the programme. By tracing
these interactions, it is, again, possible to explain aspects of the form and content of the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme.
Given the disputed theoretical territory into which the Statistical  Actors of the ONS
were walking (see Chapter Four), an approach sensitive to the social nature of official
statistic-making also sheds light on the ways in which certain theoretical ideas come to
dominate the programme. The process by which the permanent Statistical Actors of the
ONS sought to recruit temporary Statistical Actors was intensely social: they recruited
advisers  they  were  used  to  working  with,  and  accepted  ideas  which  fitted  with
established modes of thought.  While opinions  were sought  from alternative sources,
they were gathered in a haphazard way and those holding them felt themselves to be
marginalised and their opinions disregarded (see Chapter Seven). The result of this was
a statistical programme which emphasised economic conceptions of well-being while
under-playing conceptions based around mental functioning or quality of society; these
economic conceptions were amenable to the sort of data that the ONS collected, with
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large  sample  sizes  for  broad-ranging  surveys,  and  were  amenable  to  their  analytic
models,  which  sought  to  explain  aggregate  statistical  relations  through  mechanical
models. One interviewee in Chapter Seven described the outcome of the 'Measuring
National Well-being' programme as being four subjective well-being measures which
didn't mesh together, while another argued they didn't capture well-being as understood
by  health  or  mental  health  perspectives.  Attending  to  the  social  processes  of  the
construction of the programme has offered suggestions as to how and why this outcome
occurred.
On a more mundane level, the account of the process of statistic-making recorded in
Chapters Six and Seven offers numerous social  factors which impacted on the final
form of the programme. Chapter Six noted that the Advisory Forum consisted largely of
'big name' Statistical Actors who were able to offer the programme legitimacy but little
engagement.  It  noted  the  geographical  constraints  which  promoted  involvement  as
Actors by academics who worked near to the ONS' offices, and inhibited involvement
by those further afield. Chapter Seven noted an academic Statistical Actor who felt that
their  gender  impaired  the  reception  of  their  views.  Both  chapters  observe  the
disagreements and disputes between actors which those at the ONS must resolve, and
the varying attitudes of participants to each other and the ONS. Such factors, and their
impacts, were not predictable; they are only known because of the approach used here.
The case of the construction of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, then,
can be understood as a social process, and such an understanding sheds light on the
form and content of the programme.
8.2.2. What are the components of the official statistic-making process? 
This second research question fleshes out the conjectural model of Chapter One. That
model posited a set  of Statistical  Actors involved in statistical  production,  operating
under  conditions  of  opportunity  and  constraint  determined  by personnel,  resources,
technology, and so on. Chapters Four to Seven attempted to outline in more detail what
these conditions of opportunity and constraint were.
As discussed at the start of the previous section, the division between the agents within
the  conjectural  model  is  more  fluid  than  that  model  proposed.  A set  of  permanent
Statistical Actors, working within the ONS, drew on knowledge and opinions available
from diverse actors  –  in government,  in  international  organisations,  in  academia,  in
NGOs, in the private sector, and in the public. To the extent that their knowledges were
drawn on,  these  diverse  actors  become Statistical  Actors,  deliberating  alongside  the
permanent actors of the ONS. This confirms the observation of Chapter One that the
basic  conjectural  model  is  too  simple:  even  within  the  three  categories  of  actors,
individuals vary in their influence over the official statistic-making process. An example
of this can be seen in Chapter Seven, where one set of academics is recruited to write a
paper  setting  out  the  form of  subjective  well-being  questions,  while  another  set  of
academics is recruited when this form is established and the advice they would offer
against it is no longer likely to be considered relevant. As above, however, this diversity
of actors confirms the need for an understanding of the statistic-making process which
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is sensitive to social processes of negotiation and debate.
This complexity suggests a development of the conjectural model,  one which views
Statistical Actors within a constellation of influence: at the centre are the permanent
Statistical Actors of the ONS, who hold the power to accept or reject the opinions of
more  temporary  Statistical  Actors;  slightly  further  out  are  those  Actors  they  have
previously worked with; further out again are economists; then there is everyone else.
This model was sketched out by the academic George in an interview, and quoted in
Chapter Seven. It is possible to develop this model further, taking account the length of
time that Actors are involved in the official statistic-making process; this would reflect
the influence gained through persistence. It would also be necessary to place Statistical
Actors  from  central  government  and  the  Devolved  Assemblies,  and  Actors  from
international  bodies.  As an empirical finding, this  latter  group were more central  in
terms of their influence than were the former; as suggested above, it is unlikely that this
would have been predicted before the research was conducted. The exact shape of such
constellations will vary across official statistics and statistical programmes (c.f., Rhodes
1992), and it is a strength of the approach taken in this research that these shapes can be
determined.
A key component of the statistic-making process in the UK is the ONS itself, a specific
body with a specific institutional history and position within the UK policy-making
structure (see Chapter Four). As was observed a number of times in Chapter Six, the
ONS is not the only source of official statistics in the UK. To varying extents, both the
Welsh and the Scottish Devolved Administrations devised other ways of conceptualising
well-being, based on different political and organisational aims and resting on different
bodies of theory. Similarly, other Whitehall Departments were collecting statistics for
their own purposes, and showed little interest in a national programme which they did
not  see as  serving their  purposes  (see  Chapter  Six).  There are,  then,  other  ways of
producing official statistics, and well-being statistics, than the one devised by the ONS.
This underlines that the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme is a made object,
made  specifically  by a  particular  organisation,  occupying  a  particular  position  with
particular interests, and drawing on particular advice from particular places. It confirms
the importance of explaining its particular, contingent, form and content.
The  position  of  the  Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS  is  defined  by  the  institutional
arrangements  of  the  UK state.  It  was  argued in Chapter  Four  that  this  is  a  system
marked simultaneously by centralisation and fragmentation. As an example of this, the
ONS have a national remit to collect well-being statistics, but no way of compelling
other government departments to use the programme it creates. 'Well-being' as defined
by the  programme  is  a  global  concern,  and  so  should  be  relevant  to  all  Whitehall
Departments and Devolved Administrations. Those Departments and Administrations,
though,  are  functionally  independent  of  the  ONS,  to  a  great  extent  functionally
independent of the core of government (The Prime Minister's Office, the Treasury, the
Cabinet Office),  and largely define their  own concerns. This freedom on the part of
Devolved  Administrations  and  Whitehall  Departments  left  the  Statistical  Actors
working on the programme acting in a context where there was little or no perceived
need for the statistics they were producing. At the same time, the Statistical Actors of
the  ONS  felt  themselves  to  be  acting  independently  of  the  concerns  of  other
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departments;  instead  they  were  interested  in  questions  of  professional  pride,  the
coherence  and integrity  of  the  statistic,  wider  international  contexts  and so on  (see
Chapter Six). This resulted in a statistic which largely floated free of domestic context
in a way that it could not have done had it been created by a Whitehall Department or
Devolved Administration. The institutional components of the statistic-making process,
the  central  ONS and the fragmented system they sit  within,  set  the  context  for  the
actions  of  Statistical  Actors  and  determined  the  possibilities  of  the  statistical
programme.
A similar point can be made about the scale at which the ONS imagined the programme.
As Oscar, of the ONS, discussed in Chapter Six, the aim of the ONS was to obtain a
broad national picture.  This inclined them against certain types of measure,  such as
those around positive mental functioning, which were less suitable for this scale, and
inclined them towards certain survey instruments, those with sufficient sample size and
a corresponding limitation on survey length. This high-level imaginary comes from their
remit  as  a  national  body,  and  brought  them  into  conflict  with  both  Whitehall
Departments and Devolved Assemblies who conceived of 'national' as being more or
less extensive than the ONS did. The ONS' position as a body at the UK level, another
aspect  of  their  institutional  context,  shapes  the  possibilities  of  its  statistics,  a  point
which the approach of this research is able to bring out.
It was also noted in Chapter Four that the institutional history of the ONS, and its links
to  the  Treasury both  from its  dependence  on  central  funding  and  from having  the
Chancellor as Minister of Statistics, weighted its  output towards economic statistics.
This historic orientation towards the economic can be seen in the way that the ONS
went about recruiting advisers for the programme, looking primarily to economists, and
in the way they conceptualised the data they obtained, within causal models. Here the
attention to the social processes of official statistic-making, and particularly the contexts
in which Statistical Agents acted, allow the economic slant of the 'Measuring National
Well-being'  programme,  criticised  by  some  participants  in  Chapter  Seven,  to  be
understood.
Another  institutional  component  of  official  statistic-making  in  the  UK is  the  ONS'
funding, and the way that this acts as a constraint on their operations. The 'Measuring
National  Well-being'  programme  was  funded  through  a  one-off  development  grant
supplied in the 2010 spending round, but represented the establishment of an on-going
programme  instituted  at  a  time  of  austerity  in  public  spending.  This  limited  how
elaborate the Statistical Actors of ONS could be, restricting the development of new
statistics and survey instruments (see Chapter Six). It was suggested in Chapter Six that
the ONS took the opportunity of funding to develop statistics less clearly conceptually
related to well-being but which were likely to form future legislative requirements; if
this reading is accurate, it shows the adaptability of the Statistical Actors of the ONS in
navigating  the  space  which  is  provided by the  combination  of  a  fragmented  policy
system and a centralised funding system. There is an interplay between agents and their
context which an examination of the social processes of official statistic-making has
made apparent.
Also relevant in this regard is the ONS' ability to draw on pre-existing statistics in their
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construction of the programme. While much of the emphasis in the programme is on
subjective well-being statistics (an emphasis which is reflected particularly in Chapter
Seven), the majority of the statistics in the programme were already collected either by
the ONS or elsewhere in Whitehall. When the national debate,  What Matters to You?
and  subsequent  government  consultations  were  carried  out,  the  responses  of  the
Statistical  Audience  were  measured  against  the  statistics  already  available  to  the
Statistical  Actors  of  the  ONS.  This  created  a  composite  programme  which  gathers
together pre-existing social, economic and environmental statistics while badging them
as if they were a coherent set. This means that in the case of the 'Measuring National
Well-being'  programme  there  is  something  of  a  path-determinacy  resulting  in  a
programme which is largely an extension of what was already done. What has been
done before stands as a component within the official statistic-making process, shaping
the activities of the Statistical Actors. 
Another  important  feature  of  the  ONS  is  the  historic  legacy  of  concerns  around
legitimacy and integrity. It was noted in Chapter Four that the ONS stood as part of a
slightly Byzantine structure of institutions established by the Statistics and Registration
Services Act 2007 comprising of UK Statistics Authority, ONS, Government Statistical
Services and National Statistician, with responsibilities for both creating statistics and
monitoring  the  statistical  production  of  others.  This  could  be  seen  playing  out  in
Chapters Six and Seven, as Statistical Actors within the ONS spoke of the lengths they
went  to  to  secure  accurate  press  coverage  of  their  work;  as  Statistical  Actors  from
outside talked about the unprecedented extent of public and state agency consultation
involved in the programme; and in the UK Statistics Authority's decision in 2014 to
recognise the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme as a 'national statistic' with
the  recommendation that  its  accompanying commentary be improved (UK Statistics
Authority 2014a). In the context of well-being itself, concerns of legitimacy can be seen
as underpinning the movement away from GDP as an inadequate measure of social
progress,  the suggestion being that GDP is  not  a legitimate way of measuring such
things. At the same time, Bache and Reardon (2013) have argued that the move towards
'well-being'  at  the  European  level  can  be  read  as  an  effort  to  legitimise  unelected
institutions as beneficent; and Chapter Five noted that the political juncture at which the
programme was launched may have promoted 'well-being' as a way of re-legitimising a
distrusted political  class.  This highlights the role of historic public and state agency
beliefs about official statistics in influencing the ways in which official statistic-making
is conducted.
In light of this, it  is worth noting the relative lack of importance of 'evidence-based
policy'  as  a  component  within  the  conceptualisation  of  the  statistic-making process.
'Evidence-based policy' had been highlighted in Chapter Four as a potential influence on
the  programme,  as  the  requirement  for  evidence  across  Whitehall  might  lead  to
Statistical Actors shaping the programme to produce such evidence. The programme as
constructed has 41 headline measures and a raft of sub-measures, the majority of which
already existed. As several interviewees noted in Chapter Seven, this collection of many
and varied indicators is very hard to read as coherent evidence of anything in particular.
Conversely, actors from other government departments interviewed in Chapter Six saw
this  as  an  opportunity  to  provide  evidence  for  almost  anything,  as  the  individual
measures  serve  to  contextualise  each  other.  In  this  sense  the  statistical  programme
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provides narrative support for policy, regardless of what individual empirical measures
show. This mirrors many of the problems highlighted with the 'evidence-based policy'
movement, as 'evidence' is often available to support multiple contradictory positions
(see Chapter Four). The Statistical Actors of the ONS stand somewhat aloof from this;
without the need to serve any particular policy need, there is no great need for evidence
of any given kind. As a result, they tended to resist specific departmental aims for the
programme in favour of a broader conceptualisation. In this way, the unimportance of
policy and 'evidence-based policy' in driving the statistic-making process influenced the
final form and content of the programme.
Another important component of the statistic-making process was the wider network of
international actors and organisations which the Statistical Actors of the ONS formed a
part of. Chapter Four noted the international impact of the Commission on Measuring
Economic and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009), which both Oscar and
William  at  the  ONS  highlighted  in  Chapter  Six  as  being  key  to  their  work.  This
Commission  shared  several  Statistical  Actors  with  the  UK  programme,  which  also
shared  personnel  with  schemes  launched  at  the  European  and  OECD levels.  Oscar
talked about the desire to 'look Eurostat in the eye', a function of the professional pride
of the ONS and their standing within an international context (see Chapter Six). At the
same time, this comment hints at a wider set of legislative concerns which came out of
the minutes of advisory groups explored in Chapter Six; there is a danger that if the
ONS do not lead Europe in designing a programme, they will have something forced on
them. This leads to the development and inclusion of measures like Human Capital,
which  are  badly  received  in  the  public  consultation  and  by  those  scrutinising  the
programme within the Government Statistical Service (see Chapter Six). Attention to
social processes, in this case the perceptions of Statistical Actors at the ONS of their
position within wider international networks of official statistic-making, helps explain
this aspect of the programme.
The  sharing  of  members  between  international  programmes  highlights  the  role  of
international networks of knowledge within statistical production. The role of the UN
(through the System of National Accounts, United Nations, Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation  and  Development,  International  Monetary  Fund  and  European  Union
1993), European Statistical System and OECD in harmonising statistical systems across
the world can be partially seen playing out in the feedback between the ONS' testing of
subjective well-being questions and the OECD's formulation of guidance on measuring
subjective  well-being  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and  Development
2013b).  This sharing of expertise  across programmes points to the existence of fast
policy networks  in  statistical  production (see Chapter  Four),  in  which global  actors
create similar policies across borders (Peck 2002). Here international networks are a
component of the official statistic-making process in the sense that Statistical Actors are
shared between the UK and international programmes; as argued above, the uncovering
of this through an attention to the social process of statistic-making provides a way of
understanding the convergence of UK and international models of 'well-being'.
Set against the influence of this international network stood a smaller domestic set of
Statistical Actors, some of whom were closely linked to the international network and
some of whom were closely linked to the ONS. These advisers were influential largely
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to the extent that they agree with the ONS' mode of thinking (see Chapter Seven). This
has the effect of playing down the role of theory, as explored in Chapter Five, since it
predisposed the ONS to knowledge close to that which it already possessed. The role of
advice within the process of statistical construction is largely confirmatory, in as far as
the Statistical Actors within the ONS accept the advice of Statistical Actors who are
known to them, have previously worked with them, and whose views are consonant
with their established ways of thinking. This shows the importance of pre-existing belief
structures as a component within the statistic-making process; these structures would
have been hard to uncover without a direct examination of the social processes and
agents involved in official statistic-making.
In light of Chapter One, then, the statistic-making process fits a more complex version
of the conjectural model. The central component of this system, the Statistical Actors,
comprises  agents  within  the  ONS,  which  has  a  specific  institutional  and  historical
background. It also incorporates networks of international statistical and policy actors,
who tend to separate statistics from any given domestic context. There is also a role for
domestic academic actors, whose role is largely in providing the ONS with knowledge
that complements their own. In the case of 'Measuring National Well-being', at least, the
role of governmental actors is relatively small, partly a result of the fragmentation of the
UK policy sphere and, more,  the lack of a specific policy requirement for the data.
Various other aspects of institutional and theoretical context also play a role, including
the scales at  which the ONS operates,  its  funding and funding sources,  pre-existing
beliefs about legitimacy, pre-existing official  statistics and measurement instruments,
and the pre-existing approaches to statistical questions of the Statistical Actors. Many, if
not all of these, are visible only because of the research approach undertaken in this
study,  which  related  desk-based observations  about  the  potential  components  of  the
statistic-making process to accounts of how these played out in practice.
8.2.3. How do the components of the official statistic-making process interact to
influence the form and content of the statistic? 
The third research question formulated in Chapter Two builds on the second by asking
how  the  components  of  the  statistic-making  process  detailed  above  interact  and
influence each other. How do agents, the Statistical Actors, balance the demands of one
component against another in the process of official statistic-making?
Hidden beneath the outputs of the final programme are the disagreements which ran
through the statistic-making process, highlighted in Chapters Six and Seven. These were
sites of social interaction in which policy and theoretical positions were embodied in
individuals disputing with other individuals. They show the contingency of the final
statistic by marking points at which it could have developed otherwise. While in many
of their details they are specific to the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, in
their form they are applicable to all official statistics: wherever there is an institutional
or theoretical context to be navigated by actors, there will be similar negotiations. The
details of these negotiations are unique to every official statistic, but, as a social process,
contestation between interests and actors embodying them is inevitable.
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By attending to these moments of contestation, it is possible to explain how the official
statistical programme took on its final form and content, and why it did not develop
otherwise.  As  a  starting  point,  the  functional  independence  of  the  ONS within  UK
governmental structures predisposes them to what Oscar, of the ONS, in Chapter Six
described as 'the expert model'. That is, the ONS are the experts in statistical production,
so they will manufacture first and consult second. While structurally that was not the
case with 'Measuring National Well-being',  formally it was; Chapters Six and Seven
reveal substantial path-dependency arising from the incorporation as Statistical Actors
of advisers who were sympathetic to the viewpoints of the permanent Statistical Actors
of  the  ONS.  These  chapters  also  highlighted  the  role  of  Statistical  Actors  within
international  policy networks,  individuals  who also shared  the  outlook of  the  ONS'
Statistical  Actors.  By  starting  their  work  from  that  of  the  Commission  on  the
Measurement of Economic and Social Progress, predominately recruiting economists,
and lacking direct  links  between the  statistic  and policy departments,  the Statistical
Actors of the ONS produced an expert model which policy-makers found it  hard to
engage  with.  As  examined  in  Chapter  Six,  policy-actors  within  Devolved
Administrations adapted or varied the programme to suit  their  own needs and those
within Whitehall Departments largely ignored it. This pattern of contestation, and non-
contestation, by Statistical Actors, and the situation of these within an 'expert model',
sheds light on the final form and content of the statistical programme.
The expert model can also be seen at play in the specific interactions the Statistical
Actors of the ONS had with policy departments in Chapter Six and with academics in
Chapter Seven. Once the ONS Actors had established a starting point of a national-level
programme which  had subjective  well-being  as  a  central  component,  arguments  for
alternative  approaches  were  largely  written  off  as  special  pleading  (both  by  actors
within the ONS and by those in their international and sympathetic advisory networks).
The Statistical Actors of the ONS retained an expert conception of what the programme
was 'for' which did not necessarily relate either to uses by policy actors or to theoretical
conceptions  of  what  well-being  'is'.  Here  it  can  be  seen  that  the  relations  between
Statistical Actors impacts on the final form and content of the statistical programme; not
all  Actors  have  equal  influence  or  power  over  the  output  of  the  programme.  This
contextualises  the  events  of  the  process  of  official  statistic-making,  particularly  the
consultations that were undertaken, offering reasons for the success of some ideas and
the failures of others. Such reasons cannot be offered without attention to the social
processes of statistic-making (or, at least, cannot be offered non-speculatively).
This is not to say that the Statistical Actors of the ONS stood completely independently
of the domestic policy sphere.  Chapter Six notes circumstances where policy actors
were able to influence changes in the programme to better suit their needs. These were
largely changes  in  the  periphery of  the  programme,  however,  as  where  one  mental
health  measure is  swapped for  another  measure or some of the  Warwick-Edinburgh
Mental Well-being Scale measures were included in a sub-module of the programme.
Within the limits they have set, Statistical Actors within the ONS are conscious that the
programme  needs  to  be  usable,  so  in  places  resist  academic  calls  for  theoretical
improvements (see Chapter Seven). The definition of 'usable' here is set by the purposes
of the ONS' Statistical Actors and so is limited to allowing a broad picture of the well-
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being of the nation. This includes ensuring that distributions are visible and making the
data amenable to use in mechanical models, but does not include any adherence to pre-
existing policy needs. In this case, Statistical Actors and policy actors interact without
contact: the former shape their work to their expectations of potential uses by the latter.
Such a shaping of the official statistic would be invisible to accounts which did not
consider social processes.
The  ONS'  history  of  concerns  around  statistical  integrity  also  makes  their  Actors
sensitive to the Statistical Audience, albeit this audience is one which is very broadly
defined to include almost everyone in the UK. This can be seen recurring throughout the
statistic-making  process:  in  the  wide-ranging  national  debate  and  subsequent
consultations, in the careful management of the presentation of the programme in the
press and in the preparations for attaining 'National Statistic' status (see Chapters Six
and Seven). Without attending to the social processes of statistic-making, there would
be something slightly odd about this: the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme is
a  statistical  programme  with  no  obvious  group  of  users,  largely  divorced  from
department-level  policy  concerns  and  sufficiently  multi-faceted  to  preclude  easy
interpretation by the public, yet a lot of effort has been placed into ensuring it is 'usable'
and appears as legitimate.  The approach taken in this  research makes these oddities
explicable by outlining the concerns and interests of Statistical Actors which drive their
actions.
The ONS and its  Statistical  Actors  are  also acting  within wider  contexts  of  central
government  action,  particularly  those  relating  to  funding.  At  the  time  that  the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme was being developed, both the ONS and
the central government departments it was consulting were seeing substantial cuts to
their funding and staffing levels. This limited the scope of the Actors of the ONS in
what they could do with the statistical programme, leading to less innovation and more
recycling,  as  well  as  possibly  increasing  resistance  to  demands  made  by  other
departments. It also limited the scope for data collection as survey vehicles which might
have been used were cut, either by the ONS or elsewhere in Whitehall.  It also gave
reasons to adapt the programme, including measures which the Government Statistical
Services' Methodology Advisory Committee felt were unsuitable (see Chapter Six), but
which would need to be developed, possibly without additional funding, at a later point.
Again, had only the final output of the programme been examined, it would have been
difficult to explain these features, but attention to the process by which these features
were formed makes an explanation possible.
Even without this backdrop of explicit funding cuts, a history of resource constraints
within the ONS has led to an emphasis on cost-efficiency by its Statistical Actors (see
particularly  the  comments  of  William,  of  the  ONS,  on  this  in  Chapter  Six).  This,
combined with  the  legislative  requirement  for  the  ONS to  produce  certain  types  of
statistic, placed limitations on the theoretical scope of the programme. Statistics were
not re-developed on the conceptual basis  of well-being but were pulled across from
existing programmes where they were available (see Chapter Seven). Many of these
statistics are harmonised by legislation across Europe, and by best practice across the
OECD  and  UN  (for  instance,  unemployment  statistics).  This  resulted  in  a  further
resemblance between the UK's conception of well-being and those of its international
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fellows.  Such a  resemblance  was resisted  by some academic  Statistical  Actors,  and
encouraged by others. Here an attention to the social process of official statistic-making
shows not only that disputes arose but also the ways in which context influenced their
resolution; Statistical Actors interested in novel conceptions of 'well-being' and a blank
sheet of paper as a starting point were always at a disadvantage.
Understanding the statistic-making process as a social one allows us to trace the history
of the programme's measures in the interaction between Statistical Actors, and between
these actors  and their  context.  It  highlights the contingency of the final  programme
while also indicating how it took on the form and content that it did, rather than any of
the disputed potential options raised along the way. Such an understanding would not be
possible  without  an  examination  of  the  social  processes  underlying  the  statistic:  an
approach which looked only at the final output of the programme, for example, could
only speculate on the reasons for the shape of that output.
8.3. The implications of understanding official statistic-making as a social process
Chapter  Two  outlined  two  pre-existing  theoretical  approaches  to  official  statistics,
which were labelled the 'critical' and the 'native'. The former came from the Foucauldian
and  Marxian  literatures,  and  centred  on  the  role  of  the  official  statistic  within  the
working of the state.  These suggested that the official  statistic was a technology of
control, designed and used by agents of the state to influence the actions of citizens. The
latter  covered  accounts  by  official  statisticians  themselves  and  tended  to  be
methodological  accounts  of  the  construction  of  official  statistics.  These  presented
official  statistics  as  predominantly  technical  problems,  questions  of  how  to  most
accurately and validly represent an empirical reality.
 
It was argued that these approaches were incomplete, as they presented the process of
statistical construction as a black-box which either transmitted the controlling desires of
Commissioning Actors, or more-or-less straightforwardly translated the external world
into numerical representation. It was argued on the basis of the conjectural model of
Chapter One that this black-box treatment was insufficient as it missed many influences
which  shaped  the  form  and  content  of  the  official  statistic.  On  the  basis  of  the
conclusions  drawn from the  research  in  this  present  chapter,  this  argument  can  be
expanded.
Chapters One and Two argued that the presence of agency on the part  of Statistical
Actors meant that the desires of Commissioning Actors were not simply expressed in
the official statistic. The present research sought to fill a gap in the literature about how,
if at all, the desires of Commissioning Actors were transmitted and expressed. It should
be clear from Section 8.2. above that critical  models which suggest that the official
statistic is a technology of control must be complicated by the question of 'who is doing
the controlling?'. In the case of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, it is not
at all clear who the Commissioning Actors are. While it was publicly launched by a
Prime Minister who had, while in Opposition, made much of the concept, the general
lack of involvement by the centre of government and the much greater involvement by
international networks of policy actors created an official statistical programme with
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little  direct  application within domestic  policy-making.  Certainly,  from Chapter  Six,
there is little direct use of it by Whitehall Departments or Devolved Administrations.
The statistical programme thus appears to lack both a controlling will and, possibly, as a
result, any controlling ability.
One  potential  way  of  accommodating  this  seeming  lack  of  control  within  critical
accounts  is  Rose  and  Miller's  (1992)  idea  that  'governance  is  always  failing'.  The
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  may be  a  situation  where  there  was  a
desire on the part of state actors to control behaviour through the operationalisation of
'well-being', but that this desire was inadequately followed up or impossible to realise
through the medium of an official statistic. In this respect the 'Measuring National Well-
being'  programme  could  be  compared  with  health-based  interventions  around  well-
being, in which a narrative of personal responsibility is created around well-being with
an  aim of  promoting  behavioural  change at  the  individual  scale  (such as  Foresight
Mental Capital and Wellbeing Project 2008). As a descriptive, rather than a normative,
model, the official statistic is badly placed to secure similar individual-level change. It
may, however, direct action at institutional levels, acting as a benchmark against which
interventions can be measured. That this is not being done by Whitehall Departments
can be read as being the result of the relative lack of control central government has
over  them in  a  fragmented policy-making system (see Chapter  Four).  This  reading,
while  compatible  with  critical  readings  of  official  statistics,  takes  into  account  the
agency of Statistical Actors and policy-makers more generally, situating it within the
theoretical and institutional contexts they face.
An  alternative  solution  to  this  problem  of  critical  accounts  would  be  to  read  the
programme as a narrative act. Several participants quoted in Chapter Six mentioned the
role the programme had played in 'putting well-being on the agenda'. Indeed, this was
mentioned by one participant who did not agree with the shape the programme had
taken, suggesting that even a programme they didn't believe measured well-being but
which claimed it did was better than nothing. Such a position is interesting, given the
relatively small part that new statistics played in the programme; there was little in the
'Measuring National Well-being'  programme that  wasn't  already being measured.  By
creating and announcing a  'well-being'  programme, something appears to have been
done, even if no change to existing activities had actually been made; social statistics
which were originally about other things are now about 'well-being'. The statistic is thus
a form of appearance- or expectation-management, allowing existing policies such as
austerity to be re-cast in the light of well-being (Debord 1995, 1998; Lefebvre 2008;
Wark 2013). On this reading, the actual programme that Statistical Actors devise is not
important;  having any programme at  all  provides  a  commitment  to  'well-being'  and
allows  the  recontextualisation  of  pre-existing  statistics  in  those  terms.  The  political
launching  of  a  programme  which  Statistical  Actors  within  the  ONS claim  to  have
already been working on (Allin and Hand 2014, p.221) is thus an act of opportunism,
rather than of principle. This reading of the programme gives a much more indirect
treatment to the 'control' of the critical accounts, shifting the programme from being a
tool in pursuit of control in its own right to being a component within a larger apparatus
of  control.  The  programme,  on  this  reading,  manages  the  appearance  of  general
networks of state power, rather than 'well-being' per se.
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A further way of conceptualising the space between the social processes uncovered in
this research and critical account of the official statistic as a technology of control is to
observe the way in which the official statistic-making process was geared towards a
prefigured outcome. The sections above noted a great deal of path-determinacy in the
work  of  Statistical  Actors  within  the  ONS,  established  by  budget  constraints,  pre-
existing expertise on economic statistics, legislative requirements for existing statistics.
These established a bias toward economic thinking and expertise within the ONS and
international networks of policy actors working on similarly economic conceptions. The
major use for the newly developed subjective well-being statistics has been cost-benefit
analyses  (as  in  Cabinet  Office  2013;  HM  Treasury  2011a);  the  programme  also
encompasses the monetary valuation of nature as Natural Capital and the development
of monetary valuation of skills as Human Capital. The outcome of the programme can
be read as a furthering of pre-existing neoliberal agendas of market extension, at the
expense  of  counter-narratives  which  looked  at  the  mental  functioning  or  social
conditions  of  individuals  under  the  market  (for  an  argument  in  this  direction,  see
Tomlinson and Kelly, 2013). In this way, economic uses arose out a programme whose
social processes were steeped in economic thinking. On this reading, the present study
has  filled  in  the  gap  between  conception  and  action  by  indicating  how,  without
ostensible  compulsion  from  Commissioning  Actors,  a  programme  consistent  with
existing market-based modes of social organisation was created by Statistical Actors.
From the perspective of  'native'  approaches,  the  present  research contextualises  and
complicates arguments set out in Chapter Two that the official statistic is a more-or-less
accurate representation of the external world. As Chapters Four and Five showed, the
nature of that world is contested and, as Chapters Six and Seven showed, at numerous
points the Statistical Agent was called upon to adjudicate these contestations. With no
theoretical model from which to operate, the ONS purposefully went out to gain from
the  public  a  majoritarian  view  on  'what  matters',  filtered  this  through  pre-existing
knowledge and available statistics, extended it with statistics not requested by public or
state users but that were relevant in an international context,  and finally produced a
programme disputable and disputed. There is nothing in this to suggest that Statistical
Actors were not motivated by a desire to create accurate and valid representations –
numerous extracts from interviews and public documents in Chapters Six and Seven
show that this desire was central to the activity of Statistical Actors – but shows that this
desire  is  not  the  only  one  motivating  methodological  or  definitional  choices.  The
present  research  shows that  the  representational  effort  of  official  statistic-making is
situated within a wider set of aims and objectives. This has been shown in the case of
the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme, and will be true of official statistics
more generally.
However, the present research would support a modified version of native accounts, that
took the desire for accuracy and validity to be primary rather than over-riding. While
there is evidence that compromises were made between objectives, as where theoretical
purity in measures was sacrificed to make measures more usable for policy-makers (see
Chapter Seven), there was never a suggestion that invalid measures were constructed.
Even in the disputes between Statistical Actors from different academic backgrounds,
no participant ever suggested that measures were being used that were understood by
the ONS' Statistical Actors to be invalid. This is important given the historical concerns
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about the trust and integrity of official statistics discussed in Chapter Four; Statistical
Actors  were  not  subject  to  political  interference  in  the  making  of  the  'Measuring
National  Well-being'  programme and,  as  above,  were  not  consciously attempting  to
construct a technology of control. However, in keeping with pre-existing sociological
critiques  (Dorling  and Simpson  1999b),  the  representations  which  Statistical  Actors
selected were not the only ones possible and their reasons for selecting them were not
entirely  based  on  technical  or  methodological  superiority.  Instead,  they  were  valid
representations  of  an  external  world  which  can  be  validly  represented  in  multiple
different ways. The present research explains how one valid representation came to be
selected over alternatives.
As was suggested in Chapter Two, those who put forward a native account were always
aware  that  it  was  incomplete.  The  present  research  develops  the  literature  on  this
incompleteness by adding social reasons to the methodological reasons for selecting one
measure over another. Oliver (TAG member, academic in statistical theory), quoted in
Chapter Seven, was very clear on the contested nature of official statistics, noting the
historic  adjustments  to  and  debates  around  GDP.  Such  adjustments  and  debates,
however, are technical (Abramsky and Drew 2014); an understanding of social process
of statistic-making complements these existing accounts by offering further reasons for
contestation.
The present research, then, fills the gap in the literature around how official statistics are
made.  It  has  shown  that  the  outcome  of  the  official  statistic-making  process  is
contingent, dependent on the actions of agents. A different set of actors, in different
contexts,  would  have  produced  different  statistics.  This  point  applies  beyond  the
'Measuring National Well-being' programme; where official statistics involve agents in
their creation, the form and content of those statistics will be determined by the agents'
navigation of their institutional and theoretical contexts. Attending to the social process
of official statistic-making re-socialises both critical and native accounts, showing them
to be over-simplistic.
In terms of the implications for official statistic-making practice, or for policy-making
based on official statistics, the key contribution of this research is to further challenge
the naturalisation of statistics  which was touched on in Chapter One. If  the official
statistic is contingent, arising from particular arrangements of agents and their contexts,
it cannot stand as an unambiguous comment on the external world. It is not the case that
'well-being' is rising or falling, but 'well-being as measured' is rising or falling. The how
and the why of the measurement have been shown to be necessary to understanding the
statistic itself.
8.4. Reflections on the research method and its limitations
As outlined in Chapter Three, the present study represents a more limited engagement
with the official statistic-making process compared than, for example, an ethnography
of statisticians. However, it was able to engage directly with Statistical Actors, and this
engagement is one of its major contributions to the literatures around official statistics.
The methods of interviewing and public document analysis, though, privilege salient
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moments in the official statistic-making process, such as moments of contestation, over
the more quotidian activities of Statistical Actors. As a result, there is a danger that they
uncover more about what wasn't included in the final programme than what was. It has
been possible  in  the  present  research  to  make out  the  outline  of  decisions,  but  not
always to show in detail why those decisions were made. There were large parts of the
programme which were conducted by email and a large number of meetings that were
not public which would have shed light on these had they been accessible.
There was also a large amount of the programme which was entirely routine, consisting
of Statistical Actors within the ONS doing their day-to-day jobs, under constraints of
technology, time, material resources and so on. It is likely that there were options for the
programme which were ruled out before they ever reached a public meeting for reasons
of  mundane  practicality.  These  were  invisible  to  the  methods  of  the  present  study.
Understanding of the official statistic-making process would be greatly expanded by a
closer observation of these.
It should be remembered in light of these observations that unsuccessful attempts were
made  to  carry  out  an  ethnographic  study  of  statisticians  in  two  different  national
contexts (see Chapter Three). In general, it proved somewhat difficult to speak to full-
time Statistical Actors: interviews with one domestic non-national statistical producer
were  cancelled  shortly  before  they  were  due  to  be  conducted  on  the  grounds  that
statisticians  were  precluded  by  official  guidelines  from  talking  to  researchers;  an
interview at one international statistical producer was withdrawn after the interview was
conducted on the grounds that 'the views in the interview did not reflect those of the
organisation'. In both these cases there is a body corporate, and actors within it, whose
work plays a major role in the public sphere but who are closed to external scrutiny
beyond their public pronouncements. (In passing, it should be noted that this is all the
more worrying given the low level of media scrutiny of statistical bodies revealed in
Chapter Six.) Given this closure, the limited access to Statistical Actors within the ONS
which  was  possible  represents  an  unusual  and  welcome  departure.  However,  the
importance of official statistics in public life suggests that while the present research
may be the best investigation into official  statistic-making that was possible,  deeper
access with a view to a more detailed understanding would be preferable.
In general, it would have been desirable to expand the number of interviews undertaken.
This would, in part, have reduced the biases towards contested moments in the official
statistic-making  process  and  away from the  routine  and  mundane.  It  was  noted  in
Chapter  Three  that  some of  the  difficulty  in  interviewing  actors,  particularly  those
involved in the Advisory Forum, arose from their elite status. With the exception of
Mikecz (2012), Chapter Three does not engage with the literature around interviewing
elites; it is possible that had attention been paid to this literature, more interviews would
have been secured. In particular, McDowell's (1998) strategy of using existing personal
networks to secure interviews could have been more thoroughly explored than it was. A
key interview, with one of the Statistical Actors of the ONS was secured in this way, and
it is possible that more could have been. Reasons for not making more of this method of
recruitment included a reticence on the part  of the researcher to place people under
social obligation to undertake interviews they may not have undertaken otherwise, and a
fear  that  poorly  performed  interviews  would  reflect  badly  on  those  who  had
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recommended the interview to participants.
As  a  slight  caveat  both  to  the  possibility  of  undertaking  more  interviews  through
personal  connections,  and  to  the  fear  that  social  networks  would  act  to  pressure
individuals into undertaking interviews, in a number of cases social networks did not
result  in  additional  interviews.  Two  contacts  within  other  state  and  international
statistical  bodies,  one  contact  within  the  Civil  Service  and  one  within  an  NGO all
declined  interviews  despite  being  asked  by  colleagues  and  friends  rather  than  the
researcher. This may have been a result of the half-hearted use of this technique, but it is
suggestive that personal connections are not a magic bullet in securing participants.
Apart from this, the literature on interviewing elites could have been used to reduce
some of the errors inevitably made in the process of interviewing. Most of Harvey's
(2010,  2011)  guidelines  for  the  first  contact  with  elites  were  met,  particularly  the
personalisation  of  approaches  and  the  use  of  a  clear  cover  letter  (reproduced  as
Appendix B) clarifying the role of the research.  In common with McDowell (1998)
there was also a  deliberate  down-playing of  the position of  the  research within  the
discipline of Geography, with 'the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies'
thought to sound more suitable to statistical actors as a site of research into their work.
However, in hindsight, more could have been done to emphasise the importance of the
research, to aggrandise the researcher and institution, and to underline the key role the
participant  would  be  playing  (Harvey 2011).  This  was  done  to  an  extent  with  the
personalised interviews, but would have benefited from re-emphasis in the more formal
cover letter.
Delaney  (2007),  McDowell  (1998)  and  Woods  (1998)  all  offer  advice  about  the
dynamics of interviewing senior figures which may have made the interviews in the
research easier to carry out and more productive in terms of the data they provided.
Throughout  the  interviews,  there  was a  consciousness  both  of  the  seniority,  and so
relative  authority,  of  the  participants  in  relation  to  the  researcher,  and  a  sense  of
imposition  on  them,  as  they  had given  up  their  time  with  little  obvious  benefit  to
themselves.  In  a  number of  cases,  this  led to  interviews which partially reproduced
'official' accounts; in others the enthusiasm and generosity of the interviewee led to the
researcher 'being seduced' by them  (Delaney 2007). In both these situations, it became
harder  to  ensure  that  it  was  the  researcher  directing  the  interview,  and  not  the
participant. As more experience of interviewing was gained during the research, these
difficulties diminished, but it would have been helpful to be fore-armed against them in
the first several interviews (see McDowell 1998 for accounts of a similar experience).
Considering those who were interviewed, they were to an extent a self-selecting sample;
they were those able to find the time and inclination to be interviewed. In some cases,
this may have skewed the sample towards those with axes to grind although, by way of
balance, there were also a number of people keen to promote the programme and its
successes. More problematically, this sample tended to exclude many of those who had
risen to the tops of their field as they were already over-committed without participating
in the present study. The same was true of many potential participants still employed in
the Civil Service; the austerity measures discussed in Chapter Four, which have entailed
large-scale cuts to staffing levels across Whitehall, meant that many civil servants did
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not have the time to be interviewed. While it was possible to circumvent this slightly by
asking for a brief written statement of involvement, this is an incomplete solution (see
Chapter Three). Particularly as regards the Advisory Forum, it meant that there were
certain areas of the programme which proved inaccessible, even with the methodology
used.
One question  which  might  be  asked of  the  present  study is  how typical  of  official
statistics  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  case  study  is.  Several  participants,
including  those  at  the  ONS,  suggested  that  it  was  actually  somewhat  unusual  (see
Chapter Six). Reasons for this included both the fact that it was preceded by a larger
than normal consultation process and that newly created statistics are themselves rare. It
has been argued above that the former reason is more apparent than actual: while there
is clear evidence of an impressive out-reach and consultation programme, there is less
evidence that it made a radical difference to the content of the programme. The second
reason  is  also  less  damaging  than  it  appears,  given  the  influence  of  international
networks  of  statistical  and  policy actors.  As  a  result  of  the  international  legislative
component of statistics, this type of international expert knowledge network which was
so important in this case is an established part of official statistic-making. Similar, to
some degree, will be the incorporation of experts and policy-makers as Statistical Actors
and  the  filtering  of  their  advice  through  existing  modes  of  thought.  However,  the
question of how typical the statistic is is not answerable without similar studies being
conducted elsewhere (see following section).
The issue of the international context also prompts questions over how typical the UK
statistic-making process is. Comparing the dynamics of the ONS and of Eurostat, for
example, the latter is functionally and structurally very different, largely acting as a co-
ordinating  body  for  independent  national  statistic-making  bodies  rather  than  as  a
statistical producer themselves. However, the argument that this research has made, that
official statistic-making is a contingent process dependent on the social interactions of
actors within and without the permanent official statistic-making bodies, seems as likely
to be true elsewhere as it is in the UK. Again, this is an empirical question which would
need to be resolved with further research (see following section).
8.5. Possible directions for future research 
Building on the critiques above, the natural extension of this study would be to secure
better access to an official  statistic-making body and use that to  gain more detailed
observations of their work. These observations could come either through primary study
of their day-to-day activity or through more extensive interview collection and access to
fuller secondary material such as internal guidelines and policy documents. While this
proved impossible in the present case, there seems no obvious reason why it should
always be so.
Such a study would be able to go beyond the sort of novel statistic which has been
studied here and look at the more every-day statistical work, thus also resolving one of
the  questions  over  typicality  raised  above.  Given  that  most  statistics  are  already
established, how are they subsequently developed? This would likely bring in questions
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of the involvement of international networks of statisticians, the relationships between
statistic-producers  and  statistic-users  in  government  and  elsewhere,  and  further
questions around the role of Commissioning Actors of the conjectural model. Such a
study would also benefit from taking a longer view than the present study has, which
would allow it to be more sensitive to the rhythms of the social process of statistic-
making. While I was able to ask William, of the ONS, about a 'typical day', I was unable
to get an impression much beyond 'it varies'; it would be worthwhile to unpack this.
The previous section also raised a more general question about the typicality of the case
study used. As a test case, the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme has shown
the applicability of the methodology used in the present research; it has demonstrated
that the form and content of official statistics can be understood through an examination
of  the  social  processes  which  give  rise  to  them.  It  has  been  speculated  that  the
components  of  the  official  statistic-making  process  which  were  uncovered  in  the
programme are universal; that there will always be concerns around cost, competing
ideas and interests arising from institutional history and the position of the Statistical
Actors within wider policy-making systems, debates around theory, and so on. Until the
methodology is applied to other statistics, however, this remains speculation. Further
studies should be undertaken to confirm or refute this.
This study has been focussed on Statistical Actors, noting their interactions with both
Commissioning Actors and the Statistical Audience. From the literature of Chapter Two,
however, there remains a question of purpose and use. Chapter Six touched on how the
products of the statistical programme was used, noting fears from within the ONS that it
was not being fully utilised and confirmation of these fears from those in Whitehall
Departments and Devolved Administrations.  Yet  at  the same time there was a  great
effort by the ONS to ensure that the statistics were accurately presented and portrayed in
the press, and efforts within advisory panels to resist theoretical improvements which
would make the results less 'usable'. So there are a set of questions around what uses the
outputs of the programme permits, and how and why the programme is used. There are
some preliminary answers to that around moves to incorporate subjective well-being in
cost-benefit  analyses,  but  ultimately  this  is  a  question  which  requires  further
examination.
Such a set of questions would situate official-statistic making within a larger life-cycle
of social policy, further deepening the critical and native accounts of Chapter Two. As
the present study, and the 'peopling of the state' literature (Jones 2007) shows, social
policy is mediated by agents at multiple scales and levels. The present research gained
some insight into this through its observation of the use, non-use and adaptations to the
'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  by  those  across  Whitehall  and  the
Devolved Assemblies. However, there is much more that could be explored here: how
does the official statistic or statistical programme travel across agencies of the state at
national,  regional  and  local  levels,  such  as  within  Whitehall  Departments,  local
government or delivery bodies such as NHS Trusts? How does it  shape policy,  and
through  this  impact  on  the  lives  of  individuals?  Such  research  would  extend  the
methodological  approach  used  in  the  present  research  to  other  agencies  and
technologies of the state; similar questions to those posed here could be posed of White
Papers, or the reports of local council committees, for instance.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Moving beyond the specific instance of a statistic, there is a further set of questions
which this study raises about what an official statistic is and what it does. The present
study  has  suggested  the  'Measuring  National  Well-being'  programme  is  a  set  of
compromises between different potential theoretical understandings, largely unrelated to
direct policy usages; that is, it counts 'well-being as defined', not well-being as theorised
or used. The observation made at the beginning of Chapter One, that there appears to be
a statistical mode of thought which is privileged in public discourse gains a new colour
in light of this: one essentially arbitrarily defined object, GDP, has been complemented
with another, 'well-being'. Was that substitution what was hoped for, or were the vague
statements of  politicians  for  'measuring what  matters'  to  produce 'better  policies for
better lives' only ever rhetorical? Why was another official statistic sought at all, why; if
GDP didn't work, why was more expected of 'well-being'? Can we say of statistics, as
Rose and Miller (1992) do of governmental control, that they are always failing? And if
they are, what might one do instead? Such questions require a deeper engagement with
policy actors, understanding the role of the official statistic within their wider work.
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Appendix A: Statistical actors from outside the ONS
Advisory Forum, listed membership
Name Role Notes
Professor Tony Atkinson* (Sir) Academic Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College Oxford
Professor Paul Boyle Academic Chief Executive ESRC (background in quantitative social science)
Professor Tanya Byron Academic Professor of the Public Understanding of Science and Chancellor, Edge Hill University (background in public health)
Professor John Helliwell Academic Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of British Columbia
Professor Felicia Huppert Academic Director, Cambridge Wellbeing Institute (background in public health)
Professor Daniel Kahneman Academic Professor Emeritus, Psychology and Public Affairs, Princeton University (recipient of 2002 Swedish Bank Prize in Economics for work on Behavioural Economics)
Professor Alan B Krueger Academic Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University
Professor Richard Layard (Lord) Academic Director, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE
Professor Julian Le Grand Academic Professor of Social Policy, LSE
Professor Robert MacCulloch Academic Professor of Economics, Imperial College London
Professor Michael Marmot (Sir) Academic Director, International Institute of Society & Health, University College London
Professor Andrew Oswald* Academic Professor of Economics, Warwick University.
Professor Gareth Rees Academic Director, Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research, Data and Methods
Professor Amartya Sen* Academic Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Harvard University
Nicholas Stern* (Lord) Academic Professor of Economics and Government, LSE
Professor Joseph Stiglitz* Academic Professor of Economics, Columbia University (received 2001 Swedish Bank Prize 193
in Economics)
Professor Mike Tomlinson Academic Professor of Social Policy, Queen's University Belfast
Bridget Rosewell (OBE) Academic/Devolved Administration
Chairman, Volterra Consulting, and Consultant Chief Economic Adviser to the 
Greater London Authority
Professor Paul Dolan Academic/Government
Professor of Social Policy, LSE. Associate, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 
(Behavioural Insight Team)
Clive Bates Devolved Administration Director-General, Sustainable Futures, Welsh Government
Dr Norman Caven Devolved 
Administration Chief Executive, NI Statistics and Research Agency
Steven Marshall Devolved Administration Chief Social Research Officer, Welsh Government
Kate Barker (CBE) Government Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee; from June 2011 Office for Budget Responsibility (background in social housing administration)
Gareth Davies Government Director-General, Office for Civil Society (within Cabinet Office)
David Halpern
Government Behavioural Insights Team
Trevor Huddleston Government Chief Policy Analyst, Department for Work and Pensions
Dr Mallika Ishwaran Government Acting Chief Economist, Defra
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Jeremy Pocklington Government Deputy Head of Economic Policy Co-ordination at Cabinent Office; also on board of Business in the Community (a thinktank)
Amanda Rowlatt Government Chief Economist and Director of Analysis Economics, Strategy and Better Regulation (ESBR), Department for Business Innovation and Skills
Carole Willis Government Director of Research and Analysis, Department for Education
Dr Martin Weale (CBE) Government/NGO Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, Senior research fellow, National Institute of Economic & Social Research (a thinktank)
Jean-Philippe Cotis International organisation Director General, INSEE (French National Statistical Office)
Martine Durand International Organisation Chief Statistician, OECD
Enrico Giovannini International Organisation President, Italian National Institute of Statistics
Walter Radermacher International 
Organisation Director General, Eurostat
Stuart Etherington (Sir) NGO Chief Executive, National Council for Voluntary Organisations (background in running charities)
Kevin Havelock NGO Executive Vice President Global Ice Cream category, Unilever195
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Geoff Mulgan NGO
Chief Executive, The Young Foundation (social policy thinktank); also National 
Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts (charity). (Formerly director of 
Performance and Innovation Unit)
Trevor Phillips (OBE) NGO Chairman, Equality and Human Rights Commission
Mark Price (CVO20 - awarded 
2014) NGO Managing Director, Waitrose; from 2011 Chairman, Business in the Community (a thinktank)
Stuart Rose (Sir) NGO [to 2011] Chairman, Business in the Community (a thinktank)
Charles Seaford NGO Head of the Centre for Well-being, New Economics Foundation (a thinktank)
Matthew Taylor NGO Chief Executive, Royal Society of Arts (formerly head of Number 10 Policy Unit)
John Kay NGO/Academic Writer on economics for Financial Times; visiting professor of Economics at LSE
Technical Advisory Group, listed membership
Name Role Notes
Meetings
Attended
(max 8)
Professor Paul Anand Academic Professor of Economics, Open University 5
Professor David Hand Academic Professor of Statistics, Imperial College 5
Dr Eric Harrison Academic Senior Research Fellow, City University (background in comparative social surveys) 5
20 Commander of the Royal Victorian Order. 
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Professor John Helliwell Academic Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of British Columbia 0
Professor Felicia Huppert Academic Director, Cambridge Wellbeing Institute (background in public health) 2
Peter Kinderman Academic Professor of Clinical Psychology, University of Liverpool 6
Christian Kroll Academic Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, LSE 5
Professor Richard Layard 
(Lord) Academic Director, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE 3
Dr Robert Metcalfe Academic Research Fellow, Merton College Oxford 2
Dr Julie Newton Academic Research Associate, Cardiff University (background in human geography; part of the Whitehall Well-being Group; former member of Defra) 2
Professor Lucinda Platt Academic Professor of Sociology and Director Millennium Cohort Study, Institute of Education, University of London 1
Professor Steve Pudney Academic Professor of Economics, University of Essex 2
Dr Martin Seligman Academic Director of the Positive Psychology Centre, University of Pennsylvania 0
Professor Sarah Stewart-
Brown Academic Professor of Public Health, Warwick Medical School, University of Warwick 5
Professor Paul Dolan Academic/ Government
Professor of Social Policy, LSE; associate, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 
(Behavioural Insight Team) 0
Sara Grainger Devolved Administration
Senior Statistician, Scottish Government 1
Dr Steven Marshall Devolved 
Administration
Chief Social Research Officer, Welsh Government 3
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Dr Kevin Sweeney Devolved Administration Head of Central Survey Unit, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 6
Baljit Gill Government Senior Statistician, Department for Communities and Local Government 3
Dr Heidi Grainger Government Acting Chief Statistician, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 1
David Halpern Government Behavioural Insights Team 1
Karen Hancock Government Chief Economist, Department for Education 3
Dr Gemma Harper Government Chief Social Researcher, Defra 0
Hugh Mallinson Government Senior Statistician, Department for Communities and Local Government 2
Alison Patterson Government Social Science, Health Improvement Analysis Team, Department of Health 4
Nick Rowe Government Strategic Lead for Research, Sport England 0
Dr Martin Weale (CBE) Government/ NGO
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee; Senior research fellow, National 
Institute of Economic & Social Research (a thinktank) 0
Conal Smith International 
Organisation
Section Head, Well-being and Household Conditions, Statistics Directorate of the 
OECD 6
Dr John Ivens NGO Educational Psychologist and Executive Head Teacher, The Bethlem and MaudsleyHospital School 1
Sally McManus NGO Researcher, National Centre for Social Research (background in public health) 6
Juliet Michaelson NGO Researcher, New Economics Foundation (a thinktank) 4
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Andrew Rzepa NGO Senior Consultant, Gallup 4
Technical Advisory Group, attended more than 1 meeting without being a member
Name Role Notes
Meetings
Attended
(max 8)
Danielle DeFeo Government Social Research Officer, Department of Health 3
Tim Andrews Government Head of Statistics Profession, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 3
Saamah Abdalla NGO Senior Researcher, New Economics Foundation (a thinktank) 2
Technical Advisory Group, organisations which send more than one individual during the course of the programme
Organisation Role
Meetings 
attended 
(max 8)
London School of Economics Academic 5
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency Devolved Administration 6
Welsh Government Devolved Administration 5199
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Cabinet Office Government 2
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Government 4
Department for Communities and Local Government Government 4
Department for Education Government 4
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs Government 3
Department of Health Government 7
Gallup NGO 4
New Economics Foundation NGO 8
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Appendix B: Information sent to prospective interviewees
Matt Jenkins
Centre for Urban and Regional
Development Studies (CURDS)
Newcastle University
Newcastle Upon Tyne
NE1 7RU
UK
m.jenkins2@ncl.ac.uk
Understanding statistic-making as a social practice through an
examination of the UK 'Measuring Wellbeing' programme of statistics
A straightforward explanation of the research
This research asks what we are doing when we make official  statistics:  how do we
count, and why?
As  a  starting  point,  we  can  observe  that  statistics  are  inherently  social.  They  are
commissioned by people, created by people and very often about people. The way those
groups of people understand a statistic are potentially very different. Of the three, it is
the people creating the statistic who would appear to determine its form. It is they who
must realise the requests of the commissioners in such a way that the statistic can be
used by, or on behalf of, those it is about.
With that in mind, this project seeks to examine the work of the producers of statistics,
through an  exploration  of  the  UK Office  for  National  Statistic's  (ONS')  'Measuring
National Wellbeing' programme of statistics. Official statistics in the UK are mainly the
product of the ONS, so cannot be understood without reference to their practices. The
Measuring National Wellbeing programme is a good case study of statistic-making as it
is  still  a  work in  progress,  subject  to  continuing development.  This  means  that  the
discussions around how to translate the desire of its commissioners into a product which
can be used, taking account of the technical, financial and theoretical limitations the
ONS are subject to, are still ongoing. By examining how these limitations are negotiated
by the  organisation  to  produce  the  final  statistic,  the  research  hopes  to  develop an
understanding of official statistics more generally, and the way they arise in their final
form.
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Interviews
I have contacted you because you have been involved in some capacity in the statistic-
making process of the Measuring National Wellbeing programme, or a similar 
programme run by a different statistical body (such as 'GDP and Beyond'). I would like 
to talk to you about your work, and the Measuring National Wellbeing programme.
Interviews would be by phone at a time convenient to you and would last around half an
hour to forty-five minutes, or as long as you could spare. Your answers would be 
anonymised, and extracts from them would then form part of my doctoral thesis, and 
potentially in articles appearing in academic journals. No data will be published in such 
a way that you can be identified. You will be offered the opportunity to review the notes
of our conversation, and clarify your answers where you feel appropriate. Of course, at 
any point during the interview you may withdraw or refuse to answer questions.
This research project has been reviewed by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences of Newcastle University, and meets their strict 
requirements for ethical conduct in research. Should you have any complaint about the 
nature or conduct of this interview, my supervisory team are:
Andy Pike (andy.pike@newcastle.ac.uk) and Mike Coombes 
(mike.coombes@newcastle.ac.uk), both at the Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies at the University of Newcastle, address above;
and Joe Painter (j.m.painter@durham.ac.uk) of the Geography Department, University 
of Durham, Lower Mountjoy, South Road, Durham, DH1 3LE
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Appendix C: Headline measures of the 'Measuring National Well-being' programme
Taken from Office for National Statistics (2014e).
Domain
Measure
Source 
(all surveys conducted by ONS, unless
otherwise indicated)
Notes
Personal well-being
Medium/high rating of satisfaction with their 
lives overall
Annual Population Survey Respondents were asked “Overall, how satisfied 
are you with your life nowadays?”, using a scale 
from 0-10 where '0' indicates 'very dissatisfied' 
and 10 indicates 'very satisfied'.
Medium/high rating of how worthwhile the 
things they do are
Annual Population Survey Respondents were asked “Overall, to what extent
do you feel the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile?”, using a scale from 0-10 where '0' 
indicates 'very non-worthwhile' and 10 indicates 
'very worthwhile'.
Rated their happiness yesterday as 
medium/high
Annual Population Survey Respondents were asked “Overall, how happy 
did you feel yesterday?”, using a scale from 0-10 
where '0' indicates 'very unhappy' and 10 
indicates 'very happy'.
Rated their anxiety yesterday as medium/low Annual Population Survey Respondents were asked “Overall, how anxious 
did you feel yesterday?”, using a scale from 0-10 
where '0' indicates 'very non-anxious' and 10 
indicates 'very anxious'.
Population mental well-being Understanding Society Based on an abbreviated version of the Warwick-
Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale
Our relationships203
Average rating of satisfaction with family life European Quality of Life Survey, 
Eurofound
Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction 
with family life, using a scale from 1 to 10 where 
1 indicates 'very dissatisfied' and 10 indicates 
'very satisfied' .
Average rating of satisfaction with social life European Quality of Life Survey, 
Eurofound
Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction 
with their social life, using a scale from 1 to 10 
where 1 indicates 'very dissatisfied' and 10 
indicates 'very satisfied' .
Has a spouse, family member or friend to rely 
on if they have a serious problem
Understanding Society Respondents were asked 'Do you have a spouse, 
family member or friend to rely on if you have a 
serious problem?' 
Health
Healthy life expectancy at birth (male/female) Compiled from ONS data
Reported a long term illness and a disability Labour Force Survey
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with
their health
Understanding Society Respondents are asked to rate their satisfaction 
with their general health on a scale from 
'completely dissatisfied' to 'completely satisfied'. 
Responses for 'somewhat, mostly and completely 
satisfied' are included. 
Some evidence indicating probable 
psychological disturbance or mental ill health.
Understanding Society Based on data from the General Health 
Questionnaire 12 questions.
What we do
Unemployment rate Labour Force Survey
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with
their job
Understanding Society Respondents were asked to rate their job 
satisfaction (if in employment) from 'Completely 
dissatisfied' to 'Completely satisfied'.
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with
their amount of leisure time
Understanding Society Respondents were asked to rate their job 
satisfaction (if in employment) from 'Completely 
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dissatisfied' to 'Completely satisfied'.
Volunteered more than once in the last 12 
months
Understanding Society Adults (16+) were asked 'How frequently do you
do unpaid voluntary work?'
Engaged with/participated in arts or cultural 
activity at least 3 times in last year
Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport
Adult participation in 30 mins of moderate 
intensity sport, once per week.
Sport England
Where we live
Crimes against the person (per 1,000 adults) Crime Survey for England and Wales
Felt fairly/very safe walking alone after dark 
(men/women)
Crime Survey for England and Wales Respondents are asked “How safe do you feel 
walking alone in this area after dark?” selecting 
from 'Very safe', 'Fairly safe', 'A bit safe' and 
'Very unsafe'
Accessed natural environment at least once a 
week in the last 12 months
Natural England Adults (16+) were asked 'Thinking about the last 
12 months, how often on average have you spent 
your leisure time out of doors, away from home?'.
Agreed/agreed strongly they felt they belonged
to their neighbourhood
Understanding Society Respondents are asked to rate how their sense of 
belonging to their neighbourhood from 'strongly 
disagree' to 'strongly agree'.
Households with good transport access to key 
services or work (2010 = 100)
Department for Transport
Fairly/very satisfied with their accommodation Department for Communities and 
Local Government
Respondents are asked to rate how satisfied they 
were with their accommodation from 'very 
dissatisfied' to 'very satisfied'. 
Personal finance
Individuals in households with less than 60% 
of median income after housing costs
Family Resources Survey, Department
of Work and Pensions205
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Median wealth per household, including 
pension wealth
Wealth and Assets Survey
Median household income National Accounts
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with
the income of their household
Understanding Society Respondents are asked to rate how satisfied they 
are with their income using ratings from 
'completely dissatisfied' to 'completely satisfied'.
Report finding it quite or very difficult to get 
by financially
Understanding Society Respondents are asked to rate how they were 
coping financially from 'finding it very difficult' 
to 'living comfortably'.
The economy
Real net national income per head National Accounts
UK public sector net debt as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product
National Accounts
Inflation rate (as measured by the Consumer 
Price Index)
Consumer Prices
Education and skills
Human capital - the value of individuals' skills,
knowledge and competences in labour market
Calculations from ONS data
Five or more GCSEs A* to C including 
English and Maths
Department for Education and 
Devolved Administrations
UK residents aged 16 to 64 with no 
qualifications
Labour Force Survey
Governance
Voter turnout (at UK General Elections) The International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Those who have trust in national Government Eurobarometer Respondents are asked if the 'Tend to trust' or 
'Tend not to trust' the national government; the 
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measure reports those who 'tend to trust'
The natural environment
Total green house gas emissions (millions of 
tonnes)
Department for Energy and Climate 
Change
Protected areas in the UK (Millions hectares) Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
Energy consumed within the UK from 
renewable sources 
Department for Energy and Climate 
Change
Household waste that is recycled Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
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Appendix D: Outputs of the ONS 'Measuring National Well-being' programme
Domain
Measure
Latest Previous Summary of 
changes 
since March 2015 
publication Period Data Period Data
Personal well-being
Very high rating of satisfaction with their lives overall 2014/2015 0.288 2013/2014 0.268 Improving
Very high rating of how worthwhile the things they do are 2014/2015 0.344 2013/2014 0.326 Improving
Rated their happiness yesterday as very high 2014/2015 0.341 2013/2014 0.326 Improving
Rated their anxiety yesterday as very low 2014/2015 0.409 2013/2014 0.394 Improving
Population mental well-being 2012/13 24.6/35 2009/10 25.2/35
Our relationships
Average rating of satisfaction with family life 2011 8.2/10 2007 8.2/10
Average rating of satisfaction with social life 2011 7.1/10 2007 7.0/10
Has a spouse, family member or friend to rely on if they have 
a serious problem
2010/11 0.867 .. ..
Health
Healthy life expectancy at birth (male/female) 2009 - 11 64.2 /
66.1
2006 - 08 62.5 /
64.2
Reported a long term illness and a disability April to June 
2015
0.193 April to June
2014
0.185 Not assessed
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with their health 2012/13 0.593 2011/12 0.593
Some evidence indicating depression or anxiety 2012/13 0.183 2011/12 0.183
What we do
Unemployment rate May to Jul 0.055 May to Jul 0.062 Improving
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2015 2014
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with their job 2012/13 0.776 2011/12 0.773
Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with their amount 
of leisure time 2012/13 0.582 2011/12 0.577
Volunteered more than once in the last 12 months 2012/13 0.173 .. ..
Engaged with/participated in arts or cultural activity at least 3 
times in last year 2013/14 0.834 2012/13 0.831
Adult participation in 30 mins of moderate intensity sport, 
once per week. 2013–14 0.358 2012–13 0.362
Where we live
Crimes against the person (per 1,000 adults) 2014/15 57 2013/14 66 Improving
Felt fairly/very safe walking alone after dark (men/women) 2014/15 85.8% /
61.7%
2013/14 85.1% / 
58.0%
Male - Little or no 
overall change, 
Female - Improving
Accessed natural environment at least once a week in the last 
12 months 2013/14 0.58 2012/13 0.55
Agreed/agreed strongly they felt they belonged to their 
neighbourhood 2011/12 0.628 2009/10 0.66
Households with good transport access to key services or work
(2011 = 100)
2013 106
2011 100
Fairly/very satisfied with their accommodation 2013–14 0.892 2012–13 0.906
Personal finance
Individuals in households with less than 60% of median 
income after housing costs 2013/14 0.21 2012/13 0.21
Little or no overall 
change
Median wealth per household, including pension wealth 2010/12 218400 2008/10 204300
Real median household income
2013/14 24500 2012/13 23690
Little or no overall 
change
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Somewhat, mostly or completely satisfied with the income of 
their household 2012/13 0.534 2011/12 0.526
Report finding it quite or very difficult to get by financially 2012/13 0.101 2011/12 0.109
The economy
Real net national disposable income per head 2014 22065 2013 21809 Improving
UK public sector net debt as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product 2014/15 0.807 2013/14 0.791 Not assessed
Inflation rate (as measured by the Consumer Price Index) July 2015 0.001 July 2014 0.016 Not assessed
Education and skills
Human capital - the value of individuals' skills, knowledge and
competences in labour market 2014
£ trillion
18.95 2013
£ trillion
18.78 Improving
Five or more GCSEs A* to C including English and Maths 2012/13 0.589 2011/12 0.59
UK residents aged 16 to 64 with no qualifications 2014 0.086 2013 0.093
Governance
Voter turnout in UK General Elections 2015 0.662 2010 0.651 Improving
Those who have trust in national Government Spring 2015 0.37 Spring 2014 0.25 Improving
The natural environment
Total green house gas emissions (millions of tonnes) 2014 518.7 2013 566.5 Improving
Protected areas in the UK (Millions hectares) 2014 21.393 2013 15.38
Energy consumed within the UK from renewable sources 2014 0.07 2013 0.056 Improving
Household waste that is recycled 2012 0.439 2011 0.429
Table D.1. Measuring National Well-being, September 2015 release (data are the lastest available at August 2015)
Source: extracted from ONS (2015a)
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Figure D.1. Distribution of personal well-being ratings, financial years ending 2012 to 2015
Source: redrawn from Office for National Statistics (2015b), using data from Office for National Statistics (2015c)
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APPENDIX D
Figure D.2. How satistified are you with your life nowadays?
Source: Taken from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/wellbeing/measuring-national-well-
being/personal-well-being-in-the-uk--2014-15/sty-2-4-insights-into-personal-well-being.html 
(Accessed 10 December 2015)
Figure D.3. Extract from Percentages rating personal well-being at highest levels: by English 
region for financial year ending 2015 and change since financial year ending 2012
Source: Office for National Statistics (2015b)
Note: 1. Adults aged 16 and over were asked: "Overall, how satisfied are you with your life 
nowadays?"
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Appendix E: Things I did when I should have been doing other things
E.1. Up-goer Five abstract, Januray 2014
I am interested in numbers. We use numbers all the time, without really thinking about
why we're using them or what sort of thing they are. Which is a bit of a problem. Some
people say that numbers are a form of control, but I don't agree. I don't think you can
plan a number, then make the number that you planned - things will go wrong between
the plan and the number. If you can't make sure that the number matches the plan, you
can't plan for control. Instead, I am going to look at the bit between the plan and the
number to see what actually happens. My idea is that no one actually cares how the
number is made, or what they planned for it, it is just something that happens, and that
we then have to live with, like we had actually planned. This is also a problem, but a
different sort of problem.
(see http://splasho.com/upgoer5/)
E.2. Lolmythesis summaries
At January 2014
Statistics are bad, and you should feel bad.
At March 2014
Statistics are things made for reasons; you may go back to your homes now,
there is nothing to see here.
At April 2014
A statistic is a thing made by people who won't talk to me. Here's some
speculation. You may thank me later.
At June 2014
The object of the investigation isn't important, it's what people do with it
that counts. Please give me more funding to look at that.
At July 2014
Statistics are like dyanamistics, but they don't move. I'll be here all week.
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At October 2014
The statistic-making progress is either exactly as you expected it to be or a
travesty of everything you hold dear, or sometimes both.
At March 2015
Statistics are  things made by people,  used by other people,  normally for
other things.
E.3. Drawings
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